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Problems of Credit Pricing and Portfolio Management ISDA - PRMIA October 2003 Con Keating The Finance Development Centre 1 Spreads and Returns The relation is well known rt 1 y t 1 Dt ( yt yt 1) But this only applies to default free bonds And the duration of a corporate is difficult to estimate, the standard calculation does not apply. The Finance Development Centre 2 The Problem of Duration Consider two five year zero coupon bonds, a AAA and a BBB yielding respectively 6% and 10% while the equivalent government yields 5% The AAA has a modified duration of 5/1.06 = 4.71 years The BBB has a modified duration of 5/1.10 = 4.54 years The govt. has a modified duration of 5/1.05 = 4.76 years This suggests that lower credits are less risky and less volatile than governments of equivalent characteristics. The Finance Development Centre 3 Is this a practical problem? The relation between ex-ante spread and subsequent returns A sub-investment grade Index 1979 -2002 Ex-Ante Spread / One Year Returns 30 Returns % 20 10 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 -10 -20 -30 Yield Spread % The Finance Development Centre 4 Some Statistics ExAnte Spread 4.76 1.98 1.77 3.04 Mean StDev Skew Kurtosis Return 1.88 11.42 -0.06 -0.25 And correlations Cross-correlations ExAnte Spread / Return 0.6 Cross-correlations 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Lag The Finance Development Centre 5 Transition Matrices To: aaa aa a bbb bb b c D From AAA AA A 92.06% 1.19% 7.20% 90.84% 0.74% 7.59% 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.05% 2.40% 91.89% 4.99% 0.51% 0.13% 0.01% 0.02% BBB 0.05% 0.25% 5.33% 88.39% 4.87% 0.77% 0.16% 0.18% One year above and Three year below To: aaa aa a bbb bb b c D From AAA AA A 78.3% 3.0% 18.1% 75.9% 3.4% 19.2% 0.2% 1.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% The Finance Development Centre BBB 0.2% 6.2% 80.1% 12.4% 0.9% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.1% 14.7% 78.7% 4.4% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 6 Simulations A 150 bond equal weight AAA portfolio One Year Returns -Credit Migration Alone The Set-Up Coupon Life Initial RatingInitial spread Initial price 2 1 30 0.985982 5 2 45 0.979064 3 70 0.967666 4 150 0.932274 The Finance Development Centre Px after Trading spread Rating 1 year 30 1 0.988659 45 2 0.983051 70 3 0.973793 150 4 0.944904 525 5 0.82317 650 6 0.787086 1000 7 0.696265 8 0.3 7 The Results - AAA Mean StDev Skew Kurt 2.25% 0.015% -0.28155 0.210952 Distribution His togram AAA Re turns 0.300 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.100 0.050 0.000 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 The Finance Development Centre 0.023 0.023 8 AA Returns Histograms Histogram AA Returns 0.180 0.160 Mean StDev Skew Kurt 2.35% 0.083% -4.0264 20.18325 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.019 0.020 The Finance Development Centre 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 9 A Returns Histograms Mean StDev Skew Kurt 2.46% 0.139% -1.365 3.401 Histogram - A Returns 0.100 0.090 0.080 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.000 0.016 0.018 0.020 The Finance Development Centre 0.022 0.024 0.026 10 Diversified AAA/AA/A/BBB Portfolio Mean StDev Skew Kurt 2.43% 0.202% -1.238 2.308 Histogram "Diversified" Portfolio 0.100 0.090 0.080 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.000 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.027 The skewness is not diversified away ! The Finance Development Centre 11 Diversification of Corporates Corporate spreads are largely a compensation for bearing credit risk, and one reason why they are so wide is that losses from default can easily differ substantially from expected losses. Moreover, such risk of unexpected loss is evidently difficult to diversify away. As corporate bond portfolios go, one with 1,000 names is unusually large, and yet our example shows it could still be poorly diversified in that unexpected losses remain significant. Reaching for yield: Selected issues for reserve managers Remolona and Schrijvers, BIS Quarterly Review, Sep 2003 The Finance Development Centre 12 Even small correlation can be harmful to your health A distribution of defaults with .02 correlation His togram .02 De pe nde nce 0.180 0.160 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.000 