Download Chapter 4 - Utrecht University Repository

You’ll reap what you sow:
A comparative study of sharecropping
systems in Tuscany and De Meierij
Thomas J. Widdershoven
Master’s Thesis Comparative History
February 2007 | Utrecht University
page
1
Table of Contents
You’ll reap what you sow: ............................................................................................................ 1
A comparative study of sharecropping systems in Tuscany and De Meierij ............................... 1
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... 1
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... 2
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
3. Comparing regions.................................................................................................................... 7
De Meierij ................................................................................................................................ 7
Tuscany ................................................................................................................................... 8
4: Systems of sharecropping ........................................................................................................10
A: Mezzadria ...........................................................................................................................10
The spread ..........................................................................................................................10
The conditions ....................................................................................................................11
Social dimension .................................................................................................................13
B: Halfpacht ...........................................................................................................................15
The spread ..........................................................................................................................15
The conditions ....................................................................................................................16
Social dimension .................................................................................................................18
5: Various explanations ...............................................................................................................19
Economic Characteristics ........................................................................................................19
1. Wealth distribution .........................................................................................................19
Urban versus Rural.........................................................................................................19
Rich versus Poor .............................................................................................................20
2. Farm size ........................................................................................................................22
3. Transaction costs ............................................................................................................24
4. Risk Minimization ...........................................................................................................26
Tuscany ..........................................................................................................................27
De Meierij .......................................................................................................................28
Social Characteristics ..............................................................................................................29
1. Class relations .................................................................................................................29
2. Property rights................................................................................................................32
6. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................35
Wealth distribution.............................................................................................................36
Transaction costs ................................................................................................................36
Class relations .....................................................................................................................36
Property rights ...................................................................................................................37
Farm Size ...........................................................................................................................35
Risk Minimization ..............................................................................................................35
Bibliography...............................................................................................................................40
page
2
1. Introduction
Agricultural development holds an important position in the explanation of historical economic
trends. Having been the primary economic sector up until the previous century, and in certain
places continuing to be so up to this day, has ensured that explanations of economic change have
often been sought in agricultural developments.
Within this field, agricultural leases have been of particular interest especially since the work of R.
Brenner1 and the ensuing Brenner-debate. Representing the shift from a feudal to a capitalist
rural sector, agricultural leases and their effects have been thoroughly studied. In these works, the
general economic model of feudalism, or Manorialism, i.e. serfdom, closed markets, no labor
migration, is contrasted to the more modern capitalist variant of open markets and a freer labor
market. Investigations into the relative value of lease systems, as well as their effects on the
economy as a whole have answered many historical questions. This work wishes to continue in
that tradition.
This essay compares two tenancy systems of sharecropping. It also contrasts them to two other
tenancy systems those being wage labor and smallholding. Sharecropping is a form of fixed-term
lease in which a tenant applies his labor to another’s land in return for a share of the crop2. This
share ranged between half to about four fifth of the total production. A contract is set up
stipulating a number of agreements, for example the duration of the lease and the mutual
payments ensuing from it. Fixed-term or terminal lease is opposed to share-term or non-terminal
lease, which last for an undetermined amount of time for example until someone’s death. Also,
sharecropping is a commercial type of lease; it was set up with economic motives of profit. By
virtue of this nature, the emergence of lease systems indicates a capitalist development in the rural
sector. However, we must examine tenancy system individually to assess in how far they were part
of the gradual rural transition from feudalism to capitalism.
The central aim of this thesis is to compare two lease market systems used in De Meierij and
Tuscany, more specifically the sharecropping systems halfpacht and mezzadria. These two tenurial
forms hold important similarities which enable a thorough comparison. However, there is an
important difference between the two which gives rise to the central question of this thesis.
Mezzadria and halfpacht emerged at roughly the same time, in the case of Mezzadria before 1400
and halfpacht came just after the turn of the century. However, Mezzadria proved a much more
durable system then halfpacht, lasting until the 20th century whereas halfpacht started
disappearing in the 15th century already and this gives rise to the central research question of this
paper: why was the mezzadria system applied for so many centuries while halfpacht disappeared
much sooner? This is the main question of this thesis and will be investigated upon by comparing
the two systems and finding critical differences that can serve as an explanation. Drawing from,
and intertwining, preceding research done in both cases, a comparative approach is used. As this
issue is related to the economic struggle between peasants and lords aiming to change the system
to their advantage, the answer lies in a combination of the economic situation and social relations
and how these could either favour or weaken the sharecropping system. It is therefore important
to investigate the two tenant systems in the light of the gradual rural transition from feudalism to
capitalism.
Started with his 1977 article "The origins of capitalist development: A critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,"
New Left Review 1/104
2 Reid, D.R. Junior, “Sharecropping in History and Theory”, in: Agricultural History, p. 426-440
1
page
3
By describing the economic and social characteristics of the two systems and the region in which
they surfaced, significant factors which may explain the difference in longevity can be found.
After a discussion of the method, a general description of the two regions in the late Middle Ages
will be given. This will explain certain characteristics which influenced the way in which the
individual sharecropping systems developed and manifested themselves. In the next chapter, the
two systems will be described paying special attention to three typical features. First, the way in
which the system spread is discussed. Then, the conditions governing the two systems are
described. Ultimately, the social framework which enabled the systems to flourish is illuminated.
Chapter four will focus on the differences between the two regions in relation to characteristics of
sharecropping systems which can explain their relative success. These characteristics are divided
into two categories, economic and social. This distinction is somewhat artificial as economic
characteristics of the sharecropping systems are partly explained by social relations and vice versa.
The economic characteristics of the systems that will be examined are three: wealth concentration,
farm size and transaction costs. The social characteristics are made up of descriptions on class
relations and property structures. These various possible explanations for the observed divergence
will be brought together in the conclusion.
page
4
2. Method
In search for answers to the central question, how is the difference in duration of the
sharecropping systems of halfpacht and mezzadria explained, we will first consider the viability of
sharecropping in economic terms as the strongest determinant of the persistence of the system.
The underlying assumption is that, as long as a tenant system remained more effective then
others, it’s use would be continued. This presupposition is not of a solely economic nature
however; the effectiveness, and survivability of a system is closely linked with the social
framework in which it operates. Social circumstances determine the efficiency of a system and are
thus included in this research. The systems must therefore be considered in both the economic and
social setting of the two regions.
A comparative method is used to find the critical differences between mezzadria and halfpacht
which explain the difference in durability. First, a list of characteristics of the tenant systems is
made and then the way in which these characteristics respectively influence the tenant systems is
investigated and these characteristics are described for each of the two regions. In this way, we
will find dissimilarities between the systems that may answer our main question. However, finding
these variations between the two systems is only the first step of this paper. To truly assess which
characteristics of a tenancy system make it successful we must filter the significant differences
from the insignificant. Having identified the differences between the two systems, we must find
out which of these differences can explain our question. Or, to use more methodological
terminology, we must assess the strength of each independent variable, these being the economic
and social characteristics of the two regions, to explain the dependant variable, the success of the
tenancy system.
In short, a comparative case study is made in which two cases are effectively compared. A larger
number of cases would have resulted in stronger causal conclusions but would have also made the
comparison more schematic and one-dimensional. The comparison is made in a descriptive way.
The sources used for this work are all comprised of secondary literature. For mezzadria, the greater
majority comes from scholarly journals specializing on the tenant system in question. Information
on halfpacht was more difficult to come by and many sources are of a more general nature then
was strictly necessary. In the choice between a variable oriented and a case oriented comparison,
several issues have played part. If the comparison is done statistically, it would lack homogeneity
since the data available from secondary sources on the two areas are usually not corresponding in
area, era or otherwise. The statistic approach is also less desirable because the number of cases is
limited. This allows for a deep examination of each case and effectively annuls one of the great
advantages of the statistic approach: it's ability to systematically reduce a great number of cases
to a workable set of data.
However, this comparison also borrows features of the variable-oriented approach. It is, for
example, theory oriented. The main question is being answered by assessing the correspondence
between the two cases, applying a macro-social picture so to say which is characteristic of the
variable-oriented approach3. The method used in this paper is therefore not strictly case- or
variable-oriented but combines characteristics of the two approaches.
A study of primary sources would possibly have provided more homogenous data, enabling a more
detailed insight. Due to time constraints, primary research was however not possible. Further
research in this field could shed light on matters which are still unclear. In De Meierij for example,
the closer examination of population figures could help illuminate the role of the Black Death in
Ragin, C.C., ‘The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies’,
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987, p. 54
3
page
5
the spread of sharecropping farming in Europe. Also, the inclusion of other sharecropping systems
into the comparison could bring a deeper insight into the determinant of the success of tenancy
systems to the fore.
page
6
3. Comparing regions
Before setting out to compare the two regions, it is important to first gain a clearer picture of their
differences and similarities. De Meierij and Tuscany are different areas in many ways. Tuscany is
larger in size and situated on the seaside whereas De Meierij is landlocked. The Mediterranean
agricultural environment compares favorably with its Benelux counterpart in many ways.
Geographically the two regions differ greatly; Tuscany is hilly and fertile, the Meierij sandy and
level. In this way, neither is particularly well disposed for high agricultural productivity. The
Tuscan lands have been densely populated since very early ages and have known many periods of
blossoming, De Meierij was populated comparatively late and has always been less populated.
It is differences like these that make a comparison worthwhile. A lease market system is influenced
by many social and economical aspects, often distinctive to the region the system surfaced. This
chapter wishes to describe the regions in general terms before we can start the comparison in a
more substantial matter. The issues at hand here are the geographical make-up of the regions and
also their social-geographical orientation.
De Meierij
Situated in the southern parts of what is currently
called the Netherlands, De Meierij of Den Bosch
(also called Bailiwick of Den Bosch or of Bois le Duc)
formed the north-eastern part of the Duchy of
Brabant (see Figure 1). Having been founded by
Frederik Barbarossa, the duchy initially formed a
part of the German Empire. De Meierij constitutes
the northeastern part of Brabant with Den Bosch
as its capital. In 1477, the title fell to the
Habsburgs by dowry of Mary of Burgundy. During
the treaty of Westphalia, the northern part of the
duchy, and with it the Meierij, became part of the
United Provinces. The territory of De Meierij itself
did not change much over the centuries. De Meierij
always held a degree of independence from the rest
of the duchy. In the 14th century, De Meierij
constituted something of a buffer state between the
richer areas of southern Brabant and Guelders,
situated to the east of Brabant and a constant
threat of invasion4. De Meierij was a relatively poor
region in economic terms; the population density
was fairly low, lower then in the rest of Brabant,
and the soil was generally sandy and barren5. Data
on total population in the 15th century show both
a low total number as well as a reduction in the
period of 1437-1480.
Figure 1: Duchy of Brabant, as formed in
1183/1184. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org
Jansen, H.P.H., “Landbouwpacht in Brabant in de veertiende en vijftiende eeuw”, Van Gorcum & Comp.
Assen, 1955, p. 52
5 Van Diepen, D., “De Bodem van Noordbrabant”, Noordnederlandse drukkerij, Meppel, 1968, p.1
4
page
7
Tabel 1: Total Population of De Meierij of Den Bosch, 1437-1480
Year
1437
1464
1472
1480
Number of Households
17.747
17.966
16.900
16.162
Percentage (1437=100)
100
101
95
91
Source: Cuvalier, J., (1913, p.97-110) as quoted in H.P.H. Jansen, (1955, p.27-28)
All in all, De Meierij was the least densely populated part of the duchy of Brabant and suffered
from depopulation in the 15th century, although the degree of this depopulation was less severe
then in surrounding areas6.
De Meierij area consists of enormous heaths and marshlands, interrupted by woods and fenlands.
In the north and east the area is surrounded by the river Maas. Numerous little rivers rise in the
high sand areas and find their way to the rivers Aa and Dommel. Both rivers come together in the
marshlands around 's-Hertogenbosch where they form the river Dieze that ends up in the Maas.
The land is more fertile in these northern parts but there was also the constant danger of floods.
Dykes were built to withstand the water but these were not always strong enough. Sometimes, in
1472 for example, this resulted in catastrophe.. The entire region shows very little difference in
height levels. In the river areas in the north, ground level is just above sea level (between 2.5 and 5
meter in ‘s Hertogenbosch, further south and eastward, especially in the Peel region, the ground is
some 25 meter higher. Mountains or hills are entirely absent7. Since the Middle Ages the waste
lands of Peel and Kempen, in the south-east of the region have been cultivated. The northern part
of De Meierij was better suited for agriculture and consequently more densely populated. Most
common agricultural produce was grain, rye, barley and buckwheat. The further one moves south,
the farther the towns are separated from eachother8
In the 14th and 15th century, the region was ruled by a representative of the duke called the villicus
or meier. The latter of which gave the region its current name as well as the English language the
term ‘mayor’. The largest city, and seat of government, was Den Bosch. Other cities, with full city
right since the first half of the 13th century, were Helmond (1225-1241) and Eindhoven(1232).
