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Importance of Efficient Public Investment and Public Investment Management: Experience of Australia Carl Toohey Productivity Commission Australia Presentation at the Central Institute For Economic Management Workshop on capacity building to improve appraisal of public investment projects in Vietnam An APEC-funded project Nha Trang, Vietnam, 30 September –2 October 2013 Productivity Commission Outline of today’s presentation • About the Productivity Commission • Short history of economic reform in Australia and its benefits • Framework used by the Commission to help improve decision making that can be applied to public infrastructure issues • 2 examples of recent Commission work on infrastructure issues in Australia − Urban water − Electricity transmission and distribution Productivity Commission 2 Importance of this topic • Focus is on getting the policy and decision-making processes right to improve public investment across and within sectors of the economy − This is particularly important where there are multiple infrastructure priorities, and limited funds available to governments • A key message is that public investment should be productive and economically efficient so as to maximise net benefits (benefits less costs) to the community as a whole Productivity Commission 3 1. About the Productivity Commission • The Productivity Commission is the Government’s principal review and advisory body on microeconomic policy reform and regulation • Our role is to promote better informed policy decisions through independent, published analysis and advice • The Commission has a long history of providing advice and reviewing key infrastructure sectors in Australia − Water, Electricity, Telecommunications, Gas, Airports, Rail, Ports − Performance monitoring of government trading enterprises (1991-2008) Productivity Commission 4 Three key operating principles enshrined in the Productivity Commission legislation • Independent analysis and advice − Statutory agency with Commissioners − ‘Arm’s length’ from government • Processes and reporting are open and public − − − − Hold public hearings and roundtable discussions Receive submissions, which are published on the internet Analysis and advice is exposed to public scrutiny Publish draft and final reports, including modeling • Community-wide perspective − Examine impacts of policy on the welfare of the whole community, rather than just particular industries or groups Productivity Commission 5 One geography, two sovereign levels of government Northern Territory Western Australia National reform requires cooperation across jurisdictions Queensland South Australia New South Wales Victoria Australian Capital Territory Tasmania Productivity Commission 6 Website Our publications can be accessed at www.pc.gov.au Productivity Commission 7 2. Economic reform in Australia (since the 1980s) • Since the 1980s, there has been sustained and comprehensive economic reform in Australia. This includes: − Monetary policy, fiscal and exchange rate policy, capital markets − Trade and foreign investment liberalisation − Taxation, Labor markets and industrial relations − Utility reform (electricity, gas, water, rail, road, ports, telecoms) − Competition policy (including reform of Government Trading Enterprises, and third party access to essential facilities) • New National Reform Agenda − Human capital (education, health, ageing) Productivity Commission 8 Benefits of reform • Reforms improved productivity by encouraging − A better allocation of resources − Improved economic efficiency of utilities sectors − Opening up of economy to overseas trade and investment (trade intensity of Australian economy increased) − Enhanced domestic competition • As a result of reform the Australian economy became more flexible, resilient and adaptable to external shocks. • However, the reform task in Australia remains ongoing and many challenges remain, including on infrastructure issues Productivity Commission 9 Benefits of Reform: Labour Productivity and Multifactor Productivity (Labour + Capital) 110.0 Index (2008-09 = 100) 100.0 Multifactor Productivity 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 Labour Productivity 50.0 40.0 7 4 -7 7 -8 0 -8 3 -8 6 -8 9 -9 2 -9 5 -9 8 -0 1 -0 4 -0 7 -1 0 73 9 76 9 79 9 82 9 85 9 88 9 91 9 94 9 97 0 00 0 03 0 06 0 09 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Productivity Commission 10 Benefits of reform: GDP per capita Australia’s international ranking in terms of GDP per capita 1 Australia ranked 4th in 1950 2 Australia ranked 3rd in 2010 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Australia ranked 14th in 1983 14 15 16 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 Productivity Commission 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 11 3. Achieving good public investment outcomes 1. Use principles of good public policy in allocation scarce public capital 2. Use open and transparent processes to determine priorities 3. Undertake rigorous, evidence-based analysis Good public investment outcomes 4. Employ strategies to facilitate reform Productivity Commission 12 Principles of good public policy Productivity Commission 13 Identify objectives for public investment • Identify the objectives • Focus on economic efficiency − Delivery of utility and infrastructure in an economically efficient manner to maximise net benefits to the community • Avoid non-economic objectives − Using investment to achieve non-economic objectives (such as income redistribution, creating jobs) comes at a cost − Services likely to cost more for users, or the investment may be underutilised because of insufficient demand − Acts as a drag on the productivity of the economy by diverting scarce resources from potentially more productive activities − Consider the use of other tools Productivity Commission 14 Identify the problem • Identify the infrastructure bottlenecks or deficiencies • Establish why public investment is required − Governments should not address problems until a case for action has been clearly established − Not all infrastructure issues are best dealt with through government investment, source of the