Download Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs

Classification des barrières douanières
Trade barriers
Barrières
dissipatives
Product
standards
Barrières à capture
étrangère
Sanitary &
Phytosanitary
standards
Non-tariff barriers (NTB)
Restrictions
Quotas
volontaires aux
exportations
Barrières à capture
nationale
Droits de
douane
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs
1. Perfect competition
Tariff under competition
Prices
Demande nationale
Offre domestique
World price plus tariff
Tarif (droit de douane)
A
B
C
D
Prix mondial
Quantities
Quantity imported
L’effet d’un tarif pour un grand pays
Prices
Domestic demand
Domestic supply curve
World supply plus tariff
Augmentation du prix intérieur
B
C
Offre mondiale
D
A
Quantities
Quantity
imported
Tariff
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs
1. Perfect competition
Residual (after-quota) demand
Quota under competition
Prices
Domestic demand
Marginal cost
D
Prix intérieur
A
B
C
World price
Quantities
Quota
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs
2. Monopoly
Tariff under monopoly
Prices
Domestic demand
Recette marginale
Marginal cost
Prix mondial plus tarif
Tariff
A
B
C
D
Prix mondial
Quantities
Quantity imported
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs
2. Monopoly
Quota under monopoly
Prices
Domestic demand
Demande “résiduelle” (diminuée des importations)
Marginal cost
Domestic price
C
A
D
World price
Quantities
Quota
B
Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs
2. Monopoly
Quota under monopoly
Prices
Domestic demand
Residual (after-quota) domestic demand
Marginal cost
Domestic price
C
A
D
World price
Quantities
Quota
B
Use of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
(a) Ad-valorem equivalent of core NTBs, by GDP/capita of using country
(b) AVE of agricultural price-support measures
Source: Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga 2006a
OTRI and MA-OTRI by level of income
(a) OTRI
(b) MA-OTRI
Special-interest groups:
The common-agency model
Competing
“principals”
What they want
Common “agent”
What it is
interested in
Importcompeting
lobby 1
(intermediate)
Protection of
sector 1
sell to
Importcompeting
lobby 2 (final
good)
Export
lobby
Consumers
Protection of
sector 2 but not
1
Market
access
Free imports
Government authorities
•Campaign contributions
•Welfare
•Information
Transparency & access
Why more lobbying may be good in the common-agency model
Social
welfare
More access to policy
“First best” (free trade
for a small economy)
“pessimum”
Proportion of population
organized politically
0% (no specialinterest interference)
Unbalanced
lobbying
100%
(everyone
organized)