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Soc (2009) 46:262–266
DOI 10.1007/s12115-009-9196-7
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
What is Socially Relevant Science?
Nico Stehr
Published online: 31 March 2009
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009
Interest in the effect on society of scientific discoveries can
be traced back to the beginnings of the modern sciences. It
is plain to see that for reasons of legitimizing science alone,
this question was not only of interest to the early scientists.
Affirmative answers to the question of the practical virtues
of science helped the first generation of scientists—and of
course present-day scientists as well—achieve social
recognition and, not least, the resources required by a
high-quality scientific practice, characterized by division of
labour and, thus, increasingly expensive.
There have continually been voices, on the other hand,
that censure the humanities and social sciences in particular, not only due to their lack of usefulness, but rather also
because they are held to be a danger to society. In this
connection, one need only recall, for instance, the worldwide fear of the ideas of Marxism; the frequently criticized
influence of the Frankfurt School on the politics of the
1970s in West Germany; or the influence, lamented in
many quarters, of neo-liberal economic models on the
economic system of developing societies in particular.
Reservations and fears about the social consequences of
new findings and technologies in the natural sciences are
not making themselves heard for the first time nowadays.
This is also true of the promises being made; to the effect
that humanity will come to enjoy enormous progress by
means of science and technology. Convincing arguments
can be made, however, that the public discussion of the
sciences’ social role has reached a new, modern phase. The
first controlled laboratory experiment in genetic engineer-
N. Stehr (*)
Karl Mannheim Chair for Cultural Studies, Zeppelin University,
Am Seemooser Horn 20,
88045 Friedrichshafen | Lake Constance, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
ing took place in 1972; the first human being conceived
outside a woman’s body was born in 1978; and just very
recently, in April 2008, the first human–animal hybrid
embryo—a being immediately dubbed a “chimera” by the
media—was produced by scientists in a laboratory at
Newcastle University in England, However, the current
controversial discussion of embryonic stem cells, neurogenetics, xenotransplantations, reproductive cloning, and
the convergence of nanotechnologies, information technologies, biotechnologies and cognitive sciences also makes
clear that the question of the social prerequisites and
consequences of (natural-) scientific knowledge, expanding
unchecked under new types of preconditions, urgently
needs to be placed on the agenda of day-to-day social and
political activity. And, not infrequently, this discussion
culminates in the call for oversight and conscious guidance
of knowledge. The question is no longer that we do not
know enough, but rather that we know too much, and we
then have to wonder whether we indeed want to turn all of
our discoveries into practical applications.
A half-century ago, in one of the classic dichotomies of
writing about science, Charles P. Snow ([1959] 1964)
likewise gives the carriers of literary, or traditional,
knowledge extremely poor marks for being the epitome of
modern luddites. For Snow, however, this is not primarily a
matter of trivializing traditional literary knowledge, which
he of course then goes on to do; rather, he sees his thesis as
an urgent call to action for society finally to place naturalscientific and technical knowledge, and thereby its scientists—those who, as C.P. Snow sees it, have the future in
their bones—at its centre.
In the mid-seventies, in a radical reversal of C. P. Snow’s
thesis of the dilemma of the two scientific cultures as a
variant of the widespread and often resentful contrast
between knowledge and ignorance, Erich Fromm provides
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his own call to action to modern societies—finally to give
priority to being, and not having, in society—putting
forward the thesis that it is the systematic undervaluation
of the humanities and social sciences that characterizes our
present era as a disastrous historical epoch. Fromm (1976)
particularly emphasizes, in his essay To Have or To Be, that
as long as “the science of humanity does not have the allure
that up to now has been reserved for the natural sciences
and technology, the strength and vision will be lacking to
see new and real alternatives.”
Whichever of the above-cited critical observers of the
scientific landscape and the role of modern science in
society may indeed be right, one thing seems to be
inevitable: the question of the social relevance of science
can likely be problematized only twofold, once for the case
of the humanities and once for natural science and
technology, strictly segregated from one another.
