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China
1
China is of major interest within the field of comparative economic systems for several basic and
important reasons. To begin with, China is a country that adopted the Soviet model but with
interesting differences in practice. Moreover, as serious economic reforms emerged in the late
1970s, the path of reform was very different from that of other transition economies—beginning
in agriculture and for the most part sustaining many elements of the command era. However,
China’s reform combined socialism with important elements of the market and the aggressive use
of foreign trade. These reforms have moved China to a position of major importance in the global
economy. In 2009 GDP $4.9 trillion, China is the world’s third largest economy after US and
Japan. China enters a new century with economic system resembling market socialism and yet
with an historical background different from the typical conceptions of market socialism. Thus as
an economic system, as an example of systematic change, and as a player in the world economy,
China deserves close examination.
I. The Setting
1.China:
a) is very large (about the same size as Canada, 3.7 million sq miles)
b) Population is huge and growing
•2009-1.3 billion (the largest population in the world and more than 1/5 of the world's population)
•major policy problem
c) Much of its land is uninhabitable or costly to cultivate (only 10% of the land is
suitable for cultivation)
•mountains and deserts
d) Much of its resource base undeveloped, e.g., large oil reserves only starting to be
exploited
e) A poor, developing country despite rapid growth (2008—$ 5,962 PC income)
f) A rich and very long heritage
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• China has the oldest continuous culture in the world, with at least 4000 years of
historical records.
– China was once the most technologically advanced, most populous, and (from their point
of view, anyway) the most civilized country in the world. The Chinese are a very proud
people, and often very nationalistic.
– Imperial China's political history is one of long periods of stable, autocratic, and socially
conservative dynasties, with a dynastic cycle that leads to collapse of the state and
periods of terrible chaos. The Chinese have no history of democracy and a great fear of
political disorder.
– Chinese economic history is full of lost chances. Many of our most important
technologies (printing, paper, clocks, gunpowder, and paper money are just a few
examples) were first invented in China but not really put to economic use. Chinese fleets
traveled to India and Africa before the Europeans but these voyages were halted. The
expansion of trade and markets was repeatedly halted by government intervention. China
did not make the technological leap. While Europe was undergoing the Great
Transformation, China was in a period of decline.
• China did not respond to the European challenge, unlike the Japanese who
modernized their economy rapidly during the Meiji Restoration. In the Twentieth
Century, China began its revolutionary period.
– A revolution in 1911 toppled the last Qing emperor, and led to the establishment of the
Chinese republic.
– Today China remains a poor country despite rapid growth (2008-GDP per capita (PPP)
$5,962; India $2,972; Pakistan-$2,644; Hong Kong-43, 922)
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2. The Early Years (1949-1976)
•
•
•
The communist revolution in 1949 put Mao Zedong in
power. At the time of the revolution China was a classic
poor country with low PCI, significant population and
absence of institutions for econ development.
Mao Zedong proclaims Chinese People’s Republic 1949
Mao takes leadership as chief of state
– He created a strong central government and began a process
of determined Soviet-style industrialization.
•
Initial tasks
– collectivization of land
• Took the land from landlords and wealthier farmers and
placed it under the peasant control in communes
– nationalization of industry in preparation for national
planning
•
Followed typical (Stalinist) planned socialist model
– high priority to heavy industry, low priority to agriculture
• aggregate investment 20% - 25% of national product
• 85% industrial investment--heavy industry
• 8% state investment--agriculture
• by end of Mao period, industry share in national output
much higher than other countries at similar level of
development
4
Collectivization of Agriculture
• First step was redistribution of land from the landlords to the peasants in
preparation for collectivization.
• Major farming equipment provided by village authorities
• Collectivization involved organizing households into large prod teams
• Led to the commune
– In the 1950’s the communist government organized 800 million rural people into
about 52,000 rural communes
The Rural People’s Commune
• Created during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960)—a period of massive
resurgence of ideology that replaced rational decisions.
• Individual households organized into production teams (100-250 people)
• Production teams (7) combined to form brigades (16)
• Brigades combined into a commune (thousands of households in a commune)
– The communes received production targets from the state and ensured that these
targets were met.