20.000 40.000 60.000 80.000 100.000 120.000 98% independent 2% dependent The Finance Development Centre 13 Correlation and Dependence Higher moments are needed to capture dependence. Correlation tells one little about the shape of the joint distribution Copulae are little better. The presence of common factors tells much about dependence. Common Factors diversify slowly if at all The limits to (additive)diversification are well known But in the presence of common factors diversification may be slow and inefficient. The Finance Development Centre 14 Common Factors In the presence of common factors, tails can be arbitrarily thick. In the previous example, 100 defaults occur 5 standard deviations from the mean. This is the free lunch associated with CBO transactions Diversification score construction cards are flawed in this regard. The Finance Development Centre 15 One possible solution In hedge funds, we have always countered high correlation by short selling. Both are equally valid techniques for the reduction of variability. Long-Short neutralises all odd moments Long-Short tends to neutralise common factors The Sharpe ratio for a long only strategy is bounded above. The Sharpe ratio for Long-Short is unbounded The Finance Development Centre 16 Higher Moment Approaches A Hedge Fund trying to be Normal Skew 0.06 Excess Kurtosis 0.36 Historical Daily Return Distribution 90 80 70 No. Of Days 60 50 40 30 20 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -1.8 -2 0 -2.2 10 Midpoint Of Range The Finance Development Centre 17 Log-Normal or Abnormal? One of these is lognormal. The other 2 have infinite skew and kurtosis The Finance Development Centre 18 Omega functions The left bias is evident, even though skew can’t be used to measure it. The Finance Development Centre 19 Omega HF and Normal Red is analytic normal of same mean and variance The (small) sample properties of the actual should make its Omega lie above on the downside and below on the upside. The Finance Development Centre 20 Risk Profile HF This Difference in Risk Profiles arises from Skew & Excess Kurtosis of just 0.06 and 0.36 The Finance Development Centre 21 The Omega function for a Distribution This process may be carried out for any series. The value of the Omega function at r is the ratio of probability weighted gains relative to r, to probability weighted losses relative to r. If F is the cumulative distribution then (r) : (1 F(x))dx r r . F(x)dx The Finance Development Centre 22 Why is this important? The Omega function of a distribution is mathematically equivalent to the distribution itself. (Note for the quantitatively inclined. There is a closed form expression for F given Omega, just as there is for Omega given F.) None of the information is lost or left un-used. Sometimes mean and variance are enough… but sometimes the approximate picture they give hides the features of critical importance for terminal value. The Finance Development Centre 23 Graphically The area outlined in black is: I2 (r) : (1 F(x))dx r The area outlined in red is: r I1 (r) : F(x)dx The Finance Development Centre 24 Omega for a normal distribution r The slope at the mean is 2 . The Finance Development Centre 25 How can we reliably incorporate return levels and tail behaviour? Omega – A Sharper Ratio – does precisely this. •Assumes nothing about preference or utility •Works directly with the returns series •Is as statistically significant as the returns •Does not require estimation of moments •Captures all the risk-reward characteristics The Finance Development Centre 26 Basic Properties of • • • • It is equivalent to the distribution itself It is a decreasing function of r It takes the value 1 at the mean It encodes variance, skew, kurtosis and all higher moments • Risk is encoded in the relative change in Omega produced by a small change in the level of returns. • The shape of Omega makes risk profiles apparent For two assets, the one with the higher Omega is, literally, A BETTER BET. The Finance Development Centre 27 Returns for 2 normally distributed assets A and B with the same means A Asset A A 7, A 3 B Asset B B 7, B 4 The Sharpe ratio says A is preferable to B. Omega says it depends on your loss threshold. Below the mean, A is preferable, above the mean, B is. The Finance Development Centre 28 Returns for 2 normally distributed assets