Places such as Oisterwijk and Sint Oedenrode were called ‘vrijheden’, they were close to cities in
size and rights but were never walled and as such never received full city rights Nowadays the
Meierij is formed out of the eastern part of the Dutch province of Noord Braband.
Tuscany
Situated in Central Italy, Tuscany derives its name from one of its earliest civilizations, the
Etruscans. Modern Tuscany corresponds to the larger part of ancient Etruria, the Etruscan
territories9. The Romans conquered the region in the mid-4th cent. BC but after the fall of Rome,
it became a Lombard duchy with Lucca as its capital. From the 9th century A.D. onwards here
followed a powerful era under the Franks which lasted many centuries and ended with the death of
Matilda, countess of Tuscany, (d.1115), the last Frankish ruler. She bequeathed her lands to the
Jansen, H.P.H., 1955, p.28
Velthoven, van, H., “Stad en Meierij van ’s Hertogenbosch”, Joost van den Vondel, Amsterdam, 1935, p.
28-29
8 Jansen, H.P.H., 1955, p. 26
9 Hall, J.F., ‘Etruscan Italy: Etruscan Influences on the Civilization of Italy from Anquity to the Modern
Era’, p.7
6
7
page
8
papacy but by the 11th and 12th century, most cities became free communes; some of them (Pisa,
Lucca, Siena, and Florence) developed into strong republics. After a period of Pisan hegemony
lasting up until the 13th century, Florence gained control over most Tuscan cities in the 14th-15th
cent. However, Siena did not fall under Florentine influence until 1559, the time in which Tuscany
became the region it is now known as.
Florence was and is the center of Tuscany, this was the city that conquered others and played an
important part in the blossoming of the Tuscan region in the Renaissance period. Throughout the
14th and 15th century, Florence successfully extended Tuscan territories; Pistoia was conquered in
1351 and again in 1401, Pisa fell in 1406 and Livorno in 1421. Lucca remained an independent
republic for most of the 14th and 15th century. Florence bought the city in the middle of the 14th
century but lost it in a siege to Pisa10. Before 1559, the Tuscan territories were focused more to the
north then they are now. Pisa, Lecce and Florence were the important centers of the region and
the large republic of Siena, which is now part of Tuscany, was an independent state11.
Tuscany is a prosperous economic region. It possesses a number of various landscapes. There is
much fertile soil, especially in the Arno River valley and in the Maremma , a coastal strip. The
other important valleys of the region are Lunigiana, Garfagnana, Mugello, Casentino, and Val
Tiberina. The Apennines mountain range lies in northern and eastern Tuscany. This area is
characterized by modest agricultural economy and low population levels; in the northwest are the
Alpi Apuane, where the famous Carrara
marble is quarried; and there are also
mountains in the south. Unlike De
Meierij, only some 8 percent of Tuscan
lands constitutes of plains, the greater
majority of the agricultural land is
situated in hilly and mountainous areas.
Tuscan agriculture supported a wide
range of crops. Grain was most common
but other cereals, olives and grapes were
also widely grown. Vegetables and fruit
trees were also common. Cattle herds
were a much prized possession.
Figure 2: Tuscany
Source: www.tuscandream.com/map_tuscany.cfm
Machiavelli, N., History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy, chapter VII
Connell, W.J, and A. Zorzi, “Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power”, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.3
10
11
page
9
4: Systems of sharecropping
Sharecropping is a form of land tenure where landowners lease out their land to a tenant who can
cultivate this land and, in return, has to give up a percentage of his produce to the landowner.
This percentage was often 50% although it could be either higher or lower depending on various
variables such as the fertility of the land and the degree of specialty involved in the production the
crops. A contract was signed stipulating the length of the lease as well as various other agreements
both parties had to adhere to. This system of agriculture continued to be used for several
centuries, in some places even up until the 20th century.
Halfpacht and Mezzadria were the most influential form of sharecropping in De Meierij and
Tuscany respectively. The following chapter will provide descriptions of these two systems,
focusing especially on what the system entails and how it spread through the two regions. First, a
general account is given of the way in which the system emerged in the region. Then, a detailed
description of the contracts used in the tenant systems will be given to convey the exact nature of
the system. Finally, a description of the social framework in which these systems worked is given
to form an understanding of the way in which the system was used. Mezzadria will be discussed
first, then halfpacht.
A: Mezzadria
The spread
Emerging in the early 1300s in Tuscany, Mezzadria is a Tuscan form of sharecropping. Mezzadria,
from ‘ad mezzadria’ and ‘ad medium’, meaning as much as ‘for half’, was the most popular form of
share-rent while ‘ad quartum’ and ‘ad tertium’ also existed. These forms of share-rents existed in
conjunction with the commercial lease system of fixed rents which persisted throughout the
centuries. Alongside commercial leases, smallholdings of independent farmers existed to complete
the picture of the Tuscan land market. While mezzadria did not enjoy a monopoly status as either
agricultural system or commercial lease system, it constituted a vital part of the Tuscan rural
economy for an extended period of time.
David Herhily gives an indication of the rise of mezzadria farming in his book: Medieval and
Renaissance Pistoia, the social history of an Italian town, 1200-143012.
Table 2: Proportion of Mezzadria Leases at Pistoia: 1201-1425
Period
1201-1225
1226-1250
1251-1275
1276-1300
1301-1325
1326-1350
1351-1375
1376-1400
Number of Leases
6
7
5
8
18
70
189
245
Of which Mezzadria leases
0
0
0
1
1
32
106
134
Percentage
0
0
0
12.5
5.6
45.7
55
54.7
Herhily, D.A., Medieval and Renaissance Pistoroia: the social history of an Italian town, 1200-1430, 1967,
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967, p.136
12
page
10
1401-1425
510
340
66.7
The survivability of the system is illustrated by figures presented by Giuliana Biagioli13. Up until
the middle of the 20th century, mezzadria continued to be widely used in Central Italy. In a belt
extending from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea, some 70-80 percent of all cultivated land in
Tuscany, Emilia, Umbria and Marche was exploited using the mezzadria system.
However, not the entire Tuscan region used mezzadria as its lease system, especially not in its
early days. P.J. Jones14 describes the spread of mezzadria in Tuscany by opposing north and
south, an opposition which is often used for the whole of Italy. In the north, mezzadria farming
became widespread and smallholdings were becoming less and less common. Conversely, in the
areas where mezzadria farming did not become the dominant lease variant, smallholdings
remained the staple agricultural form. This occurred in southern Tuscany and mezzadria, though
not uncommon, was significantly less popular in these parts.
Jones explains the emergence of mezzadria by linking it to the depopulation trend Tuscany was
going through. This trend was partly due to the Black Death but had already set in at an earlier
date. The depopulation of the Tuscan countryside resulted in larger farms, poderi, which were
extremely suitable for mezzadria farming. While still small for northern standards, poderi required
the labor of a full peasant family and easily outgrew the size of a smallholding. However, Jones’
opposition of north and south Tuscany has recently been abandoned and the spread of mezzadria
has been linked to different factors.
Emigh sees a different distribution pattern between sharecropping and smallholding. She argues
that a farm being either a smallholding or a mezzadria type farm depends on the relative distance
of the farm from Florence. The further the farm is from Florence, the more likely it will be a
mezzadria farm. Emigh15 argues this is the result of lower transaction costs on mezzadria farms.
Herhily proposes a third explanation for the distribution of mezzadria farms. He argues that in
places where risks were higher, i.e. in the hills, mezzadria became a common arrangement but in
poderi situated on the plains, fixed-rent leases continued to be used.
Giuliana Biagoili provides another explanation for the rise of mezzadria contracts. In a position
similar to Emigh, she argues that this form of sharecropping presented a better means of resource
allocation than the other contracts available. Especially the flexibility of the system and its
powers of adaptation to demographic and economic situations can explain its popularity.
Correspondingly, when the system became too complex and rigid, it gradually disappeared16.
All these arguments are important for our understanding of the mezzadria system and will be dealt
with in greater detail in the coming pages. We will see that the models of transaction costs and risk
minimization are important factors in the explanation of the spread of mezzadria farming.
The conditions
Biagioli, G., “The Spread of Mezzadria in Central Italy: A model of demographic and economic
development”, in Evolution agraire et croissance demographique ed. Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux, Ordina
Editions, Liege, 1987. p.140
14 Jones P.J., ‘From manor to mezzadria. A Tuscan case-study in the medieval origins of modern agrarian
society’, in: N. Rubinstein (ed.), Florentine studies (London,1968) pp. 193-241
15 Emigh, R.J., “The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy of Transaction Costs”, in:
American Sociological Review, 1997, p. 423-442
16 Biagioli, 1987, p.140
13
page
11
The basic form of the mezzadria contract provided for an equal distribution of all the crops
between tenant and landlord. Usually, landlords had several peasant families working for him and
land was appointed to each family individually. If the size of the family changed, the landlord held
the right to evict them. This system resulted in a rigid, and high, amount of labor intensive
farming17. An important characteristic of mezzadria farming is the detailed conditions
administrated under the lease contract. These contracts, formally lasting one year, were often
renewed, resulting in long-term relationships. A list of requirements, from both sides, was agreed
upon in the contract, the instructive nature of these requirements give the mezzadria contract
striking similarities to a wage contract. Firstly, tenants were required to reside (abitare) on the
land rented. This meant that no other land or work could be assumed and reletting, alienating or
quitting the land without due notice was illegal. Another condition for the lessees was to work the
land well: ‘bene lavorare’. This obligation was elaborated by statute and lease and usually included
a specified system of rotation, ploughings and dates of sowing and harvest; the intense cultivation
of the land by digging and manuring, including green-manuring (sovescio) to bring the land ‘a
caloria’; digging, pruning and the increase (propagginare) of vines and olives. On the other hand,
the cutting vines and trees as well as carting away of hay, straw and dung, was prohibited18. These
agreements set leaseholds apart from perpetual grants where more room was left to the tenant and
basically functioned as protecting the long-term investment in the landowner’s property which
could easily be ignored by short-term, fixed-rent lessees. Mezzadria went even further than other
forms of leasehold by also regulating divisions of crops, stock and expenses, and the protection of
livestock, which was usually the property of the landowner. Basically, a mezzadria contract
specified and protected the contributions made by of the lord and the tenant, especially capital
goods (scorte) which, in addition to land, included a farmhouse and buildings under the
maintenance of the landlord, livestock and oxen, vats, winepresses and other farm equipment19.
Tenants rarely provided all the capital themselves but contracts could differ from one region or
time period to the next. However, a common element in many of these contracts is the use of
prestanze. Prestanze were debts and loans on capital goods, farm implements and even food
between the lessee to the tenant. This system was widespread and even farmers with their own
cattle and land contracted prestanze20. This characteristic often led historians to conclude that
mezzadria was a ‘miserable system’21 as the combined burden of debt and rent could result in
financial dependency on their lord and living on the edge of subsistence.
Herhily however, disagrees with this point of view and points to the situation in Pistoia22 and
Santa Maria Imprunetao23 to argue that the position of the mezzadria tenant was in fact superior
to that of the smallholder, especially in the field of risk minimization and availability of capital.
Herhily points out that the loans were free of interest and often not even collected24. They do not
reflect the bleakness of the system, instead they were set up to attract tenants to it. Supporting
this argument are the contractual agreements on livestock and other capital goods. The letting of
livestock was a standard part of mezzadria and reveals the peasant-friendly character of the
Luporini, A., and D. Parigi, “Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: the Italian Mezzadria”, in Economica,
vol. 63, 1996, p.445-457, p.446
18 Jones, 1968, p.223
19 Jones, 1968, p.224
20 Jones, 1968, p.226
21 A. Young as quoted in Jones, 1968, p.225
22 Herhily, D., Population, Plague and Social Change in rural Pistoia, 1201-1430 in: Economic History
Review, 1965, p. 225-244
23 Herhily, D., ‘Santa Maria Impruneta: a rural commune in the Late Middle Ages’, in Florentine Studies:
Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence ed. Nicolai Rubinstein, 1968, p.242-276, p.264
24 Herhily & Klapisch-Zuber, 1985, p.119 as quoted in Hopcroft, R. L.& Emigh, R. J. “Divergent paths of
the Agrarian Change: Eastern England and Tuscany Compared” in: The journal of European economic
history; 2000, pag. 9-43, p.21. Also Herhily, 1967, p.137
17
page
12
agreement. Oxen were usually provided by the landlord, sometimes, sheep, goats and pigs were
also included25.
The lending of capital in the form of loans and livestock indicates that the tenants had a powerful
position when dealing with the landlords. Most likely, this follows from labor scarcity which
resulted from the Black Death and the relative depopulation of the countryside during this
period26. Another indicator is that landlords often moved their tenants from one farm to the other
on the request of the peasant family.
