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Launch Forum: Regional Impact of the Global Economic Crisis Yerevan, 8 July 2009 Development and Transition newsletter Published three times annually by UNDP, London School of Economics Distributed to: – All UNDP staff in Europe, Central Asia region – 3000-plus external subscribers Goals: – Provide UNDP, independent views on development, transition issues in the region – Disseminate lessons of successful UNDP projects Current issue: Regional impact of global economic crisis Presentation goals Focus on some key economic policy issues that are: – Explored in the newsletter – Not covered by the other presentations – Relevant for Armenia These are: – Lessons from the Baltic economies’ collapse (Rainer Kattel) – Eurozone expansion? (Anders Åslund) – Banking nationalisation (Anja Shortland) “Baltic conundrum”—The Baltic states: Did “a lot of things right” . . . . . . But still became region’s worst crisis victims (along with Ukraine) – Large declines in GDP, incomes, employment – Much development progress lost – No end to the crisis in sight Realistically, it’s not clear that Baltic policy makers could/should have done something different—even ex post Conclusion: “Black swans” can be deadly “Baltic model”: Some similarities with Armenia Macro characteristics: – Relatively small state sectors Small role of state redistribution – Privatisation to foreign investors (including banks) – Currency-board/hard-peg exchange rates Micro characteristics—Liberal approach to: – Tax systems (flat tax pioneers) – Labour market regulation – Social protection systems Structural characteristics—Very small, open, transition economies: – Small domestic savings pools—FDI needed – Weak diversification prospects Structural comparison (2008 data) Population 4 Opennness 3 2 1 0 In mlns Estonia Lithuania Latvia Armenia 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% (X+M) GDP Pre-crisis performance: Good on GDP growth . . . 5.7% 6% 3% 2.2% 1.3% 2.4% 0.7% 0% EU NMS Average annual GDP growth 2005-2008 0% Latvia Lithuania Estonia % points above NMS average . . . And employment 1.9% 2% 2% 1.4% 1.5% 0.8% 0.5% 0% EU NMS 0% Average annual employment growth 2005-2007 Latvia Estonia Lithuania % point difference from NMS average Reforms did not hurt state finances . . . 50% 47% Spending Balance 41% 36% 40% 35% 34% 30% 20% 10% 1.8% 0% -2.2% -1.9% -0.9% -1.1% -10% EU NMS Latvia Estonia Lithuania General government budget (% of GDP), annual averages for 2002-2007 period. Eurostat data. . . . Or produce large public debts 60% 59% 31% 17% 10% 4% 0% EU NMS Lithuania Latvia General government debt, % of GDP, 2007. Eurostat data. Estonia Crisis hits Baltics first (in 2008) . . . 15% 2007 2009 7.9% 8.1% 5.6% 10.0% 6.3% 8.0% 13.8% 2008 3.0% 6.8% 4.7% 2.1% 1.1% 0% -4.6% -3.6% -8.0% -10.0% -15% -12.0% Latvia Estonia -5.1% -6.0% -5.0% -10.0% Lithuania Ukraine Russia Turkey Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009 Armenia . . . And deepens in 2009:Q1 0% -6% -6% -7% -6% -10% -5% -2.5% -4.5% -9% -12% -15%-14% -20% -25% -19% UKR LAT EST TUR LIT RUS SLO MOL ARM GEO SVK HUN EU Change relative to 2008:Q1. Sources: Eurostat, CIS Statistical Committee, national statistical offices, JPMorgan, press reports. US Unemployment: Baltics hit hard here, too 400 Numbers of unemployed (LFS data), June 2008 = 100 Lithuania 300 Estonia Latvia EU-12* Cyprus 200 EU-27 * Romania not included m 04 20 09 m 02 20 09 m 12 20 08 m 10 20 08 m 08 08 20 20 08 m 06 100 Source: Eurostat Cause: Rapid growth in private sector foreign debt 140% Estonia Latvia Lithuania 126% 98% 104% 114% 112% 119% 77% 78% 62% 59% 45% 30% 0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ratio of gross foreign debt to GDP. EIU data, UNDP calculations. Large current account deficits financed by parent banks Baltic banks: – Privatised in 1990s to Scandinavian banks – Benefitted from parents’: Financing of rapid credit growth Corporate governance Credit growth aided by: – Fixed exchange rates – EU accession (“free movement of capital”) Did competitiveness suffer? Effective unit labour cost trends 100% 98% 87% Nominal depreciation since mid-2008 boosts competitiveness 68% 67% 59% 48% 0% Latvia Poland Czech Estonia EU-10 Lithuania Changes in annual average effective unit labour costs, 2004-2008. Sources: Eurostat, Oxford Analytica; UNDP calculations. “Baltic conundrum”—Currency boards, EU membership: Preclude use of discretionary monetary, exchange rate policies Leave financial system open to “hot money” May cause competitiveness problems Place entire burden of macro adjustment on fiscal policy . . . – . . . But discretion here limited by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact . . . – . . . And fiscal space is in any case limited Causes of “Baltic conundrum” Small, open economies + European integration – Extensive Euroisation – Balance sheet mismatches Small savings pools + large modernisation needs (e.g., for competitiveness on single market) large capital inflows Baltic states could raise capital on markets very easily until 2008 – Cheaper than borrowing from IFIs – Access to post-accession EU funds further reduced cost of capital What could have been done? Capital controls? – Not compatible with EU membership Tighter fiscal policies? – Baltic fiscal policies already tightest in EU – High economic costs in terms of foregone output, employment, poverty reduction – High political costs Unilateral Euro adoption? – This would help with balance sheets . . . – . . . But it would not: create more fiscal space be permitted by European Central Bank What should be done now? Things that must be done by EC, ECB: – Euro adoption Åslund: ECB should have a change of heart (and not only for the Baltics . . . ) – Expansion of fiscal transfers to reduce intra-EU productivity disparities Towards a “federal European economy” Things that could be done nationally: – “Vienna process” to prevent spread of financial contagion from subsidiary to parent banks – Further reforms of labour market, social policy, to reduce nominal wages (rather than employment) Implications for Armenia Structural similarities: – Small, open, transition economies – Current account deficits – Private banking system Key differences—Armenia: – Banks, formal economy not as dollarised – Forex-denominated private sector foreign debt is small – Result: Armenia can devalue without ruinous balance sheet effects Bank nationalisation (Shortland) Many private banks have been bailed out, or nationalised, during the crisis – Both in developed countries and emerging markets – Counter-argument to “Washington consensus” “Socialism for the rich” Large emerging market data set shows state-owned bank performance is not inferior to private banks’ Reason: In emerging markets, it may be harder for the state to regulate private banks than it is to own, manage them directly Conclusion: “It’s OK to nationalise your banks” Is Sberbank the answer? Baltic, Armenian experience suggests not Armenia: Effective regulation of private banks is possible— even during crisis Baltics: – “Vienna process” reduces capital flight – Only one major bank nationalisation (Parex Bank, Latvia) Other countries: – Nationalisation: Better than bailouts (moral hazard)? – Post-crisis prospects for privatisation? Launch Forum: Regional Impact of the Global Economic Crisis Yerevan, 8 July 2009