Download Ivan Maiskii Soviet Ambassador to London 1932

Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin
• Stalin and Lenin sought
to mobilize antiVersailles powers
against Britain and
France – so even Hitler
was regarded as a
potential ally.
• In 1934, after Hitler’s
destruction of the KPD,
a turn about took place.
Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin
• Even after Hitler
dropped the Rapallo
Agreement with the
USSR, trade with
Germany remained at
earlier levels, not
dropping until 1936.
Soviet imports
remained high to 1937.
German staff at Tomka chemical weapons
facility, USSR, 1928.
Comintern Policy Under Stalin
• Just as Stalin controlled
Soviet domestic policy, so
too did he control that of
the Comintern.
• He forced the organization
to adopt an
uncompromising position
against even social
democrats – which the
Comintern called “social
fascists.” They were vilified
even more than right
wingers.
Comintern Under
Stalin
• In Germany the KPD (German
Communist Party) was directed to
join with the Nazis in attacking
the Weimar Republic.
• When, in 1933, the Social
Democrats made one last
attempt to woo KPD support
against Hitler, the KPD replied:
“the Nazi’s take power. Then in
four weeks the whole working
class will be united under the
leadership of the Communist
Party. They were fatally wrong.
The KPD were the first party
destroyed by the Nazis.
Maxim Litvinov
(17 July 1876 – 31
December 1951) was a
Russian-Jewish
revolutionary and
prominent Soviet diplomat.
People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union
In office
21 July 1930 – 3 May 1939
Litvinov’s Foreign Policy
• To gain protection from the threat of Germany,
Stalin began to play a much more active role in
world affairs.
• In 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations (1
year after Germany & Japan left). This represented
a significant shift away from previous Soviet opinion
of the League of Nations. As the threat from Japan
and Germany to the USSR increased, the USSR was
willing to work with the League of Nations, which
was based on the concept of collective security.
Litvinov’s Foreign Policy
• In 1935, as Hitler had just remilitarized the Rhineland, which was in
direct defiance to the Treaty of Versailles, and an apparent threat to
France. The USSR signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual
Assistance. This treaty was very complicated and watered down, but
it did diplomatically produce a threat of a two front war for Germany.
Hitler used this pact to announce that Germany would be
remilitarizing.
• The shift in USSR foreign policy and a new favorable stance toward
the belief in collective security largely came due to the opinion of
Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov. Litvinov, a Russian Jew.
Litvinov believed in a much more western-oriented foreign policy. It
was under Litvinov’s tenure as Foreign Minister that the USSR
entered the League of Nations (he was representative from 19341938), became recognized by the USA, became involved in the fight
against fascism in the Spanish Civil War, and worked on forming
closer relations to France and Britain.
• The USA recognized the
USSR in 1934.
• Both countries agreed to
stop hostile propaganda
against the other.
• For the USA this was to stop
communist agitation in
Depression era America.
• The Soviets hoped to use
the USA to counter the
Japanese in the Far East.
Soviet Foreign Policy Under Stalin
• Even after Hitler
dropped the Rapallo
Agreement with the
USSR, trade with
Germany remained at
earlier levels, not
dropping until 1936.
Soviet imports
remained high to 1937.
• Military cooperation
continued to 1935.
German staff at Tomka chemical weapons
facility, USSR, 1928.
The Popular Front
• However, as early as 1933,
Litvinov began to distinguish
between capitalist governments
for the fist time.
• On February 6, 1934, the French
Communist Party was still
cooperating with the Far Right. 6
days later they turned completely
around and began working with
the Socialist trade unions against
the Far Right.
• In November, the formation of a
Popular Front Government with
the Socialists was proposed.
The Popular Front
• In May, 1935 a FrancoSoviet Pact was signed –
providing mutual
support if a 3rd party
attacked either.
• In the same month, a
Czechoslovak-Soviet
Pact was signed.
The Popular Front
• In July and August of
1935, the Comintern
also adopted the idea of
the Popular Front.
• They advocated
cooperation with any
group – rightist or leftist
– to oppose Fascist or
Japanese militarist
aggression.
The Popular Front
• Popular Front governments were elected in France, Spain and Chile.
• However, cooperation between Socialists and Communists remained
shaky and non-communists in all of these countries were deeply
suspicious of the communists.
The Popular Front
• In France, the
government of Leon
Blum lasted only a year.