Social dimension
By 1350, rural Tuscany consisted primarily of two types of inhabitants: sharecroppers who leased
directly from Florentine landowners and smallholders who worked their own land sometimes in
conjunction with leasing small plots of land from their neighbor. Sharecropping began to spread
well before 1350 and continued to spread throughout the 14th and 15th century. Data suggests that
in 1427 some 56.6 percent of total Tuscan rural families were smallholders, 18.9 percent
sharecroppers and 4.3 percent were fixed term lessees27. The influence of the system was larger in
terms of land however, since mezzadria farms were typically much larger then smallholdings but
still provided work for only one family. This means that, while farms did grow in size, they did not
reach beyond the organization of a smallholding and never developed into a capitalist organization
of wage labor. This also shows that P.J. Jones’ contrast between mezzadria and smallholdings
mentioned above is hollow since the two are not exclusive categories.
In Tuscany, large landowners were generally urban elites such as successful merchants who saw
agriculture as a relatively safe area of investment; profits were not always high but more reliable
then urban investments. Agriculture was seen as a useful supplement to an investment portfolio
because of its relative security but should be complemented with other, higher risk and profit
ventures28.
Another reason for urban investors to take an interest in agriculture was the relative
backwardness of the Tuscan rural area compared to its cities and especially Florence. There was a
high demand for food and it was often imported from other regions. Prices were high and there was
dependability on others for their basic sustenance. Thus, there were financial incentives to increase
productivity because of the high demand of agricultural goods29. This made the agriculture
business more profitable and interesting then it would be in other regions. However, we should not
overestimate the profitability of agricultural investment at this time. Jones30 estimates the upper
limits for returns from urban business and agriculture were about 15 and 8 percent respectively.
A more practical reason for urbanites to be interested in agriculture is the direct supply of food
which follows from it. Landlords set up these agricultural holdings for a private, stable and
tranquil food source. High urbanization levels and low agricultural yields meant a high risk of
recurrent famines. The security following from this agricultural arrangement must not be
underestimated.
Emigh, R.J., “Means and Measures: Property Rights, Political Economy, and Productivity in Fifteenth
Century Tuscany”, in: Social Forces, 1999, pp. 461-490, p. 473
26 Herhily, 1968, p.272 as cited in Emigh, 1999, p.474
27 Herhily and Klapisch-Zuber, 1985, p.117-118 as cited in Emigh, 1997, p. 434
28 Perosa 1960 as cited in Goldthwaite 1980, p. 49
29Emigh, 1999, p. 476
30 Jones, 1968, p. 235
25
page
13
Important aspects in determining whether a farm’s agricultural system would suit the mezzadria
system are its size and crop production. Emigh31 notes that, in many cases, mezzadria farms
cultivate more expensive crops such as olives and grapes whereas grain farms were usually
cultivated by smallholdings. This indicates the predominance of rich, urban investors as these
types of crop require good management, skilled labor and capital investment before they pay off.
Especially since this type of crop takes several years before a good harvest can give a return on the
investment, growing olives and grapes was not an option for a smallholder who needed a steady
income every year to sustain himself. The cultivation of beans should be seen in the same light.
Mezzadria farms produced noticeably more beans then smallholdings. The reason for this was that
beans are less taxing on the soil then other crops, as well as being excellent fodder and therefore
producing extra manure. Beans do not pay off immediately after they are harvested, or at least
not to the extent of other crops, but are a good way of keeping land fertile and producing extra
manure which will increase productivity in the long run. Smallholdings did not have the relative
luxury of cultivating beans as they were always in need of money and food since they had no
reserves to fall back on. Data by Emigh shows that in the district of Mugellan 29 of the 66
sharecropping tenancies planted beans whereas none of the plots of land worked by the owner
planted beans in the Val di Cecina or in the Mugello32. The landowners employed managers
(fattore) for their farms make sure these investments were all properly looked after33. He also took
care that the plans of the landowner were executed. These plans were often quite detailed and
could include crop rotations, transportation and sale of the crops. Usually this manager was no
more then the messenger of the decisions taken by the landowner, although this could differ per
landowner and manager.
Mezzadria was often used on the larger types of Tuscan farm. These were owned by the urbanites
that preferred mezzadria as an agricultural system to fixed-term leasing.
These Florentines tried to consolidate larger farms but did not enlarge them so much that more
then one family was needed to cultivate all the land34. Farm size did vary considerably from podere
to podere depending on the intensity of crop cultivation, quality of the soil, presence or absence of
woodlands and pastures and on the geographical location but never beyond the size of a onefamily business venture35. Moreover, the family size itself was quite variable. Being a one-family
business venture shows a feudalist side to mezzadria. It is a possible indicator that the labor
market of that time was constrained, too constrained to move to a more capitalist lease system as
so many other regions did.
Up until the 15th century, and even after that, many Tuscan farms were not fixed units but
relatively flexible ones. Landowners were in a process of buying land and recombining them into
larger and more efficient units. However, in many areas smallholders still owned a considerable of
the land limiting the freedom of the landlords36. These lands were a peasant’s only means of
subsistence and therefore not easily taken from him; as long as a peasant retained his own plot of
land he did not have to deal with onerous share-leases. The degree of control of the urban
landowners differed greatly per region. Over the hinterlands of Florence, its contado, the citizens of
Florence held great sway. The Catasto, a Florentine fiscal survey used for taxation calculations, of
1427 shows that 2/3rd of the lands surveyed were in hands of urban residents; in the Sienese
backlands this number was larger still. In more rural areas, especially the more mountainous
regions, this development did not occur. Interestingly, the Pisan contado did not follow the general
Emigh, R.J., “The spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The political economy of Transaction Costs”, in:
American Sociological Review, 1997, pp. 423-442.
32 Emigh, 1999, p.472
33 Emigh, 1999, p.474
34 Biagioli, 1987, p.143
35 Biagioli, 1987, p.141
36 Emigh, 1999, p.474
31
page
14
trend of urban landownership. Here, the important families turned their attention to sea trade and
possessions in Sardinia rather than their hinterlands37. We can conclude that, in spite of
considerable possession of land, the urban landowners never managed to fully monopolize the land
market and their farms did not usually grow beyond family-size.
Interestingly, while many Florentine people owned large tracts of land they never showed a sign of
a collective movement towards becoming a landed aristocracy with a rentier mentality38. This
again shows the business motive with which the Florentine landowners used the mezzadria system.
An important difference between the position of the tenant and the farmer which cannot be found
in the contracts is market availability. Formally, both tenants and landlords were able to sell their
crops on the local market but for tenants market interaction was severely limited for several
reasons39. First, since the farm was family sized, almost all of the tenant’s share was used for
sustenance and therefore did not enter into the flow of exchange. Second, because of high
transportation costs, even the local markets were only a feasible outlet even for tenants living close
to towns. Also, self-sustenance was still predominant when the landlords were charitable
institutions such as hospitals and religious houses.
In summary, mezzadria became a mainstream lease system in Tuscany during the 14th century and
occurred especially on large Tuscan farms which grew a multitude of crop types. These farms were
owned by rich Florentine landowners who also dabbled in other businesses and were by no means
feudal lords. These landowners invested heavily in their farms and ran a well managed business
using on-site supervisors to make sure their plans were carried out. To attract tenants, concessions
were made in the form of prestanze (loans), many of which were never paid off, and the borrowing
of cattle, a possession which a most smallholder would not dare dream of.
B: Halfpacht
The spread
During the course of the 14th century, sharecropping emerged in various parts of the
Netherlands40. Also called halfpacht or garfpacht, this form of sharecropping holds many
similarities with its Tuscan counterpart. One of the earlier areas to develop this system of lease
was De Meierij in the Northeastern part of nowadays Noord-Brabant. While the system of
halfpacht was not identical in all Dutch regions, the focus of this study will be on the Meierij
alone. The reason for this is that in De Meierij the halfpacht system emerged early and
disappeared relatively soon, forming a clear distinction with the Tuscan mezzadria system.
Another reason for using De Meierij is that this particular region has enjoyed relatively
comprehensive research into its agricultural past. This makes the sources more accessible, an
important criterion in this field of research.
Tijdpacht emerged out of erfpacht in a step towards a more commercial market system41, it marks
an intermittent state in the transition from rents paid in crop yield to family members to money
rents paid to complete strangers. In feudal times, the land market had been governed by family
ties and loans for unspecified lengths of time and as such cannot be considered a market at all. The
Biagioli, 1987, p.142
Goldthwaite, 1968, p. 250 as cited in Emigh, 1999, p. 476
39 Luporini, A., and B. Parigi, 1996, p.447
40 Roessingh, H.K., “Garfpacht, Zaadpacht en Geldpacht in Gelderland in de 17e en 18e eeuw”,???, p.72-98
41 Roessingh, H.K., p.77
37
38
page
15
emergence of sharecropping made an important change, effectively introducing capitalist elements
into the system.
Various forms of sharecropping existed in De Meierij and halfpacht was perhaps not the most
popular. There is great diversity in the share to be paid to the landlord; several options exist
without one standing out in popularity. The proper form of halfpacht is a 50/50 divide of the
profits between landowner and peasant. To modern eyes, giving up half ones yield is a high
percentage and 50 percent was in fact the highest share a lessee has to pay. Other ratios used were
2/5th of total yields for the landlord, 1/3rd, 1/4th and also 1/5th of the yields. Explaining this
difference, as well as determining the popularity of the various options, is far from easy as the
source material cannot be considered representative.
The relative difference in quality of land may provide an explanation for the wide variety of rent
levels and lease forms42. A rich clay soil could produce far more crop then a poor and sandy one.
This resulted in higher profits and more possibilities for investment. These higher profits would
facilitate the saving of money, eliminating a key reason for payment in crops instead of money.
Also, richer soils could be cultivated more often and in a more diverse manner, this reduced the
risk of bad harvests or price stagnation peasants were constantly subjected to43. A similar
difference can be found between cattle farms and crop farms. In general, cattle farms preferred to
use fixed rents as they are less suitable for paying in yields, (butter, cheese and milk need to be
refrigerated and cattle can only serve as a percentage of yearly yields if the company is big
enough44.) Also, cattle farmers usually owned more money then crop farmers since they had to pay
for their cattle’s fodder.
The conditions
A remarkable amount of lease contracts in De Meierij from the 14th and 15th century has survived
to this day. Together they show a picture of halfpacht from which we can deduce much but which
also raises questions. A first striking aspect of the contracts is the relative non-uniformity. Some
are no longer then a few sentences, others hold detailed instructions for both the leaser and the
lessee. In accordance with Tuscan mezzadria agreements, contracts could stipulate agreements in
great detail.
The contracts stipulated many obligations and rights the two parties had. Along with a share in
the commercially cultivated crops, the landlords were entitled to the same share of crops tended
for private use. Vegetables grown in the garden of the farm, the bread made for private use, the
eggs hatched during the contract’s duration, all of these categories were mentioned in many of the
contracts45. Other subjects included in the contracts were the state of the buildings which had to
be maintained, the division of the cattle which was usually co-owned by the two parties, long-term
benefits for the farm and taxes. Entire farms were rented out along with the buildings it was
comprised of. Usually, the landowner retained the rights over these buildings and on occasion they
reserved some of them for personal use. Consequently, repairs and maintenance of these buildings
were paid by the tenant. When repairmen had to be brought round, the lessor took care of this and
paid their wages but food and shelter was usually provided by the tenant. Being very valuable,
cattle were always mentioned in lease contracts. Derived from the so-called “Kempisch stalrecht”,
the herd was usually set up 50-50 between tenant and landlord; both bring in half of the herd and
Jansen, 1955, p.42
Roessingh, p.87
44 Slicher van Bath, 1957 as quoted in Roessingh, p 86
45 Jansen, 1955, p.41
42
43
page
16
profits were divided equally46. In de Kempen, this system was implemented even though farms
continued to be leased out under a fixed price. It also happened that either party owned the entire
herd and collected all the profit. On rare occasions, the entire profit is given to the tenant even
when he does not own all the cattle47.
Taxes had to be paid even in those days and were also discussed in the contracts. There was a tax
on the owning of land, grondtijnsen, an income tax, gewintijnsen, and a buurtijns, a tax on the
communal lands. All of these taxes had to be paid to the local lord. Contracts often had detailed
instructions regarding this burden as well. The most common division was 50/50 between the
tenant and the landowner. Also common was to leave all the tax payments to the tenant. The
landlord paying more the half of the taxes was very uncommon.
Another important function of the contract was to ensure the long-term security of the farm. Since
halfpacht contracts usually lasted no longer then a handful of years, there was a certain appeal for
the tenants to produce as much as possible, and gain more profit, and leave the land behind in a
deplorable state after the contract ended. To prevent this, contracts stipulated which parts of the
land had to lay fallow during what years and sometimes even listed everything that was allowed to
be produced on the land. There were instructions on how much and which lands had to be
fertilized and a detailed description of how the various plots of land had to be left behind48. For
the same reason, the removal or sale of manure, hay and straw was usually prohibited during the
last few years of the lease.
Essentially, when halfpacht was used while the landowner did not live close to the land available
for lease, which happened frequently, contracts helped to protect the lessor from exploitation of
the land. By way of the elaborate contract, a certain level of power was kept over the tenant, even
from distance. However, one could argue that the costs of monitoring this were high. Setting up
the contract was only part of it, enforcing that contract is just as important. As we have seen, the
Tuscan landowners developed an expensive system of agents to inspect their lands for them and
ensure that the tenants kept their promises. In De Meierij, recordings of such as system have not
survived but it is save to posit that here monitor costs were equally high. The contracts have
similar attention to detail in trying to protect the landowner’s investment. Either the landowner
invests in the enforcement of this protection or he becomes vulnerable to exploitation by the
tenant. In both cases significant costs will be incurred by the landowner.
