Download DELIAN LEAGUE

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Delian League 1
DELIAN LEAGUE, or CONFEDERACY OF DELOS-the name
given to a confederation of Greek states under the leadership of Athens, with its
headquarters at Delos, founded in 478 B.C. shortly after the final repulse of the
expedition of the Persians under Xerxes I. This confederacy, which after many
modifications and vicissitudes was finally broken up by the capture of Athens by
Sparta in 404, was revived in 378-7 (the "Second Athenian Confederacy") as a
protection against Spartan aggression, and lasted, at least formally, until the
victory of Philip II of Macedon at Chaeronea. These two confederations have an
interest quite out of proportion to the significance of the detailed events which
form their history. (See Greece: Ancient History.) They are the first two
examples of which we have detailed knowledge of a serious attempt at united
action on the part of a large number of self-governing states at a relatively high
level of conscious political development. The first league, moreover, in its later
period affords the first example in recorded history of self-conscious imperialism in
which the subordinate units enjoyed a specified local autonomy with an organized
system, financial, military and judicial. The second league is further interesting as
the precursor of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues.
History.-Several causes contributed to the formation of the first Confederacy of
Delos. During the 6th century B.C. Sparta had come to be regarded as the
chief power, not only in the Peloponnese, but also in Greece as a whole, including
the islands of the Aegean. The Persian invasions of Darius and Xerxes, with the
consequent importance of maritime strength and the capacity for distant
enterprise, as compared with that of purely military superiority in the Greek
peninsula, caused a considerable loss of prestige which Sparta was unwilling to
recognize. Moreover, it chanced that at the time the Spartan leaders were not men
of strong character or general ability. Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, soon
showed himself destitute of the high qualities which the situation demanded.
Personal cupidity, discourtesy to the allies, and a tendency to adopt the style and
manners of oriental princes, combined to alienate from him the sympathies of the
Ionian allies, who realized that, had it not been for the Athenians, the battle of
Salamis would never have been even fought, and Greece would probably have the
task of driving the Persians finally out of the Thraceward towns was under the
command of the Athenians, Aristides and Cimon, men of tact and probity. It is
not, therefore, surprising that when Pausanias was recalled to Sparta on the
charge of treasonable overtures to the Persians, the Ionian allies appealed to the
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Athenians on the grounds of kinship and urgent necessity, and that when Sparta
sent out Dorcis to supersede Pausanias he found Aristides in unquestioned
command of the allied fleet. To some extent the Spartans were undoubtedly
relieved, in that it no longer fell to them to organize distant expeditions to Asia
Minor, and this feeling was strengthened about the same time by the treacherous
conduct of their king Leotychides (q.v.) in Thessaly. In any case the inelastic
quality of the Spartan system was unable to adapt itself to the spirit of the new
age. To Aristides was mainly due the organization of the new league and the
adjustment of the contributions of the various allies in ships or in money. His
assessment, of the details of which we know nothing, was so fair that it remained
popular long after the league of autonomous allies had become an Athenian
empire. The general affairs of the league were managed by a synod which met
periodically in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos, the ancient centre
sanctified by the common worship of the Ionians. In this synod the allies met on an
equality under the presidency of Athens. Among its first subjects of deliberation
must have been the ratification of Aristides' assessment.
Thucydides lays emphasis on the fact that in these meetings Athens as head of
the league had no more than presidential authority, and the other members were
called allies, a word, however, of ambiguous meaning and capable of including both
free and subject allies. The only other fact preserved by Thucydides is that
Athens appointed a board called the Hellenotamiae (steward) to watch over and
administer the treasury of the league, which for some twenty years was kept at
Delos, and to receive the contributions of the allies who paid in money.
The league was, therefore, specifically a free confederation of autonomous Ionian
cities founded as a protection against the common danger which threatened the
Aegean basin, and led by Athens in virtue of her predominant naval power as
exhibited in the war against Xerxes. Its organization, adopted by the common
synod, was the product of the new democratic ideal embodied in the Cleisthenic
reforms, as interpreted by a just and moderate exponent. It is one of the few
examples of free corporate action on the part of the ancient Greek cities, whose
centrifugal yearning for independence so often proved fatal to the Hellenic world.