The classic scientific-theoretical debates regarding the
particularities of different types of scientific knowledge,
especially the dichotomy between social and natural
sciences, lead to the result that our reflections are embedded
(or remain trapped) as if in a kind of permafrost. And thus
our capability to rethink the interplay of intellectual, moral
and social aspects within the problem of socially relevant
structures of science is limited.
I thus see myself in terms of these questions as a
revisionist. I consider the division between social and
natural sciences to be questionable, and later I will explain
in greater detail why I hold this position. In what follows,
therefore, I would like to answer the question “What is
socially relevant science?” in terms of scientific knowledge
as a whole, and not a division between humanities and
social scientific knowledge on the one hand and technical
and natural scientific knowledge on the other.
I will lay out the considerations that lead to my answer
in a series of steps: first of all, the concept of knowledge
needs to be more precisely identified; this is, as we shall
see, more than a matter of mere definition. There follows an
attempt to answer the question posed to me under the rubric
“The application of a theory is never one of strict
resemblance”. With reference once again to the thesis of
the two scientific cultures, I attempt to demonstrate that
their chances of being put into practical use are subject to
similar conditions. Finally, in a concluding section I would
like to draw attention to a series of contradictory conclusions. I place these conclusions in the context of the
modern society as a knowledge society.
Knowledge about Knowledge
I would like to define knowledge as the capacity to act (or
capability of taking action), as the possibility of “setting
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something in motion.” Knowledge is a model for reality.
Thus, for example, social statistics are not necessarily
(only) a reflection of social reality, but rather an explication
of its problems; they refer to that which could be, and in
this sense they confer the capability of taking action.
Findings are not mere passive knowledge. Knowledge
should be understood as the first step toward action;
knowledge is in a position to change reality. Knowledge
enriches human ability. And thus, even if only analytically,
briefly and provisionally, I maintain the connection between
social action and knowledge. In the practical interconnection
between findings and action then, C.P. Snow’s uncritical,
optimistic observation from the 1950s that scientists “have the
future in their bones” is doubtless correct.
My choice of concepts is immediately based upon Francis
Bacon’s famous and fascinating thesis that “scientia est
potentia,” or as this formulation is frequently, but misleadingly, translated: knowledge is power. Bacon claims that the
particular utility of knowledge derives from its ability to set
something in motion. The concept of potentia, this ability,
here describes the “power” of knowledge. Knowledge is
creation. Human knowledge is the knowledge of the rules of
action and, thus, the capability of setting the process in
question in motion, or producing something. The successes
or results of human action can accordingly be seen in the
alteration of reality. The result of this, at least for the modern
world, is that its reality is increasingly based upon
knowledge and consists of knowledge. Knowledge is not
power (in the usual sense of the word power), but rather at
best potential power. Consequently, we must differentiate
between the capabilities of taking action and making use of
the capabilities of taking action.
Science is not only the access and the key to the
mysteries of the world, but rather also the coming into
being of a world. The conception of a reality-changing or
even reality-producing knowledge (the capability of taking
action), in the case of social-scientific findings, is likely to
be almost immediately convincing. One need only recall,
for instance, the idea of the thought experiment or model
that requires practical implementation. By contrast, if one
proceeds from regarding knowledge as conforming to
reality in traditional categories, then the idea of new
knowledge as a potentially reality-changing phenomenon
is difficult to accept, and this is very possibly especially
true in the case of natural-scientific findings.
To be sure, one can refer to the example of modern
biology to demonstrate convincingly that this is not
necessarily true. Modern biology includes the fabrication
of new life forms. It does not simply investigate nature, but
rather transforms and produces new life. Biology and
biotechnology are closely interconnected.
Knowledge fulfils an “active” function, however, only
where action is not carried out within essentially stereotyp-
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ical parameters (Max Weber), or otherwise extensively
regulated. Knowledge plays an active role only where, for
whatever reasons, there is latitude or necessity for decisionmaking. For Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1936), therefore,
social action begins only “where the not yet rationalized
latitude begins, where unregulated situations force decisions to be made.” Formulated more concretely: “It is not
an action…, when a bureaucrat deals with a bundle of files
according to existing regulations. There is also no action
when a judge subsumes a case under a section of law, nor
when a factory worker produces a screw using prescribed
movements, nor actually even when a technician combines
general laws of natural processes to some end or other. All
of these modes of behaviour should be described as
reproductive, because these actions are performed in a
rationalized arrangement without benefit of personal
decision.”
