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Reduction and Emergence in Chemistry Two Recent Approches.
Eric Scerri
Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry,
UCLA,
Los Angeles, CA 90095
[email protected]
Abstract.
Two articles on the reduction of chemistry are examined. The first, by McLaughlin,
claims that chemistry is reduced to physics and that there is no evidence for emergence or
for downward causation between the chemical and the physical level. In a more recent
article Le Poidevin maintains that his combinatorial approach provides grounding for the
ontological reduction of chemistry and also circumvents some limitations in the
physicalist program. In examining the scientific issues that each author has discussed the
present author finds some shortcomings in both of these approaches.
------------1. Introduction.
In recent years there the reduction of chemistry has been discussed in a variety of ways.
Many studies have concentrated on inter-theoretical reduction between theories of
chemistry and theories of physics (Bunge, 1982; Primas, 1983). Others have discussed
the reduction of chemistry in what they claim to be a naturalistic manner, namely the
question of how some typically molecular properties such as bond angles or dipole
moments of molecules can be deduced from quantum mechanics in an ab initio fashion or
whether the periodic system can be similarly deduced (Scerri, 2004). More recently a
number of authors have turned to discussing the ontological reduction of chemistry
(McLaughlin, 1992; Le Poidevin, 2005). The present article examines the claims
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regarding emergence and the ontological reduction of chemistry in the last two cited
articles.
2. McLaughlin on British Emergentism and the relationship of chemistry to
physics.
Brian McLaughlin has written a frequently cited paper in which he seeks to give an
overview of the philosophical school that he dubs ‘British Emergentism’ which includes
the work of J.S. Mill, Bain, Lewes, Morgan and most recently C.D. Broad. I begin with
a brief summary of McLaughlin’s characterization of these philosophers, especially of
C.D. Broad.
Emergentists held, rather uncontroversially, that the natural kinds at each
scientific level are wholly composed of kinds of lower levels, and ultimately of kinds of
elementary particles. However, they also maintained that,
Some special science kinds from each special science can be wholly composed of
the types of structures of material particles that endow the kinds in questions with
fundamental causal powers (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 50-51).
These powers were said to ‘emerge’ from the types of structures in question. One
example given repeatedly by the British emergentists was that of chemical elements
which have the power to bond to other elements by virtue of their internal microscopic
structures. According to the emergentists, when these causal powers operate they bring
about the movement of particles. The striking part, as McLaughlin calls it, about the
emergentist claim is that the kinds pertaining to a special science, such as chemistry, have
the power to influence microscopic motions of particles in ways that are not anticipated
by the laws governing the microscopic particles. Emergentism is thus committed to the
possibility of ‘downward causation’.
For example, emergentists such as Broad believed that chemical bonding
represents an example of emergence and the operation of downward causation. Indeed he
went as far as to declare,
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The situation with which we are faced in chemistry…seems to offer the most
plausible example of emergent behaviour (Broad, 1925, p. 65).
Broad believed that emergent and mechanistic chemistry (non-emergent chemistry) agree
in the following respect,
That all the different chemical elements are composed of positive and negative
electrified particles in different numbers and arrangements; and that these
differences of number and arrangement are the only ultimate difference between
them (Broad, 1925, p.69).
However, he also stressed that if mechanistic chemistry were true it should be
possible to deduce the chemical behavior of any element from the number and
arrangement of such particles, without needing to observe a sample of the element in
question, which is something that is clearly not the case.
Against this position McLaughlin maintains that the coming of quantum
mechanics and the quantum mechanical theory of bonding has rendered these emergentist
claims untenable. In fact he is very categorical about the prospects for modern day
emergentism.
It is, I contend, no coincidence that the last major work in the British Emergentist
tradition coincided with the advent of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics
and the various scientific advances made possible are arguably what led to British
Emergentism’s downfall…quantum mechanical explanations of chemical bonding
in terms of electromagneticism [sic], and various advances this made possible in
molecular biology and genetics – for example the discovery of the structure of
DNA – make the main doctrines of British emergentism, so far as the chemical
and the biological are concerned at least, seem enormously implausible. Given
the advent of quantum mechanics and these other scientific theories, there seems
not a scintilla of evidence that there are emergent causal powers or laws in the
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sense in question… and there seems not a scintilla of evidence that there is
downward causation from the psychological, biological and chemical levels
(McLaughlin, 1992, p. 54-55).
These anti-emergentist claims can be criticized on several different fronts.