• French Conservatives
and rightists sometimes
used the slogan “Better
Hitler than Leon Blum.”
The Popular Front
• Worse still, in Spain,
their Popular Front
government faced
armed insurrection
from Franco’s right wing
alliance.
• Hitler’s Germany and
Mussolini’s Spain
provided arms and men
to the Nationalist
rebels.
The Popular Front
• The Spanish Civil War
presented Stalin with a
dilemma.
• Should it intervene
directly or abandon the
Popular Front
government?
• In 1936, it decided to
offer help to the
Spanish Government.
The Popular Front
• With the Fascists offering
assistance, while the British
and French insisted on nonintervention, the struggle
favoured the Nationalists.
• To make matters worse,
Communists and Socialists
struggled with each other
within the Republican
government.
The Popular Front
• In November, 1938
Stalin decided to cut his
losses.
• Aid ceased.
• The International
Brigades (foreigners
who signed up to fight
against the fascists)
were withdrawn.
The Popular Front
• Though Spain was lost, the
Soviets did score
propaganda success
through its involvement.
• Anti-fascists everywhere
noted that the USSR was
the only government that
was prepared to help the
republicans
• Communist support was
never stronger in the West
than during this time.
•
•
•
•
•
• A shift in foreign policy
From wariness of the West – to active
engagement in world-order politics
Less ideology, more pragmatism
Non-aggression pacts
Development of trade and economic relations
with all countries
After Hitler’s coming to power – campaign for
collective security
BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PURGE
• In 1933, Stalin launched purge of
party members
– Cut membership by 33%
– Partly the result of desire to rid
party of drunks, degenerates,
self-seekers, and the lazy
• Had been done before
– Also result of desire to get rid
of rank-and-file members who
might one day support Stalin’s
rivals
– Accomplished with little
bloodshed
SERGE KIROV
Stalin and Kirov
• Communist Party had become
unpopular by 1933
– Even growing dissent within the
party itself
• Some wanted to modify pace of
Five-Year Plans, improve living
standards, and even replace
Stalin
– Stalin wanted to execute all
dissidents
• Blocked by Serge Kirov and four
other members on the
Politburo
– Kirov was party head from
Leningrad
MURDER OF KIROV
• Kirov was biggest threat to Stalin
– Popular, handsome, and Russian
• Kirov shot to death at Leningrad party
headquarters in December 1934 by young
party member
– Stalin may have been behind crime
• Stalin blamed Kirov’s murder on a
conspiracy made up followers of Zinoviev
and Trotsky
– Announced that persons accused of
“preparing terroristic acts” would be
arrested and executed
• No appeal, no rights of defense
• Carte blanche for mass judicial
murder
THE GREAT PURGE TAKES OFF
• Non-Communists suffered the
most from the executions that
followed Kirov’s death
Krushchev
• Communists also arrested and
imprisoned
– Kamenev and Zinoviev
arrested
• Purged communists replaced by
reliable young flunkies
– Two of the most famous were
Nikita Khrushchev and
Laurentii Beria
Beria
The trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev
• Both men were put on
public trial in Moscow,
charged with the
murder of Kirov, and
plotting to overthrow
the Soviet State
• Both men pleaded
guilty, and read their
confessions out in court
• They were executed
along with 14 other
men accused of
terrorist activities
ESCALATION
• Local Communist Party
organizations receive letter in 1936
stating that too many “TrotskyiteZinovievite monsters, enemies of
the people, spies, provocateurs,
diversionists, white guards, and
kulaks” still existed and ordered
that they be unmasked and
punished
– Signal for a mass orgy of
denunciations, confessions,
arrests, and executions
• Fate of those denounced was
always the same
– Made to confess, always found
guilty, fired from job, and then
deported to labor camp
Lubyanka
heaquarters of the
secret police
NIGHTMARE
• Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 14 others put on trial
in August 1936 for murder of Kirov
– All confessed, implicated others, and were
executed
• Bukharin and other former leaders met same
fate
• Army was then purged
– Including General Tukhachevsky,
commander in chief of Red Army
– 80% of all colonels and 90% of all generals
were purged
• Leadership of Young Communist League,
factory managers, foreign communists, Civil General Tukhachevsky
War veterans, ex-Mensheviks, ex-SRs, friends
of Kirov, and even workers were all purged
– Once someone denounced you, no defense
was possible
3 of the 5 Soviet Marshals were liquidated
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vasily Blyukher and Aleksandr Yegorov
THE END
• An estimated one to ten million
people died during Great Purge
Nicholai Yezhov
• In 1938, Stalin suddenly stopped the
purges
– Blamed head of secret police,
Nicholai Yezhov, for the excesses
of the purges and had him
executed
• Replaced by Beria
– Pace of arrests slowed (although
they never completely stopped)
and some labor camps inmates
were released
– New members recruited into
party
• Images of executed or imprisoned people were
doctored to remove them from photos, giving the
impression that they did not exist. The person
removed here is Yezhov.