The length of a halfpacht contract varied from a few years, three was probably the minimum, to
as much as ten. From a sample of twenty-two contracts compiled by Jansen, the average duration
was 5.7 years49. A lifelong contract was also possible, ending only when the lessee had passed
away.
There is a clear correlation between the size of the plot of land leased out and the system by which
this is done. When the land was only single plot usually some money was paid as rent, this was
fixed-term leasing. But when the land leased out was larger, and came complete with stables,
farmhouses, etc. halfpacht was most popular.
Another reason for the emergence of halfpacht was also the rapid inflation currency was
undergoing in the late Middle Ages. This made money unreliable and crops relatively more
Bavel, van B.J.P., “Transitie en Continuïteit: De bezitsverhoudingen en de plattelandseconomie in het
westelijk gedeelte van het Gelderse rivierengebied, ca. 1300-ca. 1570”, Verloren, Hilversum, 1999. p.554
47 Jansen, 1955, p.48
48 This was called ‘de lating’. Jansen, p.56
49 Jansen, 1955, p.75
46
page
17
valuable. Jansen argues it is unlikely that grain prices went down in De Meierij and even if they
did, it is doubtful that they had an influence in tenant prices50.
Social dimension
Often, halfpacht leasers leased out their land because they did not want to work it for themselves;
these leases can de divided into four different groups, namely people who were no farmers
themselves, religious institutions, gentry, burghers, or peasants who held more land then they
could cultivate.
Firstly, the local gentry who sought income from their lordly possessions but were not too keen on
directly exploiting this land themselves51. These lords owned much of the land in De Meierij and
recognized halfpacht as a good way of making money without getting ones hands dirty. The use of
halfpacht by these lords illustrates the combination of feudal and capitalist economic systems that
is sharecropping: the system was still used by the lords to exploit the commoner but he was no
longer a serf bound to his nobleman but a tenant who individually agreed on a contract with his
legal counterpart.
Religious institutions were the second largest group of landowners in De Meierij and sometimes
used halfpacht. Interestingly, halfpacht was used more by monasteries situated in large cities,
especially ‘s Hertogenbosch, then by those in the countryside. The further the distance between
the landowner and the leased land, the more likely a halfpacht system was used. Not only religious
institutions, but also religious people used halfpacht. They did so for the same reasons; it was the
best way of gaining profit from something that would have been useless to them otherwise. The
third group of lessors consisted of people living in cities who either obtain a piece of land, either by
chance or on purpose, and leased it out to make a profit. Usually, these people were by no means
large land owners. Often, contract merely stated that it pertained to all the property the lessor
owned in De Meierij. Lastly, while feudal lords, religious institutions and also took part in this
commercial market, many of the lessors were peasants themselves. These peasants were of the
richer kind and owned their own land and exploited this land in two ways. Firstly, they cultivated
part of their land themselves but they often left part of their land, for whatever reason, untouched
so as to lease it out.
Interestingly, lessees of halfpacht land were not always poor, property-less peasants. Although the
greater majority of them indeed were such peasants, artisans and even lords even leased property
sometimes. For example, the nobleman Pyramus dictus Moerssoen, filius Johannis de Gherwen
leases a mansus in Harlaer and weavers and craftsmen lease a rural property for life52. It is
therefore not evident that the social position between the lessor and the lessee was automatically
in favor of the landowner. The tenant could be of a high social position and often the landowners
were no kulaks themselves.
The system of halfpacht did not last long in De Meierij. Unlike in other regions of the Netherlands
the system had all but disappeared by the 16th and 17th century. On de Veluwe for instance, a
system of sharecropping was used until the 19th century53 When the system of sharecropping
disappeared in De Meierij, wage labor took its place as the most influential agricultural tenant
system.
Jansen, 1955, p.19
Jansen, 1955, p.66
52 Jansen, 1955, p.70
53 Roessingh, H.K., p.72
50
51
page
18
5: Various explanations
As the above has shown, neither mezzadria and halfpacht nor Tuscany and De Meierij are the
same. However, they do posses enough similarities so as to enable a significant comparative
approach; being comparable in size, geography, and most importantly land lease system, a
comparison of the two will deepen our understanding of both regions and their sharecropping
system. In this chapter certain characteristics of the two regions are discussed which influenced
the sharecropping system thereby identifying the essential differences that explain the different
grade in popularity of the sharecropping system.
The explanations are divided in those referring to differences in economical structure and those
referring to the social structure of the two regions. These two types of explanation are not
mutually exclusive, since economic factors and social factors are related to one another and
interact with one another. The distinction merely mirrors a difference in emphasis and
argumentation. While both economic and social history cannot live without the findings and
methods of the other, each argument holds a core in either two of these fields. The conclusion will
then unite the social with the economic so as to reflect the two systems to the fullest extent. To
recapitulate, our main aim is to explain the question of why the Tuscan mezzadria system
continued to be applied for so many centuries while the Meierij system of halfpacht disappeared
much sooner?
Economic Characteristics
1. Wealth distribution
Urban versus Rural
One of the most important characteristics of the two regions that can explain our question is the
wealth distribution between rural and urban areas. Since a lease market system is influenced by
the economic situation of the region where the system is in place, the economic role of the city
versus that of the countryside becomes important.
The Tuscan economic system during the high Middle Ages was very different from that of De
Meierij. Especially the role of Florence as the leading actor in the economy is not mirrored in
Brabant. The famous Catasto of 1427, a Florentine survey of the fiscal record of the whole of
Tuscany, allows us a clear picture of the position of Florence in the Tuscan economy as a whole.
Dividing the total taxable wealth in Tuscany in 1427 reveals that only 15.93 percent of its total is
found in the countryside54 whereas 67.4 percent was in the possession of Florentines alone. While
Florence counted only 37.245 people, or 14% of the total population of Tuscany, it owned a
disproportionally large part of the total wealth even compared to other Tuscan cities and towns.
Twenty-one other Tuscan cities and towns, representing almost twenty percent of total Tuscan
Herlihy, D, and A.L. Udovitch, “Family and property in Renaissance Florence”, in: The Medieval City ,
ed. H.A. Miskimin, 1977
54
page
19
population, had no more than seventeen percent of total Tuscan wealth55. The countryside
represented 175.840 people, or 67 percent of the Tuscan population but held on average only 1/20th
of the wealth of a Florentine. A small circle of the hugely rich, some hundred families, owned more
then the thirty-seven thousand other families put together. The three-thousand richest families of
Florence combined were wealthier then all the other Tuscan families put together.
However, these numbers reflect the total taxable wealth and can therefore be considered
somewhat exaggerated as they include public debts, virtually absent in the countryside, and
movables, only five percent of which was owned by families living in the country. Looking at real
property alone shows a less distorted image. In 1427, the Tuscan rural population owned some 27
percent of the total real property. In contrast, Florentines own a little over half of the total real
property. Since farm land constituted an important part of these real property figures, they can
give an indication of relationship between city and rural areas in Tuscan land markets. The
Florentines were so rich, they controlled an important part of the market; most Tuscan
landowners also lived in Florence. Florentines were the main investors in agriculture and
controlled the agricultural production56.
In a data set collected by R.J. Emigh, 91.2 percent of the landowners whose residence was
identifiable were from the city of Florence57. Of the cases in which the residence of the tenants was
known, only 26 percent came from Florence. In the select few cases that the profession of the
landlord was indicated on the lease contract, we can see that they ranged from merchant to
artisans to ecclesiastics58.
While exact data on the wealth distribution in late medieval De Meierij cannot be traced, we do
have a general picture of the situation. Traditionally an area of relative poverty with sandy soils,
De Meierij did not boast a city the size of Florence or anything near it. The capital, and largest
city of the region, ‘s Hertogenbosch, did not hold the same stranglehold on its surroundings. ‘s
Hertogenbosch, founded at the end of the 12th century, received its city rights in either 1184 or
118559. Wealth was not as concentrated to ‘s Hertogenbosch as it was to Florence and large land
owners did not typically live in the big city. Except for ‘s Hertogenbosch, city rights were given to
Eindhoven, Helmond, St. Oedenrode, Oss and Waalwijk during the later centuries of the Middle
Ages. Given that these were no disproportionally large cities for the area of De Meierij, one may
conclude that the relation between city and rural wealth was different from the situation in
Tuscany. Also, landpacht was a popular tenant system under both the patricians and the rural
lords and one could even say that there was little distinction between these two social classes60.
Patricians were often part of the aristocracy and rural lords did not hold the stereotypical feudal
position of power. Unlike in Tuscany, wealth levels between rural and city residents were not so
unequal that the urban population was able to dominate the whole of the economy. The
consequences become clearer if one looks at the distribution of wealth between rich and poor.
Rich versus Poor
The six cities referred to in the text are Pisa, Pistoia, Arezzo, Prato, Volterra and Cortona with an average
size of 4.383 in 1427. The fifteen towns had 1.654 inhabitants on average. All Tuscans living outside there
areas and Florence are considered rural residents.
56 Emigh, 1997, p. 423
57 Emigh, 1997, p. 428
58 Jones, P.J., 1968, p.194
59 Velthoven, van, H., 1935, p. 67
60 Jansen, H.P.H., 1955, p.67
55
page
20
Not only the wealth distribution between urban and rural areas is different for Tuscany and De
Meierij, also the difference in the wealth distribution between classes is significant. Data on
Florentine wealth distribution, indicating an important part of Tuscan wealth, show the
inequality that prevailed. The richest one percent of Florentine households owned more then a
quarter of the total wealth of the city61 whereas some fifteen percent of the Florentine families
owned nothing at all. A small circle of the hugely rich, some hundred families, owned more then
the thirty-seven thousand other families put together. The three-thousand richest families of
Florence combined were wealthier then all the other Tuscan families put together. Within
Florence, the Gini index of concentration over total wealth was 78.75 in 142762.
Comparable figures on wealth distribution in De Meierij are not easy to find. One can get an
impression of the situation by looking at the region of the western Gelderland river area, which
had a similar agricultural orientation, and is also geologically comparable to the northern part of
De Meierij. Research on the social distribution of landownership in this area shows that the
nobility represented the largest group of landowners, owning some forty percent of total land in
1300 and 26 percent in 157063. The second largest group was peasants with 27 percent in 1300 and
22 percent in 1570. Religious institutions also constituted an important group of landowners and
burgers became increasingly more important, owning 6 percent of total land in 1300 and 11
percent in 1570. While land was concentrated in the hands of nobility and clergy, the inequality
was less pronounced. Peasantry still owned land themselves, through the ages increasingly more
so, and there is no reason to assume that an elite number of hugely rich families existed as they did
in Tuscany.
These two obvious discrepancies between the regions point at a vital difference between the land
market systems of the two. Whereas burghers of Florence owned more then half of the real
property in Tuscany, there is no city or institution that mirrored this powerful position in De
Meierij.
This is an important indicator of why the halfpacht system was not as stable as the mezzadria
system. In Tuscany, rich city inhabitants used the system to invest money, provide a large part of
the capital and to make profits. Tuscan landowners were often city dwellers who owned land as
part of their portfolio of income. As agricultural prices began to rise, owning farm land became
more and more appealing for the merchants of Florence simply because they could make the
investment that would pay off; they were the only ones in this position because the capital market
in Tuscany was so lopsided. Owning land was usually not part of the aristocratic ideal of the
country life but rather a useful and dependable asset to ones investment portfolio.
In De Meierij the halfpacht system was not an investment for rich city inhabitants. The aim of the
aristocracy was to sustain themselves, making profits was not the primary goal. Moreover, the
Tuscan system tended towards a monopoly for a few very rich urban investors, whereas the
system in De Meierij was less centralized. One might conclude that, although the two systems look
the same, they embody different economic principles. The mezzadria system was a capitalist way
to exploit ones capital investment, an option available to only a few Tuscans. Halfpacht
constituted a way for lords, clergy and peasant alike to gain an income from their possession of
land.
Herlihy, D, and A.L. Udovitch, 1977, p.6,XIII
Herlihy, D, and A.L. Udovitch, 1977, p.8,XIII
63 Bavel, van, B.J.P., “Land, Lease and Agriculture: the Transition of the rural economy in the Dutch river
area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century”, in: Past and Present, 2001, p.1-42
61
62
page
21
2. Farm size
Not only wealth concentration is important for the choice of land lease system; the size of farms
may be an important factor too. When land plots grow in size, the land comes into increasingly
fewer, and richer, hands resulting in a more capitalist and monopolist system. Also, farm size
influences the efficiency of its tenancy system. As we have seen before, in both Tuscany and De
Meierij the size of the farm influences the choice between sharecropping and fixed-term rent, the
former being preferred more and more as farm size increases, however the farm can also reach such
a large size that wage labor becomes the most appealing of the three. Knowing this, can differences
in farm size explain the divergences between the fate of the mezzadria system in Tuscany and the
halfpacht system in De Meierij?