Consequently, for Mannheim the problem of the relationship between theory and practice is restricted to
situations of just this kind. To be sure, even extensively
regulated and thoroughly rationalized situations that are
constantly repeated are not free of “irrational” (i.e., “open”)
moments. At the same time, this perspective points to the
conditions of knowledge, and indeed of knowledge as the
result of human activity. Knowledge can lead to social
action and is, at the same time, the result of social action.
Here there is already an indication that it is by no means
necessary to consider the capacity to act to be identical with
actual action, i.e., knowledge is not itself already action.
The social significance of scientific discoveries, then,
lies primarily in the capacity to make use of knowledge as
the ability to act. Or in other words: knowledge gains in
distinction on the basis of its ability to change reality.
After these preparatory remarks on the concept and role
of knowledge in connection with action, we are in a
position to answer the open question of the qualities of a
socially relevant science. I place these observations under
the heading: The application of a theory is never one of
strict resemblance.
Application of a Theory is Never One of Resemblance
A meaningful theory of pragmatic transformation of
scientific knowledge into the capacity to act is quite
decisively coloured by the elementary insight that social
action is situationally bound, and by the fact that the
characteristics or constraints of a particular situation for
taking action, which vary from context to context, are either
relatively open or unchangeable.
Human action is indeed, as Mannheim also stresses, in
manifold ways the result of a relatively set repertoire of
fixed complexes of actions or modes of behaviour, which
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play out in given triggering situations. This by no means
applies to all the situations with which we are confronted in
daily life, however, or in less routine contexts for action. As
Friedrich Tenbruck emphasizes, for example, due to
internal or external circumstances human beings continually find themselves in new situations, for which highly
automated and self-contained modes of behaviour and
habits are not appropriate. In these cases, it makes a great
difference “which elements of the situation are given and
which are open” (my emphasis). Even the fixed nature of
social relationships, or as this is also described by many
observers, the existence of “structural” attributes of action,
which work on social action as an external “force,” can be
conceived of as a set of imaginable or possible options for
taking action, which are open to certain individuals or
groups.
The qualities that findings should have—which stimulate
a demand for knowledge, influence the assessment of the
knowledge on offer, and co-determine the practicability of
the findings—are thus to a crucial degree a function of the
supposed openness of the life situation. The probability of
implementing knowledge as the capacity to act into a
particular social action is an essential consequence of the
correspondence—in the broadest sense—between the type
and content of knowledge and those elements of the
situation that can be conceived of as open, i.e., controllable
or manipulable by actors, and that can actually be
influenced.
It is probably helpful, therefore, to differentiate between
“knowledge for practice” and “practical knowledge,”
particularly since the pragmatic relevance of knowledge is
by no means certain a priori, so that knowledge can be
turned to knowledge for action or “naturally” practical
knowledge. If, in this connection, we begin by following
the strategic insights of Karl Mannheim, who in his study
Ideology and Utopia made an attempt to formulate the
problems of a “science of politics,” then it becomes clear
that the successful “deployment” of findings in concrete
situations for action demands that for such contexts, the
possibilities for action, as well as an understanding of the
actors’ latitude for action and their chances of shaping
events, must be linked together, in order that knowledge
may become practical knowledge.
The qualities necessary for an understanding of practical
knowledge, which make possible the realization of knowledge, are on the one hand particular findings, and on the
other, i.e., on the side of those taking action, the control of
situationally specific conditions. I call these abilities, which
make implementing findings possible, capacity to shape, in
contrast to knowledge as the capacity to act.
