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A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769-1821)
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A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
NAPOLEON I (1769-1821)
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Napoleon Bonaparte’s Legacy
Bonaparte is often seen in black or white terms as tyrant or emancipator.
He certainly has more features of the former than the latter. Despite the
many hagiographies that abound about the great man (Cronin’s being
especially uncritical and nauseating) it is difficult to see him as other than
a diminutive megalomaniac bent on the domination of Europe. But then,
I’m not French.
His legacy to Europe and France was, arguably, largely negative. His
decade and a half of wars had cost millions of lives, resulted in numerous
destroyed homes and villages, and had disastrous long-term, politicoeconomic consequences for the whole of Europe. His actions, arguably,
aided the forces of reaction and he himself showed many reactionary and
arch-conservative tendencies. He did introduce a number of positive and
welcome changes to French society, but the Corsican also undermined and
destroyed many of the improvements introduced by the French Revolution
of 1789. Admittedly, successive Revolutionary governments had
themselves undermined the more radical and foresighted reforms, but
Napoleon would go on to eliminate even the few freedoms that had
survived.
In 1815, he had been welcomed back from exile in Elba, ironically because
the Bourbons (Louis XVIII) who had replaced him, had behaved too much
like him, including retaining conscription and his most recent tax
increases.
However, Napoleon did have some important socio-economic
achievements.
The best of Napoleon’s actions included:
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His introduction of the ‘Code Napoleon’ which brought in a more
clearly defined series of laws which granted equality in the law;
religious freedoms and trail by jury; it would be the system used for
the basis of laws in many parts of the world (30 countries),
including Spain and South America; Napoleon certainly regarded
this as the most lasting achievement of his life;
He always maintained the support of the main beneficiaries of the
Revolution, the middle class, and confirmed the peasantry in
possession of their new lands; his 1977 biographer, Jean Tulard,
has pointed out that Napoleon was the first in a line of saviours
supported by the bourgeoisie when it felt its interests vitally
threatened;
His religious toleration, which saw freedom of worship reestablished and a Concordat with the papacy, in 1801; Lee says he
saw religion as useful “social cement”, but wished to avoid religious
controversy; he used the Concordat to confirm government
appointment of the clergy and minimised papal interference in
France; his Organic Laws guaranteed freedom of worship for
Protestants and others, but perhaps again only pragmatically: to
minimise the power of the RC Church;
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
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He dismantled the discriminatory Jewish ghettoes in Rome and
Venice, but arguably only to gain Jewish support for the Empire,
than out of any genuine humanitarianism;
His bringing in (1802) of a meritous award known as the Legion
d’Honneur, which was available to be won by all classes of French
society, was a genuinely popular move; it also usefully continued to
create the impression that France was a meritocratic society;
He set up more universities, schools and colleges and introduced
the lycee, to be run on military lines; science and maths would
become more prominent elements of the curriculum; George Rude
has commented that by 1813 France probably had the best and
most advanced education system, in Europe;
Architectural changes were made that improved the appearance of
Paris and the quality of life of Parisians (the Rue de Rivoli being one
of the new streets that were built); elsewhere in France new roads,
canals and bridges were constructed;
For strictly pragmatic reasons, in order to keep the population
quelled, Napoleon also ensured that bread prices were kept low;
He reformed the currency and re-introduced a metallic base after
the disastrous earlier experiments of the Revolution with paper
money like assignats: between 1799 and 1814 some 75 million
francs in gold and silver returned into circulation; he established the
Bank of France in 1800 and re-introduced the decimal system; he
encouraged industry by means of fairs and exhibitions and was
determined to avoid the fiscal problems that had brought down the
Bourbons.
However, on the whole it is difficult to see Napoleon as other than a
proto-fascist dictator in many ways and as such a model perhaps for those
who came after him; certainly he had the pessimistic, essentially
contemptuous (according to Chateaubriand) view of humanity, and says
Lee, had much in common with the enlightened despots of Russia, Austria
and Prussia; his methods had both elements similar to those of the ancien
regime and even the 20th century, including a personality cult. Lee terms
his rule one of “plebiscitary dictatorship”. Trotsky always associated
Bonapartism with the capture of revolution by military reactionaries.
Corelli Barnett sees him as an unprincipled adventurer whose ‘genius’
owes more to propaganda than to deeds. When one looks at Napoleon’s
actions the reactionary element is certainly very obvious:
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He may have kept the departments system introduced in 1790, but
he also continued the centralising policies begun by the Directory
(1795-1799), which provided him with more effective power than
the Bourbons had, stresses Lee; like the Roman Emperor,
Augustus, he maintained the illusion of the republic, while having
established a dictatorship. He discarded the ideas of liberty,
equality and fraternity and preferred the aura of royal power and
was even a believer in divine right! He adopted the title Le Grand
in 1807; like later dictators he was fond of what Hitler called ‘the
Big Lie’, and utilised the artistic skills of Ingres, Gericault, Gros and
David, as well as the plebiscite, to give people the mirage of their
involvement in politics;
He neglected the urban proletariat favouring employers, though Lee
points out that the Revolution itself had hardly favoured the poor
very much either (having also banned unions, for example, in the
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
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Le Chapelier Law of 1791); in addition workers were now required
to carry a pass-book stamped by their employers;
In many ways, his economic thinking remained anachronistic, with
a stress on agriculture rather than industry; he re-established the
emphasis on regressive indirect taxes, reversing the Revolution’s
emphasis on fairer, direct forms of taxation; Lee is adamant that
Napoleon’s policies established precedents for later rulers like the
German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Mussolini;
Education at primary level remained neglected as it had been under
the ancien regime prior to 1789;
The number of lycees built ensured places at the 36 for only 9000
pupils, hardly ensuring a great influx of scientists and engineers;
Parents were given almost biblical powers over their children, even
being allowed to imprison them for up to a month; illegitimate
children had few rights;
Equally, husbands had enormous powers over their wives who were
no longer allowed to sell, give away or mortgage property, and who
Napoleon wanted to stay at home and, literally, stick to knitting;
divorce became virtually impossible;
Trials may have been public and jury-led and enshrined rights in
the Code Napoleon, but Napoleon’s secret police under the arch
political survivor, Joseph Fouche, ensured many opponents of the
regime never came to trial and in 1810 the law was changed to
allow people to be arrested without trial and even to be branded, as
under the ancien regime; M. Latey says the absolute monarchs who
re-established themselves after Napoleon’s fall learned from his
methods how to keep their populations repressed;
Free speech was not allowed, critics disappeared and newspapers
were censored; Richard Cobb has even characterised his rule as:
“France’s most appalling regime”;
Feudal privileges and titles may have been abolished, but Napoleon
then created a new aristocracy many of whom were from his own
family and successful army marshals; he even made his mediocre
brother, Joseph, King of Spain, precipitating the disastrous war in
that country, in 1808 (Spain had been an ally previous to that);
Napoleon even frequently behaved like the kings of old even
reintroducing letters de cachet and of course crowning himself
emperor in 1804;
Noun
Verb
Adjective
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Bonaparte In A Typical Bombastic Pose
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Foreign Policy
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Napoleon once said that “every treaty of peace means no more to me
than a brief armistice”. He was intent on the expansion of the French
empire already begun by the Revolutionary Wars (1792-1799). At its
height the empire would consist of: 44 million subjects, 130 departments
and half a million square miles.
As with his domestic policy, the dominant leitmotif of his imperial policy
was pragmatism. Napoleon was prepared to concede certain rights and
privileges to his foreign vassals and allies, if they remained loyal.
Exploited for taxes, customs duties, conscripts and prestige, there were
basically three types of territory within the Empire. There were vassal
states under direct French control, with a puppet ruler like Louis and
Joseph Bonaparte (kings of Holland and Spain respectively); there were
allied states genuinely sympathetic to France, like the Napoleonic creation
of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; and then there were the states who were
nominal, uneasy allies: Austria, Denmark and Prussia.
Napoleon promised the Poles national restoration in return for their
military support. He effectively divided the continent of Europe into two
spheres of influence, with his 1807 agreement at Tilsit with Alexander I of
Russia, which allowed the latter to concentrate on his more traditional
foes: Turkey and Sweden.
As with his domestic policies, a strong element of authoritarianism was
always apparent in Napoleon’s thinking. He wrote to his brother Jerome:
“if you listen to popular opinion you will achieve nothing”. He allowed the
Code Napoleon to be taken up in the empire not from any sense of
enlightened thinking, but to fortify his power and control.
Eventually though people began to realise how Napoleon was exploiting
them. How he played with their national aspirations, creating the basis
for a united Italy (Cisalpine Republic) and Germany (Confederation of the
Rhine), but never intending them to develop into nation-states. The
Grand Duchy of Warsaw was a useful buffer state between the French and
Russian empires, and so on.
Many of France’s vassals and allies of course realised quite quickly what
was going on. In Italy, anti-Napoleonic, nationalist societies like the
Carbonari and Federati were formed, especially in Francophobe Naples.
Attitudes to the Jewish people really show what Napoleon was about. In
areas where it suited him (Rome, Venice, Germany), ghettoes were
dismantled and discrimination outlawed. However, in Poland
discrimination continued, because he did not want to alienate the rabidly
anti-Semitic and influential Polish Church.
However, he cannot, at least, be blamed solely for his wars with GB, a
nation traditionally hostile to France and whose colonial and mercantile
ambitions, and worries about the balance of power in Europe, were always
likely to make it an enemy of whatever regime happened to be ruling
France.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
After his dazzling successes of 1805-7(the pinnacle of his power), he had
introduced the Continental System, a form of economic warfare
designed to cripple GB, by denying it trade. The Berlin Decree of 1806
declared GB to be ‘in a state of blockade’, ordering all goods coming to
and from GB and her colonies (including the Turks and Caicos!) to be
seized. Austria and Russia after Tilsit were forced to agree.
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Though the system was haphazard, there were successes:
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From 1808 British trade did slump heavily;
British desperation (the draconian Orders in Council) led to her seizure
of neutral vessels and in turn a disastrous war with the US (the War of
1812);
From 1810-1812, the blockade was fairly rigorously enforced, effecting
British trade and commerce, and pushing up bread prices in GB; in
1811, massive riots in England led to fears of revolution;
However, the Blockade was never anything but erratic and even illogical:
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For a man so obsessed with keeping bread prices down in his own
country, Napoleon failed to see the importance of depriving GB of
wheat. Incredibly, in 1810 over 80% of GB’s imports of wheat had
come from France and her allies! Napoleon had missed a very real
chance of starving his arch-enemy into submission;
Napoleon did not uniformly enforce the blockade, selling licenses to
enable French (and occasionally US) ships to trade with the enemy;
GB with its unbeaten navy managed to find new markets for its goods
anyway outside the continent: in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey;
The blockade hurt France’s allies, as much as the British, if not more.
