Download 5 Structuring of Beliefs

5. The Structuring of Beliefs.
Are Many Opinions Random?
(re Converse)
GV917
Political Knowledge
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One way of examining if people reply to
questions at random because they are illinformed is to ask them knowledge questions
Political Knowledge questions indicate the
extent to which people are actually ignorant
about politics – and hence may have nonattitudes
A battery of Knowledge questions were
asked in the 2001 British Election Study
Knowledge Questions in the 2001 British
Election Study
True
False Don’t
Know
Polling Stations close at 10pm on Election
Day
82
7
10
The Conservative Party policy is that Britain
should never join the Euro
32
46
22
The Liberal Democrats favour a system of
proportional representation for Westminster
Elections
60
5
35
The minimum voting age in Britain is 16
10
85
5
Unemployment has fallen since Labour was
elected in 1997
77
13
10
94
3
Only taxpayers are allowed to vote in general 3
elections
Knowledge Questions in the 2001 BES
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On average 74 per cent of respondents gave
the correct answer
They were much more likely to give the
correct answers about electoral
arrangements (87%) than about party policies
(61%)
However, there is not much evidence of
complete ignorance of politics in the data –
random guessing would produce a Normal
Distribution centred on 3 correct answers
The Distribution of Political Knowledge
in 2001 (Mean = 4.4)
Political Knowledge, Age and Sex in 2001
Age
Knowledge Scores
Up to 24
3.9
25-34
4.3
35-44
4.6
45-54
4.7
55-64
4.4
Sex
Male
4.7
Female
4.2
Political Knowledge and Occupational
Status in 2001
Occupational Status
Knowledge Scores
Professionals and Managers
5.2
White Collar Middle Management 4.9
White Collar Clerical
4.6
Skilled Manual
4.3
Semi-Skilled Manual
4.0
Unskilled Manual
3.8
Results
Political Knowledge is not that high – with a
mean score of 4.4.
On the other hand it is far from being random,
since the distribution of scores is skewed
heavily to the high end
Some people undoubtedly guessed some of
the answers – but only 14 per cent got a
score of 3.0 – which is expected if people are
guessing
Another Way of Detecting Non-Attitudes –
Asking Questions about Non-Existent Issues
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Patrick Sturgis and Patten Smith asked questions about two
fictitious issues (See ‘Fictitious Issues Revisited: Political Interest,
Knowledge and the Generation of non-attitudes’ Political Studies,
2010, vol 58: 66-84)
In their research they wanted to investigate the extent to which
individuals would express an opinion about two non-existent Bills
before Parliament: the ‘Monetary Control Bill’ and the ‘Agricultural
Trade Bill’.
They were interested in finding out the extent to which people who
were politically knowledgeable and politically interested would do
this and also if there were any question order effects in surveys
containing these questions.
Responses to Two Fictitious Issues in a
Survey (N=1,024)
Responses
Monetary Control Bill % Agricultural Trade %
Strongly Support
0.8
0.4
Tend to Support
9.7
5.2
Neither Support nor Oppose
26.1
20.7
Tend to Oppose
3.6
4.1
Strongly Oppose
1.2
1.3
Never Heard of it
45.6
55.6
Don’t Know
13.0
12.8
Results
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Just over 15 per cent of respondents expressed an
opinion on the Monetary Control Bill, and just over 11 per
cent on the Agricultural Trade Bill (if we count ‘Neithers’,
‘Never Heard of it’ and Don’t know as non-opinions)
The research showed that respondents who are
politically knowledgeable and interested in politics are
less likely to respond fictitiously
There are question order effects too – respondents are
less likely to express an interest in politics if they have
just been asked about a fictitious issue – the latter
appears to put them off.
 Are
Attitudes Stable
 Over Time?
Attitude Stability over time – the case of
British Membership of the Euro in 2001
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How Much Do Attitudes to the Euro Change over
Time? This is tricky for most people because it is a
complex issue and experts disagree
This became an election issue in 2001 with the
Conservatives campaigning on a platform of ‘Save
the Pound’
The Liberal Democrats campaigned to join the Euro
more or less right away
Labour campaigned on a promise to join if the
conditions were right
Attitudes to Joining the Euro just before
the General Election of 2001 – pre election survey
aq23 Attitude Towards Joining Euro Currency
Valid
Missing
Total
Frequency
1 Definitely join
173
2 Join if conditions right
853
3 Out for at least 4/5
507
years
4 Rule out on principle
624
8 Don't know
141
Total
2297
9 Refused
5
2303
Percent
7.5
37.1
Valid Percent
7.5
37.1
Cumulative
Percent
7.5
44.7
22.0
22.1
66.7
27.1
6.1
99.8
.2
100.0
27.1
6.1
100.0
93.9
100.0
Attitudes to Joining the Euro just after the
General Election of 2001- post election survey
bq35 Attitude Toward Joining Euro Currency
Valid
Missing
Total
Frequency
1 Definitely join
137
2 Join if conditions right
824
3 Out for at least 4/5
605
years
4 Rule out on principle
597
8 Don't know
138
Total
2301
9 Refused
2
2303
Percent
5.9
35.8
Valid Percent
5.9
35.8
Cumulative
Percent
5.9
41.7
26.3
26.3
68.0
25.9
6.0
99.9
.1
100.0
26.0
6.0
100.0
94.0
100.0
Changes in Attitudes to the Euro during
the election of 2001
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There were clearly some changes in attitudes
to British membership of the Euro which
occurred during the campaign
45 per cent said join immediately or if the
conditions are right before the election, and
42 per cent said this after the election
But these are the net figures and hide a lot of
gross turnover in opinion
Stability of Attitudes over Time – The
Row percentages in a Table
Attitude Towards Britain Joining the Euro - Crosstabulation of Pre and Post Election Survey
% within aq23 Attitude Towards Joining Euro Currency
aq23 Attitude
Towards
Joining Euro
Currency
Total
bq35 Attitude Toward Joining Euro Currency
2 Join if
3 Out for
1 Definitely conditions
at least
4 Rule out
join
right
4/5 years
on principle 8 Don't know
1 Definitely join
43.9%
39.3%
8.1%
3.5%
5.2%
2 Join if conditions right
4.7%
63.5%
22.5%
5.8%
3.5%
3 Out for at least 4/5
1.6%
25.2%
44.3%
25.6%
3.3%
years
4 Rule out on principle
.6%
7.7%
24.9%
61.4%
5.3%
8 Don't know
5.6%
26.8%
11.3%
21.1%
35.2%
5.9%
35.8%
26.2%
26.0%
6.1%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Findings?