In modern society, at the intersection of possibilities to
take action and to shape events, the rapidly growing
professions of experts, advisors and consultants as media-
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tors of knowledge find their employment and exert their
influence. These professions are necessary in order to
mediate between the complexity of changing and rapidly
expanding (scientific) fields of knowledge and those who
intend to enlist these findings as aids to taking action for
ideas do not “wander” from person to person, like an item
of “luggage”; rather, ability is tied to individuals and to
“networks” of persons. Varying interpretations must come
to one single “conclusion”; only then do they become
effective as capacity to take action (Wittgenstein) and,
ultimately, as practical knowledge as well.
And it is exactly this function—the closing off of
reflection, or the “healing” of the frequent lack of
immediate practicability of scientific findings, so that they
can serve as the basis for action—which is performed by
experts or knowledge-based professions in the modern
knowledge society. The social prestige and influence of
consultants, experts and advisors is ultimately especially
pregnant whenever their expertise extends to the access and
control of additional findings.
The particular, indeed outstanding status of scientific and
technical knowledge in modern society does not result
primarily from the fact that scientific knowledge is still
widely perceived or treated as a true, objective—that is,
reality-conforming yardstick—or as an uncontested authority. In view of this reputation, many groups and individuals
are prepared in countless daily situations to suppress their
doubts and reservations. This special social, but above all
economic, status stems from the fact that scientific
knowledge, more than any other form of knowledge, does
not represent static knowledge, and continually creates and
constitutes additional possibilities of taking action. This
gives rise to an interesting analogy between the scientific
and economic systems in the function of additional
knowledge; in both systems, a “reward” is offered for
additional knowledge, either in the form of recognition and
prestige, or monetary returns.
The Two Cultures of Knowledge Once Again
Despite my original statement, from what has been said up
to now one might easily take away the impression that my
answer to the question of the qualities of socially relevant
scientific findings must be limited to knowledge in the
humanities and social sciences. This is not the case.
Therefore, at this point I will once again take up the thesis
of the two cultures of knowledge. My thesis is that the
usability of scientific findings is a function of the
production of knowledge with regard to the open conditions
in situations. A thought experiment—as an exemplary form
of knowledge in the humanities, which deals with particular
actors’ concrete conditions for shaping events and builds
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them reflexively into the experiment—thus has a greater
chance of being realized. To what extent is this connection
also true for natural-scientific findings?
The practical usability of social-scientific knowledge, in
other words, is a matter of the conditions of the “production
of knowledge,” in which relevant latitudes for shaping
events find their way into the structure and content of the
knowledge. Are there comparable conditions for naturalscientific knowledge as well, which influence its application outside of the (scientific) context of its production?
This is the case and, indeed, it is the particular material
constraints of laboratory knowledge, for example, that find
their way into the structure of such knowledge. I refer here
to effects that can be observed and then reproduced only
under specific conditions, namely under the “original”
conditions that prevailed in the laboratory. Transferring this
knowledge into other contexts consequently requires at
least a partial transfer of these conditions of production as
well, unless one is prepared to accept having produced
“only” local, “impractical” knowledge. The practical
reproduction of natural-scientific or technical knowledge,
as is also the case for realizing a thought experiment,
requires capacities to shape events that make possible the
transfer of laboratory knowledge into practice.
To be able to achieve a particular result in the laboratory,
one must fundamentally simplify or reduce the (complex)
influence of the natural environment on a process; for only
then is one in a position to be able to unambiguously
identify or determine a specific connection. The implementation of this result in practice is faced with great
difficulties, of course, including the risks that could be
associated with transforming society into a laboratory, and
which could contaminate and even obstruct the relation or
the effect.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there remains the
question of why the natural sciences are so much more
successful in practice, so that for historical and social
reasons their findings, in contrast to the social sciences,
benefit from much more “favourable” chances of being
utilized.
Science, Risk, and Uncertainty
As a conclusion to these observations on socially relevant
scientific findings, we can come to a contradictory insight.
The growing significance of science and its manifold social
utility has led to its having an extensive monopoly on the
production of socially relevant knowledge in developing
societies, which cannot be contested by religion, nor by
politics, and in particular not by daily experience.