Finding their trade declining and their ports stagnating they began to
slip from Napoleon’s side; some like Portugal had always refuse to join
the system anyway;
George Rude is convinced that the Continental System began the chain of
events that led to Napoleon’s downfall. By 1813, many of his former allies
(Russia, Austria and Prussia) had joined together to fight against him.
Yet for all its contradictions and hypocrisies, the Grand Empire had,
according to Rude: “shaken the old social order and laid the foundations of
the modern bourgeois state. For all his despotism, his arrogant unconcern
for popular and national sovereignty, his dynastic ambitions and his
increasing devotion to hierarchic order, the Emperor in his dealings with
Europe still saw himself as the heir and soldier of the Revolution. And
hesitantly and imperfectly as it might be, Europe continued to be
revolutionised under the empire, as it had been under the Consulate and
Directory”.
But then, like the Consulate and the Directory, the Grand Empire had also
betrayed the very principles of the original Revolution.
Emperor Napoleon I
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Military Assessment
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Napoleon’s military successes (he fought 40 battles in all) were equally
erratic. He has a reputation as a great strategist and tactician who could
defeat opponents from the Austrians and Russians to the Prussians.
Certainly, he created a huge French empire on the continent of Europe.
He was the famous victor of Marengo (1800), Austerlitz (1805) and Jena
(1806). He also defeated the Russians at Friedland in 1807 and the
Austrians at Wagram, in 1809. However, closer inspection of even ‘his’
victories suggests that the story of Napoleon’s military genius is a little
more complicated.
At Marengo, Michael Glover call’s his own share in the victory “dubious”
and claims that it was Generals Desaix and Kellerman who really won the
victory against the Austrians. His crossing of the Alps into Italy for the
battle was says J.C. Herold, a triumph of the soldiers, the mules and
General Berthier - not Napoleon. The Spanish, with British help, drove
him out of the Iberian peninsula. Napoleon was never able to invade
Britain nor did he ever beat the British in a major battle: on land or at
sea.
The French navy had never recovered from the Revolution, which had
decimated its officer corps. Never able to defeat the Royal Navy or
guarantee control of the English Channel for an invasion attempt, it could
not enforce the Continental System (designed to destroy GB’s trade)
either.
His infamous Russian campaign of 1812 was an unmitigated disaster and
saw the loss of the vast majority of the Grand Armee. Napoleon put the
losses of the retreat down to bad weather and snow, but the reality was
that poor planning, over-confidence and incompetence killed most of the
troops, as Adam Zamoyski in his excellent recent book on 1812, has
stressed.
In the campaign of 1812, and others, Napoleon had no qualms about
committing what today would be described as war crimes. He had
slaughtered 2000 disarmed, Turkish prisoners in Syria, for example.
Personal rivals and critics like the royal Duc D’Enghien were abducted and
shot. The military historian, David Chandler, has called him perfectly, in
my opinion: “a great bad man”.
He was defeated at Waterloo after a number of crucial mistakes. He
began the battle too late in the morning, allowing the Prussians to come
nearer to helping Wellington; he placed the impetuous Marshall Ney in
charge - and his tactics consisted of disastrously throwing infantry against
fortified farms like Hougoumont and, even more catastrophically,
attacking British and allied squares with massed cavalry charges.
Napoleon was ill on the morning of the battle (18th June, 1815); Berthier,
his most able general, was no longer at his side having died some years
before; even the famous and normally steadfast Old Guard had fled,
perhaps sick of dying for one man’s ambitions. Wright comments that at
Waterloo he “lacked the energy and decisiveness he had revealed in
1814”.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
His wars had certainly been very costly to the French people. 5.5% of
the French population (equivalent to 23% of the men of military age)
became casualties, compared with 3.4% for the admittedly shorter WWI.
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A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Key
Words
Navy
Taxes
Constitutional
Russians
England
France
Wellington
Vindictive
Cancer
Continental
Corsican
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Napoleon was never regarded
as an equal by the old dynasties
of Europe – he was the _______
upstart of no breeding and
dangerous ideas, associated too
closely with the Revolution; the
Queen of Prussia called him “the
scum from hell” and the King of
Sweden the really galling,
“Monsieur Napoleon Bonaparte”!
Napoleon was especially
despised by the British
who always refused any
lasting peace with him;
Napoleon in return resorted
to the _______ System to
try and destroy the ‘nation of
shopkeepers’; though Lee
points out how inconsistent
he was in its enforcement,
even trading with Britain!
His attempts to invade GB
never came to fruition and
they remained his bete noire
He was hated as a tyrant by the
peoples of Europe, especially the
________ and the Spanish whose
countries he invaded and pillaged; in the
latter nation, the peasantry and nobility
co-operated together against the French;
while in Russia, he failed to free the serfs
and reaped the bitter harvest of guerrilla
war there as well. Napoleon himself
always believed it was the ‘Spanish ulcer’
that had destroyed him
WHY DID
NAPOLEON
FALL FROM
POWER?
By 1814,
Napoleon
had lost the
goodwill of
not only most
of Europe, but
of a lot of
_______ itself
Napoleon’s increasing arrogance
and over-confidence caused him to
make mistakes like the invasions of
Spain and Russia; his victories saw not a
spirit of reconciliation, but a ________
humiliation of vanquished foes; Lee says
“he was not prepared to confer
partnership” and so had to fight Austria
five times, three of them caused by
insupportable treaties he had imposed
on the defeated Habsburgs; Talleyrand
had urged caution, but been ignored; he
imposed the harsh treaty of Tilsit on
Prussia in 1807, which Lee says, had
“exceptionally severe terms”
Militarily, Napoleon made huge
mistakes; the Peninsular War, e.g.;
Lee refers to his “catastrophic
blunder” in 1812 of invading Russia;
he forced too many unwilling
foreigners into the French army, thus
in 1814 only 40% were Frenchmen!
The allies were always going to be
able to bring greater nos. to bear
when they too adopted conscription;
the allies also produced better
commanders, e.g. Duke of ________
The coalition of 1813 between powers who
hated each other shows just how much
Napoleon was feared even more by them.
Autocracies joined with ______________
monarchies to defeat their common enemy
Napoleon was physically worn
out by 1815. No longer young
and dynamic, he was ill and soon to
die in exile, of stomach ________
The Continental System
failed and further alienated
potential support for
Napoleon, especially amongst
the mercantile classes, and
from 1810, Russia;
Napoleon’s _____ was also
inadequate to the task of
blockade, having only 71
ships of the line in 1813
compared to GB’s 235. Lee
stresses the importance of
this disparity in his ultimate
defeat
Napoleon was a man
without humility or
perspective. On his defeat at
Waterloo, he expected the
British to allow him to live a
comfortable existence in
__________, as a country
gentleman!
Napoleon had betrayed the principles
of the Revolution. Many in Europe
might have supported him otherwise. At
home, royalist & Jacobin opponents were
active, sick of his ________ & wars
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
NAPOLEON – EMANCIPATOR OR TYRANT?
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Was I a reactionary or a revolutionary?
GROUP/AREA
1. Bonaparte Family
2. Parisians
3. Ordinary male citizens
4. Opponents
5. Journalists
6. Husbands
7. Wives
8. Children
9. Conscripts
10. The Nobility
11. Christians
12. The Spanish
ACTION
A. Made them learn more maths, science and do
military training; discriminated against, if they were
illegitimate offspring;
B. Newspapers were censored and they were not
allowed to print what they wanted to say
C. Forced to join the army, often when still boys;
many were killed in Napoleon’s numerous wars
D. Told to do as they were told; had few rights, and
ordered to stick to knitting by a misogynistic Napoleon
E. Saw their city improved and modernised, and
become the centre of a continental empire
F. Were now allowed to vote, but there were never
any free and fair elections
G. Were rounded up by Fouquet’s secret police, and
often tortured and executed without trial
H. Allowed to practise their beliefs unhindered
I. Had total control in their household, where their
word was law
J. Given responsibility, titles and wealth, little of which
was deserved or for which they were competent
K. Invaded, treated harshly, but eventually won their
freedom through a ruthless guerrilla warfare
L. Titles were restored, and France now had again
what the Revolution had previously abolished
Questions:
1. What groups in society did well out of Napoleon’s changes?
…………………………………………………………………………………...
2. Which groups did not do so well?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
3. In what ways was Napoleon revolutionary?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
4. In what ways was Napoleon reactionary?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
5. What is your overall opinion of Napoleon’s reforms?
…………………………………………………………………………………
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
1769
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Key Events: Napoleon
Born in Ajaccio, Corsica (a French island only since 1768). Son of a petty-noble, a
Genoese lawyer.
1785
Graduates from the École Militaire in Paris. Without the right blood never would have
gained entry.
1793
Fights as an artillery lieutenant against the British at Toulon, where he makes his name.
1795
Saves Paris from a royalist mob determined to bring down the National Convention and
the Republic, and becomes a general.
1796
Marries the politically-connected Joséphine de Beauharnais, formerly the mistress of the
Directory’s Barras.
Barras makes him commander of the French army in Italy, which he conquers.
1798
Conquers Egypt.
1799
Fails to conquer Syria, and the British reverse his gains in Egypt. Returns to France
(leaving his troops to die of disease and neglect in the deserts) .
November 9-10. He and his colleagues seize power in a coup d’état and establish the
Consulate. Napoleon is First Consul, and shares power with two others, but in reality he
is master of France.
1800
Battle of Marengo. Austrians defeated, in one of Napoleon’s greatest victories.
Consolidates territorial gains in northern Italy, and establishes France’s borders.
Internal reforms codify rights gained during the French Revolution (the Code Napoléon).
1802
Made himself Consul for life.
1804
Crowned himself Emperor.
1805
Battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon decisively defeats an alliance of Austrian and Russian
forces.