• Communes were controlled by the county
• County played major role in implementing the plans of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry
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Vertical organization—structure of decision making
Organization of Agriculture Prior to the Reforms
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
County
Commune
Brigade
Production Team
Household
Each level above the individual hhld could hold land, and other
production materials under communal ownership, and each carried
out a range of production activities.
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• Individual’s Incentives in the Commune
– Individuals assigned work for which they earned points as shares of residual income
(revenue minus expenses)
• This system of payments was highly arbitrary. The work demanded vary regionally, seasonally
and from commune to commune. Contrary to any good incentive system, peasants had little
idea in advance what they would earn.
– This system resulted in problems:
• little incentive to work hard
– The workers were equally paid whatever efforts they contributed.
• little incentive for individual initiative
• Impact—large reduction of agricultural production
Nationalization of Industry
• There was a gradual transition from private to socialist industry compared to the
Soviet model
• Slow and orderly transfer from private to state ownership
– by 1956, 68% value of output by state owned enterprises (SOE) and 16% by jointly owned (stateprivate) enterprises
• Planning mechanisms, priorities and enterprise management are the same as Soviet
Union—5 year plan, the plan is the law
• Problems (poor quality, shortages, inefficiency, etc.)
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Political and Economical Turmoil
• Chinese econ development through the 1970’s was characterized by political and
econ turmoil:
– Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956-7)—a relatively liberal period of open
discussion of the econ and political system.
• Mao unhappy with the Communist Party leadership
• invites constructive criticism from intellectuals (open discussion and criticism of
the system)
• When the criticism came reveals deep hostility to the CCP
– Great Leap Forward (1958-1960)—an econ and social plan to use Chinese
population to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy
dominated by peasant farmers into a modern, industrialized communist
society.
• Was a period of massive resurgence of ideology that replaced rationality
• last vestiges of rural private property eliminated
• commune system established
– Agri was reorganized into massive communes of thousands of hhlds
• attempt to initiate rapid growth and industrialization; this goal was often pursued
in harsh way such as forcibly shifting farmers away from their land led to mass
starvation in the early 1960s.
• the plan did not achieve the intended results; economic disaster after years of
solid growth (economy collapses and does not recover to 1958 level until 1963)
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Mao stepped down as State Chairman of the PRC in 1959 but he retain Chairman of the Communist party.
The new State Chairman (Liu Shaoqu) and Deng Xiaoping (CCP General Secretary) were left in
charge to execute measures to achieve econ recovery.
Recovery from the Great Leap
•
Recovery from Great Leap emphasizes
–less focus on output growth and more on quality and efficiency
–more balanced economic development (not only heavy industry but agri)
–modernization of agriculture
–Decentralization (local decisions)
In addition to organizational changes and policy shifts, the 1960’s witnessed a wide spread
educational campaign. There was an effort to educate the population in the ways of Mao. This
campaign laid the foundations of the Cultural revolution.
The Cultural Revolution
•
Mao’s struggle to retake supreme leadership culminates in the Cultural Revolution
–peaks from 1966 to 1969
–Include domination of ideology; revolutionary class struggle continues, involving peasants class
–The Cultural revolution was an upheaval of ideas, an abandonment of much that had preceded it.
Put the Mao’s ideology as state ideology, to reeducate people in Mao’s ideology
–The Cultural revolution had a dramatic effect on China’s educated classes
•lost generation of leadership as universities closed and students sent to the countryside, students were sent to
hard industrial labor or labor in the countryside
•
No increase in GDP from 1965 to 1970
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The early 1970’s was a period of recovery from the events of the cultural revolution.
However, there were some events that pointed to:
The End of the Stalinist Period
• Mao die in Sept. 1976
• Gang of Four Trial, Oct. 1976
– Mao’s wife and three others on the left tried to sustain the Cultural revolution,
arrested and discredited
– political maneuverings end in 1978 with rise of Deng Xiaoping
• By Chairman Mao's death in 1976, the Chinese economy was isolationist and
stagnant and Chinese material living standards had failed to improve (though
extreme poverty and starvation was reduced, and average life expectancy had
increased dramatically).