problem may lay elsewhere − Government policies, such as pricing or other regulation, may be acting as impediments to efficient and least cost infrastructure provision Productivity Commission 15 Identify the options for improving provision • Identify the options − Define a broad set of policy and investment options − Assess whether they actually address the infrastructure problem − Using appropriate frameworks, assess the benefits and costs (including administration and compliance costs) and the risks • Select the best options − Consider options as part of an integrated infrastructure portfolio − Prioritize those options that generate the greatest net benefits − Implement options to maximize net benefit to the community, subject to the budget or capital constraint • Monitor and review the performance of the investment Productivity Commission 16 Open and transparent processes Productivity Commission 17 Open and transparent processes • Making public investment choices under a capital constraint is difficult, gaining public support can be useful • Open and transparent processes (and community consultation) can be important for establishing support for the program − Stakeholders may provide varied perspectives on infrastructure issues, and suggest varied solutions − Feedback on recommendations may prevent implementation issues • Productivity Commission processes and reporting arrangements are open and public − Analysis and advice is exposed to public scrutiny Productivity Commission 18 Example of a Productivity Commission public inquiry process July 2010 Terms of Reference Initial consultations (informal) September 2010 Issues Paper Roundtables October 2010 Nov - Dec 2010 Draft report released 13 April 2011 Draft report submissions May - July 2011 Draft report public hearings May - June 2011 Final report delivered to government 31 August 2011 Public submissions Initial public hearings Productivity Commission 19 Championing the benefits of the program • Governments have an important role to play in providing leadership for determining efficient and effective provision of infrastructure • Institutions like the Central Institute For Economic Management can play an important role in supporting the leadership of governments • It is critical to educate and inform the public about the need for (and benefits and costs of) the public investment program and who pays for provision, so that they better understand what is at stake and why it is in the national interest Productivity Commission 20 Rigorous, evidence-based analysis Productivity Commission 21 Adopt an ‘economy-wide’ approach • Adopt an ‘economy-wide’ focus and framework when assessing potential policy measures and public investment options − Consider outcomes/impacts on all sectors, groups and individuals − Particularly important when a group that stands to benefit (or lose) significantly is well defined, well organised, and vocal Productivity Commission 22 Use of evidence-based analysis • Undertake rigorous, evidence-based (quantitative and qualitative) analysis of the efficiency, equity and risk impacts across the economy − Draw on lessons and experience from other regions or sectors • Make use of appropriate economic concepts, tools and frameworks − Modelling has an important role to play − Economy-wide models can be particularly useful for evaluating large and complex packages of public investment in infrastructure − Use of rigorously applied cost-benefit analysis to help identify and prioritise public investment priorities Productivity Commission 23 Strategies to facilitate reform Productivity Commission 24 Identify and deal with barriers to efficient investment programs directly • Anticipate and manage barriers to implementing efficient investment programs − The costs of change are often concentrated on particular groups, whereas the benefits are more diffuse − The potential winners from change tend to be (rationally) poorly informed relative to the losers − The costs of change tend to be front-loaded, whereas the benefits arise over long time periods • (In Australia’s case), multiple jurisdictions and levels of government can increase the difficulty of achieving a nationally consistent approaches Productivity Commission 25 Develop appropriate assistance measures to deal with affordability or income redistribution concerns • Universal assistance measures are available across the community (via the tax and transfer systems) subject to eligibility criteria • Such measures are the preferred mechanism for addressing affordability concerns from change − − − − Individuals in similar circumstances are treated similarly Assistance is targeted at need, whatever the cause Addresses the net effects, after all changes are taken into account Supports individuals and families rather than a particular industry • However, targeted transitional assistance might be efficient in some circumstances Productivity Commission 26 4. Key insights from recent work by the Commission • Recent work undertaken by the Commission will hopefully provide some useful insights into the types of issues and challenges being considered in Australia • The two examples I would like to briefly talk about today are in the water and electricity sectors • This is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of these reports, rather to outline some of the key insights of relevance to the framework Productivity Commission 27 Australia’s Urban Water Sector www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/urban-water/report The purpose of presenting this case study is to illustrate the application of the framework for a sector in Australia Productivity Commission What we were asked to do (Terms of Reference) • Examine the case for microeconomic reform in Australia’s urban water sector • Identify opportunities for improving resource allocation and efficiency • Provide options to achieve these efficiency gains (with cost benefit analysis to be applied) • Propose a work program including − Priority areas − Plans for implementation Productivity Commission 29 The context for reform • Reform has occurred over the past 25 years • The sector has been under stress in recent times − Unexpected severe prolonged