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Fiscal Policy, Budget Deficits and Government Debt MSc EPS Session 5 Hilary term 2013 Professor Dermot McAleese Source: Dept of Finance Medium Term Fiscal Statement November 2012 Source: P. Lane “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis” Journal of Economic Perspectives Summer 2012 Yesterday All my troubles seemed so far away Now it looks as if they’re here to stay, Oh! I believe in yesterday. Suddenly I’m not half the man I used to be, There’s a shadow hanging over me Oh, yesterday came suddenly. “Yesterday” The Beatles Source: Lane (2012) op cit The debt equation Aim of economic policy is to reduce volatility of market economy GDP without counter-cyclical policy GDP GDP with counter-cyclical policy Potential GDP time The bursting of bubbles causes credit contraction, the forced liquidation of assets, deflation and wealth destruction that may reach catastrophic proportions. In a deflationary environment, the weight of accumulated debt can sink the banking system and push the economy into depression. That is what needs to be prevented at all costs. George Soros “The Game Changer” Financial Times 28 Jan 2009 FISCAL POLICY Counter-cyclical fiscal policy The limits of fiscal activism Fiscal policy 2008-13: averting a world depression Automatic Stabilisers What is a sustainable fiscal deficit? Policy recommendations for 2013 and beyond US after the Great Crash 1929 …. Real GDP falls by 29% 950 900 850 800 750 700 650 600 550 500 29 9 30 9 31 9 32 9 33 9 34 9 35 9 36 9 37 9 38 9 39 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 GDP (1996 $) .. and prices fall by 25% (Inflation US$1996=100) 13 12 11 10 9 8 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 “I believe myself to be writing a book on Economic Theory which will largely revolutionise - not I suppose at once but in the course of the next ten years - the way the world thinks about our problems” John Maynard Keynes - letter to George Bernard Shaw in 1933. The book was: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) 15 Chapter 1 The General Theory I have called this book the General, Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, placing the emphasis on the prefix general. The object of such a title is to contrast the character of my arguments and conclusions with those of the classical1 theory of the subject, upon which I was brought up and which dominated the economic thought, both practical and theoretical, of the governing and academic classes of this generation, as it has for a hundred years past. I shall argue that the postulates of the classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience. ----------------------------------------------------------------------1.“The Classical Economists” was a name given by Marx to cover Ricardo and James Mill and their predecessors, that is to say for the founders of the theory which culminated in the Ricardian economics. I have become accustomed, perhaps perpetrating a solecism, to include in "the classical school" the followers of Ricardo, those, that is to say, who adopted and perfected the theory of the Ricardian economics, including (for example) J.S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Prof. Pigou Key Elements in Keynesian Economics Business expectations shattered by 1929 slump. Lack of demand the problem , not lack of supply Monetary policy by itself not sufficient to promote investment Governments should: • SPEND IN A RECESSION, even though budget deficit is getting larger (‘loan-financed public works’) • SAVE DURING THE BOOM, even though it has abundant tax revenues JM Keynes A General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 1936 17 Objections to Keynes’ theory • “We cannot afford it” • Higher spending means more borrowing means higher interest rates • More Goverment spending means higher future taxes • Better to cut wages and become more competitive • Trade unions too powerful • Recession/depression self-correcting in the long run 18 Achievements of Keynes (see Chapter 15) • A key factor in enabling world economy to avoid repeat of Great Depression. • Japan used Keynesian economics to avoid economic disaster since early 1990s • US used counter-cyclical policy aggressively to offset effects of stock market collapse 2001-2 • And 2008-2013 also ..... 19 The Crisis has evoked a textbook countercyclical response EU-wide general government deficit rose from 1% of GDP in 2007 to 5% in 2011. Likewise US and Japan. Automatic stabilisers explain about half this increase, and discretionary counter-cyclical policy explain the other half. EU’s debt/GDP ratio has deteriorated, from 62% at end-2007 to 82% in 2011. Similar story US and Japan 20 Consensus turns Keynesian (% of GDP) IMF Oct 2009 ch 1 21 General gross government debt (% of GDP) Euro Area* Japan* United States* Belgium Italy Germany France Spain UK Ireland Denmark Greece 2007 72 162 67 2009 88 189 90 2012 99 214 109 88 112 66 73 42 47 29 34 115 100 128 77 91 63 72 71 51 134 104 123 88 106 88 104 122 63 168 Source: OECD May 2012 Note: compare these figures with DMcA p. Limitations of fiscal policy • Governments often got timing wrong – policies turned out to be pro-cyclical • Governments spent during the recession AND during the boom: Govt spending rises as % GDP Growing DEBT problems • Private sector response to fiscal expansion becomes less positive 23 RESULT Fiscal policy still an important tool of policy, but no longer as effective as it was in the past. 24 PUBLIC DEBT Public debt is sustainable when it remains constant proportion of GDP over time Effect on financial markets’ expectations: inflation to erode real value of fixed-interest debt debt default, rescheduling or moratorium on interest payments Public Sector Indebtedness (public debt adjusted for pensions liabilities) Openness of the financial markets fiscal conservatism … reinforced by ageing population 25 OECD May 2012 Automatic Stabilisers Tax Revenues • Corporate profits • Individual incomes • Value added tax • Real estate taxes decline Government spending • Unemployment compensation • Income support increase 28 OECD Econ Survey June 2010 p. 49 Conclusions on fiscal policy (DMcA ch 15) • Discretionary fiscal policy can play an important, even essential, role in conditions of a major economic downturn. • Response to fiscal policy expansion is sensitive to the debt/GDP ratio, the absolute govt expenditure/GDP ratio and absolute level of the budget deficit. If these are too high, the effectiveness of fiscal expansion in stimulating the private sector will be negatived. • Private debt also matters. Escalation of loans to private sector (sub-primes) in US and excessive rise of mortgages in Spain, UK created massive problems. Regulation of the banking and financial sector proved defective. 