– Inefficient farming communes (Most Chinese lived on inefficient farming
communes)
– state monopoly (Industrialization had mostly affected the cities, and the state held a
virtual monopoly)
– Inefficient state-owned factories (Inefficient state-owned factories relied on direct
state funding and produced shoddy products, and turned over all their profits to the
state; State banks were created to help finance state expenditures)
– Private ownership and incentive was virtually nonexistent.
• reform period begins
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II. Transition in China
1.
•
•
The Era of Reform: 1978
– More than two decades of stability and stellar growth
– Steady decentralization
– Combination of reform and transition
• “dual-track approach”
Dual Track Reform
Coexistence of a plan track and a market track
– Eventually the planned economy with its targets/quotas and fixed prices
would be dismantled but unlike in the former SU, it did not happened
suddenly and did not lead to an econ collapse.
Two phases
– 1978-1984:
•
•
•
–
liberalization of agriculture in an effort to increase agri production, the gov’t
restructured the agri
creation of township and village enterprises (TVE) or rural firms, who were
allowed to compete with the state firms (collectively owned enterprises, on
hard budget constraints)
spontaneous privatization of service sector
1984: dual-track applied to industry
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Dual Track in Agriculture: Household Responsibility System (HRS)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
In 1978, a village in central province (Anhui) initiated HRS. It soon gained popularity and
thus official endorsement in 1981.
– Xiaoping emphasized that state firms and government agencies should be led by those
who have some expertise, not by those who showed proper revolutionary fervor.
Covered 98% of rural population within 3 years.
Communes disbanded.
Household is a principal unit of agricultural production.
Land distributed to households as 15 year leases (after 1995, for 30 y)
Lease holders required to produce a planned allotment at planned (fixed) prices, but free to
produce and market any amount beyond planned allotment.
– The production decisions and profits were transferred from the commune to the
household. When the HRS was introduced, the collectivization was effectively brought
to an end
91% of agricultural output planned in 1978, only 5% in 1993
Semi-ownership of land caused increase in labor productivity which released labor into
small-scale entrepreneurship, e.g. crafts, services
Released labor into township and village enterprises (TVE)
– Light industry
– free to make decisions, no plan targets, to sell at mkt prices, own employment
practices
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China began its reforms with complete state ownership of industry, transportation and
commerce. Reforms began with changes in ownership relationships in agri and
small-scale trade, manufacturing and services. State ownership is a main feature
of mkt socialism
Dual-Track in Industrial Ownership Structure
• Old track state owned enterprises (SOE) vs new track non-SOEs
• Two types of new track ownership structures
– Township & Village Enterprises (TVEs) and purely private
• Mostly in small and medium industries—retail, textile, restaurants
– Most dynamic sector of the economy
• Owned or supervised by townships or villages (not state-owned)
• Can be collective enterprises, private firms, joint ventures.
• TVEs formally owned &controlled by villages &local communities
– in most TVEs, communities actually involved very little in operation of the enterprises,
TVEs act essentially as private firms
• Introduction of more competition
– Small family firms were encourage to compete
– State firms were encourage to compete with each other, and new types of firms were
allowed to compete in formerly monopolistic sectors.
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• SOEs are unprofitable and a major drain on the state budget (1985-10%
unprofitable, 1990-28%, 1995-50%)
• Most of the growth in China in non-state sector
• SOEs persist for two main reasons
– SOEs represent “commanding heights”
• State ownership of heavy industry
– SOEs employ 18% of the work force
• SOE reform
– in 1995 China initiated the “modern enterprise system,” which aimed to transform the
SOEs into modern corporations;
– Instead of privatization occurring, the form of state ownership itself was to be
transformed from direct state supervision and management to state “shareholding”
operated by “independent” managers backed a the state asset-management commission
& supervisory committee. State-owned enterprises (SOE) were to be “corporatized”;
• “corporatized” firms are SOE where the state maintains majority ownership but the
management is independent.