low rainfall/inflows, followed by recent floods in some areas (eastern Australia) − Demand growth, Ageing infrastructure Storage levels of Melbourne's reservoirs 100 Flow (GL/Year) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Productivity Commission 30 Key problems identified • The existence of multiple and conflicting objectives • Costly water restrictions and consumption targets − Lost value of consumption greater than $1 billion per year • Costly conservation measures − Rainwater tanks, low flow shower heads, water recycling − Cost of water saved through installation of rainwater tanks is about ten times the price of water • Too great a focus on addressing affordability by distorting prices Productivity Commission 31 Key problems (continued) • Deficient operational and investment practices for some regional utilities • Constraints on efficient water resource allocation and supply augmentation decisions − ‘Policy bans’: Rural-urban trade, Recycled drinking water, Aquifers − Limited application of ‘real options’ approach to planning and investment • Too much focus on investment in new desalination plants Productivity Commission 32 Investment in desalination plants Initial capacity Maximum expandable capacity Initial (and expandable) capacity as a percentage of annual consumption in 2009-10 Investment cost GL/year GL/year % A$m 90 180 18 (36) 1 890 2010 150 200 43 (57) 3 500 2012 49 25 1 200 2009 100 80 1 830 2012 45 18 387 2006 Perth (Binninyup) 100 40 1 400 2012 Total 534 35 (45) 10 207 Units Sydney (Kurnell) Melbourne (Wonthaggi) South-east Queensland (Tugun) Adelaide (Port Stanvac) Perth (Kwinana) Productivity Commission 674 Year on line 33 Costs of misdirected investment • In Melbourne and Perth, (modelled) $3.2-4.2 billion loss in NPV of community welfare over 20 years • In Melbourne, (modelled) $229–736 million loss in NPV of community welfare over 20 years from policies to use new desalination plant, not use the new Sugar Loaf pipeline, and proceed with new water recycling projects • In Adelaide, purchasing Murray River water offered large advantages over desalination (up to $1.6 billion capital saving plus other benefits) Productivity Commission 34 Some of the proposed reforms • Overarching objective for all utilities of providing water services that maximise net benefits to the community • Limit use of water restrictions • Improve pricing regime − Move from regulatory price setting to price monitoring − Encourage more cost-reflective pricing − Use the tax and welfare systems to achieve affordability objectives • In metropolitan areas, improve allocative and productive efficiency by introducing contestability • In regional areas, aggregate small utilities to exploit economies of scale Productivity Commission 35 Proposed reforms (continued) • Improve supply augmentation decisions − Consider the costs and benefits of all supply augmentation options using a real options approach − Make information on costs, risks and benefits to consumers of all supply augmentation options publicly available − Remove bans on particular resource allocation and supply augmentation options • Make retail-distribution utilities responsible for service delivery, including procurement of supply − Subject to security-of-supply standards set by government − These utilities might be owned by state or local governments • Monitor the performance of utilities, and the progress of reform Productivity Commission 36 Australia’s Electricity Transmission and Distribution Network http://pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/electricity/report The purpose of presenting this case study is to illustrate the application of the framework for a sector in Australia Productivity Commission 37 What we were asked to do (Terms of Reference) • Examine existing regulatory arrangements for electricity in the National Electricity Market (NEM) • Specifically examine: − The use of benchmarking to enhance efficiency − Whether the current regime is delivering efficient investment in interconnectors Productivity Commission 38 Transportation of electricity Productivity Commission 39 The need for reform Productivity Commission 40 Key problems • Current regulation and policy approaches create incentives for inefficient investment − Current ‘incentive based’ regulation encourages network businesses to build too much − Some current infrastructure inefficiently utilised − Reliability standards are prescriptive • Some consumers are forced to pay for higher reliability than they value − Reliability standards do not reflect consumer preferences − Few consumers face time-of-use pricing − A large share of retail electricity bills (25% in NSW) is required to meet approximately 40 hours of very high demand each year Productivity Commission 41 Key problems (continued) • State-owned network businesses have conflicting objectives, which reduces their efficiency • In the presence of congestion, current pricing regulations encourage strategic behaviour − This can lead to short-term productive inefficiency as high-cost generators are dispatched to meet demand − The long-term effects are greater, and include inefficient generator location and network investment • Progress in implementing electricity network reform is slow Productivity Commission 42 Some of the proposed reforms • Modified reliability requirements to promote economic efficiency • More efficient planning process for large transmission investments (including a full cost benefit analysis for larger investments and consideration of system-wide impacts and efficiency) • A suite of reforms to improve demand management, including (over time) the introduction of time-based pricing for critical peak periods Productivity Commission 43 Proposed reforms (continued) • Clarify the objectives for state-owned network businesses, and remove non-commercial objectives • Phase in alternative pricing regimes to discourage strategic behaviour by generators in the presence of congestion • Speed up the reform process by applying tighter implementation timetables • The potential gains from reform are significant Productivity Commission 44 Conclude • Thank you for your attention • Questions Productivity Commission 45