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PRACTICAL WISDOM AND PERCEPTION (7/23-7/27)
EN.6.5-13; C.D.C., Reeve Practices of Reason (excerpt); Note: class is cancelled Wed-Fri
Philosophy 340, summer 2012, Benjamin Visscher Hole IV, Office Hours: Tu-Fri, 1-1:30pm
COURSE STRUCTURE
(1) Introduction & the Human Good
(2) The Human Good & Virtue
(3) Virtue & the Doctrine of the Mean
(4) Virtue & Greatness of Soul
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Greatness of Soul & the Unity of the Virtues
Practical Wisdom & Perception
Practical Perception & Naturalism
Living Virtuously, Living Happily
Summary & Contemporary Debates
OPENING QUESTION
How does Aristotle’s view on, and Reeve’s discussion of, practical perception contribute to our understanding of
the doctrine of the mean, and greatness of soul (megalopsuchia)?
PRACTICAL PERCEPTION IN EN.6.8
“[A] That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said [EN.VI.7.1141b14-16],
concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. [B] It is opposed, then, to
intuitive reason [nous]; for intuitive reason is of the limiting premises, for which no reason can be given, while
practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, [C] which is the object not of scientific knowledge but
of perception – not the perception of qualities peculiar to one series but perception akin to that by which we
perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well there will be a limit. [D] But
this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities
peculiar to each sense.” (EN.VI.8.1142a23-30)
[A]
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[B]
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[C]
1. Phronesis is concerned with particulars.
2. Scientific knowledge is concerned only with universals.
3. Therefore, phronesis is not scientific knowledge.
The first premise is the case, for Aristotle, because phronesis is concerned with both particulars and universals. As
Aristotle claims, “Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only –it must also recognize particulars”
(EN.VI.7.1141b14-16).
That is to say, to exercise the virtues, the phronimos must know both universal ethical principles, as well as the
particular morally salient features of the given situation.
The second premise is the case, for Aristotle, because of his discussion of scientific knowledge in EN.VI.3,
where he claims that scientific knowledge is demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal, (and, in
APo.I.2, of causes). Therefore, Aristotle holds that phronesis is not scientific knowledge.
1. Phronesis is concerned with particulars.
2. Nous is concerned only with universals.
3. Therefore, phronesis is not scientific nous.
Like scientific knowledge, Aristotle holds that intuitive reason is not the same as phronesis because intuitive
reason is only concerned with universals: EN.VI.7.1141b14-16.
He gives his account of intuitive reason in EN.VI.6, stating that it “grasps the first principles [from which
science proceeds]” (EN.VI.6.1141a8-9). As a result of these two premises, for Aristotle phronesis is not the same
as scientific knowledge or intuitive reason.
1. Phronesis is concerned with both particulars and universals. (EN.VI.7.1141b14-16)
2. “Perception ‘controls’ [these] particulars.” (EN.VII.3.1147a25-26)
3. Therefore, “phronesis must include a kind of perception, which we may call practical
perception” (Reeve, 67).
Handout for Week Six, pg. 1
PROPER OBJECTS VS. COMMON SENSIBLES
“Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles either, i.e. the objects which we perceive
incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g. movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity; for all these we
perceive by movement, e.g. magnitude by movement, and therefore also figure (for figure is a species of magnitude),
what is at rest by the absence of movement: number is perceived by the negation of continuity, and by the special
sensibles; for each sense perceives one class of sensible objects. So that it is clearly impossible that there should be a
special sense for any one of the common sensibles, e.g. movement; for, if that were so, our perception of it would
be exactly parallel to our present perception of what is sweet by vision. That is so because we have a sense for each
of the two qualities, in virtue of which when they happen to meet in one sensible object we are aware of both
contemporaneously. If it were not like this our perception of the common qualities would always be incidental.”
(DA.III.1.425a14ff)1
 Perceiving common sensibles differs from perceiving proper objects. Common sensibles are perceived
incidentally, not essentially, through multiple sense organs. Color, for example, is special to our visual sense
organs. Unlike motion, color underlies all visual perceptions. So color is perceived essentially via the eyes. That
is to say, our perception of color is special to our eyes and is not perceptible via other sense organs.
 In [C], Aristotle states that phronesis is concerned with the ultimate particular. This process is distinct from
perceiving color, which is the proper object of our visual sense organs. Instead, it is analogous to perceiving
motion, which is commonly sensible to multiple sense organs.
THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM
Reeve cites Aristotle’s discussion of the practical syllogism (EN.VII.3.1147a25-27), pg. 69.
 A syllogism has a major premise, such as ‘all men are mortal,’ and a minor premise, such as ‘Socrates was a man.’
 In a practical syllogism, the major premise is a universal ethical principle, and the minor premise is a moral particular,
which falls under the perceptual sphere. When the virtuous agent combines the major and minor premises, he
infers the conclusion; and when this inference demands virtuous action, he thereby acts (EN.VII.3.1147a26-29).