In September 1931 rogue officers planted a bomb near a
railway in Mukden to justify a Japanese invasion of Manchuria
Japan withdrew from the
League of Nations in February
1933 because it would not
recognize Manchukuo
In the 1920s France developed alliances with Belgium,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia
The Maginot Line (built
1930-34) reflected
declining interest in
Eastern European
alliances
The original plan was adopted
jointly with Belgium, but that
country soon reverted to neutrality.
Louis Barthou
French Minister
of Foreign
Affairs
d. 1934
was a devout
supporter of
Franco-Soviet
alliance against
the Nazi threat.
Prime Ministers of France after Hitler came to power on 31 January
1933
Ivan Maiskii
Soviet Ambassador
to London
1932-1943
A former Menshevik
who feared he might
be killed if he were
not a success.
• Stalin tried to get
Western support
against the
Fascists, but with
little success.
• During the 1938
Sudeten crisis,
Stalin offered to
back up the
Czechoslovakian
government
against a
threatened
German attack.
Appeasement
Appeasement
• Britain and France agreed
to discuss the future of
Czechoslovakia with
Germany and Italy in
September, 1938.
• Neither the Czechs nor
the Soviets were invited.
• Stalin drew the conclusion
that the West could not
be relied upon to resist
Hitler.
Neville Chamberlain, the PM of GB in
Munich
Stalin uninvited intruding Munich talks
Chamberlain
Peace in our time
Edouard
Daladier
at Munich he
betrayed both
Czechoslovaks
and the Soviets
The Sudetenland (bright purple)
Appeasement
• When Hitler tore
up his 1938
agreement and
occupied the
remainder of the
Czech portion of
Czechoslovakia in
the Spring of
1939, Stalin
again noted
Western
inaction.
Appeasement Ends
Allied Military Mission to Moscow, 1939
• After March, 1939,
British attitudes shifted.
• Britain and France
opened up talks with
the Soviets, hoping to
form an alliance against
Hitler.
• There was little the
West could offer Stalin
except that the Soviets
would do most of the
fighting and that they
would not be rewarded
with any territory for
doing so.
German Expansion, 1936-1939
Viacheslav
Molotov
became the
minister of
Foreign Affairs
of USSR in May
1939, replacing
Jewish Maxim
Litvinov.
German
Foreign
Minister
Ribbentrop &
Molotov sign
pact
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939
• Hitler had far
more to offer.
• The Germans
would divide
Eastern
Europe
between
them, and
there would
be no need to
fight.
Nazi-Soviet Pact
• Hitler now had
a free hand in
Europe.
• Stalin thought
that the
capitalists
would now
fight a long,
drawn-out
struggle, while
the USSR built
its strength
while staying
out of the
conflict.
Soviet supplies getting ready for shipment to Germany
Stalin had also problems in the Far East against the imperialism of Japan
 Problems in the Far East
 Japanese aggression in
China (Manchukuo)
 Fighting on Mongolian
border
 Threat of 2-front war
The Nazi-Soviet Pact
• Stalin could not have
been more wrong.
• He was convinced Hitler
would not attack him
for years.
• When Hitler did strike,
Stalin was unready. The
Soviets had abandoned
their old pre-war
defense works for new
forward positions in
readiness for new
offensive plans.
• Soviet forces were
caught completely
unprepared.
Winter War Dec 1939-March 1940
- inflict heavy damage & casualties on Soviets
- convinced Germans of Soviet military weakness
• Invasion of the Soviet Union was not only
inevitable, but imminent by June 1941. The start of Operation Barbarossa;
There was sufficient evidence, warnings,
the Wolf enters the Bear’s Den
and leaks to confirm the fact that Hitler
was planning a massive operation in the
east, but despite the warnings and
messages from his allies, German
defectors, and his own spies (Richard
Sorge operating in Tokyo) Stalin refused
to acknowledge the threat of invasion
and dismissed them all as an “elaborate
provocation”.
