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Transcript
Worms – Code Red
BD 480
This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by David
Moore, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis.
I have edited and added material.
Dr. Stephen C. Hayne
Who gets Internet worms?



Big question: who gets code red? Big
companies? Home users? Web servers?
People who know they aren’t running IIS?
Host infection plots show some slight diurnal
behavior ==> people turning off their “web
servers”
Looking deeper shows extreme diurnal
behavior, masked in simple plots (1/3 to 1/2
machines turned on/off daily)
What is the Code-Red worm?



Malicious program that connects to other
machines and replicates itself
Exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS
Days 1-19 of each month



displays ‘hacked by Chinese’ message on English
language servers
tries to open connections to infect 100 other
randomly chosen machines
Day 20-27

launches a denial-of-service attack on the IP address
of www1.whitehouse.gov
Code-Red Detection




Data collected from a /8 network at UCSD
and two /16 networks at Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratories (LBL)
1/256th of total address space monitored
Machines sending TCP SYN packets to
port 80 of nonexistent hosts considered
infected
Data spans 24-hour period from midnight
UTC July 19th - midnight UTC July 20th
Host Infection Rate



359,104 hosts infected in 24 hour period
Between 11:00 and 16:00 UTC, the growth is
exponential
2,000 hosts infected per minute at the peak
of the infection rate (16:00 UTC)
Host Infection Rate
Exponential Infection Rate
Infection Rate over Time
Host Deactivation



Machines isolated, patched, and rebooted
throughout the day
Host considered inactive after we observe no
further unsolicited traffic
Because the Code-Red worm is programmed
to stop infecting new hosts at midnight on the
20th of every month, the majority of hosts
stopped probing in the last hour before
midnight UTC on July 20th
Host Deactivation
Host Deactivation Rates
over Time
Host Characterization: Country


The following graph shows the top ten
countries of origin for all infected hosts
Surprisingly, Korea is the second most
prevalent country, behind countries with
more advanced network infrastructure
Host Characterization:
Country of Origin
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Infected Hosts
US
Korea
China
Taiwan
Canada
UK
Germany
Australia
Japan
Netherlands
Conclusions





359,104 hosts infected in less than 14 hours
up to 2,000 hosts per minute infected
Collateral damage: routers, switches, printers,
and DSL modems crashed, rebooted, or
otherwise damaged
Unpatched, insecure machines put everyone at
risk
Will we be prepared for the next major
exploit?
Patching Survey



Idea: randomly test subset of previously
infected IP addresses to see if they have
been patched or are still vulnerable
360,000 IP addresses in pool from initial July
19th infection
10,000 chosen randomly each day and
surveyed between 9am and 5pm PDT
Patching Rate
Host Infections
Conclusions



1/3 - 1/2 of hosts are coming and going on a
daily cycle
DHCP effect can skew statistics, since the
same host can have multiple IP addresses
Even with the “best” possible warning, the
majority of IIS patching occurred after the
start of the next round of CodeRed