Data on the southern Netherlands64 shows that farms increased in size during the late Middle Ages
and continued doing so for an extended period of time. This development begun about midfifteenth century and persisted strongly especially during 1550-1580. Small and average tenants
increasingly lost their lease land and disappeared. The agrarian landscape became increasingly
dominated by large-scale tenant farms. In the western Gelderland river area, this development is
very pronounced. While the Gelder river area is not in De Meierij, the two regions are bordering
and we can assume that the agricultural development in both these regions is comparable. At the
beginning of the 15th century, large tenant farms of at least 35 hectares were completely absent in
this area. In 1570, there were certainly ninety of them. Farms occupying over twenty-five
hectares, rare occasions in the 14th century, covered at least 40 percent of the total cultivated land
by the end of the sixteenth century. These sizes were never attained in Tuscany.
Interestingly, not only did the average farm grow in size, the total land available for lease also
increased. In 1400, 14 percent of all peasant owned land was available for lease, in 1570 this was 20
percent65. Burghers leased out forty percent of their land in 1400, this grew to 75 percent in 1570.
Nobility, while already boasting a high 70 percent leasing ratio in 1400, leased out 85 percent of
their land in 1570.
These numbers show that this area of the Netherlands was shaping into a more capitalist society.
The development of fourteenth century towns with their strong agricultural character into
sixteenth century metropoles with their wealthy entrepreneur-investors changes agriculture from
an industry where one works for his own subsistence to one where profits are sought.
There are multiple reasons for the increase in farm size and land available for lease. Firstly, the
wage-price scissors, which, during the period 1440-1580 continually favored large tenant farmers.
Food prices rose quicker then wages. This entailed that large tenant farmers could obtain more
profits as the profits from selling food surpluses rose quicker then the costs of the wages they had
to pay to produce these goods. Conversely, this was at the disadvantage of small farmers who had
to go into wage labor to obtain additional income. Also, the larger farms were able to strengthen
their position on the lease market by continuously specializing in labor extensive crops, thereby
reducing labor input and increasing profits. This form of specialization needed investment capital
and resulted in a complete dependency on the market, it was therefore not a path open to smaller
tenant farmers. The transition to large scale leasing and large tenant farms began in the early 15 th
century; relatively early from a western European viewpoint but late when compared to Tuscany
Bavel, van, B.J.P., “Land, Lease and Agriculture: the Transition of the rural economy in the Dutch river
area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century”, in: Past and Present, 2001, p.14
65 Bavel, van, B.J.P., 2001, p. 26
64
page
22
Large farms had existed for some time in Tuscany. So-called poderi emerged at around the middle
of the 13th century66. These poderi were integral family holdings which constituted large
consolidated tenements with specific names located in the open countryside. The arable land was
ranging between 100-300 staiora67 or about 5.6 and 16.9 hectares and was ploughed by at least two
oxen. A poderi typically included courtyards and stables, wells, ovens and outbuildings, stoneconstructed farmsteads and often combined with ‘case di signore’ for managers and landowners. In
this it was very different from the small, anonymous aggregations of plots encircling villages most
peasant landowners possessed. In size they were basically large smallholdings but they remained of
relatively medium size; they did not grow beyond the amount of land one family could cultivate.
By the fourteenth and still more the fifteenth century, the typical estate of Florentine territory
was a complex of poderi with stock and buildings, to be let by form of commercial lease.
During later periods, farms in De Meierij continued to grow larger still whereas Tuscan size did not
evolve. Tuscan farms did not reach sizes beyond 10-20 hectares, whereas in De Meierij, and many
parts of Europe, farms increased in size in a later period but continued to grow beyond the size of
Tuscan ones. The stagnation of Tuscan farm size can be explained by the absence of a labor
market effectively barring the way to a more capitalist system of wage labor to exploit the land.
The absence of this labor market is then shown by the continued use of the family as the backbone
of the farm.
We can see that in the cases of both De Meierij and Tuscany, average farm size initially increased.
The two regions take part in the same trend but Tuscan farms stopped growing after a while and
eventually farms Meierij grew bigger. Alongside the traditional, small peasant holdings designed to
maintain a life of subsistence, a more capitalist method of farming cropped up. The process of
richer land owners expanding their terrain at the cost of the smaller farmers happened in both
areas. In Tuscany however, this happened some centuries before it did in Brabant. It is
doubtlessly true that the surfacing of these larger farms went hand in hand with the emergence of
a new land lease system. Most all of these large farms used the mezzadria or halfpacht system to
lease out their land to farmers. In a data sample compiled by Emigh, the average size of properties
was 1.3 hectares68 for fixed term leases whereas this was 6.9 hectares69 for share-term leases70. By
using share-term type leases on their big farms, large landowners could ensure profits and at the
same time wring out the less fortunate peasant to become larger still.
Although there are differences, notably in the onset of the growth of farms, the increase of farm
size cannot explain the divergent paths of the two regions. Following the growth of farm size,
Tuscany and De Meierij both developed a similar lease system, Tuscany being almost two
centuries ahead in time. Farm size grew in both cases, reflecting the more capitalist nature of the
tenant system. We can also see that the Tuscan farms stopped getting bigger after a while whereas
farms in De Meierij, and other areas of Western Europe, continued to grow. This indicated the
divergent paths the two regions took but it does little to shed light on why this happened. The
factor farm size alone cannot explain the fact that the mezzadria system in Tuscany was more
durable than the halfpacht system in De Meierij. A possible explanation that does surface from
this investigation into farm size is the influence of labor markets. It seems that the ineffectiveness
Jones, P.J., ‘From manor to mezzadria: a Tuscan case-study in the medieval origins of modern
agricultural society”, p. 223
67 1 AH equals 17.80 staiora, 1 staiora equals roughly 562 square meters. Benassi, L., and Castiglia, R.,
“Mirteto: Storia e trasformazioni di un complesso monastico nel monte Pisano”
66
22.82 staiora
123.08 staiora
70 Emigh, R.J, 1987, p.430
68
69
page
23
of the Tuscan labor market to supply wage laborers to replace the family business caused the
stagnation in the Tuscan development towards bigger farms.
3. Transaction costs
R.J. Emigh argues in her article ‘The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy
of Transaction costs71’, the importance of transaction costs and subsequently that of the
Florentine investors in the spread and continued use of mezzadria. Because most Tuscan landlords
lived in Florence, transaction costs formed an important chunk of the costs of investing in
agriculture; the further the land in question was situated from Florence, the higher the costs of
land management and labor supervision were. In an effort to lower these costs, sharecropping was
used.
Sharecropping is a means to lower total transaction costs when both wage labor costs and farm
leasing costs are highly variable. This situation is depicted in Figure 1a. Wage labor and farm
leasing are two different arrangements for letting peasants work the land of the landowner. One
can have either a system of total wage labor, or a system of total farm leasing, or a mixture of
wage labor and farm leasing. Both wage labor and land leasing involve transaction costs. In the
case of wage labor, these costs are mainly supervision costs. Since the peasant gets a fixed sum, he
will not be inclined to work harder to produce more for the sake of the landowner. Wage labor
provides little incentive for increased effort because the reward will be equal no matter how much
is produced. Supervision is needed to make certain that the maximum amount of produce is
realized. Supervision costs will be relatively high, especially when there is scarcity of labor, so that
workers are not easily replaceable, or when work is complicated, and requires much attention from
supervisors. This results in high labor costs.
In the case of land lease, there is no need for labor supervision, since peasants will be stimulated to
produce as much as they can, given that they pay a fixed price for the land. Yet, fixed term
leasing also involves costs, primarily land management cost. Supervision is needed because tenants
will be inclined to abuse the land in order to produce as much as possible and maximize their profit
in this way. Land management costs tend to be high when it is not easy to control the land, for
instance because the landowner lives far away from the land he leases. Wage supervision costs and
land management costs are inversely related to one another. In a system of total wage labor, land
management costs are absent. In a system of total land lease, there are no labor supervision costs.
Both costs may be more or less variable depending on individual cases. Costs of for instance wage
labor are more variable, if a small increase of wage labor in the system leads to substantially
higher costs. If both wage supervision costs and land management costs are highly variable, a
mixed system may result in a lower total amount of costs than either of the extremes. In that case,
a system of sharecropping, which combined wage labor and land leasing, will give the lowest
transaction costs, and will therefore be stable. This situation is sketched in Figure 1a. When either
of the two costs is less variable, sharecropping will not be the preferred agricultural system. Figure
1b shows the situation where land management costs are inflexibly low. Rationally, this scenario
would result in a system of fixed term leasing since total transaction costs are lowest then.
Emigh, R.J., ‘The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy of Transaction Costs’, in:
American Sociological Review, 1997, pp. 423-442
71
page
24
Figure 3: Transaction-Cost Model of Contractual Choice
Source: Emigh (1997, p.425)
The situation on Tuscan farms, especially those far removed from Florence, mirrors Figure 2a.
Both labor supervision costs and land management costs will have been relatively high for two
reasons72. Firstly, the distance between the landowner and his tenants is relatively large resulting
in higher costs for both labor supervision and land management. This pattern of landowners using
a mezzadria system being far removed from their lands can be seen quite clearly for Tuscany.
Lands situated closer to Florence, and therefore the landowner, often used a system of fixed-term
leasing because land management costs were lower there. Secondly, the crops grown on Tuscan
mezzadria farms were relatively labor and capital intensive. Some crops were highly dependant on
skilled labor because the profit margins are heavily determined by how carefully the plants are
planted or the harvest handled. Certain types of crop such as orchards and vineyards require large
initial capital input and require skilled management to pay off. For these two reasons, labor
supervision and land management costs were highly variable on Tuscan farms. This situation
resulted in a Figure 1a situation and mezzadria farming. For plots of land closer to Florence, where
the land owner has better possibilities of preventing gross mismanagement of his land, Figure 1b
sketches the situation. This argument explains both the emergence of mezzadria as a system used
on larger farms isolated from Florence and why it persisted through time. As long as the labor
supervision and land management costs remained high, mezzadria would continue to be the most
cost effective system.
In De Meierij, two systems competed with each other, halfpacht and fixed-term lease. For smaller
type farms close to the landlord, a fixed-term rent system was often used; for land complete with
farm buildings situated further away, halfpacht became en vogue. This situation is comparable to
Tuscany. However, there were still important differences between the two regions. In Tuscany,
wealth was concentrated in Florence and almost all land owners lived far from their leased-out
lands. In De Meierij, many different social classes used the sharecropping system to rent out their
72
Emigh, 1987, p.426
page
25
lands, not just the large land owners, with the result that some lived close to their land while
others were far removed from it. In Tuscany, mezzadria was used on large farms that produced
wine and olive oil, capital intensive production that required skilled labor and management to be
lucrative. In De Meierij, halfpacht was used on large farms which grew grain or rye, crops which
need relatively little investment and labor input.
These two disparities hold significant
consequences for the transaction costs
in De Meierij. Firstly, because
halfpacht was used for the production
of less complicated crops, need for
skilled labor was lower, capital
investment was not as important and
ultimately labor supervision costs were
less variable than in Tuscany.
Secondly, since halfpacht was mainly
in use on larger farms which were far
removed from the lessor, land
management costs were in a similar
situation as those in Tuscany.
Therefore, the situation as it was
found on large farms far removed from
the land owner in De Meierij during
the late Middle Ages is reflected in
Figure 2c. We can see that the most
effective output-sharing rate is not
sharecropping, as it was in Tuscany,
but in fact wage labor.
(c) Low Labor Supervision Costs;
Variable Land Management Costs
Total transaction costs
Land
management
costs
Labor supervision costs
0
Wage
labor
1/2
Sharecropping
Output-Sharing Rate
1
Fixed-term
leasing
This marked difference may explain why halfpacht disappeared relatively soon in the Brabant
landscape while it endured for centuries in Tuscany. In Tuscany, mezzadria was a compromise
between wage labor and fixed term rent designed to minimize costs and maximize profits. It was
the optimal system, given that both labor supervision costs and land management costs were
highly variable. In De Meierij, halfpacht was an improvement to fixed-term leasing, at least when
land management costs were high i.e. the farm was far away from the land owner. Yet even in that
situation, wage labor would result in fewer transaction costs. In terms of profit maximization, the
halfpacht system thus was not the optimal situation, and therefore proved less stable. When the
system of wage labor became known in De Meierij, it soon surpassed halfpacht in popularity and
utility. This is understandable, given that for the situation in De Meierij a system of only wage
labor had fewer transaction costs than any mixed system.
If we apply the transaction cost model to Tuscany and De Meierij, it appears that the two regions
are fundamentally different. Whereas sharecropping was optimal in Tuscany, it was only an
improvement to fixed-term leasing in De Meierij. For De Meierij, wage labor provided the fewest
transaction costs. Therefore, it is logical that share-cropping remained the most popular system in
Tuscany for a long time, and had much less viability in De Meierij.