A and B with the same means A B The superior portfolio is dependent upon the threshold level. If we measure performance based on a sample of mean 6.9, then we will see a preference reversal relative to 7.1. The Finance Development Centre 29 Omega Risk Profiles The risk is encoded in the way Omega responds to a small change in the level of returns: 1 d Risk (r) : (r) dr For normally distributed returns, at the mean this is simply determined by the standard deviation. The Finance Development Centre 30 Even for normally distributed returns, Omega has more information Risk(r) 2.4 2.2 2.0 Risk(r) decreases as decreases and also for fixed as we move away from the mean The Finance Development Centre 31 Omega Risk Profiles for a distribution with negative skew and a normal with the same mean and variance show dramatically different features. Negative skew in green, Normal in Blue, mean is 8.5, Standard Deviation is 1.82 The Finance Development Centre 32 The Shape of Omega Option Strategies Omegas for two US mortgage-backed strategies The Finance Development Centre 33 Risk Profiles – Option Strategies The Finance Development Centre 34 Simulations show the potential impact on terminal value. Losses were 250 times more likely with BH than with CL BH folded in September 2002 after a loss of 60% on a gamble for redemption. Loss ~ $500million. The SEC investigation continues… The Finance Development Centre 35 Returning to the earlier simulations Omega AAA Simulations 1000000 100000 Iteration 1 10000 Iteration 2 1000 Iteration 3 Omega 100 10 1 0.0212 0.1 0.0216 0.022 0.0224 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001 Return The Finance Development Centre 36 AA- Omega(s) The Finance Development Centre 37 Rating Class - Omegas The Finance Development Centre 38 Portfolio & Rating Class - Omegas The Finance Development Centre 39 Covenants and Collateral Covenants in public debt are good for shareholders In a competitive investment market all of the gains associated with lower funding cost accrue to the company Covenants serve to discipline management Ratio test covenants of the income or asset coverage genre may increase the likelihood of default and distress Ratings triggers are really death spirals. The Finance Development Centre 40 Covenants and pricing Covenants restrict the range of possible state prices of corporate bond. Covenants increase the price of a bond Covenants, ceteris paribus, lower the mobility of the transition matrix. The Finance Development Centre 41 Security and Collateral To the extent they reduce the loss in default, also help to reduce the diversification problem Histogram - 100% Recovery Histogram - 30% Recovery 0.080 0.070 0.070 0.060 0.060 0.050 0.050 0.040 0.040 0.030 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.017 0.019 The Finance Development Centre 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.031 42 Security and Collateral - Omegas 10000 30% Recovery 1000 100% Recovery 100 10 0. 01 3 0. 01 5 0. 01 6 0. 01 8 0. 01 9 0. 02 1 0. 02 2 0. 02 4 0. 02 5 0. 02 7 0. 02 8 0. 03 0. 03 1 0. 03 3 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 This results in a higher mean return, and vastly better downside protection. The Finance Development Centre 43 Omega - Bond pricing The essence of pricing corporate bonds using Omega is to equate the Omegas over the range of support of the function. 100000 1000 Omega Price 10 -0.016 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 0.1 0 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.00001 The Finance Development Centre 44 Dynamics of Corporate Bond Returns We need to examine two distinct elements The relation of returns to their prior returns autocorrelation We might also consider correlation to treasuries. The Finance Development Centre 45 One Problem for the Statisticians Auto-correlation • Auto-correlation - the degree to which today’s return forecasts tomorrows. • Skill? • Or returns smoothing? The Finance Development Centre 46 Correcting for Auto-correlation ConvertibleFRM HFR CSFB Henn Fixed Inc FRM HFR CSFB Excess Returns Mean Std Dev Info Ratio 0.682 1.065 0.640 0.524 1.033 0.507 0.494 1.371 0.361 0.357 1.235 0.289 0.470 1.370 0.343 0.045 1.320 0.034 0.166 1.176 0.141 Adjusted Returns Mean Std Dev Info Ratio 0.670 1.624 0.413 0.503 1.594 0.315 0.485 2.618 0.185 0.349 1.865 0.187 0.439 2.574 0.171 0.037 1.931 