Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
It was, however, not always thus. As recently as 1895-96 the two countries almost went to war over Venezuela, the crisis only being averted by the statesmanship of Lord Salisbury, whose actions were more the result of Realpolitik than any romantic conception of the kin of English-speaking peoples. Yet the first decade of the twentieth century was an age of transatlantic marriages in high places, the families of wealthy American industrialists married into the British aristocracy in a series of high profile weddings. These marriages hit the pages of the forerunners of Hello! and OK! magazines, animating the public consciousness in both countries and generating the beginnings of wider sense of cultural kinship, whilst binding elites to each other. “Solid, not Slavish” UK-US Relations under Cameron and Clegg By Nicholas Kitchen 20 W ithin minutes of the United Kingdom appointing a new Prime Minister, President Barack Obama was on the telephone, reaffirming “the extraordinary special relationship between the United States and Great Britain, one that outlasts any individual party, any individual leader… is built up over centuries and is not going to go away.” Obama’s warm reception for David Cameron was a deliberate attempt to reboot a relationship which got off to a poor start, when the 44th president seemingly misjudged the sensitivity with which the United Kingdom regards its most significant alliance earlier in his tenure, a misjudgement marked by tabloid outrage over the President’s DVD-based ‘gift’ and more significant diplomatic contretemps over Brown’s difficulty gaining a private meeting with the President at the UN. Yet as the United States reminds itself of the need to pay due attention to British sensibilities, the foreign policy establishment in the United Kingdom has been undergoing one of its periodic bouts of soul-searching about the nature and value of ‘the special relationship’. A report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee hit the headlines recently with its conclusion that “the phrase ‘the special relationship’… is potentially misleading” and its recommendation “that its use should be avoided.” Following the report, and what he perhaps viewed as a growing sense of public dissatisfaction regarding the balance of Anglo-American relations, Britain’s new foreign secretary William Hague said that he expected Britain’s relationship with the United States to be “solid, not slavish” under the new coalition government in Westminster. But is the relationship between Britain and the United States likely to shift significantly with a different occupant of Downing Street? Indeed, should we expect British foreign policy to alter in any significant way with the advent of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government? One expects not: British foreign policy has long set a course in parallel to the United States, and the alliance itself remains historically unique in its depth and institutionalisation. Christopher Meyer, a former British Ambassador to the United States, recently described the ‘special relationship’ as a British “neurosis” and worried that “the rhetoric and mythology of the ‘special relationship’ has a pernicious influence on our ability to construct and define the relationship”. But whilst the phrase may be diplomatically unhelpful for both countries, it does capture the sense in which the alliance between Britain and the United States is unlike any other in international society, both at a political and bureaucratic level and at a deeper cultural level. Of course, it was the two World Wars that cemented the alliance as a political construct, and the Cold War that allowed the relationships undertaken in wartime to become embedded in the fabric of the two states’ foreign policy apparatus. In addition to the personal cooperation at elite levels and the sense of shared political values engendered by the opposition to what each saw as the totalitarian dangers of first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union, a number of areas of formal cooperation at the less transient levels of government became established. Scientific exchanges on nuclear diplomacy grew to encompass epistemic communities of experts across fields in regular communication, coordination and exchange. The depth of intelligence sharing actually increased after the war, to such an extent that some consider the two countries’ intelligence gathering organisations as essentially one officialdom, with the CIA and SIS mounting joint operations and the NSA and GCHQ sharing cyberintelligence as a matter of course. At almost every level of government and public policy, the two governments have enshrined regular official cooperation, right up to collaborative training courses for 3-star generals. Alliances, like marriages, undergo their ups and downs. At the level of individual leaders, Thatcher’s relationship with Ronald Reagan stands out as one of public bonhomie and private candour, even rancour. Blair’s determination to re-establish Britain on the world stage lay behind his act of political conjuring to be at once the soulmate of Bill Clinton and the best buddy of George W. Bush. Yet relationships can endure when there seems there is nothing left to keep them together, through the force of habit above all else, and it is in this sense that the ‘special’ nature of the Anglo-American alliance has the capacity to outlast disagreements and divergence of interests. A recent poll conducted in advance of a conference on the status of the ‘special relationship’ at the Royal United Services Institute found what appeared to be a level 21 Not that the American government will be too concerned at a lack of British involvement in the central European issues of the day. The United States has long been ambivalent towards the EU as a foreign policy actor, regarding European integration as a welcome bulwark against the reemergence of continental conflict but preferring to deal bilaterally with the more powerful member states on international issues. Where the United States may find