It is, therefore, a profound mistake to regard the history of the league during the
first twenty years of its existence as that of an Athenian empire.
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Thucydides expressly describes the predominance of Athens as hegemonia
(leadership, headship), not as arch (empire), and the attempts made by Athenian
orators during the second period of the Peloponnesian War to prove that the
attitude of Athens had not altered since the time of Aristides are manifestly
unsuccessful.
Of the first ten years of the league's history we know practically nothing, save that
it was a period of steady, successful activity against the few remaining Persian
strongholds in Thrace and the Aegean (Herod. i. 106-107, ). In these years the
Athenian sailors reached a high pitch of training, and by their successes
strengthened that corporate pride which had been born at Salamis. On the other
hand, it naturally came to pass that certain of the allies became weary of incessant
warfare and looked for a period of commercial prosperity. Athens, as the chosen
leader, and supported no doubt by the synod, enforced the contributions of ships
and money according to the assessment. Gradually the allies began to weary of
personal service and persuaded the synod to accept a money commutation. The
Ionians were naturally averse from prolonged warfare, and in the prosperity which
must have followed the final rout of the Persians and the freeing of the Aegean
from the pirates (a very important feature in the league's policy) a money
contribution was only a trifling burden. The result was, however, extremely bad for
the allies, whose status in the league necessarily became lower in relation to that of
Athens, while at the same time their military and naval resources correspondingly
diminished. Athens became more and more powerful, and could afford to disregard
the authority of the synod. Another new feature appeared in the employment of
coercion against cities which desired to secede. Athens might fairly insist that the
protection of the Aegean would become impossible if some of the chief islands
were liable to be used as piratical strongholds, and further that it was only right
that all should contribute in some way to the security which all enjoyed. The result
was that, in the cases of Naxos and Thasos, for instance, the league's resources
were employed not against the Persians but against recalcitrant Greek islands,
and that the Greek ideal of separate autonomy was outraged. Shortly after the
capture of Naxos (c. 467 B.C.) Cimon proceeded with a fleet of 300 ships (only
100 from the allies) to the southwestern and southern coasts of Asia Minor.
Having driven the Persians out of Greek towns in Lycia and Caria, he met and
routed the Persians on land and sea at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia.
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In 463 after he had quarrelled over mining rights in the Strymon valley. It is said
(Thuc. i. 101) that Thasos had appealed for aid to Sparta, and that the latter
was prevented from responding only by earthquake and the Helot revolt. But this
is both unproved and improbable. Sparta had so far no quarrel with Athens.
Athens thus became mistress of the Aegean, while the synod at Delos had
become practically, if not theoretically, powerless. It was at this time that Cimon
(q.v.), who had striven to maintain a balance between Sparta, the chief military, and
Athens, the chief naval power, was successfully attacked by Ephialtes and
Pericles. During the ensuing years, apart from a brief return to the Cimonian
policy, the resources of the league, or, as it has now become, the Athenian empire,
were directed not so much against Persia as against Sparta, Corinth, Aegina and
Boeotia. A few points only need be dealt with here. The first years of the land
war brought the Athenian empire to its zenith. Apart from Thessaly, it included all
Greece outside the Peloponnese. At the same time, however, the Athenian
expedition against the Persians in Egypt ended in a disastrous defeat, and for a
time the Athenians returned to a philo-Laconian policy, perhaps under the
direction of Cimon.
Peace was made with Sparta, and, if we are to believe 4thcentury orators, a
treaty, the Peace of Callias or of Cimon, was concluded between the Great King
and Athens in 449 after the death of Cimon before the walls of Citium in
Cyprus. The meaning of this so-called Peace of Callias is doubtful. Owing to the
silence of Thucydides and other reasons, many scholars regard it as merely a
cessation of hostilities (see CIMON and CALLIAS, where authorities are
quoted). At all events, it is significant of the success of the main object of the
Delian League, the Athenians resigning Cyprus and Egypt, while Persia
recognized the freedom of the maritime Greeks of Asia Minor.