0.019 0.162 1.882 0.086 Errors Mean 1.76% 4.01% 1.82% 2.24% 6.60% 17.78% 2.41% Std Dev -52.49% -54.31% -90.96% -51.01% -87.88% -46.29% -60.03% Info Ratio 35.47% 37.87% 48.75% 35.29% 50.15% 44.12% 39.01% • The differences are meaningful The Finance Development Centre 47 Adding a security to a portfolio The Finance Development Centre 48 Autocorrellogram - Portfolio Ex The Finance Development Centre 49 But this isn’t enough The Finance Development Centre 50 Instantaneous Regression Yields and Rates The Finance Development Centre 51 But the long run relation between spread and yield is more complex And this is at odds with the earlier instantaneous result The Finance Development Centre 52 The answer lies in the dynamics And therein lies a trading strategy. The Finance Development Centre 53 But before delivering too much optimism Euro Corporate Spread vs Government Yield 150 (bps) 25/10/02 (3.90;144) 140 130 120 04/07/02 (4.49;114) 110 100 10/03/03 (2.98;104) 7/11/01 (3.67;99) 90 80 13/06/03 (2.64;75) 70 03/09/03 (3.63;65) 21/08/00 (5.30;69) 30/05/01 (4.76;66) 60 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 The Finance Development Centre 5.00 5.50 54 Modigliani - Miller and Modern Finance Few will not now know the M-M theorem, under which corporate financial structure is irrelevant Newer Theories exist - in many regards these look like the pre-M-M world. A simple test: If M-M applies the principal components of default variability would be constant across countries - observed corporate financial structure differs markedly internationally. The Finance Development Centre 55 Principal Components of Default The data was pre-processed to remove cyclical (phase) effects which might otherwise bias the results. The Finance Development Centre 56 An important warning The principal components analysis suggests that the default process varies markedly among countries. This suggests that different credit evaluation models are needed in each country. If these are based upon financial statements, it would be as well to remember the different purposes for which financial statements are produced. This is rather more than differences in legal processes and systems. The Finance Development Centre 57 An Afterthought Portfolio Weighting by Different Schemes A Comparison of Equal weighting and weighting by equal expected loss 1000000 Equ 1 100000 Equ 2 10000 EL 1 1000 EL 2 100 10 1 -0.004 0.1 0.006 0.016 0.026 0.036 0.01 0.001 The Finance Development Centre 58 Credit Derivatives The Banks have bought a net $190 billion of protection. The Insurance industry has written a net $300 billion of protection. These are small sums - about a quarter of the UK mortgage market! Notwithstanding that, some of the mono-lines look over-exposed. None of the models in use for pricing works with any meaningful precision. This will require full information pricing. The Finance Development Centre 59 The justification for that last assertion Lies in the non-normality of spread distributions The Finance Development Centre 60 But we might try estimating econometric models Quite a few have done precisely this. Here’s our model results The Finance Development Centre 61 The diagnostics for which are: The Finance Development Centre 62 The Durbin-Watson suggests that something may be awry Which is just as well as: Grimmett is a set of earthquake data Sparrow is a set of car number plates collected by my daughters And that illustrates the econometric problem rather well The data is sparse, noisy and not really suitable for mining exercises. The out of sample performance usually abysmal. The Finance Development Centre 63 In my experience linear factor models can “explain” only 70% - 80% of what happens And that isn’t enough for practical pricing The work has really only just started By way of ending let me offer a final insight Credit is an expectation of Liquidity So maybe we should all be working on Liquidity Further Papers: www.FinanceDevelopmentCentre.com [email protected] The Finance Development Centre 64 Omega Interpretations Omega may be interpreted as the ratio of a “virtual” call to a “virtual” put. b (1 F (r ))dr ( r ) r r F (r )dr E[ max{ x r ,0}] E[max{r x,0}] a Omega may be viewed as the “fair game” representation of the distribution. And we might argue that this is the correct place from which to measure Risk The Finance Development Centre 65