– SOE were given improved managerial incentives, allowed to keep much of
their own profits for reinvestment and worker bonuses, and forced to rely on
loans from state banks rather than direct government grants.
• Eventually, the planned economy, with its quotas and its fixed prices, would be
dismantled, but unlike in the former Soviet Union it did not happen suddenly and
did not lead to an economic collapse.
– Gradually abolition of planned economy
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Dual-Track Regional Development
• Certain places (mostly coastal) targeted for faster transition
• Begins in 1980 when four southern coastal sites were designated Special
Economic Zones (SEZ)--Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Zhuhai, Hainan Island
added in 1988
• Twenty cities subsequently approved as Economic and Technological
Development Districts (ETDD)
• SEZs&ETDDs exempted from most controls on foreign investment and private
ownership that bring investments, foreign technology and mkt access.
• Result is much faster growth, especially in non-state sector
• Regional disparities a major problem
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Economic Growth
Nation Guangdong Fujian Zhejiang Jiangsu Shangdong
Average annual growth
SOEgrowth
TVEgrowth
Foreign and joint ventures
9.3%
19.7%
10.1
19.5
58.6
17.3%
9.5
19.6
50
18.9%
9
24
38.6
16.4%
9.1
17.8
42.3
16.3%
9.2
18.5
37.3
16
•
International trade—open door policy
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–
–
China opened to the world, tourism was allowed, students to study abroad, the
special econ zones were established to bring in foreign technology, investment and
mkt access.
International contacts between people
•
officials, tourists, students, scholars, etc.
Foreign trade and investment, especially in Special Economic Zones.
2. Sources of Growth
a) Initial conditions
–
in 1978, most labor (71%) agricultural
• marginal productivity was very low
• agricultural reforms caused large rise in productivity and encouraged
formation of TVEs and private enterprises (agrofood process, light
industry) from the freed-up labor
• movement of low-productivity labor into higher productivity TVEs is the
major source of growth
• opposite of Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe where most labor
was in SOEs which collapsed with transition
–
very little was planned in China at start of reform compared to Soviet Union
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b) Integration into global economy
–
exports gave ready employment for freed up agricultural labor in labor
intensive production in TVEs
–
allowed China to import modern technology
–
encouraged foreign direct investment which increased capital stock, access
to modern technology, and efficient western management
• FDI—investment by foreign investor in the form of acquiring substantial shares in
domestic companies
c) High saving rate
–
Chinese saving rate high even by Asian standards (China--23% of
disposable income, Japan: 21%, Taiwan: 18%, Germany: 13%, US: 8%)
d) Centralized control discredited
–
Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution were disasters obvious to
everyone
–
allowed Deng Xiaoping to institute reforms without much resistance
e) China is the largest recipient of foreign investment in Asia.
–
Huge investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese (labor intensive
industries which were losing comparative advantage in Hong Kong and Taiwan
moved to mainland China)
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3) The Chinese Economic System
•
•
•
Large state enterprises are state owned, while agri & small-scale businesses are private
No “standardized “rule of law” in the form of civil or common law, the supreme law comes
from the authority of the communist party & of top government officials, whose word is
above the formal law or regulations.
China is considered mkt socialism b/c has the 2 main features: state ownership and mkt
allocation
a) Corporate Governance and Property Rights
– The formal property rights are weak. These property rights are guaranteed by an implicit
contract with state or party authorities, who agree to exercise the property rights.
• business cannot turn to legal system to enforce contracts
– Chinese contracts are primarily regulated by relational contracting rather than the rule of
the law.
– the ultimate guarantor for property rights is the Chinese Communist party
– 2007 (March) new property law adopted.
• The law covers the creation, transfer, and ownership of property, and is a part of the
ongoing effort to gradually develop a civil code. Hu Jintao (President and
Communist Party Leader, 2002) and Wen Jiabao (Prime Minister, 2003) have taken
a centrist position, protecting property rights for the rising middle class and farmers,
while promoting a "harmonious society" that strives to distribute wealth more
equitably, to increase social expenditures on health and education, and to alleviate
some of the excesses of pollution and corruption that have accompanied rapid
growth.