During this period the power of Athens over her allies had increased, though we
do not know anything of the process by which this was brought about. Chios,
Lesbos and Samos alone furnished ships; all the rest had commuted for a money
payment. This meant that the synod was quite powerless. Moreover in 454
(probably) the changed relations were crystallized by the transference (proposed
by the Samians) of the treasury to Athens (Corp. Inscr. Attic. i. 260).
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Thus in 448 B.C. Athens was not only mistress of a maritime empire, but ruled
over Megara, Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, Achaea and Troezen, i.e. over so called
allies who were strangers to the old pan-Ionian assembly and to the policy of the
league, and was practically equal to Sparta on land. An important event must be
referred probably to the year 451,-the law of Pericles, by which citizenship
(including the right to vote in the Ecclesia and to sit on paid juries) was restricted
to those who could prove themselves the children of an Athenian father and
mother. Thus measure must have had a detrimental effect on the allies, who thus
saw themselves excluded still further from recognition as equal partners in a league.
The natural result of all these causes was that a feeling of antipathy rose against
Athens in the minds of those to whom autonomy was the breath of life and the
fundamental tendency of the Greeks to disruption was soon to prove more
powerful than the forces at the disposal of Athens. The first to secede were the
land powers of Greece proper, whose subordination Athens had endeavoured to
guarantee by supporting the democratic parties in the various states. Gradually
the exiled oligarchs combined; with the defeat of Tolmides at Coroneia, Boeotia
was finally lost to the empire, and the loss of Phocis, Locris and Megara was the
immediate sequel.
Against these losses the retention of Euboea, Nisaea and Pegae was no
compensation; the land empire was irretrievably lost.
The next important event is the revolt of Samos, which had quarrelled with
Miletus over the city of Priene. The Samians refused the arbitration of Athens.
The island was conquered with great difficulty by the whole force of the league,
and from the fact that the tribute of the Thracian cities and those in
Hellespontine district was increased between 439 and 436 we must probably infer
that Athens had to deal with a widespread feeling of discontent about this period.
It is, however, equally noticeable on the one hand that the main body of the allies
was not affected, and on the other that the Peloponnesian League on the advice
of Corinth officially recognized the right of Athens to deal with her rebellious
subject allies, and refused to give help to the Samians.
Two important events alone call for special notice. The first is the raising of the
allies' tribute in 425 B.C. by a certain Thudippus, presumably a henchman of
Cleon.
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The fact, though not mentioned by Thucydides, was inferred from Aristophanes
(Wasps, 660), Andocides (de Pace, § 9), Plutarch (Aristides, c. 24), and
pseudoAndocides (Alcibiades. II); it was proved by the discovery of the
assessment list of 425-4 (Hicks and Hill, Inscrip. 64). The second event belongs
to 411, after the failure of the Sicilian expedition. In that year the tribute of the
allies was commuted for a 5% tax on all imports and exports by sea. This tax, which
must have tended to equalize the Athenian merchants with those of the allied
cities, probably came into force gradually, for beside the new collectors called
moriastai we still find Hellenotamiae (C.I.A. iv. [i.] p. 34).
The Tribute.-Only a few problems can be discussed of the many which are raised
by the insufficient and conflicting evidence at our disposal. In the first place there
is the question of the tribute. Thucydides is almost certainly wrong in saying that
the amount of the original tribute was 460 talents (about £100,000); this figure
cannot have been reached for at least twelve, probably twenty years, when new
members had been enrolled (Lycia, Caria, Eion, Lampsacus). Similarly he is
probably wrong, or at all events includes items of which the tribute lists take no
account, when he says that it amounted to 600 talents at the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War. The moderation of the assessment is shown not only by the
fact that it was paid so long without objection, but also by the individual items.
Even in 425 Naxos and Andros paid only 15 talents, while Athens had just
raised an eisphora (income tax) from her own citizens of 200 talents, Moreover it
would seem that a tribute which yielded less than the 5% tax of 411 could not have
been unreasonable.