Admittedly the quantum mechanical theory of bonding that McLaughlin appeals to does,
provide a more fundamental account of chemical bonding that the classical, or Lewis
theory. Nevertheless, it does not permit one to predict in advance the behavior of
elements or the properties that a compound might have once any two or more elements
have combined together. Moreover, it is not as though there was a complete absence of
any theoretical understanding of chemical bonding before the quantum theory was
introduced. Lewis’s theory, whereby covalent bonds occur when elements share pairs of
electrons, gave a good account of the bonding in most compounds. Lewis arrived at his
theory over a period of time but his crucial realization was that most stable molecules
have an even number of electrons, while unstable ones such as nitrogen monoxide (NO)
possess an odd number of electrons. Lewis thus naturally assumed that bonding to form
stable molecules involved the pairing of electrons.
Admittedly the quantum mechanical theory, devised by Heitler, London, Pauling,
Millikan and others goes beyond this homely picture of pairs of electrons, mysteriously
holding atoms together. However, Lewis’ concept of bonds as pairs of electrons is not
thereby refuted but rather given a deeper physical mechanism. According to the quantum
mechanical account electrons are regarded as occupying bonding and anti-bonding
orbitals. To a first approximation, if the number of bonding electrons exceeds the
number of anti-bonding electrons the molecule is predicted to be a stable one.1
Moreover, the electrons occupy these orbitals two by two in pairs. The deeper
understanding lies in the fact that the electrons are regarded as spinning in opposite
directions within all such pairs. Indeed it is the exchange energy associated with electron
spin which accounts quantitatively for the bonding in any compound and it is in this last
respect that the quantum mechanical theory goes beyond Lewis’s theory.
Linus Pauling, one of the chief architects of the quantum mechanical account of
chemical bonding was quick to point out the continuity with Lewis’ concept when he
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wrote the following passage in perhaps his main contribution to the theory of chemical
bonding,2
It may be pointed out that this theory is in simple cases entirely equivalent to G.N.
Lewis’s successful theory of the shared electron pair, advanced in 1916 on the
basis of purely chemical evidence. Lewis’s electron pair consists now of two
electrons which are in identical states except that their spins are opposed (Pauling
1928, 359).
There is another aspect of McLaughlin’s above cited passage that is entirely
incorrect, namely his claim that the discovery of the structure of DNA owes something to
the quantum mechanical theory of bonding. As a matter of fact there is no connection
whatsoever between these two developments. All I can think of to explain McLaughlin’s
statement is that Pauling was involved in both developments.3 But of course Pauling
rather famously failed to find the structure of DNA and was beaten to it by Crick and
Watson.
In fact the discovery of the structure of DNA was driven almost entirely by the Xray diffraction evidence that became available to Crick and Watson, courtesy of Wilkins
and Franklin. It did not rest on any quantum mechanical calculations or indeed any
insights provided by the theory.4 McLaughlin does not say anything whatsoever about
pre-quantum mechanical theories of bonding, except to imply that they were completely
inadequate. At the same time he suggests that the quantum mechanical theory has
provided a complete answer to the question of bonding. Neither of these extreme
positions are correct.
It is not clear whether it is the superior quantitative nature of the quantum
mechanical theory that McLaughlin is so impressed by since he does not say. The only
argument offered is that the quantum mechanical theory led directly to the elucidation of
the structure of DNA and hence the development of modern molecular biology and
genetics. If one separates any implications of the quantum mechanical theory of
chemical bonding for the later developments in molecular biology as I am urging, it
raises the question of why McLaughlin believes that quantum mechanics was so
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overwhelmingly successful in chemistry, to the extent of rendering emergentism about
bonding completely untenable. McLaughlin offers us no such argument for the
superiority of the quantum mechanical account of bonding over the earlier classical
theory of Lewis. McLaughlin implies that the quantum mechanical theory provides what
the classical theory could not, namely the power to predict how two elements might react
together. Or is McLaughlin suggesting that using quantum mechanics we can predict the
properties of an element from a knowledge of the number of fundamental particles that its
atoms possess?
Unfortunately, as anyone who is aware of the current state of quantum chemistry
knows well, neither of these feats is are possible. In the case of elements we can predict
particular properties perhaps such as ionization energies but not chemical behavior. In
the case of compounds what can be achieved is an accurate estimate, and in many cases
even predictions, regarding specific properties in the compounds that are known to have
formed between the elements in question. Quantum mechanics cannot yet predict what
compounds will actually form. Broad’s complaint about the inability of mechanistic or
classical chemistry to predict the properties of elements or the outcome of chemical
reactions between any two given elements remains unanswered to this day. Why then
should we accept McLaughlin’s claim that pioneer quantum chemistry, let alone today’s
version of the theory of bonding, can so decisively deal a death-blow to any notions of
emergence and downward causation?