1806
Makes his brothers kings of Holland and Naples, establishes the Confederation of the
Rhine (most of modern Germany), of which he is Protector, and enters Warsaw,
effectively controlling Poland. Imposes the Continental blockade, closing Europe to
British trade, in an attempt to bankrupt Great Britain.
1807
Seizes Portugal.
1808
Makes his brother Joseph King of Spain. The Peninsular War begins and lasts five years,
with British troops allied with the Spanish against Napoleon.
1809
Defeats Austria again at the Battle of Wagram, and annexes the Illyrian provinces.
1810
The Empire reaches its greatest extent. Napoleon divorces Josephine, in favour of MarieLouise, the daughter of the Austrian Emperor who gives him a son.
1812
Napoleon begins his unsuccessful invasion of Russia. After the disastrous retreat from
Moscow all Europe unites against him.
1813
Battle of the Nations at Leipzig further weakens the French army
1814
Napoleon abdicates unconditionally and goes into exile on the island of Elba, in the
Mediterranean.
1815
Escapes from Elba, and marches on Paris. The French rally to him, and the allies, Britain
and Prussia, join to crush him. He is defeated at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, and
later exiled to St. Helena where he writes his memoirs and places a positive spin on his
actions.
1821
Dies, on May 5. His body is taken to Paris and buried in state a number of years later
(1840). His admirer, Hitler, later places his son, Napoleon II, next to him.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
THE CONGRESS SYSTEM
(1814-1815)
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A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Europe in 1815
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The Europe Napoleon left for his rat-infested island exile of St. Helena had
200 million people (today c.730 million) in 1815, and was, in many ways,
essentially still a medieval society. The vast majority of Europeans
worked on the land; in Russia up until 1861 they were even still serfs!
What is a serf?
Industrialisation was growing, but even in GB, most people still earned a
living from the land (as opposed to about 2% today).
The dominant institutions then were: monarchies; aristocracies & the
Church and they wished to maintain the status quo. Napoleon Bonaparte
was the prime villain, because he seemed to threaten such institutions (in
reality Napoleon, the man who crowned himself emperor in 1804, was
himself a fan of the status quo in many ways). The ruling class was,
therefore, essentially conservative and reactionary. Plutocracy still
dominated societies and democracy was a long way off.
What does ‘plutocracy’, ‘conservative’, ‘reactionary’ and ‘democracy’
mean?
However, things were changing; nationalism was growing and the peoples
of Europe were starting to think of their rights, as much as their duties.
Liberalism was growing. Romanticism, with its expression of feeling and
emotion, was replacing the staid rationalism of the 18th century. Ludwig
van Beethoven symbolising the new age and its political/social ambitions,
with his powerful, free-spirited and original scores.
The Peace settlements of 1814 –1815 (The Congress of Vienna)
When Bonaparte was first defeated in May 1814, the First Treaty of Paris
treated the French leniently: no army of occupation; no indemnity; no
seizure of French colonies. The unpopular Bourbon monarchy of the
obese
Louis XVIII was, however, re-imposed on the French people. Russia and
Prussia were more interested in grabbing territory (the former, Poland,
the latter, Saxony).
However, Napoleon’s return (the so-called ‘Hundred Days’) and the
widespread support he accrued from the French people, meant the second
settlement, decided by the Congress of Vienna, would be far harsher.
The Second Treaty of Paris (November 1815) stated that:
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French frontiers would go back to 1790, i.e., they were not to keep
any of their conquests;
An indemnity of 700 million francs was imposed;
An army of occupation was imposed for a period of at least 3 years;
Those in attendance from the four major powers were:
 Tsar Alexander I of Russia;
 Prince Metternich of Austria;
 Viscount Castlereagh & Duke of Wellington of GB;
 Prince Hardenberg of Prussia;
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
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They all basically wanted a conservative settlement and a lasting
peace, and were in general agreement with each other. Poland was an
area of contention, with some parts going to Prussia and Austria, and a
large eastern slice to Russia. The Poles retained some independence
only in the free city of Kracow.
Prussia received large parts of Saxony, the Rhineland and even parts
of Swedish territory. At this stage Prussia was still pro-Russian.
The Russians, besides the kingdom of Poland, were also confirmed in
possession of Finland.
The Austrians, under the arch-conservative Prince Metternich, were
opposed to any concessions to Liberalism and Nationalism and wished
to re-assert their control over the Italian states.
The British retained their imperialistic conquests from the French and
Dutch, scattered all over the globe. In continental terms, they were
interested in keeping a strong Austria and Prussia in Central Europe to
counterbalance Russia in the east and France in the west.
Austria, Prussia and Russia formed a Holy Alliance, basically to
safeguard the status quo. Even the conservative British found this too
reactionary a step, however, and refused to join.
Problems in areas like the Balkans, where the interest of various
empires came into conflict, also remained unresolved.
The peoples of all these territories were, of course, not consulted. The
major powers were more interested in maintaining a balance of power
in Europe than anything else. As Watson comments: “liberal and
nationalist aspirations had little influence on the statesmen at Vienna”.
Instead their aims can be summarised as:
1. Retaining the balance of power, with no single power able to
dominate others, but as Dakin has commented, this concept
paradoxically and dangerously meant different things to different
nations;
2. A lasting peace after the 20 years of conflict that had just
occurred;
3. Compensation was of interest to the avaricious states: Holland
would get Belgium; Austria parts of Italy, etc.
4. Legitimacy, as proposed by Talleyrand, in reality meant it was
applied, as Seaman stresses, only really in the interest of the
French Bourbons and was ignored elsewhere like Poland, Norway
et al;
5. Containment involved the principle of buffer states along the
French border; it is one of the reasons the Grand Duchy of
Luxemburg, along with Andorra, Liechtenstein, etc. survive
today, of course;
What is historiography? How should we use it? Is it important?
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
15
The Congress did have a no. of positive outcomes though:
+ The French were represented at the Congress by Talleyrand. He
proposed the principle of legitimacy that all rightful rulers should be
restored to their thrones, and was keen to check the ambitions of
Russia in Poland, and those of Prussia generally;
+ Italy’s chaotic political system was rationalised - to an extent;
+ Germany’s many states were reduced to 39 and tied together in a
loose confederation (compare this to the 365 in 1500);
+ minority peoples, like the Genoese, were protected - to a degree;
+ free navigation of Europe’s waterways was allowed;
+ the slave trade was condemned;
Watson believes the statesmen of the Congress could “justifiably have
claimed that they had brought to Europe the peace at which they aimed”,
but admits that the overall terms were “fundamentally conservative”, and
helped to lead to decades of future conflict. Seaman is equally scathing of
Vienna, while Nicolson is more positive, saying it helped to preserve peace
for 40 years.
I tend to agree with Webster and see it as an expedient product of its
time, with very little foresight involved.
Assignment
Compare and Contrast the terms of the Congress of Vienna 1815 with
those of the Paris Treaties in 1919.
Theme
Economics
Territorial
Military
Political
Vienna
Versailles
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Empathy Exercise
What do you think each of these men, representing some of the major
powers, would have thought about the terms of the Congress of
Vienna?
“As GB’s representative I feel…
“France says…
“As autocrat of Russia…
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
17
1848 –YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
The Revolutions of 1848
18
The famous revolts of 1848 (‘The Year of Revolutions’) were largely a
miserable failure. However, they had important longer term
consequences. The Habsburg Empire against which they were largely, but
not solely, directed would survive for another 70 years. Only GB and
Russia would be largely unaffected by the revolts of that momentous year.
Why do you think this was so?
The Long Term Causes
These resulted from the events of 1815-1846 and included:



Population growth, which a still agrarian Europe couldn’t sustain,
especially in times of acute poor harvests;
Industrialisation resulted in urban over-crowding. Towns like
Lille in France saw an average age of death of 32; epidemics of
cholera ravaged France in the 1830s and 1847-9; strikes, riots,
increased crime, alcoholism were all serious problems;
mechanisation of industry displaced skilled artisans who were often
replaced by unskilled migrants from the countryside; of course,
conditions were just as bad in England and Russia, but no
revolutions would result there;
The Congress system was being increasingly challenged as
reactionary and out-moded; liberalism was developing throughout
Europe as the middle class became more numerous and tired of the
restrictions placed on their lives; on top of this, many of these
people were also nationalists tired of being ruled by foreign and
detached dynasties, especially that in Vienna;
The Short Term Causes


The food crisis. After 1845, a severe crisis developed which
helped to plunge Europe into revolt. Cereal and potato harvests
failed in the mid 1840s, so in Hamburg grain prices rose by 60%
and potato prices in parts of Germany by 135%. These were not
prices a man with a large family on a subsistence wage could
absorb, given they already had to spent 70% of their income on
food. In 1845-7 bread riots resulted, the crisis compounding the
long-term problems;
The financial crisis which began after 1845 forced many
businesses into bankruptcy after the rise in food prices saw other
manufacturers hit. The withdrawal of credit by British capital
severely cut borrowing. Overproduction was also a problem as it
was to be in the US in the late 1920s. Food hikes may have largely
affected the working classes, but business problems affected the
middle class who now made common ground with the ‘lower
classes’.
Events in France
Opposition in France to the rule of the conservative King Louis-Philippe
was sharpened by the economic crisis of 1845 onwards. Scandals and
financial corruption had besmirched the reputation of the ruling class,
especially as the majority of the middle class were excluded from being
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
19
allowed to vote by a stringent 200 franc tax qualification. The
incorrigible French King refused to compromise with the demands of the
disenfranchised who became increasingly desperate and radical.
Demonstrators were shot by royal troops and the always volatile Parisian
population, who also happened to be starving, created barricades, aided
by the militia. In late February, the King abdicated. The 2nd French
Republic would last only 4 years and like the 1st be replaced by a
Bonapartist dictatorship.
The aspirations of the working and middle classes were too disparate to
be hopeful for a prolonged co-operation. The consequent Provisional
Government has been described by Anthony Wood as “an indigestible
amalgam of two utterly different political groups”. Stop-gap social
measures by the PG were designed to temporarily placate the working
class. The peasants were increasingly taxed to try and solve the state’s
continuing fiscal difficulties. Universal male suffrage, however, was a
genuinely radical move and the electorate jumped from a pathetic 250
000 to 9 000 000! Subsequent elections saw the disaffected, but
essentially ignorant and easily influenced peasantry voting for
conservative and moderate, Church-advocated candidates. The
Constituent Assembly was thus highly biased in favour of the right and
this would create a potential for further conflict between them and the
urban masses. Barricades were once again erected in Paris, but this time
the government proved competent and General Cavaignac cleared the
streets during the June Days. 3000 rioters were killed; 12 000 arrested,
of whom 4000 were deported. Wilmot states that “the June Days
signalled the triumph of reaction over reform”. In December, the nephew
of the Corsican tyrant, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, was elected President of
a republic he would then set about dismantling.
