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Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy Lock-In effect & Networks externality Seungkyoon Shin Recognizing Lock-In • Cost of switching • Compare – Ford v. GM – Mac v. PC Information Rules 2 Spring 2000 What’s the Difference? • Durable investments in complementary assets – – – Hardware Software Netware • Switching cost and lock-in are ubiquitous in information systems • Supplier wants to lock-in customer • Customer wants to avoid lock-in • Basic principle: Look ahead and reason back Information Rules 3 Spring 2000 Examples of lock-in • Bell Atlantic and AT&T – 5ESS digital switch used proprietary operating system – Large switching costs to change switches • Computer Associates – Vender Level Locking – System Level Locking Information Rules 4 Spring 2000 Small Switching Costs Matter • • • • Look at lock-in costs on a per customer basis Phone number portability Email addresses (Mail Forwarding issue) Hotmail (advertising, portability) – $400 mil for 9.5 mil subscribers • ACM, CalTech – Provide forwarding service to approach possible donors Information Rules 5 Spring 2000 Valuing an Installed Base • Customer C switches from A to "same position" w/ B – Total switching costs = customer costs + B's costs • Example – Switching ISPs costs customer $50 new ISP $25 – New ISP make $100 on customer, switch – New ISP makes $70 on customer, no switch • In a competitive market, Profit=switching costs Information Rules 6 Spring 2000 Profits & Switching Costs In General: • Profits from a customer = total switching costs + quality/cost advantages • In commodity market like telephony, profit per customer = total switching costs per customer • Use of this rule of thumb – How much to invest to get locked-in base – Evaluate a target acquisition (e.g., Hotmail) – Product and design decisions that affect switching costs Information Rules 7 Spring 2000 Classification of Lock-In • Durable purchases and replacement: declines with time • Brand-specific training: rises with time • Information and data: rises with time • Specialized suppliers: may rise • Search costs: learn about alternatives • Loyalty programs: rebuild cumulative usage • Contractual commitments: damages Information Rules 8 Spring 2000 Durable Purchases • • • • • Telephone switches, Mainframe, OS After-market sales (supplies, maintenance) Depends on (true) depreciation Usually fall with time due to depreciation Watch out for multiple pieces of hardware – Supplier will want to stagger vintages – Contract renewal • Technology lock-in vs. vendor lock-in Information Rules 9 Spring 2000 Brand-specific Training • • • • • When personnel are trained General training/brand specific training How much is transferable? Software, an obvious example Competitors want to lower switching costs – Borland’s Quattro Pro help for Lotus 123 users – MS Word and WordPerfect help Information Rules 10 Spring 2000 Information & Databases • Data files – Insist on standard formats – S/W and database – Whether information can be easily ported over to another system • Zip - CD - DVD Transition Information Rules 11 Spring 2000 Specialized Suppliers • If durable equipment or S/W is highly specialized, it will be hard to find alternatives • Pentagon: Joint strike fighter project – Structuring competition among suppliers – Boeing, Lockheed Martin, McDonald • IBM – Dual sourcing – Intel and AMD Information Rules 12 Spring 2000 Search Costs • Consumers’ Search Cost – Psychological costs of change – Time and efforts – Risk to customers • Suppliers’ Search Cost – Promotional cost – Cost of actually closing the deal – Cost of setting up a new account – Risk to suppliers • Example of Risk: Credit Cards – $100 million in receivables is worth about $120 million – Market valuation of “loyalty” Information Rules 13 Spring 2000 Loyalty Programs • Constructed by firm (artificial lock-in) – Frequent flyer programs – Getting more popular in E-Commerce – Keep track of history sales: consumer information • Personalized Pricing – Gold status • Example: Amazon and Barnes and Noble – Amazon Associates Program v. B&N's Affiliates program • Add nonlinearity? Information Rules 14 Spring 2000 Suppliers and partners • Bilateral, or two-sided lock-in • Railroad spur lines • Customized software – Game for the Nintendo 64 platform – S/W for Apple computer Information Rules 15 Spring 2000 Follow the Lock-in cycle Brand Selection Sampling Lock-In Entrenchment Information Rules 16 Spring 2000 Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy Networks and Positive Feedback Old and New • Industrial Economy – Populated with oligopolies – Economies of Scale • Information Economy – Temporary monopolies – Economies of Networks Information Rules 18 Spring 2000 Important Ideas • Positive feedback • Network effects • Returns to scale – Demand side – Supply side Information Rules 19 Spring 2000 Positive Feedback • • • • • Strong get stronger, weak get weaker Negative feedback: stabilizing Makes a market “tippy” Examples: