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A Hybrid QoS Routing Strategy for Suburban Ad-Hoc Networks Muhammad Mahmudul Islam Ronald Pose Carlo Kopp School of Computer Science & Software Engineering Monash University Outline Introduction Overview of SAHN Routing in SAHN (SAHNR) Simulation Results Future Work Acknowledgements Introduction (1/4) How to Connect to University's Network from Home Commercial Wired Services Direct Dial-up Services Internet Services Dial-up Broadband (cable modems, xDSL etc) Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks Single Hop Solutions 802.11b Multi Hop Solutions Nokia Roof-Top SAHN MIT Roofnet Introduction (2/4) Limitations of commercial services Impose service charges Require costly wiring infrastructure Not widely available Provide mostly asymmetric bandwidth utilization Inadequate for file transfer, X protocol, interactive graphical programs etc Local Telephone Office Local Telephone Office ISP Local Telephone Office Introduction (3/4) Limitations of single hop ad-hoc networks Must have direct connectivity to all nodes Longer distances may be covered with higher transmission energy Interference may increase as connectivity increases Overall network throughput may decrease Introduction (4/4) Limitations of Nokia RoofTop A central admninistrator has control over the whole network through RMS to Assign addresses to each node Change subscribers’ setting Unable to detect rogue/non-cooperating nodes Authetication scheme using 16 bit key SAHN (1/2) Provides services not offered by commercial service providers Bypass expensive infrastructure for broadband Provide symmetric bandwidth WLAN in inadequate wiring infrastructure Bypass ongoing service charges for Telco independent traffic Features multi-hop QoS routing Security throughout all layers Utilizing link states (e.g. available bandwidth, link stability, latency, jitter and security) to select suitable routes Avoid selfish routing strategy to avoid congestion Proper resource access control and management SAHN (2/2) Ideal for cooperative nodes. E.g. spread over a suburban area, connecting houses and business Topology is quasi static Uses wireless technology Symmetric broadband, multi Mbps bandwidth No charges for SAHN traffic Application Application SAHN services Presentation Pre se ntation run alongside Se ssion S ession A V O U E T TCP/UDP TCP/UDP TCP/IP Transport Transport D D H I I E IP Conceived by O O R IP Ne twork Network SAHN Routing Ronald Pose Data Link e .g. IEEE 802.11 variants Data Link & Physical e .g. IEEE 802.11 variants Physical Carlo Kopp in 1997 A Standard SAHN Node Appears to host like a cable modem Functionally more like a RF LAN repeater Embedded microprocessor & protocol engine that implements all SAHN protocols, manages and configures the system Each SAHN node has at least 2 wireless links Capable of achieveing link rate throughput References R. Pose and C. Kopp. Bypassing the Home Computing Bottleneck: The Suburban Area Network. 3rd Australasian Comp. Architecture Conf. (ACAC). February, 1998. pp.87100. A. Bickerstaffe, E. Makalic and S. Garic. CS honours theses. Monash University. www.csse.monash.edu.au/~rdp/SAN/. 2001 Paul Conilione. QoS for Suburban Ad Hoc Networks. Honours Interim Presentation, CSSE, Monash University, 5th June 2003 MIT Roofnet. http://www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/roofnet/ Design Challenges for SAHN Routing (1/2) Wireless medium inherently vulnerable to Eavesdropping DoS attacks Node masquerading Requires security policies implemented at all levels Wireless technologies (e.g. 802.11) do not feature Resource access control Resource management Requires higher level protocols to efficiently handle limited resources Design Challenges for SAHN Routing (2/2) Ad-Hoc wireless networks should handle node/link failures find routes on demand route packets with required QoS detect non-cooperating