What are the similarities between the events of 1848 and those of 1789?
The Habsburg Empire
The events of the French February Revolution were inspiration to the
radicals within the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire. In the latter, the
situation was made even more volatile by the added dimension of racial
tension between the disparate members of the Empire.
In Hungary, the Magyar nationalist Lajos Kossuth helped to pass the
‘March Laws’, a demand for Hungarian independence from Vienna, but
also containing radical social provisions and examples of Magyar
chauvinism and territorial ambition. Crisis in the imperial capital, which
culminated in the fall of that arch-reactionary Metternich from power, saw
Hungary gain its independence and a constitution, with Kossuth its virtual
dictator.
In Austria itself, Metternich had been got rid of by a radical mob
demanding social and political change. The Emperor Ferdinand was forced
to accept a constitution and to hold elections, before being driven out of
Vienna, in May.
In Czech Bohemia, similar nationalist and liberal demands to those of
Hungary resulted in the desperate Emperor accepting the liberal demands
and agreeing to set up a parliament for the Czechs in Prague.
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Northern Italy saw the Austrians being driven out by Milanese
protesters demanding liberal reforms and improved economic conditions,
for which the absence of Austrian troops was thought essential. In
Venice, Daniel Manin helped create an independent Venetian republic.
Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia all declared war on Austria, in March.
However, ultimately the revolutions of 1848 were a failure, as the
Habsburg monarchy was able to re-establish itself by 1849. How?

Nationalities turned on each other. In Bohemia, Czechs and
Germans clashed; in Hungary, pro –Imperial Croats and
Transylvanians fought with nationalist Magyars. The Slavic Czechs
even came to admit that they needed the protection of the
Habsburg monarchy against the designs of the Germans for a
Greater German Reich; in Italy, the Pope refused to support
Piedmont against Austria and was aided by the pro-Catholic French;

As in France, there were antagonisms between those who
wanted moderate constitutional reform and those who
wanted social changes and a republic established. This
happened in Austria and Northern Italy, where hopes for further
change withered away and Marshall Radetsky’s troops pounced; in
Italy, local insularity and parochialism had complicated matters;

The revolutionaries had made mistakes like allowing the
Emperor to leave Vienna for Innsbruck where he set about planning
the counter-revolution; they had also abolished serfdom, one of
their most lasting achievements, but paradoxically also a cause of
their defeat as the conservative peasantry, now they were free,
were no longer so interested in supporting radical revolts;

Military might was used indiscriminately and ruthlessly against the
rebels; in Prague a mere 1200 rioters (out of a population of 100
000) were the excuse needed for General Windischgratz to
bombard the city for 5 days; Radetsky’s Austrians defeated the
Italians at pitched battles like Custozza and Novara, in Italy; in
Vienna, General Windischgratz again bombarded a city to clear its
streets during the ‘October Rising’; thousands were killed, but not
before they had lynched a government minister (hardly likely to
endear revolution to the essentially law-abiding middle classes!);
Governor Jellacic in Hungary, as a Croat, could be guaranteed to be
ruthless with his Magyar foes; the army in fact, officered by the
nobility were, says Wilmot, “solid and experienced” and like their
later 20th century compatriots, always obeyed orders; the
Hungarians fought longest and hardest, but were eventually
defeated by the ruthless General Haynau, in August 1849;

Russia’s autocratic and reactionary Tsar, Nicholas I, had
offered help to his fellow emperor worried that upstarts like the
Hungarians might give ideas to his own subject peoples, like the
Poles; the Russians intervened on the side of the Austrians, but
says Wilmot not decisively so;
Nicholas I
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
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NATIONALISM IN ITALY –
THE RISORGIMENTO
Guiseppe Garibaldi
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Italy Before and During the Risorgimento
22
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
The Creation of Italy and Germany
23
A. The Risorgimento (1859-61 & 1866 & 1870)
Italy, as a country, was nothing more than a ‘geographical expression’
in Metternich’s cynical phrase, prior to the 1860s. Admittedly, there
was an Italian language and a shared culture stemming from the
writings of Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio to the operas of Rossini,
Donizetti and Verdi (himself something of an arch Italian nationalist).
However, Italy was divided into a no. of states, including kingdoms
ruled over by foreign dynasties, like the Bourbons who controlled
Naples and the Habsburgs who controlled Venetia. The Papacy did not
help matters, as they were opposed to unification and resented any
infringement on their secular powers. Pius IX was especially hostile.
While foreign powers, like the Austrians and the French, carved off
large slices for their empires, the Congress system had largely
confirmed the status quo in Italy, assigning the idea of a united Italy to
the realms of “political fantasy” according to Wilmot and allotting its
provinces (Parma, Modena, Tuscany, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies)
to various scions of the House of Habsburg.
There were radical nationalist groups like the Neapolitan Carbonari, but
they were largely still too insular and ineffective to achieve
independence for the whole of Italy. Between 1820 and 1831 there
were a number of ineffectual, regionalised uprisings. Italians
demonstrated they were still too disorganised and too parochial to
obtain independence for their peninsula from the ruthless and
imperialistic Austrians.
In fact, Italy was not created by some popular nationalist up-rising of
its people, but as Watson says, by “rather narrow interest groups”. He
even claims that basically “Piedmont-Sardinia took over the rest of
Italy” and that Italy (and even more so Germany) was the creation of
power politics. However, even the cynical Watson admits there was
some role to be played by men like Mazzini and the voice of the people
- and by Garibaldi’s famous 1100 red-shirts (‘The Thousand’) who were
to conquer the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
The university educated, quiet and gentle middle class Giuseppe
Mazzini, according to Wilmot, was “probably the most dedicated Italian
revolutionary of his time”. (He was also not unique and came in along
line of other nationalist thinkers like the pro-papal Vincenzo Gioberti
and the pro-Piedmontese democrat Cesare Balbo). Mazzini had joined
the nationalist Carbonari, but abandoned them as being too ineffectual.
He appealed to all Italians, not just to the middle class, but was no
class warrior, and refused to support social reforms, being quite
prepared to ignore the working class and peasantry if it gained him the
support of the rich and powerful for a unified Italy. He did though
want a republican, secular, democratic, free Italy and even envisaged
a United States of Europe. His methods involved violent insurrection
and propaganda, and in 1831 he founded Young Italy (GI) to promote
his goals. He had established the short-lived Roman Republic in 1849,
but on its collapse he fled abroad, the rest of his life somewhat of an
anti-climax. He ultimately failed to see his hopes for an Italian
republic founded and died a disappointed man in 1872. Andrina Stiles
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
24
has commented that Mazzini ideas were “too intellectual, too
idealistic and too impractical to be the real basis for revolution”. He
was always appreciated more by foreigners than by his fellow Italians
in life - and even after his death.
Giuseppe Garibaldi was also a genuine radical and revolutionary,
“whose charisma was overwhelming” (Stiles). An auto-didact and man
of action (he had even tried piracy for a while), from a humble
background, he had helped Uruguay gain its independence from
Argentina, fought in Brazil and joined Mazzini’s Young Italy (GI)
movement. He took part in the 1848 campaigns against the Austrians,
becoming a royalist. In 1849, he held Mazzini’s Roman Republic
against the French for 30 days, but being defeated barely escaped
from Italy with his life, having lost his wife on the retreat, the
Austrians hot on his tail. After a period of exile in the USA, he
returned to Italy in 1854, split with the ardently republican Mazzini and
pragmatically threw in his lot with Cavour and Victor Emmanuel II. His
support for the monarchy helped to increase its prestige. During
1859-61 he and his Red Shirts would defeat the Austrians and
Neapolitans in battle and add Sicily, Naples and the rest of il
mezzogiorno to the fledgling state. He was also prepared to ignore,
like Mazzini, the desires of the poor, in favour of national ambitions.
His determination to add Rome to the new nation-state brought him
into conflict with his King who defeated and wounded him in battle, in
1862. In 1867, he tried again to annexe Rome, but was defeated by a
combined Franco-Papal force. He also fought for the French against
the Prussians in 1870-71 and became attracted to socialism in his later
years, dying in 1882.
The real driving force behind the movement to full independence,
however, was not the romantic and dynamic Garibaldi, but a Turin
politician and journalist, Count Camillo de Cavour. Cavour was liberal,
ambitious, energetic and able. He was a pragmatic moderniser, who
admired GB’s methods and had helped turn Piedmont into Italy’s most
sophisticated state. As a secularist, Cavour believed the RC Church
should stay out of politics and the law. In all this, Cavour was
supported by his rather reactionary, but politically astute king, Victor
Emmanuel II. Piedmont-Sardinia’s involvement in the Crimean War
(1854-56) had given the state increased credibility (showing to GB and
France that, unlike Austria, it could be trusted to support them), and
also increased further its ambitions.
Piedmont had further credibility because it had a constitution (in reality
this meant little as prior to Cavour the kingdom was backward,
absolutist and highly Cathoilic); because it had fought two wars against
the Austrians (1848-9 under its king, the revered Charles Albert)) and because it seemed to the middle classes to a respecter of
property. The canny Cavour had also introduced a number of
moderate political and economic reforms making it even more
attractive to liberals and nationalists.
Watson suggests that Cavour’s ambitions resulted from his naked
opportunism and that the unification of Italy was not so much his goal,
but rather what was good for himself and his state, a view shared by
S. J. Lee. To this end, he allied with the French, under that archconspirator Napoleon III, against their common Austrian enemy. Their
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
25
aim, at this stage, seemed merely to carve up northern Italy
between them, Napoleon envisaging a Northern Italian kingdom which
would be both a buffer and an ally in the struggle between France and
Austria.
Two awful battles (Magenta and Solferino) in June 1859, helped to free
part of northern Italy from the Austrians. Then Austria and France
came to an agreement (at the peace of Villafranca) to basically ensure
the status quo in Italy continued. However, Piedmont-Sardinia
continued to grow, helped by a series of plebiscites, and Cavour
seemed placated by this.
