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Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Managerial Economics and
Organizational Architecture, 5e
Chapter 21: Understanding
the Business Environment:
The Economics of
Regulation
McGraw-Hill/Irwin
Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Examples of Government
Regulation
• Antitrust legislation
• Environmental protection laws
• Financial disclosure for publicly traded
stock
• Intellectual property, labor, and safety laws
• Utilities regulation
• Financial services regulation
• Transportation industry regulation
21-2
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Economic Motives for
Government Intervention
• Provide laws and legal institutions that
define and enforce property rights
• Seek to correct market failure
– Externalities
– Public good
– Monopolies
– Asymmetric information
21-3
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Defining and Enforcing
Property Rights
• Enforceable property rights increase
incentive to invest and trade
– patents, copyrights, trademarks
• Enforceable contracts reduce transactions
costs
– greater gains from trade, more wealth
– Lower transactions costs of contracting
21-4
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Redressing Market Failures
• Externalities
– costs or benefits imposed on involuntary
parties
– pollution
• Public goods
– nonrival consumption
– nonexcludable
– free riders
21-5
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Redressing Market Failures
• Monopoly
– antitrust laws
– potential for regulators to be “captured” by the
industry
• Informational failures
21-6
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Redistributing Wealth
• Individuals have incentives to use
regulatory powers to their advantage
• Lobbying for wealth transfers yields no
productive benefits for society
• Taxi quotas raise the price above
equilibrium reducing consumer surplus
• Taxi companies are willing to spend up to
the increase in their profits to lobby
21-7
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Wealth Transfers via Government
Quotas on the Number of Taxis
$
Government
intervention yields
higher price (P’)
and lower output
(Q’),
reduces consumer
surplus (shaded
area) and transfers
wealth to cab
companies (π).
Lost potential gains from trade
P’
π
P*
S
D
Q’
Q*
Q
21-8
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Economic Theory of Regulation
• Special interests express demand for
regulation or other favorable laws
• Politicians (self-interested) supply
regulation and other laws
• Incentives to free ride and form coalitions
– political power depends no ability to deliver
votes and contributions
– special interests are costly to form
21-9
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Market for Regulation
• In competitive and unregulated industry,
Pc=MC
• Collusion among firms could yield
monopoly price, Pm>Pc
• This will maximize profits in the industry
• If the industry is regulated, the firms will
want Pm and consumers will want Pc
21-10
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Industry Profits in Competitive
and Monopolized Markets
$
Price (in dollars)
$
P0
P0
Pm
Pm
Pc
MC
D
MR
Qm
Pc
Q
Π
Qc
Quantity
m
Profit
21-11
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Regulatory Behavior
• Regulator seeks to maximize political
support from constituents
– businesses prefer higher profits
– consumers prefer lower prices
• Political support functions illustrate
tradeoff between prices and profits that
yield the same political support
21-12
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Political Support Functions
Increasing
political
support
Price (in dollars)
$
PS1
Pz
Py
PS2
Px
Πx
Πy
p
Profit
21-13
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Regulatory Market Equilibrium
• Regulators choose the price and profit
level that maximizes their political support
• Regulated price is determined by tangency
between monopoly profit function and
political support function
• Regulated price is Pr*, Pc<Pr*<Pm
21-14
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Equilibrium Regulated Price
$
P0
Price (in dollars)
PS1
Pm
PS2
P*r
Pc
Π*r
Πm
p
Profit
21-15
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Market for Regulation
• Regulators do not always behave in
obviously consistent ways
• Unorganized consumers offer regulators
relatively little political support
• Political outcomes depend on relative
effectiveness of special interests
• Government programs tend to benefit
small groups at the expense of large
groups
21-16
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Managerial Implications
• Government regulations can create
barriers to entry
– directly (e.g., legal profession, mail delivery)
– indirectly (e.g., restaurant health codes,
imposition of payroll tax)
• Firms have incentives to push for
regulations that raise their rival’s costs
• Importance of coalition formation
• Business participation in political process
21-17
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e
Payroll Tax and Profits
of Low-Labor Firms
Price (in dollars)
$
310
S1
305
S0
300
D
Q
250
400
Quantity of rugs
21-18