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b) Capital Markets resembles the capital mkts in Europe and other parts of Asia in that:
– Companies receive funding thru banks, not thru stock markets
– Commercial banks are the major source of financing for Chinese companies;
• as a consequence of relying on bank loans, Chinese companies operate w/ high debt
burdens.
– Banking system
•
•
Near monopoly of state on banking till 1983.
Banking system consists of the Central bank (PBOC) and big 4 state-owned
commercial banks--Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial bank of China,
Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction bank.
– Before 1983, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) assumed all the functions of regulation and
had control of all banking business. However, in 1983, four specialized banks were
established to take over the banking business from PBOC, allowing PBOC to focus on
regulation and monetary policy. The big four remained as specialized banks until 1994
when three policy banks were established to take over the policy-directed lending
functions—China Development bank, Export and Import bank of China, Agricultural
Development bank of China.
• Through the early reform period banks remained property of the state and gave loans
under the direction of gov’t and party officials, giving preferences to state
enterprises.
•
Interest rates are regulated on loan and deposit
•
savings channeled to inefficient capital formation in SOEs
20
• as a consequence of state direction of credits, China’s commercial banks have a high
ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs)
– are loans that are not being served w/ interest and principal payments and will
be probably not be repaid.
– Chinese banks face a major bad loan problem, bank staff is relatively
inexperienced, need to reform.
–
Gradual reform of banking system
•
Establishing of various kinds of banks
–
•
Development and implementation of market-oriented banking system
–
–
•
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In the banking business, the four state-owned commercial banks, namely, ICBC, CCB,
BOC and ABC are still the biggest players though their dominance is in gradual
decline. At the end of 2007, the Big Four accounted for 50% of China’s total banking
assets. Another important type of banking institutions is the 13 joint-stock commercial
banks, including Bank of Communications and China Merchant Bank. Currently, jointstock commercial banks are the most dynamic in China’s banking sector. Their asset
expansion is double the pace of the Big Four. By the end of 2007, their market share
had increased to 18% from 14% at the end of 2003.
accounting standards for the banks.
Liberalization of interest rates. Market-based interest rate reform is intended to establish the pricing
mechanism of the deposit and lending rates based on mkt ss and dd. The central bank would
continue to adjust and guide the interest rate development, which allows the market mechanism to
play a dominant role in financial resource allocation.
With Chinese membership to WTO, domestic banks must compete with foreign
banks, and the foreign banks have the same rights as domestic banks.
In 1992 funds raised through sale of new stock and bonds has accounted only for21b/w
2-14% of a total financing, in 2001-equity mkt finance was only 8% of total
d) Privatization of smaller state owned companies
–
China has allowed the private sector to grow but in core areas as state banking and
other “commanding heights” industries (transportation) the state wishes to maintain
control
–
SOEs continue to be a huge drain on economy
•
There is no too much evidence that restructuring of SOE has improved
performance; the productivity has fallen.
e) Agriculture
–
incomplete ownership of land
–
disincentive to improve land
•
reduces potential productivity of land
f) Trade relations
– joining WTO—12/01
– trade relations with the US (MFN status), EU, Taiwan, and other Asian countries
g) International finance
– In July of 2005 China abandoned the Yuan peg with the US$ and linked its currency to a
basket of currencies.
– The nation’s long-term goal is to make the full convertibility currency gradually
• The Chiness currency is convertible on the current account (trade) but it is only
partly convertible on capital account (FDI and portfolio)
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h) Social safety net
–
not as immediate need as in other transitional economies
•
•
•
–
rural population to large extent self-sufficient
continued support of SOEs reduces urban unemployment
lack of political reform prevents the poor from having a voice
the state establishes a system of social insurance, social assistance and
medical care
•
•
–
the state enterprises are suppose to pay a soc sec tax =20% of their payroll plus another 8%
for health and unemployment insurance;
China is also experimenting w/ privatized soc sec accounts
The state system covers primarily employees in urban state enterprises and
excludes those out of the labor force and those living in the countryside
•
•
–
–
–
–
the state system covers less than 20% of the population.