However in return for these new additions to Piedmont, Savoy and Nice
were given to France (and still are French today), suggesting Italian
unification was not Cavour’s over-riding priority (he was never
particularly bothered by the French betrayal at Villafranca either).
Meanwhile in the south of Italy (il mezzogiorno) Giuseppe Garibaldi, a
true radical patriot (and whom Stiles says: “represented the nonintellectual active approach to Italian unity”), was helping the Sicilians
in their struggle against a cruel Bourbon king. The Sicilians were
fighting, however, as much against poverty and oppression as for a
united homeland. Garibaldi’s Thousand (using both the regular and
guerrilla tactics at which he excelled) were successful in Sicily and then
crossed to Naples, winning the battle of Calatafimi against the
Neapolitan forces in 1859. Cavour though was alarmed by his success,
as it did not promise to do much for Piedmont or its king. In the end
though, he manoeuvred an agreement, which created an alliance
between Piedmont and Garibaldi’s forces, and avoiding a civil war.
Much of Italy was, therefore, united by 1860, under Victor Emmanuel
as its king. One of the king’s first acts was to dismiss Garibaldi.
However, the Pope was still opposed to unification, and Venetia
remained outside the kingdom of Italy (until Prussia’s defeat of France,
in 1870). Cavour’s premature and unfortunate death in 1861,
increased the difficulties.
Rome was safe, because it was protected by Napoleon III, who was
worried about domestic, French Roman Catholic opinion. Venetia
became Italian when Prussia went to war with Austria (the occupying
power) and in return for Italian troops, agreed to help them drive the
Austrians out of La Serenissima. In this way, the Prussian chancellor,
Otto von Bismarck, helped to create a more united Italy by the Treaty
of Prague in 1866.
The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, forced Napoleon III
to withdraw his troops from Rome, which left it open to seizure by the
nationalists (the fact that Cavour had not threatened Roman
independence suggests, as Wood points out, the triumph of realpolitik
over romanticism). The reactionary Pope, Pius IX, retreated into the
Vatican. Sore losers to the end, the Popes banned Catholics from
voting in Italian elections until 1904, and didn’t officially recognise the
Italian state until the Lateran Treaties of 1929.
Wood emphasises that the “key to [Cavour’s] success had been careful
diplomatic preparation based on the realisation of the need for military
assistance from France, rather than reliance upon a general
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
revolutionary situation”. He also says Cavour was aided by
“extraordinary good luck”.
26
The more radical Garibaldi and Mazzini, however, were not happy with
the new Italy and remained in exile. Mazzini had wanted a republic
(which was not established until 1946). Instead, Italy had a rather
conservative
monarchy united on Piedmontese terms. Some of the more radical
nationalists were also annoyed that not all Italian speaking areas had
been
included (Fiume, South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, etc.), a bone of
contention that would crop up again in the 20th century, especially
under Mussolini.
The Role of Napoleon III
Napoleon had helped drive the Austrians out of Northern Italy in 1859,
which Piedmont could not have done alone. L.C. B. Seaman is convinced
of Napoleon’s crucial role, commenting that: “he made Italian freedom
possible. Without him neither Cavour nor Garibaldi could have united
Italy”.
The reality is more complex. Napoleon had crushed the nascent Roman
Republic in 1849; he had at the famous Plombieres meeting of 1858, tried
to keep Italy weak and disunited. At the peace of Villafranca in 1859, he
had quite cheerfully allowed Austria to retain Venetia, and in 1860 had
taken possession of Nice (where Garibaldi had been born) and Savoy. In
1866, he did manage to hand over Venetia to Italy (under Prussian
pressure), but was still distrusted for keeping French troops in Rome until
1870.
GB’s role in the Risorgimento
GB played a less important role in helping to achieve Italian unification
than say France or even Prussia. However, a number of British actions
were designed to help Italy achieve independence and unity, if only out of
British self-interest.
GB was delighted with Piedmont’s entry into the Crimean War (1854-56),
because it promised to placate a much more powerful Austria, the
argument being that with the greatest thorn in her side involved in the
Crimea, Austria would also be able to send troops to support the FrancoBritish and Turkish efforts against the Russians. In the event, Austria
remained neutral and this rather peeved the French and British; while the
fact that Austria even considered intervention in the first place deepened
Russian mistrust, so further weakening Austria’s position in Italy.
Britain hoped a united Italy or at least a united northern Italy would
counterbalance French influence in the region; while an ejection of Austria
would allow the latter to concentrate its defences against Russia, a
country GB was increasingly suspicious of.
Such Machiavellian schemes were typical of the period, with the British
Royal Navy, for instance, safeguarding Garibaldi’s invasion of Sicily, in
order to try and guarantee his success and so weaken Austria.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
GB also pressured Napoleon III to allow a stronger and more unified
Italy than he really envisaged.
27
Ultimately, of course, GB did not create Italy, but its passive and active
support was one of the factors which helped.
Pope Pius IX – Reactionary who bitterly opposed the Risorgimento
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28
Empathy Exercise
What do you think each of these major figures really thought about the
risorgimento?
“As King of Italy…
“Io sono…
“Mein Gott…
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE THREE GREAT ITALIAN PATRIOTS
MAZZINI
Background
Character
Motivation
&
Aims
Methods
Successes
Failures
CAVOUR
29
GARIBALDI
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THE UNIFICATION
OF GERMANY
30
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
B.The Unification of Germany (1870)
31
Demands for German unification had been growing for decades before
the mid-19th century. Many Germans even looked as far back to
Charlemagne and other Holy Roman Emperors, like Frederick
Barbarossa, for inspiration. In fact, many Germans argued that
German myths and German culture and language made them a
uniquely privileged race. Others, rather more practically, saw the
business opportunities a united Germany could bring. The current
loose confederation of 39 states and 23 million people, established by
Napoleon and then the Congress of Vienna, hardly aided the free flow
of trade given the diversity of customs barriers and tariffs in force.
German Protestants also wanted a German state to counterbalance
Catholic, Habsburg Austria; while German liberals envisioned a
modern, centralised state and a representative government similar to
that of the USA’s or even GB’s. Edward Crankshaw has commented
that the real motivation for unification was related to the “needs of
industry and trade which turned out to be the critical factor”.
The creation of the Zollverein or Customs Union by Prussia had already
created conditions for free trade and close economic co-operation
between the German states. Northern states especially saw fiscal
benefits, therefore, in being linked in closer ties with Prussia.
Crankshaw, of course, emphasises it was industry and the industrial
revolution that was the driving force behind unification.
Equally, however, many Germans (perhaps the majority) opposed or
were, at best, indifferent to unification. Kingdoms like Hanover and
Bavaria wished to retain their independence; as did proud centres of
commerce like Frankfurt (it is perhaps indicative that its mayor hanged
himself when the city was eventually taken over, in effect, by Prussia
in 1866). People were used to their own state’s ways of doing things,
and as to who conscripted your son or demanded your taxes did it
really make any difference whether it was Germany or BadenWurttemburg?
Besides these domestic opponents there were also foreign barriers.
Conservatives thought the destruction of the states system might open
the door to revolution or antagonise the great powers of Europe and so
lead to outside intervention.
Austria was determined that Germany would stay dis-united, and
France was equally determined to ensure there would be no disruption
of the balance of power in Europe. (GB welcomed a counter-balance to
France).
The foundations for a united Germany lay in the militaristic state of
Prussia. The King of Prussia, Wilhelm I, relied upon the advice of a
Count Otto von Bismarck to achieve his goals – and he would be
fundamental.
The young Otto von Bismarck
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
32
Bismarck, born in 1815, was of the junker class, a Protestant and a
staunch royalist, Prussian nationalist. A sensualist, he was a ruthless,
unscrupulous and vindictive individual, though not without wit and
charm. An able linguist (in English, French and Russian), university
educated, he married in his early thirties and became a devoted (if
faithless) husband and father. He was at a loss what to do in life until
he entered Prussian politics, being elected to the Prussian Diet in 1847.
He would be a politician for the next 43 years and in Stiles and
Farmer’s phrase: “an unconventional and unpredictable maverick” and
a flexible pragmatist.
Much more conservative than his contemporary Cavour, he
nevertheless had similarities with the ambitious Piedmontese politician.
Showalter, in fact, says he was “not a German nationalist, but a
Prussian patriot” (views echoed by Stiles and Farmer); while Wood
emphasises his contradictions and says he was a conservative, with a
revolutionary foreign policy agenda. He had learnt of the power of
nationalism from the 1848 revolutions. His posting as Prussian
ambassador to Russia in 1859, convinced him of the need to keep that
giant of an empire at arms length.
When the king had trouble with the National Assembly (landtag), it
was the able politician Bismarck who managed to over-awe them into
accepting higher taxes to pay for a bigger army and a longer
conscription period. He censored critical newspapers, and ignored
criticism from the National Assembly. His loyalty was to his king and
no-one else.
Bismarck had a highly pragmatic, but also opportunistic approach to
politics. This realpolitik, based on a ruthless principle of ‘blood and
iron’, saw the Russians as allies, given their common interests in
subjugating Poland; and the Austrians and French as enemies, because
they opposed Prussian expansion. The Poles under Prussian rule did as
they were told, and if they stepped out of line were ruthlessly
persecuted. The British (more concerned with their empire than
Europe anyway) were potential allies against Napoleon III, but
otherwise were largely ignored.
War to Bismarck, was also a means of unifying the Prussian people and
distracting from internal problems, a method also used later, perhaps,
by Wilhelm II in 1914.
Was Bismarck an opportunist or did he plan unification from the
beginning of his career?
IT WAS A PLAN!
Bismarck claimed in his self-aggrandising
memoirs, written in the 1890s, and to
politicians like the British PM, Disraeli, to
have always had definite goals of unification
Bismarck probably had broad outlines of
what he planned, but not specific plans
IT WAS PURE OPPORTUNISM!
To A.J.P. Taylor Bismarck was merely an
opportunist reacting to events as they
happened, taking calculated risks and
benefiting from his opponents mistakes
Bismarck was not primarily a German patriot
or nationalist. His loyalty was to the Prussian
monarchy and not to the German people
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
How Bismarck Created Germany
33
Three wars were effectively used by Bismarck to create a German state:

1864 against Denmark; resulted in the seizure of Holstein for
Austria and Schleswig for Prussia. At this stage, Austria was still
an ally (Bismarck was lulling them into a false sense of security
and was always immensely proud of this diplomatic subterfuge
in his acquisition of the duchies); eventually, Prussia would
control the whole of the Schleswig-Holstein peninsula. The area
would help Prussia dominate the Baltic and the North Sea and
bring with it the excellently situated naval base of Kiel.