• Stalin’s refusal to acknowledge the
impending war, his purging of the Red
Army Officer Corps between 1937-38
(Kennedy-Pipe 43), and the relative
unpreparedness (for Blitzkrieg tactics),
lack of training and experience of the
Red Army, as well as possessing outdated
vehicles, tanks and airplanes at the start
of the war, all led to initial sweeping
victories for the Nazi War Machine in the
Soviet Union during the first few months
of the war.
The Red Bear awakens . . . eventually
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•
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When news of the invasion reached Stalin, he still firmly believed that disaster could be
averted through negotiations, and he staunchly refused to allow artillery crews to open fire
on the advancing Germans.
When Stalin finally realized how critical the situation had become, he became traumatized
and suffered a nervous breakdown: “The Dictator’s behaviour in the wake of the initial
attack has been well documented. Gromyko recalls that Stalin was convinced that Hitler
would honour the treaty. This view is reinforced by others, who also tell of Stalin’s shock and
breakdown at the timing, if not the substance, of the German ‘betrayal’”.
It wasn’t until July 3rd that Stalin finally addressed the Soviet people of the current state of
affairs resulting from Hitler’s treachery. His speech involved nationalist rhetoric, calling for
the destruction of the fascist invaders, implementation of ‘scorched-earth’ policy, and the
creation of a partisan unit to guard and defend the motherland; despite his temporary lapse
and breakdown, Stalin had awakened and transformed into the national leader that the
Russian people could empathize and appeal to, someone who could assure them of victory.
Regardless of the initial success of Operation Barbarossa in the first few months of the
invasion, it was ultimately a failure by the end of 1941: the Germans ground to a halt just
outside the gates of Moscow by November of the same year, and despite the better
judgment and wisdom of his experienced generals and officers, Hitler was against a
blitzkrieg strike at Moscow, instead, he ordered all three armies to “advance simultaneously,
giving priority to a breakthrough in the south”.
The loss of initiative against Moscow, combined with the onset of winter, the arrival of
Zhukov to organize and coordinate the defense of the Russian capitol, and the failure to get
Japan involved in the war against the Soviet Union, made Operation Barbarossa a failure.
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By 1943 the war in the Eastern front had changed: The
Red Army was more experienced, better equipped, and 1943:
highly motivated to halt and crush the German invaders.
The Battle of Stalingrad which ended with the surrender
of the German Sixth army, and the first German field
marshal of the war (Friedrich Paulus) on January 31st
1943, was the first turning point for the Red Army.
However, while the destruction and surrender of the
Sixth army was a severe loss, it was in no way a fatal
blow to the Wehrmacht: as ‘Operation Citadel’ would
show, the Germans were still capable of mounting large
scale offensives across the vast Russian landscape.
Approximately six months later, the Germans launched
Operation Citadel to overwhelm the Kursk salient, and
the largest ground battle in history began. Having
received intelligence reports from allies, the Soviets
were well prepared this time, and they entrenched
themselves to meet the Germans head on: “The salient,
an area about half the size of England, was stuffed with
armour and infantry and awaited the next move”.
On July 5th 1943, the 9th army and 4th Panzer division
spearheaded the assault, thinking they could
overwhelm the Soviet defenses with another blitzkrieg
strike. Instead, they were met with fierce resistance in
the form of tank traps, entrenched anti-tank infantry
divisions, improved T-34 tanks, and Russian reserves
ready to be called in for counter-attacks. After suffering
countless setbacks, Op. Citadel was abandoned on July
13th, and the Wehrmacht suffered its most costly and
severe defeat.
The Tide Turns
The Yalta Conference: Feb. 4-11, 1945
• Meeting of the Big Three for discussion and cooperation over the future of Europe
following the defeat of Nazi Germany.
• At the time of the conference, the Red Army was within 40 miles of Berlin, while
the Allied forces in the west were recovering from the ‘Battle of the Bulge’ in the
Ardennes. Roosevelt himself informed Stalin that Eisenhower did not intend to
cross the Rhine until March (Kennedy-Pipe 69).
• Stalin actually made it clear to Zhukov that he wanted Berlin taken as quickly as
possible in February; however, on February 6, Stalin cancelled the demand, having
received assurances from Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would be
guaranteed its own occupation zone in Germany after the war (Kennedy-Pipe 72).