The number of tributaries is given by Aristophanes as 1000, but this is greatly in
excess of those named in the tribute lists. Some authorities give 200; others put it
as high as 290. The difficulty is increased by the fact that in some cases several
towns were grouped together in one payment (suntelias). These were grouped
into five main geographical divisions (from 443 to 436; afterwards four, Caria
being merged in Ionia).
Each division was represented by two elective assessment commissioners (taktai,
who assisted the Boule at Athens in the quadrennial division of the tribute.
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Each city sent in its own assessment before the taktai, who presented it to the
Boule. If there was any difference of opinion the matter was referred to the
Ecclesia for settlement.
In the Ecclesia a private citizen might propose another assessment, or the case
might be referred to the law courts. The records of the tribute are preserved in the
so-called quota lists, which give the names of the cities and the proportion, one
sixtieth, of their several tributes, which was paid to Athens. No tribute was paid by
members of a cleruchy (q.v.), as we find from the fact that the tribute of a city
always decreased when a cleruchy was planted in it. This highly organized financial
system must have been gradually evolved, and no doubt reached its perfection only
after the treasury was transferred to Athens.
Government and Jurisdiction.-There is much difference of opinion among
scholars regarding the attitude of imperial Athens towards her allies. Grote
maintained that on the whole the allies had little ground for complaint; but in so
doing he rather seems to leave out of account the Greek's dislike of external
discipline. The very fact that the hegemony had become an empire was enough to
make the new system highly offensive to the allies. No very strong argument can be
based on the paucity of actual revolts. The indolent Ionians had seen the result of
secession at Naxos and rebellion at Thasos; the Athenian fleet was perpetually
on guard in the Aegean. On the other hand among the mainland cities revolt was
frequent; they were ready to rebel. Therefore, even though Athenian domination
may have been highly salutary in its effects, there can be no doubt that the allies
did not regard it with affection.
To judge only by the negative evidence of the decree of aristotles which records
the terms of alliance of the second confederacy (below), we gather that in the later
period at least of the first league's history the Athenians had interfered with the
local autonomy of the allies in various ways-an inference which is confirmed by the
terms of "alliance " which Athens imposed on Erythrae, Chalcis and Miletus.
Though it appears that Athens made individual agreements with various states,
and therefore that we cannot regard as general rules the terms laid down in those
which we possess, it is undeniable that the Athenians planted garrisons under
permanent Athenian officers (cronrarcoi) in some cities.
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Moreover the practice among Athenian settlers of acquiring land in the allied
districts must have been vexatious to the allies, the more so as all important cases
between Athenians and citizens of allied cities were brought to Athens. Even on
the assumption that the Athenian dicasteries were scrupulously fair in their
awards, it must have been peculiarly galling to the self respect of the allies and
inconvenient to individuals to he compelled to carry cases to Athens and
Athenian juries. Furthermore we gather from the Aristotles inscription and from
the 4thcentury orators that Athens imposed democratic constitutions on her
allies; indeed Isocrates (Paneg., 106) takes credit for Athens on this ground, and
the charter of Erythrae confirms the view (cf. Arist. Polit., viii., vi. 9 1307 b 20;
Thuc. viii. 21, 48, 64, 65).
Even though we admit that Chios, Lesbos and Samos (up to 440) retained their
oligarchic governments and that Selymbria, at a time (409 B.C.) when the empire
was in extremis, was permitted to choose its own constitution, there can be no
doubt that, from whatever motive and with whatever result, Athens did exercise
over many of her allies an authority which extended to the most intimate concerns
of local administration.
Thus the great attempt on the part of Athens to lead a harmonious league of free
Greek states for the good of Hellas degenerated into an empire which proved
intolerable to the autonomous states of Greece. Her failure was due partly to the
commercial jealousy of Corinth working on the dull antipathy of Sparta, partly to
the hatred of compromise and discipline which was fatally characteristic of Greece
and especially of Ionian Greece, and partly also to the lack of tact and restraint
shown by Athens and her representatives in her relations with the allies.