greater difficulty with the United Kingdom is Britain’s ability to continue to fund the level of its international So British foreign policy, in respect to its closeness to the contributions: the UK’s Strategic Defence Review is widely United States, is unlikely to change significantly. Core expected to cut major capital projects, which will only strategic ideas held in the United Kingdom hardly differ exacerbate the technology gap which inhibits military across the political parties, and the Foreign Office has an cooperation on the ground. If one includes the effects of enduring sense of the UK’s role in the world that outlasts sterling’s devaluation, and outranks party political “In the UK at least, Britons continue the Foreign and differences. On Afghanistan Commonwealth Office has and Iran the two countries to value a marriage in which they already seen its budget cut are joined at the hip; even on feel unloved and under-appreciated. by around forty percent issues where there is some over the last two years, policy discord, such as IsraelSo British foreign policy, in respect to and is likely, along with Palestine or climate change, its closeness to the United States, is other departments, to have there is debate about policy unlikely to change significantly. Core to find another twentyin terms of means rather than five percent reduction any explicit disagreement on strategic ideas held in the United in costs, a prospect that the goals to be obtained. In Kingdom hardly differ across the threatens to undermine the recent election campaign, political parties, and the Foreign Office the international credibility the differences between the of British foreign policy. parties on international issues has an enduring sense of the UK’s role Yet the American line in were almost imperceptible. in the world that outlasts and outranks both official and informal party political differences.” discussions is that the Where the new British British will do what government may differ they can and they will continue to appreciate that input, significantly from its predecessor is on the issue of Europe. welcome cooperation and value British counsel across Tony Blair’s government made great play of positioning the range of foreign policy operations. The British may itself at the ‘heart of Europe’, despite Blair regarding EURO entry as politically difficult and Gordon Brown as Chancellor not be in a position to follow slavishly, and there is little evidence that they ever really have in terms of elevating sceptical about the economics of monetary union. The American concerns above British interests. But despite a coalition is most divided on European issues, with the likely reduction in British capacity, the relationship benefits Conservatives dominated by eurosceptics and the Liberal from deep foundations and regular maintenance and Democrats the most pro-European of all Britain’s political will remain more solid than any other bilateral diplomatic parties. So far that divide has been bridged via a pledge relationship: the French, Germans, Chinese and Japanese to give the public a referendum on any major transfers of will be complaining about British access to the United States power to the EU; transfers that in the wake of Lisbon are for some time yet. ■ unlikely to be mooted in the current Parliament anyway. The Tories in particular may struggle with European *** diplomacy – their MEPs sit with the far right coalition in Dr Nicholas Kitchen is Coordinator of the LSE IDEAS the European Parliament – but with the Eurozone likely to spend the foreseeable future engaged in measures to secure Transatlantic Relations Programme and Editor of IDEAS Reports. the single currency and agree fiscal policy coordination it seems doubtful that the EU will have sufficient political will to address issues on which British input is required. The coalition may therefore be able to avoid having to play its weakest suit. of cognitive dissonance among the British public: whilst 85% believe Britain has little or no influence on American policies and 62% agree that the United States does not consider Britain’s interests, at the same time 66% expressed favourable feelings towards the United States and 62% agreed that the US is Britain’s most important ally. In the UK at least, Britons continue to value a marriage in which they feel unloved and under-appreciated. 22 For credit card orders call +44 (0) 1235 400524 or order online at www.routledge.com To find out more about Routledge Politics titles, or for a free catalogue, please contact Michael King on 020-7017-6073 or email [email protected] Edited by IDEAS Co-Director Professor Michael Cox alongside Professor Inderjeet Parmar of Manchester University this volume is the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the key concept of soft power in foreign affairs and is essential reading for scholars of US foreign policy, public diplomacy, international relations and foreign policy analysis. The rise of widespread negative attitudes towards US foreign policy, especially due to the war of aggression against Iraq and the subsequent military occupation of the country – has brought new attention to the meaning and instruments of soft power. In this edited collection, an outstanding line up of contributors provides the most extensive discussion of soft power to date. Soft power is the use of attraction and persuasion rather than the use of coercion or force in foreign policy. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies, whereas hard power develops out of a country’s military or economic might. Soft Power has become part of popular political discourse since it was coined by Harvard’s Joseph Nye, and this volume features a brand new chapter by Nye outlining his views on soft, hard and smart power and offers a critique of the Bush administration’s inadequacies. He then goes on to examine the challenges for the incoming US president. The other contributions to the volume respond to Nye’s views from a range of theoretical, historical and policy perspectives giving new insights in to both soft power and the concept of power itself.