1866 against Austria (the Seven Week’s War); France was
neutralised with vague promises of land; the Habsburg empire
weakened by a cynical encouragement of Italian, Romanian and
Hungarian nationalism (a Magyar legion fought with the
Prussians in 1866, and Austria ended up fighting a two front war
against both Prussia and Italy); Prussia then seized Holstein,
and kicked Austria out of the German confederation, more
perhaps because Austria was an obstacle to Prussian ambitions
in Germany than anything else; the Austrian armies were
smashed at Sadowa (Koniggratz); Prussia dissolved the old
confederation, seized Hanover, Hesse and Frankfurt and set up a
North German Confederation with Wilhelm I as its president. A
veneer of liberalism was applied to its constitution, but
Bismarck’s real aim as Watson points out was: “the
aggrandisement of Prussia”. Bismarck displayed this in the way
he refused to impose humiliating peace terms on Austria,
because he did not want an antagonistic Austria at his back,
when he eventually attacked France. The Treaty of Prague saw
Austria withdraw from German affairs and Italy rewarded with
Venetia. Crankshaw says Austria’s defeat was the result
of:“Bismarck’s diplomacy, Krupps’ steel, Roon’s military
machine, Moltke’s strategic genius…” Helmut von Moltke was a
master strategist, knew how to transport troops, and arm them
with the most modern weapons (a breech-loading rifle the
Austrians had ironically rejected as too expensive!). His
contribution to Bismarck’s success should not be
underestimated, though Craig is adamant that ultimate glory
should still go to Bismarck.
Bismarck, left, with Roon (centre)
and Moltke (right). The three
leaders of Prussia in the 1860s
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
34
Consequences of the German victory included the fact that:



Austria now turned her attention more towards the Balkans,
and had to form a dual monarchy with Hungary in 1867;
Southern, Catholic, liberal states remained outside the North
German Confederation, but under obligation to Prussia in the
event of war;
William Carr emphasises how France had suffered from
Austria’s defeat as well, because the balance of power had
been upset, and was determined to obtain territorial
compensation;
France was now the main obstacle to Bismarck’s and Prussia’s ambitions.
Bismarck was determined to goad Napoleon III of France into a conflict
that would neutralise this final stumbling block. France’s attempts to
takeover the pro-German Luxemburg and later Belgium were ideal means
of discrediting France. The French’s successful blocking of a
Hohenzollern’s attempt to assume the Spanish throne was the excuse
needed. Bismarck then engineered the Ems Telegram affair to further
goad the French into war, relying on the pride of Napoleon and the Duc de
Gramont. To Carr, Bismarck had war in mind from the very beginning.
SUMMARY OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF COMBINED
FACTORS FOR GERMAN UNIFICATION
War
War
Bismarck
Prussian
Army
Zollverein
French
Neutrality
German
Nat.
Prussian
Economy
Austrian
Weakness
Bismarck’s
Diplomacy
Prussian
Army
Zollverein
French
Neut.
German
Nat.
Prussian
Econ.
Aust.
Weak.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
KEY = V for Vital; S for Significant; P for Peripheral
German Snyder rifle – a vital technological innovation
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011

35
1870-71 against France (the Franco-Prussian War); saw
the defeat of the French armies, most notably at Sedan, but also
at Saint-Privat and Gravelotte. Bismarck had provoked the war
through the device of the infamous Ems Telegram and by
stoking German francophobia. The south German states were
brought into the Confederation and a German Reich proclaimed
at Versailles in 1871, with Wilhelm I now as Kaiser (or emperor)
and Bismarck, his Imperial Chancellor. The French, like the
Austrians, had been an obstacle to German unification, fearing
an upsetting of the balance of power. France was humiliated by
the defeat and by the reparations and land confiscations, which
followed (she lost Alsace-Lorraine and a million of her citizens
with it, along with 5 billion francs). France had also slipped into
civil war and the infamous and anarchic events of the 1871 Paris
Commune.
Germany had won because they had the leadership of von Roon,
von Moltke and Bismarck, whereas the French had only
mediocrities like Napoleon, Bazaine and MacMahon. The
Germans had concentrated their troops efficiently and far more
quickly than the chaotic French. The Germans had better small
arms (the Snyder) and the excellent Krupps’ artillery. The
French had paradoxically not been as united as the people who
were fighting them for their very nationhood.
The Treaty of Frankfurt in May 1871 saw the wealthy AlsaceLorraine annexed by Germany; a German army occupy France
until the indemnity of 5 000 000 000 francs was paid; the
Germans were also entitled to a victory march through Paris;
Carr is very critical of Bismarck’s short-sighted vindictiveness
and says it would create massive problems for the future.
The terms of the Congress of Vienna were now truly dead.
Germany in 1871 had one of the most liberal constitutions in Europe,
paired with a conservative Kaiser and a ruthless Chancellor who would
guide it with an iron hand until 1890, when he would be dismissed by the
equally autocratic Wilhelm II.
The Germany created by Bismarck, was largely German speaking and an
economic powerhouse of 41 million people. In both ways it had surpassed
France. But as a new power, it had, arguably, fatally upset the balance of
power in Europe and its belated imperial ambitions would also go on to
cause severe problems, helping to lead to WWI.
Also, Bismarck’s Germany was only kleindeutschland it was not
grossdeutschland: many German speakers (from Bohemia, the
Sudetenland, Austria, etc.) were not in it. The ambition to create a truly
German Reich would fall to one Adolf Hitler to complete, albeit briefly, in
the late 1930s and early 40s.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
36
King Wilhelm I of Prussia is proclaimed Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany.
The Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, January, 1871.
The painting emphasises the military and aristocratic aspects of
Wilhelm I’s accession to the Imperial crown. He was offered the crown
by his fellow German monarchs, not by the people nor by the landtag.
Such autocratic beginnings were to be obvious in his successor,
Wilhelm II’s attitude towards the crown.
SUMMARISING ACROSTIC OF BISMARCK
Noun
B
I
S
M
A
R
C
K
Conclusion:
Verb
Adjective
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Compare and Contrast Cavour and Bismarck
Introduction
37
Say What You Are Going
To Say!
State Your Theme!
Challenge the Question!
Grab the Examiner’s
Attention!
Both Cavour and Bismarck frequently seen as father’s of their respective
countries of Italy and Germany. However, this is, arguably, too simplistic
a view. There were also arguably more obvious similarities between the
two, while the differences tend to be more subtle.
Main Points
Similarities
Break Down/ Structure Essay
Use Concepts: Political,
Economic, Social, etc.
Use Structure of Question to
Help
1. Background/Personal Aspects: Both were aristocrats and titled
members of the plutocracy. This may account for their faith in
monarchies and their loyal service to their (unremarkable) kings:
Bismarck’s Wilhelm I and Cavour’s Vittorio Emmanuele II;
2. Religion: Both were essentially anti-Roman Catholic, though less for
doctrinal than political reasons. They were both determined that
the RC states in S. Germany and the Pope in Italy would not
obstruct their political ambitions;
Write
Analytically,
Using Facts to
Back Up Your
Ideas
It is Not A
Story!
3. Economics: Both had an interest in their state’s economies and
believed that a strong economy would help create a strong state.
Under Bismarck, Germany’s coal and steel production would
outstrip France and GB’s respectively; both, of course, were helped
in their ambitions by the favourable economic climate and
technological advances of the time. The Prussians so-called ‘needle
gun’ certainly helped their troops triumph at Sadowa (Koniggratz)
in 1866.
4. Politics: Both men were notorious opportunists and pragmatists.,
Always
Include
Historiography
– It Suggests
Wider Reading
and
Awareness of
Different
Points of View
able to benefit from dangerous lack of cohesion amongst their
foreign opponents. Bismarck was the proponent of realpolitik, but
Cavour was also clever enough to manipulate men like Napoleon
III. Both, as Wood points out, were prepared to use war as a
means to achieve an end, especially against the Austrians when
they posed an obstacle to their ambitions. Both, more
controversially, were also concerned with their own states more
than the unification of their nations. Watson emphasises how
Bismarck’s primary motive was the “aggrandisement of Prussia”,
something he also accords to the ambitious Cavour, whom he sees
as first and foremost a Piedmontese, a view concurred in by Lee.
Showalter even goes as far as to say that Bismarck was not a
German nationalist, but essentially a Prussian patriot. Equally, we
should not see them as men acting in isolation. They should not
take all the credit (or blame). Bismarck was assisted by von Roon
and von Moltke; Cavour famously by Garibaldi, and had also built
on the foundations laid by Mazzini and others. Bismarck and
Cavour also, of course, had their failures, not least Bismarck’s
inability to create a grossdeutschland and Cavour’s inability to
appease the Papacy (which did not join Italy until nearly a decade
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
after Cavour’s death); both certainly had their opponents and
domestic enemies;
38
Differences
5. Political: Bismarck was a Protestant conservative, whose policies were
a means of isolating liberals and uniting a divided nation. In contrast,
the Catholic Cavour was more of a liberal, though ironically it was
Bismarck who ended up creating the most liberal constitution in
Europe. Cavour was certainly less ruthless than Bismarck, and
preferred plebiscites, at times, to war. He also sought foreign allies in
his ventures, notably Napoleon III. Bismarck was arguably the more
successful, though he did have the excellent Prussian army, and
ultimately his creation of a new nation did have more disastrous longterm consequences than the creation of Italy.
Conclusion
Both Bismarck and Cavour were significant, perhaps vital, elements in the
formation of their nation states. Certainly, however, they cannot be studied in
isolation nor should they be regarded as sole architects of Germany and Italy.
What stands out, ultimately, was that they were both more similar products of
their plutocratic age, than complete contrasts.
Say What You’ve Said i.e. A
Summary of Your Argument
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Bismarck’s Foreign Policy (1871-1890)
39
Germany’s creation had not so much upset the balance of power, as more
like thoroughly destroyed the whole concept. Now there was a huge,
economic and military powerhouse dominating Central Europe. The noses
of the British, French and Russians were seriously put out of joint.