nodes Requires an efficient on-demand routing solution Possible Routing Solutions for SAHN (1/3) Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols Table Driven DSDV WRP GSP FSR HSR On Demand DSR AODV MSR AOMDV TORA Hybrid LANMAR QoS Routing Possible Routing Solutions for SAHN (2/3) Dynamic source routing (DSR) On demand Uses source routing Can find multiple routes Network overhead increases for carrying source routes No security at network layer Does not consider QoS for route selection Does not feature load balancing Cannot detect non-cooperating nodes Possible Routing Solutions for SAHN (3/3) Ad Hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) routing On demand Cannot find multiple routes to a destination No security at network layer Does not consider QoS for route selection No support for load balancing Cannot detect non-cooperating nodes Why Customized Routing for SAHN (1/2) Existing ad-hoc routing solutions do not feautrure one or more of the following attributes Multiple routes to a destination Resource Access Control QoS Load balancing Security at network layer Optimization for quasi-static networks Handling non-cooperating nodes Why Customized Routing for SAHN (2/2) Mobile IP (IPv6) Uses proactive routing technique ideal for centralized networks Whole network is flooded with link state information Assumes direct link (single hop) between home/foreign agent and each host Cannot not handle non-cooperating nodes Properties of SAHN Routing Protocol (1/2) Uses source routing for route discovery Maintains routes dynamically similar to DSR e.g. gratuitous Route replies, salvaging data/error packets etc Properties of SAHN Routing Protocol (2/2) Decreases network overhead Excludes source route in every data packet Avoids selfish/uncoordinated routing strategy Makes use of available paths having QoS Chooses least congested paths Balances load among available paths Features network level security with least network overhead Node authentication Encryption of packet information Handling non-cooperative nodes Focus of this Paper Modified DSR to decrease network overhead by excluding source route in every data packet avoid selfish/uncoordinated routing strategy by choosing least congested paths feature network level security by encryption of packet information QoS parameters for SAHNR Available bandwidth (bypass congested paths) Network level encryption for each session Phases of SAHNR Route Discovery On demand Data Transmission On demand Route Maintenance Periodically and on demand • Node Authentication • Exchange of keys are done in these phases Network Level Security at a Glance RREQ packets contain 1. Public key from downstream nodes ACKRREQ packets contain 1. Public key from upstream nodes 2. Shared key 3. Identification signature 1 & 2 are encrypted with down stream nodes’ public key Initial DATA packet for a session contains 1. Shared key from downstream nodes 2. Identification signature 1& 2 are encrypted with upstream nodes’ public key Neighbour Discovery & Security (1/8) Requires RREQ, ACKRREQ, RREP & ACKRREP packets Authentication and negotiation of shared key for encrytion/decryption of data packet is performed Level 1 Level 2 Global Source Address SAHN Id Type Global Destination Address Local Source Address SEQ HTL Total Size Level 2 Data HC RIL. Each node's address & QoS values RREQ/RREP Packet Format CRC Level1 Public key of the transmitting node (for RREQ) Neighbour Discovery & Security (2/8) S wants to find route to X Generates [public key (PbS), private key(PrS)] D B H C S N G E F X Neighbour Discovery & Security (3/8) S broadcasts RREQS packets to its neighbours with PbS RREQS {S,PbS,QoSS} D B H C S N RREQS G E F X Neighbour Discovery & Security (4/8) B generates [ PbB, PrB] & a shared key (ShB) Encrypts ShB & B’s identification signature with PbS Unicasts ACKRREQ with e(ShB+B,PbS) & PbB to S Rebroadcasts RREQ packets