30 The New Mantra: Fiscal policy must be pro-cyclical! Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation to stabilise debt IMF Article IV Report: Ireland, Sept 2012 31 32 New mantra: Growth Friendly Fiscal Consolidation 33 What went wrong? A European Commission view 34 35 36 37 JAPAN 1990-2012 – A CASE STUDY OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 38 39 Japan's government budget balance 4.0 2.0 20 06 20 04 20 02 20 00 19 98 19 96 19 94 19 92 -2.0 19 90 19 88 0.0 -4.0 -6.0 -8.0 -10.0 40 Japan: Govt spending and revenues 45.0 43.0 41.0 39.0 37.0 Expenditure 35.0 Revenues 33.0 31.0 29.0 27.0 25.0 Source OECD May 2012 41 42 Japan's Gross Government Debt as % GDP 1988-2007 240.0 220.0 200.0 180.0 160.0 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 Source: OECD Economic Outlook Dec 2011 43 Japan's Deflation 1995-2009 2.0 1.0 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 Source: CPI data, taken from World Bank, OECD 44 JAPAN Real GDP growth 1961-2010 (% p.a.) 15 10 5 0 -5 45 Source: “Win some, lose some: monetary policy in Japan” The Economist January 26th 2013 Verdict on Japan’s use of fiscal policy post 1990 crisis • Aggressive monetary and fiscal policy • Economic disaster averted • Full recovery still elusive • Debt/GDP ratio up from 64% (1991) to 219% (2012) • Relying on exports to reflate economy 47 Unemployment rates (% of labor force) for US, Euro area and Japan OECD Dec 2010 Fiscal policy – a Japanese view • Japan’s fiscal deficit is ‘a perfect example of a good deficit’. Without the increase in spending that produced such larger deficits, Japan would have experienced a drop in GDP similar to that in the Depression era US where GDP halved in just 4 years. (p. 259) • In a balance-sheet recession, the private sector focuses on reducing debt not on maximising profits. To increase government spending is the only effective response. Richard C Koo The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics; Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession Wiley 2009 Fiscal policy: ECB pre-crisis A discretionary fiscal policy attempting to fine tune the economy can have stabilising effects, but the size of the effect tends to vary depending on several factors and is generally assessed to be small. What is not small, however, is the risk associated with such activist fiscal policies. Experience suggests that unless a discretionary fiscal stimulus is timely, targeted and temporary, it actually risks being harmful. ECB Monthly Bulletin June 2008 p. 79 Government spending (% GDP) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Euro Area 47;1 51.2 50.9 49.4 49.2 Japan US 37.2 39.1 42.0 42.7 41.1 42.5 42,8 42.1 43.4 41.2 GREECE 50.5 53.8 50.3 49.5 France 53.3 56.7 56.6 56.4 57.1 Germany Netherlands Sweden 44.0 46.2 51.7 48.1 51,6 54.8 47.9 51.3 52.6 45.7 50.3 51.2 45.5 49.9 51.4 Italy 48,6 51.7 50.4 49.7 49.2 UK 47.9 51.5 50.6 49.8 48.6 Source: European Economy Autumn 2011 50.1 United States Budget Balance (% of GDP) 1988-2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 -6.3 -11.3 -10.5 8.8 -3 -3 -3 -3 Source: OECD Economic Outlook Dec 2010 Questions on Economist article, 1 Nov 2008 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. “The standard response to a demand shock is to use monetary policy.” a) What is a “demand shock” and what caused it in the present context. b) Outline the major instruments of monetary policy. Explain the meaning of the term “money multiplier”? Why is it “collapsing”? What measures could be taken to raise its value? What effect would a steep fall in property prices and in the stock market have on the level of investment? What are automatic fiscal stabilisers? Why do they differ in magnitude between countries? What is meant by a “fiscal stimulus”? Does it matter if the stimulus takes the form of an increase in spending or a fall in taxation? Some argue that increased government spending will lead to an expectation of increased taxes in future that will negate any effect on aggregate demand in an economy. Do you agree? Why would a fiscal stimulus tend to be more effective in a large country (the US) than in a small open economy (Ireland, Morocco)? Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a government to plan for a budget deficit? “Conventional monetary and fiscal policy may not prevent a prolonged deflationary slump.” What can be done if this happens? 56 What policy measures should Japan take to reduce its budget deficit? Exercise 4, p. 397 In a monetary union, the importance of fiscal policy as an instrument for smoothing output at a national level becomes even greater, in view of the loss of national monetary policies. Euro area wide interest rates cannot be geared to the national economic situation whereas automatic stabilisers can help to offset any unduly contractive or expansionary effects on domestic demand. However, if deficits are high, the resultant further increase in the deficit may undermine confidence in the future soundness of public finances, which could prompt private agents to save more and thus offset the forces of auto stabilisation. ECB Monthly Bulletin August 2005 p.66