Of course if McLaughlin believes otherwise the onus is on him to marshal some
support from the contemporary literature in quantum chemistry. Merely claiming,
incorrectly as it happens, that the theory of bonding led to development of molecular
biology will simply not do.
In any case, as McLaughlin himself seems to concede, the advent of a quantum
mechanical theory of bonding did not in fact kill off emergentism completely since some
prominent biologists and neurophysiologists such as Roger Sperry, whom he cites,
continued to work in this tradition. Moreover, if one surveys the literature in science as
well as philosophy of science, one cannot fail to be struck by the ‘re-emergence of
emergence’, as it has aptly been termed, in recent years (Cunningham, 2001). This is
equally true of the humanities as it is of the physical sciences. For example, the
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prominent Harvard chemist George Whitesides has been devoting an increasing amount
of attention to supporting claims for the emergence of chemical phenomena from
physical ones, precisely the example of emergence which McLaughlin wishes to deny so
strenuously (Whitesides, Ismagilov, 1999). Rather than being ‘killed off’ by the quantum
mechanical account of chemical bonding, emergence is alive and well. McLaughlin’s
attempt to assert the reduction of chemistry by appealing to the non-existence of
emergence of the chemical from the physical, and his associated denial of downward
causation are thus entirely unconvincing at least to the present author.
Finally, as Kim has pointed out in another context, the notion of emergence is a
perfectly respectable one that bears some striking similarities to the currently popular
notion of non-reductive physicalism that prevails in the philosophy of mind.5 I do not
believe that a straightforward appeal to the quantum mechanical account of chemical
bonding can be taken as signaling the demise of emergence of chemistry from physics. I
suggest that the claim made by McLaughlin takes the Quinean recommendation, of
finding one’s ontology from contemporary scientific theories, a little too far.
3.
Another approach to the Reduction of Chemistry - Le Poidevin.
The second article under consideration also raises the question of the ontology of
chemistry. To what extent can we avail ourselves of knowledge obtained through
theories such as quantum mechanics? Robin Le Poidevin, contrary to McLaughlin’s
approach, believes that we need to separate ontology from epistemology rather sharply. 6
He claims to have given an argument in favor of the ontological reduction of chemistry,
which does not appeal to the fortunes of any particular physical or chemical theory. He
also hopes to bypass the kinds of problems that beset a physicalist approach to
ontological reduction. As he explains, these are problems which apply to the reduction of
the mental, as much as they do to the reduction of the biological or chemical levels to
fundamental physics.
Le Poidevin makes special mention of the periodic system and of Mendeleev's
prediction of new elements. He sets out to discover why Mendeleev was so confident
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that the elements he predicted actually existed. Le Poidevin claims that this is not a
question about Mendeleev’s confidence in the periodic law but rather about an implicit
conceptual move. If one grants that the gaps in the periodic table represented genuine
possibilities, elements that could exist, why did Mendeleev assume that the possibilities
would actually be realized?
Le Poidevin then draws the following distinction.
Even if some elements in the table are merely possible, there is a genuine
difference between the physical possibility of an element between, say, zinc and
arsenic (atomic numbers 30 and 33), and the mere logical possibility of an
element between potassium and calcium (19 and 20) (Le Poidevin, 2005, p.
119).
I refer to this passage because the discreteness in the existence of elements goes
on to play a pivotal role in Le Poidevin's eventual argument in favor of the ontological
reduction of chemistry. Le Poidevin agrees with those who in recent years have claimed
that chemistry is not reduced to physics in an epistemological sense but, to repeat, his real
goal is to examine the ontological question without appeal to theories.
The thesis of ontological reduction is that properties we would recognize as
paradigmatically falling within the domain of chemistry are determined by more
fundamental properties. Ontological reduction is not committed to the view that
we are already acquainted with these more fundamental properties, nor even that,
once acquainted with them, we could successfully derive the chemical properties
from the fundamental ones. There is, I think, a strong intuition that ontological
reduction is true, whatever the fortunes of epistemological reduction. But what is
the source of this intuition? Can ontological reduction be defended independently
of epistemological reduction? (Le Poidevin, 2005, p. 120-121).