to its neighbours with PbB ACKRREQ B {e(ShB+B,PbS), PbB} RREQB {(S,QoSS) (B,PBB,QoSB)} B RREQB S H C N G D E F X Neighbour Discovery & Security (5/8) S gets ShB & B’s identification signature by decryption d(e(ShB+B,PbS), PrS) Registers B as a valid node if its signature matches node identification table B ACKRREQC {e(ShC+C,PbB), PbC} C S N G RREQC {(S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,PBC,QoSC)} RREQC RREQ C F D E H X Neighbour Discovery & Security (6/8) H receives RREQE from E H has route to X D B H C S N ACKRREQE G F E RREQE Route Table(RTH) : : (X,QoSX) : RREQE {(S,QoSS) (B,QoSB) (C,QoSC) (E,PbE,QoSE)} X Neighbour Discovery & Security (7/8) H generates a RREPH packet from RREQE & RTH H unicasts RREPH packet to E D B H C S N Route Table(RTS) : : : G E F Route Table(RTH) (S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,QoSC)(E,QoSE) : (X,QoSX) : X RREQE {(S,QoSS) (B,QoSB) RREPH (C,QoSC) {(X,QoSX) (E,QoSE)} (H,QoSH) (E,QoSE)(C,QoSC) (B,QoSB)(S,QoSS)} Neighbour Discovery & Security (8/8) A RREP is forwarded according to the next node address S receives RREPs from neighbouring nodes S selects a suitable route based on gathered QoS of each route RREPB {(X,QoSX)(H,QoSH) (E,QoSE)(C,QoSC) (B,QoSB)(S,QoSS)} B RREPC {(X,QoSX)(H,QoSH) (E,QoSE)(C,QoSC) (B,QoSB)(S,QoSS)} C S Route Table (RTS) : (B,QoSB)(C,QoSC) (E,QoSE)(H,QoSH) (X,QoSX) : : G N D RREPE {(X,QoSX)(H,QoSH) (E,QoSE)(C,QoSC) (B,QoSB)(S,QoSS)} E F H Route Table(RTH) (S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,QoSC)(E,QoSE) : (X,QoSX) : RREPH {(X,QoSX)(H,QoSH) (E,QoSE)(C,QoSC) (B,QoSB)(S,QoSS)} X Data Transmission (1/4) First few data packets contains full RIL S generates a ShS or keeps Shb S unicasts DATA packet with e(ShS+S,PbB) to B DATAS {(S,e(ShS+S,PbB),QoSS) (B,QoSB)(C,QoSC) (E,QoSE)(H,QoSH) (X,QoSX)} FTB : : : D B S Forward Table(FTS) : S->B->X : G N FTH : : : FTC : : : H C E F FTE : : : X Data Transmission (2/4) B gets ShS & S’s identification signature by d(e(ShS+S,PbB), PrB) Registers S as a valid node matching its node identification table Updates RT/FT with unknown information Forwards data packet to the next node from RIL with e(ShB+B,PbC) B S FTB : S->C->X : Forward Table(FTS) : S->B->X : G DATAB {(S,QoSS) (B,e(ShB+B,PbC),QoSB) (C,QoSC)(E,QoSE) (H,QoSH)(X,QoSX)} D H C N E F X Data Transmission (3/4) Reamining nodes registers immediate upstream nodes Update RT/FT with unknown information Forward data packet to the next node from RIL with e(Sh?+?,Pb?) D B S FTB : S->C->X : Forward Table(FTS) : S->B->X : G N FTH : S->X->X : C FTC : S->E->X : F DATAC {(S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,e(ShC+C,PbE),QoSC) (E,QoSE)(H,QoSH) (X,QoSX)} E FTE : S->H->X : H X DATAH {(S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,QoSC)(E,QoSE) (H,e(ShH+H,PbX),QoSH) (X,QoSX)} DATAE {(S,QoSS)(B,QoSB) (C,QoSC) (E,e(ShE+E,PbH),QoSE) (H,QoSH)(X,QoSX)} Data Transmission (4/4) Remaining data packets do not contain RIL An intermediate node Finds the next node from the FT with <Global Source, Global Destination> Updates Local Source with its own address Updates its RT/FT Level 1 Level 2 SAHN Id Global Source Address Type Local Source Address Global Destination Address Total Size SEQ Level 3 HTL Total Size Level2 Data HC Encrypted Level 3 Payload RIL (for first few packets) Data to be Transmitted DATA Packet Format CRC Level1 Encrypted Level3 Payload CRC Level3 Route Maintenance (1/4) Takes actions if 1. A link fails 2. A route error control (RERR) packet is received 3. Data packets are recieved for unknown destinations 4. A RT/FT entry becomes too old Level 1 Level 2 SAHN Id Type Global Source Address Local Source Address Global Destination Address Total Size SEQ Level 2 Data HTL HC Unreachable Node Address RERR Packet Format CRC Level1 RIL. Each node's address & QoS values Route Maintenance (2/4) 1. If the route maintenace module senses a link failure Tries