4. Risk Minimization
page
26
For our current standards, the economic risks involved in medieval agriculture are significant.
Harvest failures were common and when these did happen, the consequences were severe. Because
of the absence of a welfare system, a harvest failure could effectively result in starvation. From
this point of view, the spread of sharecropping can be explained. Usually, a tenant system of
sharecropping is not considered to be economically efficient and it is therefore remarkable that a
system of sharecropping emerged in so many different societies. In a quest to explain the
emergence of these systems, historians have tried to find qualities in the system, which can explain
its apparent appeal to tenant and landowner. One of these perceived qualities is sharecropping’s
ability to minimize risk. The tenant gives away half his produce meaning that the risk of harvest
failure is also shared equally with the landowner who will receive less profit. This effectively makes
harvest failure less disastrous for the tenant73. Following this theory, it could be argued that the
divergence in De Meierij and Tuscany can be explained through their different ability in risk
minimization, with landpacht being the inferior of the two.
In a system of fixed term rents or wage labor, all risk is concentrated on one of the parties
involved. If, in a wage labor system, the harvest fails, the landowner has to bear all the costs.
Conversely, when a tenant leases a piece of land for fixed term rent, he will have full responsibility
for the harvest. Especially in the case of a tenant farmer, this can result in disaster. When having
to produce for one’s own subsistence, a failed harvest can mean starvation.
In a system of sharecropping, the good times as well as the bad times are shared. When a harvest
fails, the tenant has to pay less to the landowner. A failed harvest will therefore be detrimental for
both parties, but not to the same extent as either of the other two systems. Especially in high
likelihood of harvest failures, sharecropping is a form of risk minimization which can provide a bit
more security then wage labor or fixed rents74. Often, sharecropping contracts were in popular use
during rough economic times, was or a series of harvest failures, only to be replaced by fixed-term
rent contracts when the rough patch was over75.
To analyze in how far risk minimization played its part in the longevity of the sharecropping
systems of the two regions, we will examine the terms of the contract used as well as the type of
tenants, rich or poor, that used share-tenancy arrangements. The contracts should tell us whether
or not risk was an important factor in this business. The degree of wealth of the tenants will tell us
if the sharecropping system was important for its risk minimization. If so, we can expect many of
the tenants to be quite poor and therefore risk-averse.
Contrasting the regions Tuscany, where sharecropping was thriving, and De Meierij, where it soon
disappeared, one could find two arguments for this divergence. Firstly, that risk minimization
either did not ensue for the halfpacht system as it did in mezzadria or, secondly, that risk sharing
was not an important factor in the choice of tenant system in De Meierij, whereas it was in
Tuscany.
Tuscany
We know that the mezzadria system did in fact distribute the risk of failed harvest evenly between
tenant and landowner as it constituted a 50/50 arrangement in the harvest. Also, when considering
the contracts mezzadria agreements produced, we can clearly see a pre-occupation with the risk
present in the business venture. A mayor part of the contracts consisted of the writing out of the
A notion already entertained by J.S. Mills ‘Principles of political Economy’, (London, 1857), p.365-366
Ackerberg, D.A., & M. Botticini, “The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk
Sharing, Moral Hazard or Capital Market Imperfections?”, in: Explorations in Economic History, 2000,
p.241-257, p. 242
75 Bavel, van, B.J.P., 1999, p. 553
73
74
page
27
exact arrangements of possessions76. Contracts were designed to protect the, often substantial,
investment of the landowner. These investments came not only in the form of his land but often
also his cattle and grape vines or olive trees. Tenants did not have similar investments to protect
but mezzadria certainly had an appeal for them. As mentioned above, mezzadria tenants often
preferred to work on sharecropping farms even when they possessed smallholdings, possibly
because their smallholdings were more risky ventures. While it is difficult to assess the validity of
this argument, i.e. the connection between Mezzadria’s risk minimization and its popularity with
the tenants, it is a plausible explanation of the circumstances. Tenant farmers often preferred
working on mezzadria farms and the risk of harvest failure was shared with the landowner. We
must note however, that the Tuscan economy had a relatively strong capital market77, which
partly reduces the catastrophic aftermath of a harvest failure for the peasant.
We must draw the conclusion that mezzadria holds the advantage of risk minimization, and this
seems to have attracted tenants to it. Risk minimization can be considered as a means of making
the system desirable to the eyes of the tenant. Interestingly, in times of economic prosperity and
low chances of harvest failure, mezzadria contracts continued to be used. This indicates that the
attraction to the mezzadria contract was not restricted to its risk spreading qualities.
De Meierij
As in mezzadria farming, halfpacht offers a 50/50 division of profits and therefore a distribution of
risk. Analogously, the halfpacht contracts of De Meierij are in many ways comparable to those of
Mezzadria Tuscany. One of the functions of the contract was to write out the exact terms of both
ownership and obligation towards one another78. For the landowner, the contract mainly served to
protect his investments. For the tenants, the contract offered clarity on their obligations towards
the landowner as well as their rights. From this it follows that risk minimization was indeed a
consequence of the use of the halfpacht system.
We must remember however, that the halfpacht tenant was not typically a poor farmer. A survey
of the position of the tenant in De Meierij society shows that tenants were often respected
members of the village community and some held politically important jobs79. Also, it is unlikely
that the poorer type of tenant made much use of the halfpacht system as it did require
investments, also from the farmer. Cattle, for example, were usually provided 50/50 meaning that
the tenant had to possess or loan half of it himself, a considerable monetary burden80. In Tuscany,
cattle was often provided by the landowner.
Being a relatively poor area in terms of soil quality and wanting a strong capital market81, risks in
De Meierij were extra high. In a situation similar to de Veluwe, there was little variation in crops
grown which increases the risk of both harvest failure and reduced income because of price
stagnation82. Also, the market integration of the Meierij peasant was generally limited; money
transactions were not yet an established part of life.
Jones, P.D., p.223
Botticini, M., “Institutions, Information, and Markets in 15th Century Tuscany”, 1997, in: The Journal of
Economic History, 1999, p.456-460, p. 456 Cambridge University Press, New York
78 Jansen, 1955, p. 41-9
79 Jansen, 1955, p.71
80 Jansen, 1955, p.72
81 Jansen, H.P.H., 1955, p. 39
82 Roessingh, p.86-89
76
77
page
28
In short, both the mezzadria system and halfpacht held risk-minimizing qualities. The division
was 50/50, limiting the detrimental results of harvest failure for the tenant, and the contracts show
a definite interest in the curbing of investment risk, especially from the landowner. Risk
minimization was a promoting factor in the spread of halfpacht. While the tenants were usually in
an economically safe position, part of the appeal to halfpacht must have been its minimized risk.
This model of explanation gives a possible reason for the relatively quick disappearance of
halfpacht but cannot explain the persistence of the system in Tuscany. Arguing from this model,
sharecropping was introduced in De Meierij during times of special economic hardship,
demographic decline and periods of war, and disappeared relatively quickly when the economy
started to bloom again. Halfpacht was a system taken up because the economic climate demanded
more security. This explanation sees halfpacht as a solution to a temporary problem but never a
permanent solution. While this argument explains the short life of the halfpacht systems, there are
a few drawbacks to it. Namely, it is problematic to argue that for the whole period of halfpacht
popularity, De Meierij was economically unhealthy so much so that business risks were avoided.
Firstly because there are no means to assess when an economy is so unsafe that risky ventures are
avoided. Secondly, the sharecropping system was used for more then a century, a very long time
for an economic downturn. Also, risks were especially high on the sandy soils of the Meierij,
making the swift disappearance of the system all the more puzzling. Therefore, while the risk
minimization argument is a strong explanans for the surfacing of halfpacht in De Meierij region
and can explain its quick disappearance, its arguments are not easily verified and the question
remains why similar regions continued to use similar tenancy systems.
For mezzadria the situation is different. The Tuscan system of sharecropping remained in place
until the 20th century. It is unlikely that the Tuscan region went through so many centuries of
economic duress before finally recovering economically and popularizing a new tenant system.
Mezzadria can surely not be seen as a temporary solution to economic hardship; the reasons for the
continued popularity of the system may be linked to its ability to spread risk but is not limited to
it. Again, risk minimization provides a strong argument for the surfacing of the sharecropping
system but it cannot explain the divergence noted between the two systems. The argument of risk
minimization cannot identify the essential difference between the mezzadria and halfpacht system,
which make the one so durable, and the other more quickly redundant.
Social Characteristics
1. Class relations
As we have seen from the descriptions of mezzadria and halfpacht, the social framework in which
these two systems operated was different. These differences help explain the dissimilar
survivability of the system in the two regions.
In Tuscany, the difference in social and political standing between the land owner and his
mezzadria tenant was at first sight quite large. Urban folk, already regarded more highly then the
backward rural population, owned large tracts of land which they leased to tenants. These
landlords were immensely more rich then anyone else in the region. Also, Tuscan share leases
rarely lasted longer then five years and the threat of eviction was omnipresent for every tenant83.
However, land owners in Tuscany were not in a position to exploit their social power to their own
advantage. One would assume that the land owners, being part of the same social class with the
83
Hopcroft & Emigh, 2000, p.25
page
29
same economic aims and political influence, were able to combine forces in order to maximize
profits and minimize the freedom of the tenants. The most likely way in which this could have
happened was to start a system of wage labor on the farms where the peasants received enough
wage to subside but the greater majority of the profits went to the landowner; this system was
used in many regions outside Tuscany to substitute a sharecropping system.
However, this switch did not happen in Tuscany; rather, mezzadria was a system in which the
rights of the peasant were relatively well protected and this situation did not change for centuries.
One reason why this did not happen was that the Tuscan countryside suffered from labor
scarcity84. Many Tuscans were drawn to the wealth of Florence and moved away from the relative
poverty of the countryside. The Black Death was also an important factor in the labor scarcity.
This rural depopulation meant that landlords had to offer incentives to attract tenants. If they did
not do so, the tenants could move easily between landlords if they were unhappy with their
treatment. Often, the tenants also owned their own plot of land which they could withdraw to
when the sharecropping arrangement did not appeal to them85. At other times, landlords
complained that there were no tenants available at all and some land was left uncultivated
because tenants did not come86.
The relative strength of the Tuscan tenant is also obvious in mezzadria arrangements itself. The
tenants did not need to invest themselves; the landlord bore this cost entirely. Also, tenants could
use means of agriculture not usually open to smallholders; cattle were provided and beans could be
grown since there was little short-term pressure. Loans between tenants and landowners were
common; many tenants took off without repaying debts87. All these factors made higher
production levels on mezzadria farms possible. At the same time, mezzadria had the advantage of
distributing risk evenly between the tenant and the land owner88. When a peasant suffers from a
bad harvest from his smallholding land, he must have some reserves put aside to make it through
to the next harvest. If the harvest fails in a mezzadria system, the reserves needed are half of that
of a smallholding peasant. Also, reserves can be increased more easily in the form of the loans
discussed above. In fact, many of the peasants preferred to labor as mezzadria tenant, and
subsequently having to give away half of their produce, on the well-stocked and comfortable farms
of landlords. Sometimes leaving their own lands merely casually cultivated or even entirely
neglected89. In some locations, smallholders and customary i.e. fixed-term tenants became
sharecroppers90. This is remarkable since they would get a full return on the cultivation of their
own land while they had to give away half of what they produced on the mezzadria farm.
However, we should not consider the position of the Tuscan farmer to be ideal. Mezzadria was in
certain ways a step up from smallholdings, but mostly because these were no picnic themselves. It
is no wonder that mezzadria could be preferred over working on modest, scattered plots in a
constant fight against starvation with high risk of harvest failure and few means to increase
production.
The urban domination of the Tuscan agricultural sector is also an important factor in the stability
of the mezzadria system. The greater wealth and political power of the Florentines enabled them
Emigh, 1997, p.435
Emigh, 1999, p.467
86 Herhily, 1968, p.272; Emigh, 1997, p.435
87 Herhily & Klapisch-Zuber, 1985, p.119 as quoted in Hopcroft & Emigh, 2000, p.21 and Herhily, 1967,
p.137
88 Ackerberg, D.A., and M. Botticini, “The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany:
Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?” in: Explorations in Economic History,
2000, p.241-257, p. 242
89 Herhily, 1968, p.275
90 Jones, 1971, p.516 as cited in Hopcroft & Emigh, 2000, p.25
84
85
page
30
to control the land market. Smallholdings had little chance of competing in the land market with
Florentines. Even relatively wealthy rural Tuscans rarely purchased land91. This prevented the
rise of an autonomous and enterprising rural sector which could compete with the mezzadria
system.
The social situation was quite different in De Meierij. Landowners did not represent a homogenous
social class as they did in Tuscany. Halfpacht was set up with different aims by different people. It
was a way for farmers and non-farmers alike to make some extra money on something that would
otherwise have only cost tax money. For this reason, class relations between tenants and
landowners were not as clear-cut as they were in Tuscany. While every landowner entered the
halfpacht system for the same reason, making a profit, they were not all part of the same social
class. In De Meierij, the landowner could be part of the Brabant gentry, a religious institute, a
farmer who owned more land then he could cultivate or the next of kin of a late farmer. Even a
tenant did not necessarily have to be a property-less peasant. In certain cases hefty investment
was needed to make the lease pay off and was therefore only open to the higher classes. Johannes
de Espendonc, for example, leased his land while he was ’schepen’ or alderman in SintOedenrode92.