VHS v. Beta, Wintel v. Apple “Winner take all markets” Information Rules 20 Spring 2000 Sources of Positive Feedback • Supply side economies of scale – Declining average cost – Marginal cost less than average cost – Example: information goods, Automobile industry • Demand side economies of scale – Network effects – In general: fax, email, Web – In particular: Sony v. Beta, Wintel v. Apple Information Rules 21 Spring 2000 Network Effects • Real networks: – Fax machines, compatible modems, email • Virtual networks – Mac users, CD-ROM driver, Nintendo 64 – Computer (both S/W and H/W) buyers are picking a network, not simply a product. E.g. user group • Number of users – Metcalfe’s Law: Value of network of size n proportional to n2 • Importance of expectations Information Rules 22 Spring 2000 Lock-In and Switching Costs • Network effects lead to substantial collective switching costs • Even worse than individual lock-in • Due to coordination costs • Example: QWERTY Information Rules 23 Spring 2000 Don’t Get Carried Away • Network externalities don’t always apply – ISPs (but watch out for QoS) – PC production • Likelihood of tipping – See next slide Information Rules 24 Spring 2000 Likelihood of Tipping Low Scale High Scale Economies Economies Low Demand For Variety Unlikely High High Demand For Variety Low Depends Information Rules 25 Spring 2000 Chicken & Eggs • Fax and fax machines • VCRs and tapes • Internet browsers and Java Information Rules 26 Spring 2000 Igniting Positive Feedback • Evolution – Give up some performance to ensure compatibility, thus easing consumer adoption • Revolution – Wipe the slate clean and come up with the best product possible Information Rules 27 Spring 2000 Evolution • Offer a migration path – Failure of CBS • Examples – Microsoft – Borland v Lotus • Build new network by links to old one • Problems: technical and legal Information Rules 28 Spring 2000 Technical Obstacles • • • • Compatibility/Performance Trade-off Use Creative design Think in terms of system (NBC/CBS) Converters and bridge technologies – One-way compatibility – Office 97/95 – Boland Q-pro/Lotus 1-2-3 Information Rules 29 Spring 2000 Legal Obstacles • Need IP licensing • Example: – Sony and Philips CDs – Amazon.com’ banner ad Information Rules 30 Spring 2000 Revolution • Users will bear the switching cost when production is so much better than what people are currently using • Groves’ law: “10X rule” • But depends on switching costs • Example: Nintendo vs. Sega Information Rules 31 Spring 2000 Openness v. Control • “Open” approach: offering to make the necessary interfaces and specifications available to others • “Control” approach: keeping your system proprietary • The goal is to maximize the value of your technology, not control Information Rules 32 Spring 2000 To maximize the value… • Your reward = Total value added to industry x your share of industry value • Value added to industry – Depends on product and – Size of network • Your share – Depends on how open Information Rules 33 Spring 2000 Openness • More cautious strategy than control • Full openness – Anybody can make the product – Problem: no champion • Alliance – Only members of alliance can use – Problem: holding alliance together Information Rules 34 Spring 2000 Control • Control standard and go it alone • A strategy for Market leaders: AT&T, MS, and Intel • If several try this strategy, it may lead to standards wars Information Rules 35 Spring 2000 Generic Strategies Compatible Control Open Controlled Migration Open Migration Incompatible Performance Discontinuity Play Information Rules 36 Spring 2000 Performance Play • Introduce new, incompatible technology • Examples – Palm Pilot – Iomega Zip • Attractive if – Great technology – Outsider with no installed base Information Rules 37 Spring 2000 Controlled Migration • Compatible, but proprietary • Examples – Windows 98 – Pentium chips – Upgrades and update of S/W programs Information Rules 38 Spring 2000 Open Migration • Many vendors, compatible technology • Little switching cost for customers • Examples – Fax machines – Modems Information Rules 39 Spring 2000 Discontinuity • New technology, but incompatible with existing technology • Supplied by many vendors • Examples – CD audio – 3 1/2” disks Information Rules 40 Spring 2000 Lessons on Lock-in • • • • • Switching costs are ubiquitous Customers may be vulnerable Value your installed base Watch for durable purchases Be able to identify 7-types of lock-in Information Rules 41 Spring 2000 Lessons on Network and Positive feedback • Positive feedback means strong get stronger and weak get weaker • Consumers value size of network • Works for large networks, against small ones • Consumer expectations are critical • Fundamental tradeoff: performance and compatibility Information Rules 42 Spring 2000 Lessons, continued • Fundamental tradeoff: openness and control • Generic strategies – – – – Performance play Controlled Migration Open Migration Discontinuity • Lessons of history Information Rules 43 Spring 2000