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Canada’s declining social safety net – EI reform & Budget 2009 Lars Osberg Economics Department Dalhousie University Conference: The 2009 Federal Budget: Challenge, Response and Retrospect John Deutsch Institute May 7-8, 2009 - Queen's University Now that we need a safety net… OECD Economic Outlook March 2009 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/1/42443150.pdf Canada - Unemployment 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 6.3% 6.0% 6.1% 8.8% 10.5% UI/EI Replacement Rate – 38 years of decline The average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models. http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html ; The Canadian Labour Force Participation Rate Revisited: Cohort and Wealth Effects Take Hold Steven James, Tim Sargent, Russell Barnett and Claude Lavoie Working Paper 2007‐01, Finance Canada, Page 11 Average Gross Unemployment Benefit Replacement: Canada 1961-2005 OECD Summary Measure 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 10 Replacement Rate: Relatively low by OECD standards OE C D S ummary Meas ure 2005 Averag e G ros s Unemployment B enefit R eplac ement S eries 1 24 33 Au 12 13 A 26 34 US 24 33 35 UK 12 35 39 st ra l A u ia s B e tria lg iu Ca m n D e ad nm a a F i rk nl an Fr d a G nc e er m an y Ne th I ta ly N e erla w nd Ze s al a N o nd rw S w ay S w ed itz en er la nd 22 32 49 41 Net Replacement Rate over 60 months of unemployment, 2006 Average over 4 Fam ily types 67% and 100% of AW w ithout Social Assistance OECD, Tax-Benefit Models w w w .oecd.org/els/social/w orkincentives 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Lu I xe tal y m bo N ur et he g r N ew l an d Ze s al an N d or w ay Po rtu ga l Sp a Sw in e Sw d e i tz n U ni erl an te d Ki d n U ni gdo te m d St at es Au st ra li a Au st ria Be lg iu m C an ad a D en m ar Fi k nl an d Fr an G ce er m an G y re ec e Ic el an Ire d la nd 2 0 “it is important to remember that only insurable earnings up to the MIE are covered by the Employment Insurance Program” REPORT OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY TO THE EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION ON THE EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PREMIUM RATE AND MAXIMUM INSURABLE EARNINGS, 2009: ◦ 2007 40,000 42.9% 2008 41,100 43.5% 2009 42,300 44.2% Maximum weekly benefits $ Average weekly benefits $ 423 318 435 331 447 % of insurable earnings above MIE 58.5% 59.1% 59.6% Maximum EI insurable earnings $ Proportion of claims at maximum CANSIM, table 276-0016 2007 actual: 2008, 2009 estimated 1977-01 1977-09 1978-05 1979-01 1979-09 1980-05 1981-01 1981-09 1982-05 1983-01 1983-09 1984-05 1985-01 1985-09 1986-05 1987-01 1987-09 1988-05 1989-01 1989-09 1990-05 1991-01 1991-09 1992-05 1993-01 1993-09 1994-05 1995-01 1995-09 1996-05 1997-01 1997-09 1998-05 1999-01 1999-09 2000-05 2001-01 2001-09 2002-05 2003-01 2003-09 2004-05 2005-01 2005-09 2006-05 2007-01 2007-09 2008-05 2009-01 The Big Issue – EI is much harder to get, especially since 1996 UI/EI Beneficiaries to Unemployed Ratio Canada & Ontario - 1976-2009 CANSIM V384773, V384807, V2091135, V2094924 12 MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.900 0.800 0.700 0.600 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000 CANADA ONTARIO Responding to Need (a bit) EI Eligibility and Duration April 12 - May 9, 2009 Regular Benefits Toronto Unemployment Rate Montreal Windsor Halifax 8.8 8.7 13.2 6.0 595 595 420 700 Minimum Weeks Payable 23 23 31 19 Maximum Weeks Payable 47 47 50 41 Unemployed - March 2009 295,300 110,600 Number of Insured Hours Required to Qualify 42,600 14,100 Formula-driven response to labour demand variation? IMF: “the role of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilizer … could be boosted by making regular tax and transfer programs more cyclically responsive. For example, the generosity of unemployment insurance systems could be automatically increased when the economy is in a downturn and jobs are harder to find” IMF World Economic Outlook, October, 2008 Foreword page xiv Political Economy Costs Large ◦ Regional stereotyping & erosion of common polity Understanding Unemployment and (Un)Employment Insurance 1970s/1980s literature ◦ UI incentive effects to labour supply/search ◦ Unemployment ≈ “Leisure” Explosion of “Happiness” literature in 1990s ◦ Large Negative Impact of unemployment Both unemployed & employed miserable when U rate rises Risk-averse workers facing possible job loss, unable to smooth consumption privately ◦ Rationally willing to pay for insurance coverage Canadian fiscal peculiarities EI Account pays for: ◦ Maternity benefits ◦ Federal deficit reduction in 1990s ◦ Training & employment services Social decision to fund from EI premiums ◦ payroll tax base NOT normal OECD practice Defensible expenditures on merits ◦ But NOT = “social safety net” for risk of earnings loss during recessions Regular Benefits + Admin ≈ 60% of EI expenditure Downloading Cyclical Risk Recessions of early 1980s & 1990s ◦ Greater UI coverage + Social Assistance Ottawa cost-shared SA with provinces Since 1996 ◦ SA costs now 100% paid by provinces ◦ Individuals / Families Less coverage & shorter, lower benefits under EI Lower real value of SA benefits ◦ Less ‘Automatic Stabilization’ implies greater cyclical risk Larger share of greater cyclical risk is now borne by families & provinces Budget 2009 response to “worst global recession since 1930s” ? No change in EI eligibility or replacement Increase in duration of benefits ◦ + 5 weeks (Canada) ◦ + 13 weeks (USA) Cost = 0.037% GDP = $ 575M / 1560 B (2009) Budget 2009 Page 204 = 3.42 % of projected EI Premiums Nil change in “social safety net” Substantially inferior to previous recessions & OECD norm Marginally inferior to USA 2009 Budget 2009 emphasizes training expenditure + premium freeze Implications of Inadequacy Training emphasis of Budget2009 makes sense IFF ‘short, sharp blip in trend growth’ ◦ Social returns nil if general excess supply of skills ◦ But not credible ◦ OECD & IMF & others – 10.5% unemployment at least through 2010, & then…..???? ◦ Benefits exhaustion @ 10%+ Unemployment Social Insurance for market income risk ◦ Quid pro quo underlying Globalization & Marketorientated policy reforms ◦ Political Economy Implications of generalized job insecurity & uninsured mass unemployment? Needed EI Reforms Easing of entrance requirement Tier II for longer term unemployed ◦ > 50 weeks – not likely to be rare in 2010+