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Download Worms - Dr. Stephen C. Hayne
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Worms – Code Red BD 480 This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by David Moore, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen C. Hayne Who gets Internet worms? Big question: who gets code red? Big companies? Home users? Web servers? People who know they aren’t running IIS? Host infection plots show some slight diurnal behavior ==> people turning off their “web servers” Looking deeper shows extreme diurnal behavior, masked in simple plots (1/3 to 1/2 machines turned on/off daily) What is the Code-Red worm? Malicious program that connects to other machines and replicates itself Exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS Days 1-19 of each month displays ‘hacked by Chinese’ message on English language servers tries to open connections to infect 100 other randomly chosen machines Day 20-27 launches a denial-of-service attack on the IP address of www1.whitehouse.gov Code-Red Detection Data collected from a /8 network at UCSD and two /16 networks at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories (LBL) 1/256th of total address space monitored Machines sending TCP SYN packets to port 80 of nonexistent hosts considered infected Data spans 24-hour period from midnight UTC July 19th - midnight UTC July 20th Host Infection Rate 359,104 hosts infected in 24 hour period Between 11:00 and 16:00 UTC, the growth is exponential 2,000 hosts infected per minute at the peak of the infection rate (16:00 UTC) Host Infection Rate Exponential Infection Rate Infection Rate over Time Host Deactivation Machines isolated, patched, and rebooted throughout the day Host considered inactive after we observe no further unsolicited traffic Because the Code-Red worm is programmed to stop infecting new hosts at midnight on the 20th of every month, the majority of hosts stopped probing in the last hour before midnight UTC on July 20th Host Deactivation Host Deactivation Rates over Time Host Characterization: Country The following graph shows the top ten countries of origin for all infected hosts Surprisingly, Korea is the second most prevalent country, behind countries with more advanced network infrastructure Host Characterization: Country of Origin 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 Infected Hosts US Korea China Taiwan Canada UK Germany Australia Japan Netherlands Conclusions 359,104 hosts infected in less than 14 hours up to 2,000 hosts per minute infected Collateral damage: routers, switches, printers, and DSL modems crashed, rebooted, or otherwise damaged Unpatched, insecure machines put everyone at risk Will we be prepared for the next major exploit? Patching Survey Idea: randomly test subset of previously infected IP addresses to see if they have been patched or are still vulnerable 360,000 IP addresses in pool from initial July 19th infection 10,000 chosen randomly each day and surveyed between 9am and 5pm PDT Patching Rate Host Infections Conclusions 1/3 - 1/2 of hosts are coming and going on a daily cycle DHCP effect can skew statistics, since the same host can have multiple IP addresses Even with the “best” possible warning, the majority of IIS patching occurred after the start of the next round of CodeRed