 It is in this sense that Reeve is licensed to claim that practical perception ‘controls’ the particulars. Practical
perception somehow fills in the minor premise of the practical syllogism. It tells us what the morally salient
particulars are, in our given perceptual field.
 Reeve further suggests that we read the practical syllogism in concert with Aristotle’s analogy between geometry
and phronesis. Aristotle claims:
“For the person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse in the way described as though he
were analysing a geometrical construction … and what is last in order of analysis seems to be first in
order of becoming.” (EN.III.3.1112b20-21)

In [C], Aristotle compares practical perception to perceiving a triangle when performing a geometry problem. In
geometry, the ultimate particular is the last step in the geometer’s deliberative process. So too, in ethics, the
ultimate particular is the last the in order of the virtuous person’s deliberative process. Like a geometer
attempting to solve a problem, the phronimos problem solves in that he attempts to find a way to act virtuously
and achieve eudaimonia (EN.VI.12.1144a29-36).
MORAL DELIBERATION
 Hexis: An agent’s character determines his ends, that is, the goals of his action. If he has the right kind of
character, he will have the right goals. If he does not, he is at best clever and not phronimos – the clever person
pursues the wrong ends because his character is vicious (EN.VI.12).
 Bouleusis: When the agent deliberates, he carries this goal back to something that is in his control, i.e., something
in his perceptual field. That is, he carries the universal back to the particular.
 Prohairesis: So he chooses something he can do (on the basis of what is in his perceptual field).
1
J. A. Smith trans.
Handout for Week Six, pg. 2
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Praxis: He then acts on that choice because, as Aristotle claims, the phronimos must also act from his knowledge
(EN.VII.10.1152a8-9).
Moral character determines an agent’s ends. Phronesis is the intellectual virtue by which, among other things, the
practical syllogism is constructed: it finds means to the right ends. And practical perception plays a role in filling
in the content of the minor premise.
THE GEOMETER ANALOGY
Proposition I.9 from Euclid’s Elements
The problem is that geometer wants to know how to bisect a rectilinear angle; he wants to construct a line midway
between AB and AC. To do this, he needs a single point equidistant between the two lines. He can find such a point
by using a compass to mark off D and E, such that AD = AC, and so on.
 Hexis: His geometric skill (i.e., his theoretical virtue qua geometer) determines the kinds of problems he will try
to solve and his conceptual resources for solving them.
 Bouleusis: The geometer deliberates when he tries to find a geometrical construction to help him solve his
problem. He surveys his conceptual resources – he has already learned how to draw lines, bisect lines, draw
circles, and connect intersecting lines in the first book of the Elements – when trying to find the best
construction. So he brings the problem back into his perceptual field.
 Prohairesis: He then chooses the best geometric construction for his problem, on the basis of what is in his
perceptual field.
 Praxis: He then performs a series of actions. In doing this, he perceives the particulars of the above geometric
construction. This helps him arrive at a solution.
Reeve: “The perception involved in phronesis is like that involved in the geometrical example in three respects, then.
First, it is not perception of proper objects. Second, it is a search, partly perceptual, for the solution to a problem.
Third, it involves finding the right universals and bringing them together with a particular in the way that solves that
problem” (69).
“[D] But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than that
of the qualities peculiar to each sense.”
 Reeve: “to know that this meat is healthy is the best of all since by acting on that knowledge guaranteed to eat
healthily… We can now understand why it is more practical perception that is phronesis. It is because phronesis is
more the knowledge of particulars that such perception makes possible than it is knowledge of universals” (70).
Handout for Week Six, pg. 3
BROADER DISCUSSION
 Moral perception seems to be important in our everyday lives, as a mechanism for solving everyday moral
problems. The idea is that we attend to our perceptual field to find creative solutions.
 People with autism may seem to lack a kind of moral perception: the ability to feel empathy and the ability to
perceive social cues (that seem to play a role in right action).
 “Carrying” the universal (ethical principles) back to the particular (facts) is controversial. Is Aristotle’s ethical
theory character based or principle based? In other words, is it a kind of virtue ethics?
 This passage in Aristotle is the historical antecedent for moral particularism (and against moral generalism). The
view, “at its most trenchant, is the claim that there are no defensible moral principles, that moral thought does
not consist in the application of moral principles to cases, and that the morally perfect person should not be
conceived as the person of principle” (SEP).2
 This practical perception plays a role in present-day virtue ethical theory. John McDowell, for example, holds
that the virtuous agent is one who has a “reliable sensitivity” to the morally salient features of any given
situation. He states: “A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to … [the demands of kindness] … [The]
deliverance of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge.”3
 One may also argue that Aristotle holds a kind of intuitionism if we interpret practical perception as a kind of
intuitive awareness of value.
NOTES
2
3
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/
“Virtues and Reasons,” Virtue Ethics (Crisp, M. & Slote, R. eds., OUP, 1997): 141-162, 142.
Handout for Week Six, pg. 4