Arguably, the creation of Germany itself was one of the long-term factors
for WWI. Bismarck knew he had to tread a careful path.
Avoid a war on two
______, given
Germany’s
vulnerable
geographical
position





Key words
Europe
France
Two
Fronts
Russia
Maintain peace in _______ –
essential for the security of the
Empire and its commercial prosperity
BISMARCK’S
FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES FOR
THE GERMAN
EMPIRE
(1871-1890)
Avoid having to make a choice
between Austro-Hungary and
________ in their disputes
Prevent
_____________
from mounting
a serious
challenge to the
new Empire
Ensure that in any grouping of the
five great European powers Germany
is on the side of _______ of them
SUCCESSES AND
FAILURES OF
BISMARCK’S
FOREIGN POLICY
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
BISMARCK’S ACTIONS
40
ACTION
The Three Emperors’
League
DATE
1873
DETAILS
Russia feeling isolated reverted back to an agreement with
Austria and Germany; Bismarck was delighted and felt
confident France itself could be isolated; however, disputes in
the Balkans would again drive a wedge between Austria and
Russia;
An anti-French Italy formed a means of reassuring Bismarck
that he had now a three power alliance against either France
or Russia; however, Italy and Austria were not close and a
Franco-Russian alliance remained a major fear;
A short-term security measure designed to strengthen
Germany against a possible Franco-Russian entente, was
made with Austria; an initially temporary alliance it was
renewed until 1918; meant to be secret, the Russians soon
found out about it; Wilmot says that the alliance was not
Bismarck’s final choice between Austria and Russia;
The Near-Eastern
Crisis
187778
The Congress of
Berlin
1878
The Dual Alliance
1879
The Three Emperors’
Alliance
1881
The Triple Alliance
1882
Isolated France; established common anti-republic and antisocialist views between the German, Austrian and Russia
emperors; however, there was no formal alliance
The Reinsurance
Treaty
1887
Bismarck sponsored a deal to keep the peace and status quo
in the Mediterranean and Near East;
The Second
Mediterranean
Agreement
1887
War between Austria and Russia became a possibility when
they clashed over the shrinking Ottoman Turkish empire in the
Balkans;
Bismarck acted as mediator between Russia and Austria, in
the revision of the San Stefano treaty Russia had imposed on
Turkey in 1878; however, Russia was unhappy at this and
blamed Germany and the Three Emperor’s League was
dissolved immediately; Bismarck had helped to stop a
damaging European war, but had alienated Russia which
increasingly saw Germany as pro-Austrian;
Bismarck got an assurance out of Russia that in the event of
war with a third power, each would maintain its neutrality;
In 1890, Bismarck was forced to resign by Wilhelm II. A much more
aggressive, imperialistic foreign policy would be the result – and
ultimately so would a war on two fronts that Bismarck had been so keen
to avoid.
‘
Dropping the Pilot’, 1890, a fatal error?
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
BISMARCK’S ACTIONS – THE ANSWERS
ACTION
The Three Emperors’
League
DATE
1873
The Near-Eastern
Crisis
187778
The Congress of
Berlin
1878
The Dual Alliance
1879
The Three Emperors’
Alliance
1881
The Triple Alliance
1882
The Reinsurance
Treaty
1887
The Second
Mediterranean
Agreement
1887
DETAILS
41
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
LONG TERM REASONS FOR
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
(1855-1894)
42
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
The Russian Empire (1855-1894) –
The Long Term causes of the 1917 Revolutions
43
In 1897 Russia had: 129 m. people (55m Russians, 22m Ukrainians, 11m
Turks, 8m Poles & 5m Jews, plus nearly a hundred other nationalities);
and 8.5 m. sq. miles of territory; it was a poverty-stricken, primarily
agricultural and rural state: a land of peasants and bad harvests. By
1914, the population had risen to 175m (it had only been 45m in 1800),
with 26m in urban areas and 5m employed in industry, but Russia was
still an essentially backward, anachronistic state. Even agriculture was
less advanced than in the rest of the Europe, especially given that the
Russian growing season was up to three months shorter than in the rest
of the continent.
Thus the peasants frequently starved, not only because of the inefficiency
of the system and the climate, but because the government callously
exported grain. 50% 0f peasant children died before the age of 5. Only
the peasants paid the poll tax. Echoes with pre-Revolutionary France are
very apparent.
S.L. Hoch describes a typical peasant dwelling during the winter, as:
”…fetid from animal and fowl excreta. The ceilings were covered with soot
and ash. …The dirt floor was always damp and in the spring and autumn
it was muddy. It was impossible to keep cockroaches out of the food...”
Industry was financed by foreign money, especially French loans, and
Russia was constantly short of capital.
Social divisions were rigid; the middle class miniscule; the peasantry
downtrodden and exploited; in fact only 1 in 5 Russians could read in
1897; only 4% of the population had received an education, by 1914.
While Russian universities were excellent, there were far too few and the
student population, as a percentage of the whole population, was tiny
(c.10 000). Women were rarely allowed a higher education and Jews
were discriminated against in most of the professions. The intelligentsia
were a dissatisfied, dangerously articulate and under-employed, growing
threat to the status quo.
Watson describes the Imperial Russian system as, in short, full of
“inequalities, injustices and incompetence”. He describes how even its
tyranny was inefficient, as censorship was erratic, the Okhrana (secret
police) ineffectual and riots and uprisings frequent. Watson goes on to
emphasise the very important point that “when the tsarist state collapsed
in February 1917, it did so because of its own paralysis and because of
universal disaffection and disgust, not because of planned revolution”.
Of course, we should also not forget that repressive states often produce
a great cultural flowering. Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Khorsakov, Borodin,
Mussorgsky, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov and Tolstoy, being some of the
illustrious names we should remember too about the Tsarist period.
Alexander II – Tsar Liberator?
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Alexander II (1855-81): ‘The Tsar Liberator’,
Reformer or Reactionary?
44
Alexander succeeded his arch-reactionary father, Nicholas I, and though
he was to do some interesting things, he was essentially still his father’s
son, intent first and foremost at preserving his dynasty’s (the Romanov’s)
interests.
Alexander was unusually well-educated and well-prepared for the throne,
which he inherited at the age of 36. He was well-travelled and had even
made the effort to visit Siberia. However, though essentially a decent
man, Alexander lacked real reforming passion and was an innate
conservative.
Serfdom, a medieval system of pseudo-slavery, still existed in Russia
when Alexander succeeded to his throne. Alexander was prepared to
change this iniquity, but he was determined any reforms would not lead to
fundamental political changes. The freeing of the serfs in 1861 was, in
reality, no such thing. The Tsar lost a chance to bind the people to the
monarchy.
The greedy and intransigent nobility were the ones who really benefited,
as they gained generous financial compensation and a slightly more fluid
labour market. The peasants, in contrast, were hardly more free than
they had been before 1861. They were crippled by 49 year compensation
payments and remained impoverished and angry. They still needed
passes to move outside their villages; could still be flogged and their sons
were still conscripted into the appalling conditions of the Russian army.
Watson says that the so-called freedom of 1861 was in actuality, “hollow”.
The peasants felt cheated and remained hungry for land.
Alexander did, in the first years of his reign, enact other reforms:
 He introduced trial by jury; reduced the number of secret trials;
judges were adequately paid and better educated to reduce bribery;
punishments were made less severe, and torture (technically)
banned;
 Tax-collecting was taken away from private individuals and
devolved to the state;
 Liberals like Nicholas Milyutin were given government posts, helping
to prepare the way for emancipation;
 Censorship was relaxed from 1865;
 More schools were built; 8000 primary schools in 1856 leapt to 23
000 by 1880;
 Local administration was improved by the setting up of the zemstva
(elected rural local councils) and duma (elected town councils)
system, which allowed a limited role for the people, though these
institutions were always skewed in favour of the nobility;
 Industry was expanded, with more railways built due to the reforms
of Reutern;
 A Russian State Bank was founded in 1860 to provide credit for
Russian industry;
 The army saw reforms and the length of service reduced from 25 to
15 years and eventually to a mere 6 years; the army was no longer
used as a dumping ground for criminals and military discipline was
made less barbarous; though given Russia’s thrashing by Japan in
the 1904-5 war, it is debateable whether any of these reforms
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011

45
made much difference to an institution which relied on quantity
over quality;
Grain production increased massively after reforms from 76 to 257
million poods (1 pood = 36Ib or 16.36kg);
However, when it came down to it, ‘the reformer’ was still a Romanov
autocrat first and foremost, especially after 1865-66:
















In 1861, the Tsar had sacked Milyutin for his liberalism, pressured
by conservative aristocrats;
Reactionaries like Peter Shuvalov were put in charge of the secret
police (the Third section) and Education (a Count Tolstoy);
The Tsar was quick to stamp on all nationalist societies: the Poles,
especially (they had rebelled in 1863), though the Finns, etc were
not excluded;
Russification was applied strenuously, and when it came down to it,
Alexander was very much a Russian bigot;
The Jews were frequently persecuted in horrible pogroms;
Show trails of opponents like the ‘trial of the 50’ and ‘the trail of the
193’ were held;
Press freedoms were eroded and mass round-ups took place, after
assassination attempts on his life in 1866;
Political detainees lost their right to trial by jury;
Universities were closely monitored and in 1861 many were closed
down; in the 1870s, state supervision was reintroduced;
Liberal members of the Imperial family like Grand Duke Constantine
and Grand Duchess Helen lost their earlier influence and found it
hard to even get an audience with the Tsar;
Alexander expanded the Russian empire into Central Asia, bringing
Russia into potential conflict with GB;
In foreign policy, he sympathised with militarist Prussia, ignored
liberal France, reconciled Russia with autocratic Austro-Hungary,
and fought a successful war against the Ottoman empire, gaining
territory and creating the state of Bulgaria;
The zemstvas were deprived of their (limited) authority;
In many ways, as Watson emphasises, what freedoms there were in
Russia were due to the inefficiencies of the system, as much as to
any sense of liberalism;
Watson comments that Alexander’s “main anxiety now was to
preserve Romanov autocracy and to stabilize Russian society” – and
nothing more profound or altruistic than that;
Under Alexander, terrorism increased, and the activities of the
Narodnya Volya eventually resulted in his own assassination in
March 1881; Alexander’s legs were blown off and his son and
grandson watched him bleed to death on his bed; this only
increased their own determination to resist further reforms;
Watson sums Alexander up as a mild reformer, who ultimately showed
he had a stronger attachment to the Romanov tradition of government
by repression. His concern was to make Russia strong, not its people
free.