In its function of researching new areas and thus
expanding the latitude for making decisions and taking
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action in society, science is simply irreplaceable. In so far
as one wishes to gain certain and accepted knowledge, there
is no address to appeal to in society other than that of the
scientific system. At the same time, it must present this as
hypothetical knowledge, which could also appear differently in the future. It produces its own type of uncertainty, in
that every new piece of knowledge gained by scientific
means also marks out new areas of inadequate knowledge,
without which scientific progress would be impossible.
The systematic relationship between knowledge and
inadequate information can be most clearly seen in the
discourse on risk in society. Everything that we know about
possible ecological, climatic or technical dangers, we know
only on the basis of scientific investigations. Since we also
know how this knowledge was produced, however, we see
the associated limits of this knowledge too; we see the blind
spots and the provisional nature of this knowledge.
As a result of this mechanism, science has now lost its
traditional legitimation, to the extent that it can no longer
appear to be the representative of social progress or the
voice of reason. Science is not the authority of which man
can demand what is right or true. The central point may be
that the contingency of scientifically gained knowledge has
become known, and is being communicated within society
as inadequate knowledge.
With the disintegration of the fiction that science
produces certain knowledge comes the threat of a loss of
credibility and authority in the public sphere. The completely novel element of the present situation can be seen in
the fact that criticism of science is no longer from outside,
couched primarily in moral, religious or ideological terms,
but rather is formulated as science. Science speaks of itself
as if it were a third party. And this knowledge is fed into
decisions as knowledge about conditions, contexts and
consequences of action, which could also have turned out
differently. It is for this very reason that we cannot expect
to gain more certainty from more research, but rather more
uncertainty, since the wealth of alternatives open to the
decision-maker is reflexively increased.
Moreover, the required knowledge being demanded is no
longer only in the direction of ends that can be technologically realized, but rather in the realm of undesired sideeffects. Thus the future becomes a crucial parameter for
knowledge (the precautionary principle). Obviously, there
is a direct relationship between foreseen and unforeseen
consequences of action. The further the decision-maker’s
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time horizon is extended into the future, the more probable
the increase in unforeseen consequences (as, for instance,
adaptation to the consequences of climate change). Both
factually and socially, the significance of ignorance
increases for the actors. The share of the action that can
be known only in terms of probability or improbability
grows, and the decision itself takes as its basis only a
fictively certain reality.
A reflection on these facts does not have to lead to
relativism or arbitrariness of knowledge, but it does make
us aware to what degree science itself has become riskladen and is increasingly becoming a source of political
problems; of how knowledge societies will react with this
new political field; and how science is thereby driven to
ever more complex constructions. And this in a society that
has no choice but to take risks.
The crucial point of this discovery is that in spite of
all the uncertainty of knowledge production, science is
the only legitimate way to create knowledge in modern
society. Its task is not the promulgation of certain
knowledge, but rather the management of uncertainty.
The heart of this perception is communication regarding
the uncertainty and the provisionality of science’s own
production of knowledge, in exchange with the public
and the politicians.
Further Reading
Fromm, E. 1976. To Have or To Be. New York: Harper & Row.
Mannheim, K. 1936 [1929]. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge.
Snow, C. P. 1964 [1959]. The Two Cultures: and A Second Look. An
Expanded Version of the Two Cultures and the Scientific
Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stehr, N. 2005. Knowledge Politics. Governing the Consequences of
Science and Technology. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Nico Stehr, International Advisory Editor of Society, is Karl
Mannheim Professor of Cultural Studies at the Zeppelin University,
Friedrichshafen, Germany. His research interests center on the
transformation of modern societies into knowledge societies and
associated developments in different social institutions of modern
society (e.g. science, politics, the economy and globalization). Among
his recent publications are: Biotechnology: Between Commerce and
Civil Society (Transaction Books, 2004); Knowledge (with Reiner
Grundmann, Routledge, 2005), Moral Markets (Paradigm Publishers,
2008), Who owns Knowledge: Knowledge and the Law (with Bernd
Weiler, Transaction Books, 2008) and Knowledge and Democracy
(Transaction Publishers, 2008).