Le Poidevin's answer to the last question is that it can. In addition he is well
aware that the frequent appeal to physicalism that is made, especially in the philosophy of
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mind, is plagued by some rather serious problems. The author reminds us that the claim
that chemical properties supervene on those properties described by the complete science
is just as trivial as the thesis that mental properties do. Secondly he brings up the socalled ‘symmetry problem’. Even if we suppose a one-to-one correspondence between a
given chemical property and one described by physics, that correspondence would not by
itself suggest that one is more fundamental than the other
Le Poidevin considers the relationship between valence and electronic
configuration in an effort to cast further light on these issues,
Suppose, for example, valency to supervene on electronic configuration. At first
sight, the relation appears to be asymmetric because of a valency of 1, for
example, can be realized by a number of distinct configurations, but nothing can
differ in terms of valency without also differing in terms of electronic
configuration. However, the relevant part of the configuration--the part that
determines valency--will not vary among elements of the same valency. The
determination therefore goes both ways (Mumford [1994]). So chemical
reductionism, the one thing that physicalists supposed they could hold up to the
world as a shining example of the success of their programme, is suspect for some
of the same reason that physicalism about the mental is suspect (Le Poidevin,
2005, p. 123-124).
Is Le Poidevin correct in his assertion that " nothing can differ in terms of valency
without also differing in terms of electronic configuration"? In fact this is not the case
since, as is well known, most non-metal elements can show variable valences in spite of
possessing a single electronic configuration. Sulfur, to take just one example, has the
electronic configuration of 1s2, 2s2, 2p6, 3s2, 3p4. Nevertheless, it commonly shows
valences of +2, +4 or +6 such as in the compounds SCl2, SO2 and SO3 respectively.
But Le Poidevin is nevertheless still correct in pointing out that in general the
symmetry problem is a pressing one. One cannot be sure that it is the 'lower' levels that
determine the 'upper' levels and not vice versa. The grounding of reduction requires
something more than the physicalist prejudice, or the hope, that physical levels determine
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chemical levels and not vice versa. Le Poidevin propose to circumvent both this problem
and the problem of vacuity, mentioned above, by an approach that he terms
combinatorialism.
The central contention of combinatorialism is this: possibilities are just
combinations of actually existing simple items (individuals, properties, relations).
Let us call this the principle of recombination. To illustrate it, suppose the actual
world to contain just two individuals, a and b, and two monadic properties, F and
G, such that (Fa & Gb). Assuming F and G to be incompatible properties, and
ignoring the possibility of there being nothing at all, then the following is an
exhaustive list of the other possibilities:
1.
Fa
2.
Fb
3.
Ga
4.
Gb
5.
Fa & Fb
6.
Ga & Gb
7.
Ga & Fb
(Le Poidevin, 2005, p. 124).
Le Poidevin explains that combinatorialism is a form of reductionism about
possibilia. He claims that the talk of non-existent possibilia is made true by virtue of
actual objects and their properties, just as the inhabitants of his model world is made
possible by virtue of a and b and the properties F and G. Here the reader is being
implicitly invited to also consider such examples as Mendeleev's predicted elements in
this way. According to le Poidevin’s approach, the elements that are as yet non-existent
but physically possible are those that can be regarded as combinations of some undefined
basic objects and/or basic properties.
Le Poidevin suggests that this approach provides a means of establishing the
required asymmetry in order to ground the reduction of the chemical to the physical or
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the mental to the physical, and a means of countering the symmetry problem alluded to
earlier.
A property-type F is ontologically reducible to a more fundamental property-type
G is the possibility of something's being F is constituted by a recombination of
actual instances of G, but the possibility of something's being G is not constituted
by a recombination of actual instances of F (Le Poidevin, 2005, p. 129).
I come now to the crucial argument in Le Poidevin's paper,
But since the thesis of ontological reduction is about properties, we do have to
have a clear conception of what is to count as a chemical property. I shall take the
identity of an element, as defined by its position in a periodic ordering, and its
associated macroscopic properties (capacity to form compounds of a given
composition with other elements, solubility etc.) to be paradigmatically chemical
properties. About these properties we can be unapologetic realists. A periodic
ordering is a classification rather than a theory, so this conception of chemical
properties is as theory-neutral as it can be.7 Below this level, the theoretical
content, and corresponding pressure to be instrumentalist, increases. The question
of the ontological reduction of chemistry (or at least the question I am interested
in) is the question of whether these paradigmatically chemical properties reduce
to more fundamental properties (Le Poidevin, 2005, p. 131).