• The main concerns and points of interest throughout the Yalta conference can be
broken down into three categories:
– The Polish Question
– The future of Germany and the “Declaration on Liberated Europe”
– The conditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan
• The creation of the United Nations Organization was also discussed at the Yalta
conference, but its importance was relatively low in comparison with the other
three points, especially the future of Poland and Germany. Furthermore, the issue
was generally agreed upon, with Stalin accepting the veto mechanism and reducing
his demand of the number of general assembly seats for the Soviet Union from 15
to 3 (Nation 153).
The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
Contention and Cooperation amongst the Titans
Yalta cont’d
• The issue of Poland was of crucial significance for all three
powers. Poland was, after all, the reason why France and
England declared war on Germany, and as such, it was a
crucial point of interest between the two sides in the
conference. Out of the eight meetings in the Yalta conference,
seven of them involved the question of Poland, and four key
aspects were discussed:
– A formula for establishing a single provisional government for Poland.
– How and when to hold free elections
– Possible solutions to the future of Poland’s frontiers, both in the east
and the west
– Steps designed to safeguard the security of the Soviet rear (Petro and
Rubinstein 48)
•
Why was Poland such a significant point of conflict between the two sides?
– For Stalin, Poland was a vital security interest that would act as an essential buffer zone
in the event of another invasion from the West. For Stalin and the Russian people, the
Second World War had left a permanent scar on their outlook of life, especially
considering the unprecedented figures and costs that the war had exacted on the Soviet
Union (LaFeber 20).
– For Roosevelt, the future of Poland was a crucial factor for the future of Eastern and
Central Europe, and Harriman (American ambassador to Russia) warned Roosevelt that
“Stalin must not be allowed to establish “Totalitarianism” in Soviet-occupied territories,”
and that unless they were willing to live in a Soviet-dominated world, they should do
everything they can to economically assist states that were naturally friendly to them
(LaFeber 17).
•
•
Regarding Germany, the Big Three discussed the nature of how Germany should be
dealt with after their unconditional surrender (which was agreed upon by all three
heads) and how it would be partitioned to allow for a free and democratic Europe.
Points of conflict were raised regarding the form of reparations that were to be
paid out to the Soviet Union, and the inclusion of France into the partition system.
Stalin was angered by the notion of France joining in the partition of Germany
because of their poor performance in resisting and fighting Germany throughout
the war. As for reparations, Stalin wanted to either destroy or relocate German
industry to prevent them from dominating Europe in the future. He argued two
points: that 80% of Germany’s industrial capacity should be dismantled, leaving
the rest in control of the Allies; and that Germany would pay back the Soviet Union
in reparations for the devastation that it caused during the war (Kennedy-Pipe 73).
The Far East: the secret protocol
•
•
The American delegation was also concerned with the entrance of the Soviet Union into the
war with Japan.
Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan under certain conditions:
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•
•
The preservation of the status quo in the Mongolian People’s Republic
The return of lost territories and rights that Russia had lost to Japan after the war of 1904-5, namely
the return of Southern Sakhalin and the annexation of the Kurile Islands
The restoration of former Russian economic privileges in Manchuria
The internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval
base of the Soviet Union restored (Petro and Rubinstein 49).
Roosevelt, with the advice and influence from Admirals Nimitz and King, and Generals
Marshall and McArthur, accepted the conditions under which Stalin proposed he would enter
into war against Japan. The reasoning behind the need for Soviet entrance into the war was
that it would take another eighteen months to defeat Japan after the defeat of Germany, and
that the invasion of mainland Japan would cost America dearly in terms of casualties and
resources (Petro and Rubinstein 49).
These concessions gave the Soviet Union a greater commanding presence in the far east,
greater than what they originally had prior to 1904. Ironically enough, three months after the
defeat of Germany, the U.S.A. found itself in a position capable of bringing Japan to its knees
without the aid or assistance of the Soviet Union (Petro and Rubinstein 49).
The results of Yalta: success or failure?
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•
On the question of Poland, Stalin was resolute and unshakable in his insistence of its strategic importance
to the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of the pro-communist Lublin committee as the de facto
government of Poland. Despite minor concessions and compromises made by Stalin to appease Roosevelt
and Churchill on incorporating some pro-Western Poles in the government, the fact remained that Poland
was securely within the Soviet sphere of influence; “the agreement was so elastic the Russians could
stretch it from Yalta to Washington without breaking it” (LaFeber 16).