A Russian Icon – The Religious Alexander II Would Have Fully
Appreciated Its Spiritual Value
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
To What Extent Did Alexander II Succeed in Reforming
Russian Life and Institutions? [Model Essay]
46
Alexander II has traditionally been seen as a reformer. In reality, though
he did enact some changes to Russian life and institutions, he was
defeated both by the enormity of the task he faced and by his own, later
inclination to apply the brakes to even those few areas he had improved.
Alexander’s successes in reforming the life of the Russian peoples, revolve
around his changes to the oppressive and deeply plutocratic nature of the
Russian state. He officially abolished the use of torture (though, in reality
it continued in use) and punishments were made less severe. His changes
to the length of military service (reducing it from 25 years to eventually 6
and abolishing the hated military colonies), also had a beneficial effect on
the quality of life of the Russian people. Censorship was relaxed and
allowed a greater degree of freedom of expression for artists, writers and
musicians.
In terms of his reforms of traditional Russian institutions, Alexander went
further. He is best known, of course, for abolishing, in 1861, what had
become almost synonymous with Russia: serfdom. His reforms of the
judiciary, including more jury trials, better paid and educated judges (to
reduce corruption) and fewer secret hearings were all positive steps.
Alexander was also the first Romanov autocrat to introduce an element of
local and regional representation in his setting up of the zemstva and
duma assemblies, respectively. He built more schools; introduced a
Russian State Bank to help industry, and built more railways to improve
communications in his huge empire. However, ultimately it would be
wrong to see Alexander as a particularly successful or even consistent
reformer.
Alexander was, above all, still an autocrat. Many of his reforms were
designed to strengthen Russia and the autocracy, not to benefit its people.
Thus the reduction in military service had the benefit of massively
reducing the military budget. His changes to the army hardly made a
dent, as Russia would be defeated by a third-rate power like Japan, in
1905.
Alexander was still very much an imperialist. He stamped on all
opposition within his empire, especially form nationalist groups like the
Finns and the Poles. He was a ruthless persecutor of the Jews, as his
predecessors and successors, before and after him. Charques has pointed
out that anti-Semitism was a useful means of diverting attention from the
failings of the government.
Poverty and illiteracy remained rampant in his domains. As late as 1897,
16 years after his assassination, only one in five Russians could read and
write, and most never even saw a school.
As his reign matured and especially after 1865-66, Alexander in fact grew
more reactionary and conservative in nature. Once again, press freedoms
were eroded; political trials increased in number and the zemstvas were
deprived of their (limited) authority. Serfdom may have been abolished,
but the 49 year indemnity payments had merely replaced one form of
slavery with another. The mir system ensured the peasants continued to
enjoy only a subsistence level existence. In Watson’s words, the Imperial
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Russian system remained one of “inequalities, injustices and
incompetence”.
Alexander was at best, only a mild reformer. Ultimately, as Watson
emphasises, he showed a stronger attachment to the Romanov tradition
of government - than he did to the needs of his people or even his
country. It may even be argued that his actions (or rather inaction)
helped to lay the foundations for the disasters that were to strike Russia
in the early twentieth century.
Assignment
Dissect the above essay, pointing out its important constituent aspects.
47
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
48
Alexander III (1881-94): Arch-Reactionary
A large man (1.90m) of enormous physical strength, but limited foresight, the
badly educated and none too bright Alexander was hugely influenced by the
bigoted Konstantin Pobedonostsev, who reinforced his policy of autocracy and
Russification (Lynch points out, alienating his subjects when he should have
been trying to cohese them), and a reversal of many of his father’s reforms.
He crushed freedom of thought, nationalist aspirations and his Jewish
subjects (like nearly all the Tsars, Alexander was a rabid anti-Semite).
The universities, the press and the law courts were strictly supervised (women
were banned from receiving a higher education). In 1889, Land Captains,
with enormous powers, were imposed on the peasantry to keep a close eye
on them. Understandably, they were resented and hated.
In response, radicalism grew. The first Marxist group was formed in 1883.
Industrialisation added an embittered urban proletariat to a disgruntled
peasantry. Alex responded by creating a ruthless secret police (the Okhrana).
Political prisoners were made to walk the 1660 km (1040miles) to exile in
Siberia. It took them three months to get there.
Alexander had set up a Peasant’s Bank in 1882, but it made few loans; he
also reduced land redemption payments and abolished the poll tax. However,
he continued to deny workers the right to strike, and so conditions in the
factories remained appalling, despite his curtailment of child labour.
To his credit, Alexander did at least appoint the able (if highly egotistical)
Sergei Witte to the Ministry of Finance, where he did much to improve the
economy, eventually completing the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1904.
However, it can also be said that Witte’s skills only delayed the inevitable
reforms, which the government should have made. As Watson says “his
financial skill and the loans he raised in France, merely made the monarchy
solvent enough to ignore liberal demands for parliamentary control of
taxation”. Plus Witte could hardly be described as a political liberal, given his
dedication to Alexander III a man he highly admired.
With a father and grandfather like these, it was not surprising that Nicholas II
(himself tutored by Pobedonostsev) turned out the way he did – and became
the last Romanov emperor of all the Russias.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
49
Nicholas II (1894-1917): The Last Romanov Tsar
Nice moustache, Nicky…
Weak, vacillating, but committed to the autocracy and his dynasty,
Nicholas was in many ways typical of the rest of his Romanov relatives,
except perhaps in his height (1.68m). Even with all these limitations,
however, he might still have survived to die in his bed, if WWI had not
broken out. However, given his role in helping to bring about the war and
his own disastrous handling of it, he perhaps brought on his own doom,
especially given his incorrigibility.
Demands for reform were dismissed as “senseless dreams”. He ditched
the able Witte (a favourite of his father); appointed reactionaries like
Meshersky, and showed himself an incompetent ruler. His unpopular,
pushy, charmless German wife, Alexandra, did not help with people’s
perceptions of him.
Political groups like the Socialist Revolutionaries grew in strength, despite
heavy persecution and liberal use of Siberian exile (1 in 9 of Siberia’s
population were exiles). Constitutional parties like the Cadets were also
set up. Assassination though, remained very common in Tsarist Russia as
a means of protest – often because it was the only option open to a
discontented people.
The Marxist Social Democrats under Lenin and Menshikov were also
beginning to become a thorn in the government’s side.
Nicholas’ disastrous and vindictive handling of the disturbances of 1905
(wrongly described as a revolution), only increased the opposition to him.
His setting up of a national parliament in 1906 (the duma) was initially a
promising step, but Nicholas, being Nicholas, quickly emasculated its
powers, and stifled further reforms.
Financial and economic developments did take place, especially under the
able, if ruthless Pyotr Stolypin. However, the Tsar never gave him his
complete support and seemed almost relieved when Stolypin was
assassinated in 1911 (probably by an agent of his rightist, conservative
enemies, than by the left). Nicholas was always perhaps his own worst
enemy, as the unimaginative frequently are.
Nicholas II & His Four Daughters and Son
and Heir
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
19th Century Figure
a. Napoleon
Bonaparte
50
REVISION HEADS N’ TAILS EXERCISE
Action
1. French ruler and loser of Franco-Prussian War; he both supported
and opposed the Risorgimento. An inveterate plotter, he was easily
suckered into declaring war on Prussia, in 1870. Ended up dying in
exile, in England.
b. Wellington
2. Radical Italian patriot who led his Red Shirts to victory in the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and helped unify Italy.
c. Metternich
3. Prussian War Minister who helped achieved German unification with
his policies.
d. Hardenberg
4. Hungarian nationalist of 1848 Revolutions and thorn in the side of
the Austrians, who was ultimately a failure in his aim of achieving an
independent republic.
e. Alexander I
5. French tyrant who laid foundations for many of Europe’s post-1815
problems.
f. Mazzini
6. Reactionary and Catholic Piedmontese monarch who became first
King of a united Italy.
g. Garibaldi
7. Prussian Minister who represented its interests at the Vienna
Congress and was determined to gain territory.
h. Cavour
8. Russian bigot, reactionary adviser of Alexander III and tutor of
Nicholas II. His policies and championing of Russification antagonised
the Russian empire’s many minorities.
i. Victor Emmanuel II
9. Liberal Piedmontese politician and (unwitting) architect of Italy’s
unification.
j. Otto von Bismarck
10. Prussian Chief of Staff and able organiser who helped win the
Franco-Prussian War, especially through his innovative use of the
railways.
k. Von Roon
11. Italian nationalist who wanted a democratic and republican Italyand so died a disappointed man.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
51
l. Von Moltke
12. Arch-reactionary Austrian Chancellor and opponent of ideas of
Nationalism and Liberalism.
m. Napoleon III
13. Reactionary Russian Tsar who represented an anti-Polish stance at
Vienna.
n. Lajos Kossuth
14. Prussian Chancellor and architect of German unification.
o. K. P.
Pobedonostsev
15. Conservative British representative at Vienna who wanted to
reinstate the status quo and maintain the balance of power on the
continent, which would become a British foreign policy object for the
next 100 years.
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
REVISION HEADS N’ TAILS EXERCISE –THE ANSWERS
19th Century Figure
Action
a. Napoleon
Bonaparte
b. Wellington
c. Metternich
d. Hardenberg
e. Alexander I
f. Mazzini
g. Garibaldi
h. Cavour
i. Victor Emmanuel II
j. Otto von Bismarck
k. Von Roon
52
A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
l. Von Moltke
m. Napoleon III
n. Lajos Kossuth
o. K. P.
Pobedonostsev
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A LEVEL History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
HISTORIOGRAPHY REVISION HEADS ‘N TAILS
Historians
Watson, Lee
Showalter, Watson
Seaman, Watson, Webster
Crankshaw
Historians
Watson, Lee
Showalter, Watson
Seaman, Watson, Webster
Crankshaw
54
Arguments
Bismarck was first and foremost a Prussian patriot, rather
than a German nationalist
The motives behind German unification were economic and
industrial
Cavour was an unwilling architect of a united Italy being first
and foremost a Piedmontese politician
Bismarck’s attitude to Vienna saw an essentially an expedient
policy after the 1866 War
Arguments