Let me say something about the second sentence since I think this will turn out to
be Le Poidevin's undoing. In his brief list of what he terms paradigmatically chemical
properties the author has lumped together (a) the identity of elements, (b) their capacity
to form compounds of a certain composition and (c) their solubilities. But there is a longstanding philosophical view whereby elements should be regarded as having a dual
nature consisting of basic substances and of simple substances (Paneth, 1962). If one
takes this dual view seriously it casts doubt on Le Poidevin's lumping together of the
existence of elements and their properties such as solubilities.
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As Mendeleev, and more recently Paneth among others have stressed, the notion
of an element as a basic substance concerns just its identity and its ability to act as the
bearer of properties. A basic substance does not however possess any properties.8 The
‘properties’ of an element however reside in the simple substance and not in the element
as a basic substance. According to this view, the identity of an element and its properties
are regarded as being quite separate. If we consider le Poidevin’s three examples, namely
identity, capacity to form compounds and solubility we see a conflation of basic
substance aspects (identity) with simple substance aspects (solubility). It is only by
failing to distinguish between the identity of elements and their possessing properties,
such as solubility, that Le Poidevin is able to give the impression that he has provided an
argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry as a whole.
He then adds,
We might, just accept it as a brute fact about the world that the series of elements
was discrete. But if there were a finite number of properties, combinations of
which generate the physical possibilities represented by the periodic table, then
variation would necessarily be discrete rather than continuous. We can believe in
the existence of these fundamental entities and properties without subscribing to
any particular account of them (e.g. an account in terms of electronic
configuration), such accounts at least show us the way in which chemical
properties could be determined by more fundamental ones. The point is that,
given the principle of recombination, unless those more fundamental properties
exist, unactualized elements would not be physical possibilities (Le Poidevin,
2005, p. 131-132).
Let me try to rephrase the argument. We assume that the combination of a finite
number of fundamental properties, via a combinatorial approach, leads to a discrete set of
macroscopic physical possibilities. We also know empirically that the chemical elements
occur in a discrete manner since there are no intermediate elements between, say,
hydrogen and helium. Le Poidevin is thus claiming that his combinatorial approach can
thus be taken as an explanation for the discreteness in the occurrence of elements and
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furthermore that it justifies the fact that Mendeleev regarded the yet undiscovered
elements like germanium as being physical possibilities rather than merely logical ones.
4.
Further comments on Le Poidevin
One might even grant that Le Poidevin's argument provide the sought after justification
for the ontological reduction of the chemical elements to fundamental physical properties.
But has Le Poidevin provided any grounding for the ontological reduction of chemistry
tout court? I think not. For example, the solubilities of elements which the author
included in his list of paradigmatically chemical properties does not occur in a discrete
manner. A particular ionic compound can have a solubility of 5 grams per liter. Another
one might have a solubility of 6 grams per liter of water. But there is nothing discrete
about solubility. It is quite possible that other salts will display solubilities falling
anywhere between these two values.
Unlike the existence of chemical elements which does appear to be a discrete
phenomenon, solubility or acidity or basicity or oxidizing power or indeed almost every
"paradigmatically chemical property" does not form a discrete set. As a result one cannot
invoke a combinatorial argument of the type suggested by le Poidevin in order to provide
an ontological grounding for these properties. Le Poidevin would only have provided a
general argument for the ontological reduction of chemical properties in terms of
combinatorialism if all properties, without fail, displayed discreteness in the manner in
which they occur.
As to whether Le Poidevin has separated the question of ontological reduction as
fully from that of epistemological reduction as he seemed to promise in his article, I have
some doubts. Admittedly, the ordering of the chemical elements may not be in any sense
theoretical, as he states, but there is no denying that ordering the elements by way of
atomic number, or by whatever other means, is dependent on our knowledge of the
elements. It is just that this knowledge takes the form of a classification or ordering
rather than a theory as Le Poidevin correctly points out. But surely this does not render
the act of classification any less epistemological.
Finally, I would like to point out some specific points concerning Le Poidevin's
analysis. Let me return to the question of the discrete manner in which the elements
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occur. This fact, it will be recalled, is taken by Le Poidevin to support a combinatorial
argument whereby a finite number of fundamental entities or properties combine together
to give a discrete set of composite elements. But what if we consider the combination of
quarks (charge = 1/3), instead of protons (charge = 1)? In the former case a finite number
of quarks would also produce a discrete set of atoms of the elements only the discreteness
would involve increments of one-third instead of integral units. In fact chemists and
physicists have been actively searching for such ‘quark matter’ (JØrgensen,
)
And if this were the case, then it would be physically possible for there to be two
elements between say Z = 19 and Z = 20 to use Le Poidevin's example. Let us further
suppose that a future theory might hold that the fundamental particles are some form of
sub-quarks with a charge of 0.1 units. Under these conditions combinatorialism would
lead to the existence of nine physical possibilities between elements 19 and 20, and so on.