to find alternate route to destination Sends RERR of the broken link to its neigbours Deletes corresponding entries of broken links from its RT/FT Route Maintenance (3/4) 2. If a node receives a RERR packet the route maintenance module Sends RERR to its neigbours Deletes corresponding entries from its RT/FT Route Maintenance (4/4) 3a. If a node receives a data packet for unknown destination, the route maintenance module Tries to find a route to the destination 3b. If it fails, it Sends RERR to the source of the data packet References A. Bickerstaffe, E. Makalic and S. Garic. CS honours theses. Monash University. www.csse.monash.edu.au/~rdp/SAN/. 2001 P. Misra. Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Mobile Networks. www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~jain/cis78899/adhoc_routing/index.html. 02/07/2000 Simulation Setup (1/2) GloMoSim (version 2.03) 21 static nodes in 3 sq. km physical terrain Standard radio model for transmission Propagation limit = -111.0 dBm Two-Ray model for the propagation path loss where Free space path loss for direct links Plane earth path loss for more distant links Radio transmission power = 15.0 dBm, antenna gain = 0.0 dB, radio reception threshold = -81.0 dBm, sensitivity= -91.0 dBm & SNR = 10.0 dB AODV, DSR and SAHNR were used as routing protocols SAHNR contaied follwoing features All standard features of DSR Network level shared key negotiation Accumulation of QoS info (available bandwidth) during route discovery Route selection based on bandwidth availabilty & hop count Using forward table for data transmission Simulation Setup (1/2) FTP connection. 0 (Client), 11 (Server) Total 8000000 pkts, 1460 bytes/ pkt, starts at 30 sec sim time FTP connection. 19 (Client), 1 (Server) 0 7 Total 11000 pkts, 1400 bytes/ pkt, starts at 70 sec sim time 4 FTP connection. 18 (Client), 3 (Server) Total 9000000 pkts, 1500 bytes/pkt, 1 8 starts at 100 sec sim time CBR connection. 0 (Client), 20 (Server) 5 Total 13000000 pkts, 1512 bytes/pkt, inter-departure time 1.5 sec/pkt, 2 9 starts at 28.8 sec sim time CBR connection. 17 (Client), 0 (Server) 6 Total 20000000 pkt, 1024 bytes/pkt, inter-departure time 1.1 sec/pkt, 3 10 starts at 15 sec sim time 14 11 18 15 12 19 16 13 20 17 Simulation Result (1/3) Total no. of bytes received Comparing total data received at FTP servers using SAHNR, DSR and AODV 100000000 80000000 60000000 40000000 20000000 0 SAHNR 0 DSR AODV 1000 2000 3000 4000 Simulation Time (seconds) 5000 Simulation Result (2/3) Total no. of CTRL packets transmitted in the network Comparing load of CTRL packets in the network 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 SAHNR DSR AODV 0 1000 2000 3000 Simulation time (seconds) 4000 5000 Simulation Result (3/3) Comparing number of packets received with and without source routes with SAHNR 100000 90000 80000 70000 No. of packets received at FTP servers 60000 50000 40000 Node 18 Node 11 30000 20000 Node 3 10000 WSR - With Source Route WOSR- Without Source Route Node 1 0 Node 0 WSR WOSR Future works Integrate all QoS metrics (bandwidth, error rate, latency, jitter) for routing Incorporate security schemes i.e. node authentication, encryption/decryption Define a feasible network size & packet length Detect non-cooperative nodes Perform more simulations with varied network sizes, directional antennas and different topologies with presence of rouge nodes Test SAHNR in real environment Acknowledgements Initial definition of the SAHN architecture was carried out by Adrian Bickerstaffe, Enes Makalic and Slavisa Garic in their computer science honours projects in 2001 at Monash University. They also implemented the initial testbed. The current project builds on their excellent work. Part of presentation was partly done with Paul Conilione, using exclusively the abilities given to him by his Chinese Buddhist Taoist Master, Shifu Chow Yuk Nen. Thank You ?