The privatized soc sec accounts are meant to cover the remainder
as SOEs privatized, unemployment will soar
rural population has much lower income and access to health care
high rate of savings and self- reliance and family support
the dramatic rise in inequality
•
•
–
Chinese mkt reforms have changed the income distribution dramatically, lead to increase in
inequality; it is exactly what would be expected from the move to private enterprises.
Now the income distribution is similar to other relatively poor Asian countries and the US
– Gini Coefficient, China 0.40, USA 0.40, India 0.38.
Human Capital Investment
•
•
•
Difference between rural and urban
Difference between developed and under-developed area
They are both potential source of inequality
23
Per Capita Income 1978 - 2001 (in RMB yuan)
7000
6860
6280
6000
5854
5425.1
5160.3
5000
4838.9
4283
4000
3496.2
3000
2577.4
2026.6
2000
1000
0
2366
2210.32253
2162
2090.1
1926.1
343.4
133.6
477.6
1700.6
1577.7
1510.2
1375.7
1221
1181.4
1002.2
921.6
899.6
784
739.1
686.3 708.6
544.9 601.5
397.6 423.8 462.6
191.3
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 200024
2001
rural
urban
Yucai Schools (Urban)
25
Poor Village Schools
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i) Regional policy
– By 1993 more than 9,000 zones had been created, leading to substantial
growth of foreign investment by foreign enterprises bringing in new
technology, services and increasing competitiveness.
– most growth from Special Economic Zones and Development Areas
– huge income differential between coastal and interior provinces (4-5 times)
j) Population policy
– To control the huge population of 1.3 billion, “one child” policy (more than
2 decades old policy) restricts urban couples to only one child, while
allowing rural couples to have a second child if the first one is a girl.
– slowing population growth
– slowing/preventing migration to cities
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4) Transition in China—Summary
– Strategy
• From central planning to indicative planning
– Allowed plan and market to exist together
• From indicative planning to market allocation of goods and services
• Grow out of the plan” instead of ``shock therapy”
• Transition and growth at the same time
– Transition
• In converting its planned econ to a market econ, China faced 2 principal
challenges:
– Replacement of administrative allocation by market allocation
– Replacement of administered prices by market prices
• To achieve this objective China used the dual track approach, which
established autonomy and incentive.
• Reforms began smoothly and econ growth accelerated
• Nobody was made obviously worse and opponents were bought off (Pareto
Improvement)
• Interdependence between SOE & non-state sector
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The dual-track system of prices introduced in the mid-1980s to facilitate the transition of
China from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy has essentially been phased out,
reducing to a single-track, market-based system, with the following exceptions:
In 2001/07, the remaining planned prices are to be abolished with the exception of: the
prices of natural gas, oil, edible oils, grains, tobacco, water, salt, and products related to
national security
Phasing Out the Dual-Track
(percent of output value, selected years)
Plan
price
Guide
price
Market
price
1978
1985
1988
1991
1993
1995
1998
1999
2001
94.4
37.0
24.0
22.2
10.4
17.0
9.1
6.7
2.7
0.0
23.0
19.0
20.0
2.1
4.4
7.1
2.9
3.4
5.6
40.0
57.0
57.8
87.5
78.6
83.8
90.4
93.9
Source: Price Yearbook of China (various years)
"Guide prices" are government-administered prices, but with reference to market supply and demand
29
• China’s market transition is incomplete but in some sense successful up until
now
• Gradualism continues to guide experiments in advancing reforms
• Chinese reforms differ in form and consequences from the approach taken in
the CEE. China avoided the sharp contraction of output, surging inflation
and elevated unemployment that characterized transition in all CEE.
• Chinese growth accelerated with the reform. Employment grew. Agriculture
in China was dominant, while the CEE were industrial economies.
• The main point of difference is the relative pace of political and econ
reform.
• In CEE political occurred rapidly and ran ahead of econ reform. In China the
reverse—econ reform evolved much more rapidly than political reform
30