It would appear that Le Poidevin's distinction between a physical possibility, as opposed
to a merely logical one, is dependent on the state of knowledge of fundamental particles
at any particular epoch in the history of science which is surely not what Le Poidevin
intends. Indeed the distinction proposed by Le Poidevin would appear to be susceptible
to a form of vacuity, not altogether unlike the threat of vacuity which is faced by
physicalism, and which was supposed to be circumvented by appeal to combinatorialism.
Finally there is a somewhat general objection to the use of combinatorialism in
order to ground the ontological reduction of chemistry. It would seem, at least to the
present author, that the assumption that fundamental entities combine together to form
macroscopic chemical entities ensures from the start that the hoped for asymmetry is
present. But it seems to do so in a circular manner. If one assumes that macroscopic
chemical entities like elements are comprised of sub-atomic particles then of course it
follows that the reverse is not true. The hoped for asymmetry appears to have been
written directly into the account, rather than deduced.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, after many years during which philosophers of chemistry
concentrated on the question of the epistemological reduction of chemistry, and had
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perhaps dismissed the question of ontological reduction as a foregone conclusion, there
has been a recent resurgence of interest in the ontological question. McLaughlin has used
the success of the quantum theory of chemical bonding to conclude incorrectly that the
emergence of chemistry from physics is entirely ruled out. Le Poidevin claims to have
given an ontological argument in favor of the reduction of chemistry which does not
appeal to any physical theories and yet it appears to do just that.
My own conclusion is that one should exercise moderation between an extreme
Quinean approach of attending solely to scientific theories and Le Poidevin’s approach of
dispensing altogether with the findings of scientific theories. Surely a more subtle
approach is required in trying to uncover the ontology of chemistry or any other special
science. Of course one needs to consult the findings of the empirical sciences in
question, but there is still scope for philosophical consideration, perhaps along the
general lines offered by Le Poidevin. Philosophical positions such as reductionism,
atomism and emergence cannot be judged on the basis of some contemporary theory or
other. In addition if one does consult the findings of scientific theories to draw
ontological lessons it is essential for one to do so in an accurate manner and not in the
way that these two authors appear to have done.
Although it is encouraging to now see mainstream philosophers taking an interest
in chemistry they need to also get the chemistry right.
1
I am referring here to molecular orbital theory as developed by Mulliuken, Hund and
others which is mathematically equivalent to the valence bond method to which Pauling
made seminal contributions. The notion of bonds as pairs of electrons is no less retained
in the valence bond method which in many senses is closer to Lewis’ classical theory,
although I do not have the space to enter into the details here.
2
This article is singled out, and reproduced, in a recent book by Alan Lightman as one of
the 22 most influential scientific articles of the twentieth century. (Lightman, 2005).
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3
Admittedly Pauling discovered that protein molecules have the structure of an  helix
and this was a step towards the realization by Crick and Watson that DNA has a double
helical structure. But no quantum mechanics went into Pauling’s discovery.
Furthermore, Pauling was involved in the race to find the structure of DNA but by his
own admission was working on altogether the wrong track. Neither he nor Crick and
Watson employed any quantum mechanics in their search for the structure of DNA.
McLaughlin repeats his false claim again, regarding the path to the discovery of the
structure of DNA, later in the article.
4
Among the other evidence was a knowledge of base pairing which had been obtained
previously by Chargaff. The definitive source on the discovery of the structure of DNA
is due to Robert Olby, 1974.
5
This is not to say that Kim supports either emergence or non-reductive physicalism. In
fact he argues that non-reductive physicalism in particular represents an unstable position
(Kim, 1999).
6
In this respect Le Poidevin differs from other contemporary authors whose ontological
views are heavily influenced by theoretical developments in quantum chemistry
(McLaughlin, 1992).
7
It may well be theory neutral but it is surely not epistemologically neutral. God does
not order the elements. It is scientific knowledge by way of Moseley and others that has
allowed us to order the elements into a coherent sequence. Again I don't want to deflect
any attention from the main line of argumentation.
8
Except for possessing an atomic weight which is the characteristic property of an
element as a basic substance for Mendeleev. In modern terms, the characteristic property
becomes atomic number.
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