The relationship between lessor and lessee was not predetermined and could range from a sort of
feudal lord and his serf to an old woman having inherited a piece of land and her prosperous
tenant farmer wanting to invest more in agriculture. Outwardly, tenants in De Meierij held more
sway over their landlords then in Tuscany. Brabant landowners were not a united class with
political power, they were a potpourri of classes, and could not unite in an urban domination over
the rural classes such as happened in Tuscany.
In this light, it is therefore remarkable, that halfpacht changed relatively quickly into a system of
wage labor where the landowner is in a clearly more powerful position. Two factors can explain
this paradox. Firstly, De Meierij did not suffer from rural labor shortage as Tuscany did. Large
cities were few in and around De Meierij and did not have the same pull factor as Florence had.
Also, halfpacht was used more then a century later then mezzadria and consequently did not suffer
from the dreadful effects of the Bubonic plague. Secondly, there was no urban hegemony over the
rural industry like in Tuscany. In De Meierij, where such a power concentration was absent, the
road to an autonomous and enterprising rural sector was wide open.
For these two reasons, Meierij tenants soon became wage laborers. In fact, the wage laborers were
often peasants who were hired by richer peasants to work their land, a development which would
be unthinkable for the urban dominated Tuscan countryside. In the absence of urban control, the
richer peasants could compete with each other in a relatively open agricultural market. The
winners became large landowners, those who lost in the competition of life had to sell their land
and become wage laborers.
We may conclude that two differences between De Meierij and Tuscany explain the popularity of
the mezzadria system in the one region and its decline in the other. In both areas, a collision
between landlords and tenants resulted in a compromise between the aspirations of landlords and
peasants. The strong position of the Tuscan tenants, enabled by labor scarcity on the countryside,
ensured that the position of the tenant in the mezzadria system in Tuscany was not unfavorable
compared to its rival, smallholdings. In De Meierij, where there was less labor scarcity because of
the absence of a large town or bubonic plague, halfpacht could not be consolidated by the tenants
and they soon became wage laborers. Secondly, the Florentine domination over the agricultural
sector promoted the spread of Mezzadria and prevented smallholders from competing on the land
91
92
Hopcroft & Emigh, 2000, p.35
Jansen, 1955, p.71
page
31
market. In De Meierij, where the land market was more open, an enterprising rural sector
developed which eventually found a new system to replace halfpacht.
2. Property rights
As stated in the introduction, the question of why one economic system remained in place while
the other disappeared can be answered in economic terms of efficiency. Viewing the actors in
history as well-informed, rational, profit-seeking individuals, economic history explains the rise
and decline of economic systems through their relative merits. In this light, the reason for the
disappearance of sharecropping in De Meierij was the economic ineffeciency of the system.
Conversely, the reason for the system to remain in place in Tuscany was its relative effectiveness
when compared to other systems. One field in which we can assess the efficiency of an economic
system is its social rules on property rights.
When regarding property rights, sharecropping is usually not regarded as an effective system.
Secure property rights are the most important determinant of investment and innovation. Where
property rights are guaranteed, individuals have incentives to undertake investments or
innovations because they can expect to receive full benefits from these activities. In a system of
sharecropping, property rights are divided between the landlord and his tenant. This does not
provide good incentives to invest, innovate and work hard, making sharecropping economically
unviable compared to systems where property rights are not shared. In the framework of a world
system, this idea had been proposed in the book by D.C. North and R.P. Thomas: The Rise of the
Western World (1973)93. Since then three opinions on the merits of sharecropping have developed in
the historical debate of property rights. As we will see, all three approaches more or less share the
view that sharecropping is ineffective because of the division of property rights.
Firstly, the classic economists consider sharecropping to be an ineffective form of land tenure,
arguing very much along the line of North and Thomas. Since neither tenants nor landowners
retained their entire output resulting from increased inputs, both would tend to work less and
underinvest in share-tenancies. This makes sharecropping less productive than if the land were
worked by its owners94.
Neo-classical economists adopt a different point of view. Starting out with the assumption that
landlords would not use a tenurial form that provided a smaller output than would be otherwise
possible, they argued that sharecropping would not be widespread unless it was a relatively
efficient system95. They therefore turned to examinations on how property rights were enforced
arguing that tenurial forms were differentially adopted depending on ease of enforcement and
supervision of property rights. As a result, neoclassical economists also consider other incentives
that could explain the adoption of share-term lease, including the distribution of risk, transaction
costs and the incentive to innovate and invest. The neoclassical perspective suggests that the
choice between sharecropping and owner cultivation rests on which is most efficient, using
property rights, risk management, transactions costs etc. as determinants. It does not argue that
the one is necessarily more or less efficient then the other. The neoclassical approach assesses cases
separately but provides no theory which embodies all possible cases. While neoclassical economists
generally consider sharecropping and owner cultivation to be equally efficient, the former has one
important drawback when compared to the latter. In general, sharecropping systems frequently
suffer from a lack of incentives for landowner and tenant to invest and innovate. In systems where
North, D.C. & R.P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World, 1973
Emigh, 1999, p.465
95 Emigh, 1999, p.465
93
94
page
32
there is security of tenure, innovations and investments are more likely because returns are
guaranteed. This work, therefore, also casts doubt on sharecropping’s ability to sustain
innovations and investment.
Lastly, Marxist economists consider sharecropping to be an inefficient form of agricultural labor96.
Marxists view the system as a means of extracting surplus from peasantry in a feudal setting.
Sharecropping is seen as a labor intensive form of production where higher productivity than
smallholdings is possible but only through increased labor input. Capital intensity does not
increase in a system of sharecropping. The only way of increasing productivity is increasing labor
intensity. This does not result in innovation and investment however and efficiency suffers.
Rather, sharecropping constitutes a return to a quasi-feudal labor-intensive form of agricultural
production.
In short, all three approaches view sharecropping as ineffective. Neoclassicists are the only ones
who believe the system can have its merits although they also question the viability of it in the
long run due to a lack of incentive for investment and innovation. Linking these arguments with
the two cases at hand gives us important insight on the efficiency of sharecropping and the reasons
for its relative survivability
In Tuscany, mezzadria was, as we have seen, a system set up by urban landowners who controlled
the agricultural market. The system was dependant on these landlords for both innovation and
investment. To assess the degree with which the landlords invested in their land one may compare
the productivity of mezzadria farms and that of land worked by owners, most of which are
smallholdings. Data compiled by Emigh97 on the areas of Mugello and Val di Cecina shows that
land productivity on sharecropped land lay considerably higher per hectare. The average
productivity on land worked by the owner was 50 soldi per staiora98 in Mugello and 52 soldi/staiora
in Val di Cecina. Conversely, productivity on the sharecropped lands of Mugello has an average of
120 soldi/staiora.
Emigh also shows that the increase in production is not due to a substitution of a low priced crop
for a higher priced one, or the supplying of additional labor. Rather, Emigh uses models to
determine that the variables ‘number of crops per unit of land’ and ‘value’ of the land are the
influential factors for the production levels99. ‘Value’ is a combination of the intrinsic quality of
the land and the improvements made to the property. The difference between sharecropping and
owner based production must lie in the improvements made to the property as well as the number
of crops grown. Quality of land was less important since, when the ‘value’ of land is left out of the
model, productivity is still significantly higher on mezzadria farms. It is clear that the number of
crops per unit of land was larger on mezzadria farms because of investment.
A Marxist could argue against this evidence that the mezzadria landholders used labor intensive
means to increase productivity. As we have seen, this would indicate a lack of capital investment
and innovation and be an ineffective method of production. Emigh counters this claim by setting
up a third model to test whether labor intensity can account for the difference in productivity100.
She finds that the total number of crops has an impact on total output separate from the effect of
the number of adult male workers. This shows that the increase of total output was not achieved
solely through increasing labor productivity. In fact, Emigh finds that “the relation between the
Emigh, 1999, p.466
Emigh, 1999, p. 470
98 ‘The monetary value of the crop is calculated using the standard prices that the Catasto officials assigned
to crops in the Mugello’. Emigh, 1999, p.469
99 Emigh, 1999, p.470-71
100 Emigh, 1999, p.472
96
97
page
33
number of adult male workers and total output in household of sharecroppers and households of
other rural inhabitants was the same”101.
We can conclude that Mezzadria was a more innovating system than Tuscan smallholders because
landlords introduced new technologies and invested in their holdings. As we have seen before, the
Florentine landlords made capital improvements to their properties, provided working capital to
tenants, improved cropping patterns and used the cultivation of beans to increase soil fertility.
They were in a better position to make these innovations and investments than peasants who held
their own land. The large differences in actors’ abilities to invest and innovate negate the negative
effects of incentives based on the shared returns of shared property rights102. None of the three
traditional critical views on sharecropping therefore fit in with mezzadria. Even though the
property rights were shared, it was an economically viable system, also in the long run, with
innovation and investments being made. Possibilities for innovation were restricted to urban
landlords but this constraint was outweighed by the vastly superior resources and opportunities
for investment the urban elite enjoyed103. It is noteworthy however, that the urban landlords did
not adopt a system of wage labor to overturn the issue of shared property right altogether. If they
had done so, their investments would have surely yielded a greater return for them.
The situation in De Meierij was different. Property rights were divided here as well but with the
negative consequences that can be linked to that. Innovation and investment did not get full
returns and were therefore less appealing. But, unlike in Tuscany, the social difference between
landlord and peasant was not large. There was no strong hold in the rural sector and anyone who
could invest and innovate was free to do so but was deterred by ill-defined property rights. When a
system of sharecropping did emerge in De Meierij it turned out to suffer from inefficiency due to
shared property rights. Therefore, it turned out to be an ineffectual system in the long term and
was eventually replaced. The Meierij economy did not suffer from the level of unequal wealth
distribution as Tuscany. For this reason, the detrimental effects of shared property rights, which
reduced the appeal of investment and innovation, were felt harder here. In De Meierij, both rich
tenants and landowners of halfpacht farms were in a position to invest in the land to increase their
production and profits. And both parties would be equally deterred by the fact that half of the
return of their investment will be siphoned off by the other party. Other systems, such as wage
labor, do not present this problem to the investor and if therefore more appealing to them.
This argument shows that sharecropping worked efficiently in Tuscany, where innovations and
investments were made, and was less successful in De Meierij. In Tuscany, the negative effects of
shared property rights were not nearly as large as in De Meierij. Actually, the mezzadria system in
Tuscany seems to be an exception to the general rule that shared property rights precludes
economic development, whereas the halfpacht system in De Meierij is well in line with this rule.
However, it does not follow that property rights in Mezzadria farming were distributed more
efficiently then in halfpacht. Simply, the Florentine urbanites bit the bullet and invested
regardless, in De Meierij, investors looked for another system in which their endeavors would bear
more fruit.
Emigh, 1999, p.472
Emigh, 1999, p.461
103 Emigh, 1999, p.483
101
102
page
34
6. Conclusions
Having examined the influence of six social and economic differences between halfpacht and
mezzadria, we have found several key characteristics, which give answers to our research question.
The difference in longevity of the sharecropping system in the two regions can be attributed to
several discrepancies, which interacted with each other to form a milieu that was either beneficial
or detrimental for the continued spread of sharecropping. First, we must mention the indicators
farm size and risk minimization. For both of these characteristics, we must conclude that they
cannot explain the different paths taken by tenant systems in Tuscany and De Meierij.
Farm Size
The size of a farm influences the choice of tenant system with which the farm will be exploited.
Sharecropping systems blossom when applied to average size farms, while smaller farms mainly
constitute smallholding tenancy and larger ones are usually exploited by way of wage labor.
Therefore the differences in farm size between the two regions can explain the relative popularity
of the mezzadria system. In this light, farms must initially have been larger in Tuscany then in De
Meierij, explaining the early surfacing of the system, while Meierij farms then increased in size and
Tuscan farms did not, explaining the recognized divergence.
When examining farm size, we can indeed conclude that farms got bigger as the mezzadria system
was introduced. This happened in Tuscany some two centuries before it did in De Meierij. But
Meierij farms, unlike their Tuscan counterparts, continued to grow in size. This development both
reflects the similar development the two regions underwent as well as their schism.
However, farm size cannot be considered anything else but an indicator of this. Farm size
influenced tenancy systems but is itself dependant on stronger social and economic determinants.
To understand why farms continued to grow in De Meierij but not in Tuscany, we must consider
other factors. Investigations into farm size show labor markets to be a strong indicator. The family
size nature of the Mezzadria farm demonstrates the inability of the labor market to supply wage
laborers, which would enable larger farms.