Even when Roosevelt attempted to decrease the ‘elasticity’ of the compromise in Poland through his
“Declaration of a Liberated Europe” it was amended by Stalin and eventually accepted by Roosevelt himself
(LaFeber 16).
Despite the gains that Stalin was able to pull out from the Yalta conference, there were still some issues and
demands that were either compromised or rejected. The issue of reparations from Germany was left
unresolved; a Reparation Committee was established, but there was no unanimous decision amongst the
big three as to what the exact sum of reparations was to be set at (Nation 152).
Furthermore, Stalin had to accept the role of France in post-war Germany as a concession to Churchill for
giving him Poland as a buffer zone. Churchill argued that ‘France was as important to Great Britain as
Poland was to the USSR (Nation 152).
The Americans achieved their goals of getting the Soviet Union involved in the war against Japan, as well as
setting up the basic foundations for the United Nations and the voting methods to be used in the Security
Council (Petro and Rubinstein 48).
In the end, the big three made compromises that would ensure mutual cooperation until the end of the
war, and set the stage for a post-war peace following the defeat of Japan.
The results of the Yalta conference can be seen as a success to an extent, in the form of cooperation
between the three heads of the most powerful states in the world. It is especially impressive considering
the fact that cooperation was achieved despite their opposing ideological interests:
–
“The Yalta negotiators confronted numerous conflicts of interest, but a mutual willingness to compromise ultimately
allowed the vital concerns of all participants to be accommodated” (Nation 152).
The Controversy behind Yalta
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The results of the Yalta conference have sparked many debates and theories regarding a variety of issues,
ranging from the division of Europe to the treachery of the Soviet Union in failing to uphold its end of the
bargain. Some claim that Eastern and Central Europe, along with parts of the far East, were sold out to
Stalin, in return for recognition of American and British interests in Western Europe and Asia.
This theory, however, ultimately fails. The agreements that were made concerning the control and
influence over certain parts of Eastern and Central Europe were a reflection of the reality of the situation
that encompassed the area following the Soviet thrusts into Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland
throughout the course of the war: “if anything, what happened at Yalta was an attempt by the West to
mitigate the reality of the Soviet control in the East” (Kennedy-Pipe 69).
The reality of Yalta was both an affirmation of regional power politics and self-interested goals, as well as
the desire to establish a peaceful and stable post-war setting that would accommodate all three powers:
“what occurred at Yalta was a classic negotiating process characterized by hard-bargaining and mutual
concessions . . . An encounter in which they prized agreement by traditional negotiation as preferable to
unilateral action which might undermine the international stability” (Nation 153).
When the Soviet Union intervened in the political affairs of Rumania two weeks after the Yalta conference,
Roosevelt alleged that Stalin had fallen back on his word regarding the ‘Declaration of Liberated Europe.’
However, the case for Rumania was easily ripped apart by Molotov, and despite American dissatisfaction,
the fact remained that Rumania was an integral part of the Soviet sphere of influence over Eastern Europe
(LaFeber 17). Moreover, Churchill himself turned a blind eye to the events occurring in Rumania in return
for Stalin’s non-intervention in Greece.
These would inevitably affect the policies and politics that would be discussed at the conference in
Potsdam in July 1945, following the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The Potsdam Conference: July 17 –
August 1, 1945
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Occurring five months after the Yalta conference, the meetings in Potsdam
revolved around some similar issues, but the context of the conference, and the
actors, had changed dramatically.
Germany had been defeated, Roosevelt was dead and replaced by Truman, the
policies and concessions of Yalta were being questioned, and the successful
testing of the atomic bomb would ultimately change the fate of the post-war
world.
Objectives of Potsdam
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The primary goals of the conference was to come to terms over three important issues that
were left unresolved from Yalta; the fate of former Nazi satellite states (especially Italy), the
borders of Poland, and the question of reparations, which was the subject of much debate
and contestation between all three sides (Yergin 114).
The issue of reparations was contested between the two sides when the Americans and
British argued that payments were to be made first to the creditors (American and British
bankers), while Molotov argued that the Soviets required initial payments to offset the huge
scale of destruction and devastation Germany had caused to the Soviet Union (Yergin 114).