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Only 44 per cent of the who supported joining
before the election also supported this policy
after the election
64 per cent were consistent in saying that
Britain should join if the conditions are right
44 per cent were consistent in waiting for 4 to
5 years
61 per cent consistently ruled out
membership in principle
The Extent to which people were consistent
over time – the total percentages in a table
aq23 Attitude Towards Joining Euro Currency * bq35 Attitude Toward Joining Euro Currency Crosstabulation
% of Total
aq23 Attitude
Towards
Joining Euro
Currency
Total
bq35 Attitude Toward Joining Euro Currency
2 Join if
3 Out for
1 Definitely conditions
at least
4 Rule out
join
right
4/5 years on principle 8 Don't know
1 Definitely join
3.3%
3.0%
.6%
.3%
.4%
2 Join if conditions right
1.7%
23.6%
8.4%
2.1%
1.3%
3 Out for at least 4/5
.3%
5.6%
9.8%
5.7%
.7%
years
4 Rule out on principle
.2%
2.1%
6.7%
16.6%
1.4%
8 Don't know
.3%
1.7%
.7%
1.3%
2.2%
5.9%
35.8%
26.2%
26.0%
6.1%
Total
7.5%
37.1%
22.1%
27.1%
6.2%
100.0%
Findings?
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55 per cent of respondents remained
consistent between the two waves of the
panel survey – 45 per cent were inconsistent
We see this from the main diagonal of the
table
But ‘Definitely Join’ and ‘Join if the conditions
are right’ are not that different. Are people
really being inconsistent if they move from
one of these categories to the other?
How Can this be explained?
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One explanation is that there are a lot on
non-attitudes and these are the 45 per cent of
respondents who change their minds
Another explanation is that there are some
non-attitudes, but measurement error
accounts for a lot of this. One example, of
measurement error is people shifting one
category between waves of the survey – they
are not responding randomly, but rather
probabilistically.
A Recoded Version of the Table
Europre * Europost Crosstabulation
% of Total
Europos t
Europre
Total
1.00 Join
2.00 Wait
3.00 Dont Join
1.00 Join
35.1%
6.6%
2.5%
44.2%
2.00 Wait
10.0%
10.9%
7.5%
28.4%
3.00
Dont Join
2.7%
6.3%
18.5%
27.4%
Total
47.7%
23.8%
28.5%
100.0%
Probabilistic Responses
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In the revised version of the table 65 per cent
are consistent rather than 55 per cent
The really inconsistent people are those who
move from join to don’t join. These make up
only just over 5 per cent of the sample
Some may be answering at random, but
others may have genuinely changed their
minds in response to the campaign
Conclusions
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Some people clearly do answer at random, since
switching right across the spectrum is clearly not likely to
be a rational decision except for the small number who
changed their minds in the campaign
However, switching between adjacent categories is not
so unlikely. So when measurement error is taken into
account the “randomizers” may not be that large a group
Knowledge of politics is limited, but it is clearly a long
way from being zero with people just guessing the
answers
In addition ‘useful’ knowledge such as when the polling
station closes is quite high. Knowledge of party policies
may be less useful because it is less important to people
An Alternative - Collective Opinions
(see Page and Shapiro)
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They argue that attitudes are neither perfectly
formed or random, but are derived from some
underlying values and beliefs
New information will push the individual’s
preferences back and forth over time – but
this might be the product of uncertainty as
much as randomness
Each individual will have a true long-term
preference which can be observed by
sampling people over time
Collective Opinions
(see Page and Shapiro)
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If this is true then at any given moment the
public as a whole will have real collective
attitudes – but it is defined on average
Random deviations will occur away from the
average for any one individual – but
collectively the public will have a ‘rational’ ie.
Meaningful opinion.
This averaging out process results from the
law of large numbers
Condorcet ‘Jury’ Theorem
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More than two centuries ago Condorcet
demonstrated that if a number of individuals tried to
answer a factual question and each had a better
than 50 % chance of being correct, then a collective
decision by majority vote had a much better chance
of being correct than a decision by a single person
Suppose an individual has a 60 % chance of being
correct (and a 40 % chance of being wrong)
Suppose we add two more individuals to the ‘jury’
What are their chances of being correct by majority
voting?
Condorcet ‘Jury’ Theorem
Note that if at least two of them vote for the 0.60 branches, they will come to the right
decision. So probability of a correct decision under majority rule =
0.216+0.144+0.144+0.144=0.648 – the probability of the jury being correct has increased
by 0.048 when three people are on it compared with only one.
0.6
0.216
0.6
0.144
0.144
0.6
0.096
0.144
0.4
0.096
0.4
0.096
0.4
0.064