Risk Minimization
An established argument to explain the relative popularity and longevity of sharecropping
systems is its virtue of risk distribution and minimization. Following this theory, it could be
argued that the divergence in De Meierij and Tuscany can be explained through their different
ability in risk minimization, with landpacht being the inferior of the two.
We have seen that risk minimization occurred in a similar way in the two systems, production was
split in both cases reducing the risk for both landlord and tenant. There is no cause to assume that
mezzadria was more capable of minimizing risk than the halfpacht system, they were equally well
adapted to the task. For this reason, it is unfeasible to seek the critical difference between the two
systems in this field.
After having considered these two characteristics, which have failed to provide us with answers,
we must turn to the other four. These indicators studied all provide explanations of why
page
35
sharecropping survived in Tuscany and disappeared in De Meierij. We must now carefully describe
in what way they do so and compare the relative strength of their arguments.
Wealth distribution
Investigation into wealth distribution brought a marked difference between the two regions alight.
In Tuscany, wealth was heavily concentrated in the hand of an elite few Florentines. Not only was
Florence much richer than any other city or rural area, within Florence, many poor families
existed and wealth was distributed highly unequal. In De Meierij, wealth was not as concentrated
into so few hands, neither were urban areas particularly richer than rural ones. This difference
indicates a difference in the position of the landlord. Tuscan landlords were very often Florentines,
using mezzadria as a system to economically exploit their land possession and capital investments.
Only Florentines were rich enough to buy land and invest into it to make it economically viable;
the capital market was monopolized. In De Meierij, landlords constituted a mixed group of classes,
lords, clergy and farmers. Capital markets there were free for competition.
While this difference does not in itself explain the divergence between Tuscany and De Meierij, it
gives a clear difference between the two regions, which, as we have seen, proved to have a
profound influence on the development of tenant systems in the two regions.
Transaction costs
Another way in which the continued popularity of sharecropping in Tuscany and its slump in use
in De Meierij can be explained is by means of transaction costs. When arguing that a tenant
system will only be in place for so long as it is economically viable, we must consider the
importance of transaction costs for its continued existence. If, and only if, a tenant system
provides lower costs then its competing systems, will it be used. We must therefore ask the
question if transaction costs differed in De Meierij and Tuscany and if this difference can explain
our research question.
For Tuscany, both labor supervision costs and land management costs, i.e. transaction costs, will
have been relatively high for two reasons. Firstly, the distance between the landowner and his
tenants is relatively large resulting in higher costs for both labor supervision and land
management. Secondly, the crops grown on Tuscan mezzadria farms were relatively labor and
capital intensive. This resulted in the use of the mezzadria system in which managements costs
were lowest.
In De Meierij, distance between landowner and tenant was usually equally large as in Tuscany If
not, a system of fixed term rent was used instead of halfpacht. Halfpacht farms however, did not
produce crops which were very labor and capital intensive, if was usually grain. This difference
resulted in less variable labor supervision costs. Therefore, unlike in Tuscany, not sharecropping
but wage labor was in fact the economically most viable option. This explains why Meierij
landowners soon adopted this system in favor of halfpacht.
Class relations
page
36
Social differences between the two regions can also give answers to our main question.
Investigations into differences in class relations shed light on the workings of the tenant systems
and their appeal. Two key differences can be found.
Firstly there is an important difference in relationship between landholder and tenant. In
Tuscany, labor scarcity made that landowners had to attract tenants to the mezzadria system. By
providing investments and loans, working on a mezzadria farm became more productive and
therefore appealing. Tenants were lured away from their smallholdings to work for the urban
investors. In De Meierij, labor scarcity was less pressing in the rural areas for two reasons. Firstly,
large towns with attracting prospects, such as Florence in Tuscany, were absent. Secondly, the
bubonic plague had less influence on the system. It hit the region less hard and at an earlier time
then coincided with the spread of halfpacht. The relative strength of the Tuscan tenant is an
explanation for the continued use of mezzadria. Here, Florentine elites were not able to break up
families, extend farm sizes further and exploit their investments more fully. In De Meierij, where
the position of the tenant was more vulnerable, wage labor was successfully imposed by
landowners.
The second difference in class relations is the homogenous make-up of the Tuscan landlords.
Unlike in De Meierij, the greater majority of all mezzadria landlords were part of the same social
group, wealthy Florentines investors. This urban control of the agricultural market prevented the
rise of an autonomous and enterprising rural sector which could compete with the mezzadria
system. In De Meierij, where the agricultural market was open to competition, sharecropping was
soon out-matched by systems of wage labor set up by rural investors.
Property rights
While property rights were divided similarly in landpacht and mezzadria, property rights can
serve as an explanation to our question. This is notably due to the different effect shared property
rights had in both systems.
In De Meierij, North’s argument on shared property rights can provide an explanation for the
disappearance of halfpacht. Dividing the property rights threatens incentives to invest and
innovate as profits following from these actions are shared. The division of property right can
serve as an explanation of relatively quick slump in popularity of the halfpacht system.
Contrastingly, in Tuscany the detrimental effects of shared property rights were negated by the
distortion in the capital market. Production levels of mezzadria farms were higher then on
smallholdings, indicating that more investments were made to sharecropping farms the to
smallholdings. This peculiar situation, irregular in the view of property rights, can be explained by
the singular position of the landlords in Tuscany who controlled the agricultural market and
enjoyed the opportunity to invest in it profitable even when sharing property rights. Or, put
differently, the possibilities for innovation were restricted to urban landlords but the vastly
superior resources and opportunities for investment the urban elite enjoyed outweighed this
constraint.
Assessing explanations
In conclusion, if we look at the developments in the field of tenant systems in the light of a
development towards a capitalist system, we can see that De Meierij went down this road earlier
than Tuscany. While Tuscan landowners started using a sharecropping system some one hundred
page
37
years earlier, they did not let go of it for centuries after their northern counterparts. The reason for
this is a multitude of circumstances, which support the continued use of sharecropping in the one
area and restrain its use in another. Slowly breaking away from a feudal towards a capitalist
system, sharecropping can be seen as an intermediate step from feudal fixed term rent towards
capitalist wage labor.
Transaction costs serve as an explanans of why these systems of sharecropping survived in the one
area and disappeared in the other. In a compromise between fixed term rent and wage labor,
sharecropping can be the most efficient economic system when both labor supervision costs and
land management costs are highly variable. In mezzadria, where farms were situated far from
Florence and the crops cultivated were generally labor and capital intensive, the costs were indeed
variable. This made mezzadria farming more cost effective than both fixed term leasing and wage
labor. In De Meierij, where agriculture was generally less labor intensive and farms were not
typically situated far from the landowner, transaction costs were not favorable in a sharecropping
system but in fact in a system of wage labor.
Property rights also provide an explanation why De Meierij adopted a different tenant system
whereas Tuscany stuck with sharecropping. We have seen that in both cases, property rights were
shared and consequently incentives for innovation and investment were curbed. However, this did
not lead to a similar situation. Mezzadria farms did not reduce investment whereas De Meierij
turned to a system of wage labor to secure property rights. The reason for this important
difference cannot be found within property rights, which are organized identically in both cases,
but has to be sought elsewhere. Possible explanations could be the particular labor market in
Tuscany which prevented landowners from moving to a system of wage labor or the mentality of
the Florentine landowners who were not deterred by the lower profit margins and would perhaps
invest in trade goods if they were after higher profits. This leads us to our last explanans: wealth
distribution and class relations.
In Tuscany, there was a clear social stratification and economic inequality. The landlords using
mezzadria were rich Florentines who pursued agriculture as an additional source of income. The
tenants were families who did not own enough land to live off of. The landlord supplied the raw
materials and the tenants provided the labor. In De Meierij, the social positions were less
juxtaposed. Landlords could be poor and tenants rich. Investment could come from both parties
and cattle were usually possessed equally. Effectively, the Florentines dominated the Tuscan
capital market whereas in De Meierij there was no monopoly. This is an important difference
between the two areas and, while it does not give economic reasons for either staying with a
sharecropping system or moving on, it highlights a critical difference which explains the rapid
adoption of a more capitalist system in De Meierij and a more hesitant shift in Tuscany.
On the other hand, we must consider that the position of the Tuscan tenant was relatively
stronger than that of his Meierij counterpart. Agricultural labor scarcity, due to the lure of
Florence as well as the catastrophic effects of the bubonic plague, greatly improved the bargaining
position of the Tuscan tenant. So, while the Florentine landlords were in a financially powerful
position, they were unable to push the Tuscan tenant into a system of wage labor. Mezzadria
continued to be used because of scarce labor. This worked in two ways: landlords could not replace
the system because they were unable to force tenants into wage labor. And wage labor would not
be more efficient because of the highly variable labor supervision costs. In De Meierij, where
agricultural labor was more abundant and farms grew less labor intensive crops, tenants were
forced to work as wage earners and this was the most economically viable system. Because of the
relative abundance of labor, labor supervision costs were less variable and wage labor was an
economically attractive prospect.
page
38
Now we have seen the four explaining factors for our research question. While it is difficult to
argue that one is superior to the others I wish to point out that two of these arguments are
independent models, class relations and transaction costs, whereas the other two, wealth
distribution and property rights, find a critical difference between the two systems but cannot
explain these differences by themselves. All four differences can explain the divergence
independently and to say which is the strongest of them all is no more than educated guesswork.
Lastly, we must appreciate that mezzadria was not an inefficient economic system. In Italy,
innovation and investments were common on mezzadria farms. The Florentine landowners knew
that the return on their investments were meager but still chose to make them. In De Meierij, both
rich tenants and landowners were deterred to invest by shared property rights. If they did invest,
a system of wage labor was more appealing to secure all the profits gained. This shows that
mezzadria was did not prohibit innovation and was well adapted to the particular Tuscan
situation. However, it also explains why landlords eventually moved on in favor of wage labor, in
De Meierij more quickly so than in Tuscany.
page
39
Bibliography
Ackerberg, D.A., & M. Botticini, “The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance
Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard or Capital Market Imperfections?”, in: Explorations in
Economic History, 2000
Bavel, van, B.J.P., “Land, Lease and Agriculture: the Transition of the rural economy in the
Dutch river area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century”, in: Past and Present, 2001
Bavel, van B.J.P., “Transitie en Continuïteit: De bezitsverhoudingen en de plattelandseconomie in
het westelijk gedeelte van het Gelderse rivierengebied, ca. 1300-ca. 1570”, Verloren, Hilversum,
1999
Biagioli, G., “The Spread of Mezzadria in Central Italy: A model of demographic and economic
development”, in Evolution agraire et croissance demographique ed. Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux,
Ordina Editions, Liege, 1987
Botticini, M., “Institutions, Information, and Markets in 15th Century Tuscany”, 1997, in: The
Journal of Economic History, 1999, p.456-460, p. 456 Cambridge University Press, New York
Connell, W.J, and A. Zorzi, “Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power”, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000
Diepen van, D., “De Bodem van Noordbrabant”, Noordnederlandse drukkerij, Meppel, 1968
Emigh, R.J., “The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy of Transaction
Costs”, in: American Sociological Review, 1997
Emigh, R.J., “Means and Measures: Property Rights, Political Economy, and Productivity in
Fifteenth Century Tuscany”, in: Social Forces, 1999
Hall, J.F., “Etruscan Italy: Etruscan Influences on the Civilization of Italy from Anquity to the
Modern Era”, Brigham Young University, 1996
Herhily, D., Population, Plague and Social Change in rural Pistoia, 1201-1430 in: Economic
History Review, 1965
Herhily, D.A., Medieval and Renaissance Pistoroia: the social history of an Italian town, 12001430, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967
Herhily, D., ‘Santa Maria Impruneta: a rural commune in the Late Middle Ages’, in Florentine
Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence ed. Nicolai Rubinstein, 1968
Herlihy, D, and A.L. Udovitch, “Family and property in Renaissance Florence”, in: The Medieval
City, ed. H.A. Miskimin, 1977
Hopcroft, R. L.& Emigh, R. J. “Divergent paths of the Agrarian Change: Eastern England and
Tuscany Compared” in: The journal of European economic history, 2000
page
40
Jansen, H.P.H., “Landbouwpacht in Brabant in de veertiende en vijftiende eeuw”, Van Gorcum &
Comp. Assen, 1955
Jones P.J., ‘From manor to mezzadria. A Tuscan case-study in the medieval origins of modern
agrarian society’, in: Florentine studies ed. N. Rubinstein, London, 1968
Luporini, A., and D. Parigi, “Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: the Italian Mezzadria”, in
Economica, 1996,
Machiavelli, N., “History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy”, 1520
Mills, J.S , ‘Principles of political Economy’, London, 1857
Ragin, C.C., ‘The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies’,
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987
Reid, D.R. Junior, “Sharecropping in History and Theory”, in: Agricultural History
Roessingh, H.K., “Garfpacht, Zaadpacht en Geldpacht in Gelderland in de 17e en 18e eeuw”
Velthoven, van, H., “Stad en Meierij van ’s Hertogenbosch”, Joost van den Vondel, Amsterdam,
1935
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duchy_of_Brabant
www.tuscandream.com/map_tuscany.cfm
page
41