On matters of former satellite states there was also a failure of negotiations: when asked if
Stalin would normalize relations with Italy, Stalin responded by basically asking Truman and
the American government to normalize relations with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. As
Byrnes noted, however, Truman could not recognize the three Eastern European states, not
with their current governments at least (Yergin 114).
Finally, on the question of Poland’s frontiers, there too existed conflict. The American
delegation in particular, feared that by giving more land to Poland, they were effectively
constraining and damaging Germany’s potential economic and industrial rebirth (Yergin 115).
Despite a complete failure of negotiations in the initial phase of the Potsdam conference,
Yergin argues that there would eventually be renewed, and successful, attempts at resolving
these disputes in the near future, thanks in part to the successful testing of the most
destructive weapon invented by man.
The Atom Bomb and its political
impact on post-war Europe and the
world
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•
•
The atom bomb fundamentally changed the outlook, ambitions and goals of the
American delegation at the conference in Potsdam. The fact that America
possessed a weapon more powerful than anything ever invented by man gave
Truman an undeniable sense of superiority, and greater impatience, throughout
the rest of the proceedings following successful confirmation of the bombs testing
(Yergin 115).
However, despite the change in attitude, Truman, and Byrnes in particular, pressed
for a quick end to the conference by proposing a package deal that would serve
the interests of the Soviet Union, Britain and America. A solution was offered on
the issue of reparations, and Byrnes noted that if Stalin accepted the compromise
on reparations, than the West would accept concessions on matters of territorial
interest for the Soviet Union in the East, so long as interests over Italy and the
West were respected by Stalin (Yergin 117).
The logic behind a quick end to the conference was based on the strategic
importance of constraining Soviet expansion and ambition in the far East,
especially in Japan. With the Atom Bomb, America no longer needed Soviet
assistance to crush Japan because an invasion was no longer necessary (Yergin
116).
The Atom Bomb cont’d
•
•
•
•
Why did the bomb suddenly change the ambitions and goals for Truman and allow
the American delegation to make concessions for the Soviet Union that were, up
until that point, inconceivable? The answer lies in a statement made by General
McArthur in response to the Atomic Bomb: “Well, this changes warfare!” Indeed,
as Yergin notes, the leap in technological warfare “was a dismal promise to make
geography meaningless” (Yergin 120).
Before the bomb, concerns for the security of Eastern and Central Europe were
dependant on conventional methods of warfare. The Bomb practically eliminated
those barriers by making it possible to impose security on any location in the
globe.
Thus, while it could be argued that the bomb was an important factor that allowed
the Big Three to make compromises and concessions that served their selfinterests, the fact remains that the bomb inevitably resulted in a deep sense of
insecurity (Yergin 120).
When Truman first hinted to Stalin on July 24th that America possess a weapon of
unimaginable power, Stalin responded, in an unflinching manner, that he hoped
they would use it to its full potential against Japan (Nation 162).
Results of the Potsdam Conference:
success or failure?
•
•
•
•
•
Compromise was made to increase the frontiers of Poland, pushing it westward up to the
Oder-Neisse line. In return, a demand for a fixed sum compensation out of Germany’s
industry was dropped by Stalin. Instead, it was agreed upon by the Big Three that reparations
would be extracted out of their own occupation zones, with the Soviet Union being allowed
an additional 15% of ‘unnecessary’ capital equipment out of Western zones in return for raw
materials and foodstuffs from the East, and an additional 10% with no exchange (Yergin 11718).
Regarding the spheres of influence over Europe, the common approach was to let each side
retain their separate interests in their own zones, for lack of a better approach: “Because
they could not agree on how to govern Europe, they began to divide it” (Yergin 118).
Thus, the fate of Eastern Europe was left in the hands of the Soviet Union, while Italy
remained in the hands of the Western powers (Yergin 118).
Like Yalta, the Potsdam conference can be seen as a success in the form of mutual
cooperation between the two emerging superpowers of the world. Despite their radically
polarized perspectives and ambitions, Truman and Stalin, with the help of their aides and
advisors, were able to hammer out a post-war environment that left both sides relatively
satisfied.
However, like Yalta, Potsdam can also be seen as a failure due to some of the controversies
that arose shortly after its conclusion. The weight of the Atomic Bomb had cast an uncertain
future for the balance of power in not only Europe, but of the world.
Conclusion: the stage is set for the
Cold War
The conferences held at Yalta and Potsdam can be argued to have
laid the foundations for the end of the Second World War and the
beginning of the Cold War. The short-term considerations that
were achieved at both conferences reflected the self-interested
objectives that the Big Three had in mind for their respective
spheres of influence. The principle factor that guided the
conferences was based on mutual cooperation to end the war, and
the desire for peaceful co-existence in the post-war period. By
Yalta, the Soviet Union stood as a military superpower that was
more than capable of finishing Germany off on her own. The
concessions made by Churchill and Roosevelt was a reflection of
this reality. Consequently, Truman and the American delegation,
fearful of the threat that the Soviets posed on all of Europe, were
determined to take a hard-line approach to curtail Soviet interests
and ambitions, at least until the advent of the bomb. And while
the Cold War was practically inevitable with the introduction of
the bomb, it seemed, for a short while, that diplomacy and coexistence was possible, and that after witnessing the most
destructive, costly, horrific, and inhumane war in history, peace
was perhaps somewhat plausible. The use of the bomb in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, shattered that vision, and the
consequent political and ideological struggles of the following year
between the two superpowers made the Cold War an inevitable
consequence.
Rokossovsky and Zhukov
The two top generals who won the war in the east.
Both of them were Tsarist NCOs. Rokossovsky suffered
in the Stalinist torture chambers before the war.
Yalta Conference, February 1945
Casablanca, January
1943
Roosevelt first
suggested insisting
that the Axis
powers surrender
unconditionally.
Churchill, taken by
surprise, disliked that
idea as involving a
likely prolongation of
the war.
The "Big Three" at the Tehran Conference
28 November – 1 December 1943
The Percentages agreement,
also known as the "Naughty
document", was an alleged
agreement between Soviet
premier Joseph Stalin and British
prime minister Winston Churchill
about how to divide
southeastern Europe into
spheres of influence.
September 1944
Why was the USSR victorious?
• Outnumbered Axis forces
• Russian winter – repeatedly upset Nazi plans (1941 - 42, 1942 – 43)
• Resilience & determination of the Russian people (over 17 million killed, but they
still fought on!) – ‘Borodino spirit’ – fostered by Stalin’s successful propaganda
campaigns to raise morale, inc. not persecuting the Church (prepared to use any
means to give the Russians the will to fight on)
• Strong leadership – Stalin (civil) & Zhukov (military) – Zhukov was largely given a
free hand by Stalin in conducting the war, unlike Hitler who constantly meddled in
military plans - Red Army reorganised effectively into modern fighting force with
specialist units - ‘Tank Armies’; ‘Shock Armies’; partisans behind enemy lines;
massed artillery formations - after damage of the Purges, Winter War & initial
disaster of 1941.
• Terror among civilians and soldiers enforced by the NKVD & Death to Spies –
ultimately the Soviet peoples had to fight even if they did not want to.
• Hatred of Nazis (sworn enemies of Communism) – especially after the atrocities
committed against Soviet civilians.
• T34 tank – a decisive weapon – mass-produced – best tank of the war
• Industrial production continued in the east – 1300 factories moved from the war
zone to the new industrial areas beyond the Urals e.g. Magnitogorsk.
• Aid from the western allies – intelligence reports from UK, (code-breaking carried
out by ULTRA) and industrial products from USA (Lend-Lease Agreement from
1941) – maintained Soviet war production.
Europe 1946
Stalin in 1945
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Under his leadership the USSR had won WWII (1945 – adopted the
title Generalissimo to stress his part in ultimate victory). The Red
Army had advanced into the heart of Europe – How did Stalin’s
priorities now change?
Creating a truly Communist society remained the stated goal of
the USSR, but the entrenched power of Stalin & the Communist
Party made this impossible.
‘Socialism in One Country’ could no longer be the rationale for
Soviet policy – the USSR’s conquest of much of eastern and central
Europe meant it was no longer the only Socialist state in the
world. It had become a ‘superpower’ whose military might made
it a far greater threat to its Capitalist neighbours than the USSR of
the 1920s and 30s.
A huge amount of Soviet territory had been devastated by the
Nazi invasion. Reconstruction of the Soviet economy was now
necessary.
Stalin’s position as leader was secure (although he was no less
paranoid) – he no longer exercised strict control over political
appointments (everyone in high office owed their position to him
anyway), but he maintained his supremacy through intrigue, coldbloodedly fostering suspicion, fear and rivalry among his
subordinates.