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Ageing paranoia: its fictional basis and all too real costs Jane O’Sullivan Fenner Conference 2013 – Population, Resources and Climate Change. AAS 10-11 October 2013 Ageing is the main excuse for maintaining population growth • Population growth is a policy variable (a choice). • A significant shift in policy in the past 20 years: • High fertility nations have reduced family planning. • Low fertility nations have resisted stabilisation. • A consequent resurgence in global population growth. Global population won’t peak unless nations embrace stabilisation or descent. Population Projections 2012 Revision 2012UNUN Population Projections 18 World Population (billions) 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year 2040 2060 2080 2100 Population Projections 2010 and 2012 2012 UN UN Population Projections 18 High 15.8 16.6 billion World Population (billions) 16 14 12 Medium 10.1 10.9 billion 10 8 Low 6.1 6.8 billion 6 4 2 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year 2040 2060 2080 2100 Population Projections 2010 and 2012 2012UNUN Population Projections Constant Fertility 28.6 billion 18 High 15.8 16.6 billion World Population (billions) 16 14 12 Medium 10.1 10.9 billion 10 8 Low 6.1 6.8 billion 6 4 2 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 Year 2040 2060 2080 2100 UN Population Projections 2010 and 2012 Projections are blind to carrying capacity 18 World Population (billions) High 15.8 16.6 billion Resource Constraints? 16 14 12 Medium 10.1 10.9 billion 10 8 Low 6.1 6.8 billion 6 4 2 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 YearEarth Support”: 7-12 billion is “the zone” Joel Cohen “How Many People can the “If most people would 2012prefer Estimatea decline in birth rates to a rise in death rates, then they Estimate a decline in fertility while time remains to realize that choice.” should take actions2010 to support Annual UNIncrement of2010 Population Population Projections and 2012 Annual Increment of Population (millions) 120 Constant Fertility Projection 100 80 60 Recent estimates from Population Reference Bureau Medium Projection 40 20 0 1990 2000 2010 Year 2020 2030 Press briefing upon publication of UN’s “World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision” “…Most of this increase is due to changes in our estimates of current fertility for several high-fertility countries … “Our medium-variant projection continues to assume a rapid fall in future levels of fertility for these countries. We continue to calibrate the pace of future fertility decline using the historical experience of countries that underwent a major reduction of fertility levels after 1950, in an era of modern contraception. The medium‐variant projection is thus an expression of what should be possible … “… [it] could require additional substantial efforts to make it possible.” John Wilmoth, Head of Population Division, UNDESA Fertility reduction in response to population-focused family planning programs 8 TFR (births per woman) 7 6 5 Least developed countries Less developed excl. China Maldives Iran Viet Nam Thailand Mauritius South Korea 4 3 2 1 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Typical fertility reduction of 2-3 units per decade in the first two decades. (UN projection assumes 1 unit per decade.) UN Survey of Population Policy 2011 Population growth and Government opinion of it Old age dependency and Govt concern 40 Japan South Sudan Jordan 4 Liberia Niger Germany Italy 30 Angola Burundi Uganda Eritrea Greece Sweden Latvia Portugal Bulgaria Austria Croatia Estonia Belgium France Finland Denmark United Kingdom Spain Switzerland Hungary Slovenia Somalia Singapore Gabon Israel Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Tajikistan Guinea-Bissau Oman Luxembourg 2 Saudi Arabia Bahamas Maldives Panama Australia Monaco Lebanon Ecuador Mongolia Cyprus Spain Canada Cook Islands CzechItaly Republic Palau Slovenia 0 Benin Malawi Congo Burkina Faso Madagascar Zambia Rwanda Senegal Mauritania Nigeria Ethiopia Kenya Afghanistan Mozambique Togo Cameroon Comoros Guinea Belize Ghana Guatemala Iraq Yemen Sudan Vanuatu Austria Uruguay Thailand Slovakia Portugal Greece TFYR Macedonia Japan Poland Cuba Hungary Germany Romania Croatia Armenia Belarus Georgia Estonia Ukraine Costa Rica Swaziland Libya Colombia Namibia Ireland Saint Lucia Iceland South Africa Uzbekistan Turkey Mexico Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan Tunisia Norway Switzerland Kazakhstan New Zealand Peru Suriname Morocco Botswana Chile Brazil Seychelles Fiji Argentina Lesotho Belgium Sri Lanka Liechtenstein Sweden San Marino Myanmar Samoa Guyana China Tonga France Denmark Malta ElBarbados Salvador Finland Jamaica Netherlands Cape Verde Grenada Mauritius Dominica Montenegro Honduras Bhutan Pakistan Paraguay Malaysia Algeria Cote dIvoire Philippines Egypt Timor-Leste Kiribati Cambodia Djibouti Indonesia India Haiti Nicaragua Nepal Bangladesh Viet Nam United Kingdom Zimbabwe Tuvalu Holy See Old Age Dependency Ratio (65+ / 15to64years) Population Growth Rate (% p.a.) 2005-2010 Mali Chad Gambia 20 Argentina Netherlands Norway Ukraine Lithuania Czech Republic Uruguay Romania Georgia Malta Luxembourg Canada Australia Serbia Belarus Poland Montenegro Cuba Slovakia Ireland Israel TFYRCyprus Macedonia Albania Armenia Barbados New Zealand Iceland Seychelles Turkey Tonga Tunisia Suriname Ecuador 10 South Sudan Kiribati Cameroon Djibouti Liberia Sudan Somalia Niger Comoros Yemen Sierra Leone Nauru Albania Samoa Egypt Nepal Guatemala Cambodia Maldives Indonesia Nicaragua Haiti Morocco Myanmar Lesotho Honduras Pakistan Malaysia Algeria Libya Bhutan Vanuatu Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Ethiopia Congo Timor-Leste Turkmenistan Philippines Iraq Malawi Solomon Guinea Namibia Senegal Swaziland MaliIslands Botswana Mauritania Jordan Mongolia Tajikistan Guinea-Bissau Zambia Chad Nigeria TogoFaso Gambia Angola Burkina Kenya Burundi Saudi Arabia Afghanistan Eritrea Oman Kuwait Bahrain Chile Saint Lucia Lebanon Jamaica Thailand Singapore SriChina Lanka ElGrenada Salvador Mauritius Panama Brazil Bahamas Kazakhstan Gabon Costa Rica Peru Mexico Viet Nam Cape Verde Colombia Paraguay Azerbaijan South Africa India Fiji Zimbabwe Bangladesh Belize Mozambique Ghana Cote dIvoire Guyana Benin Madagascar Uganda Rwanda Qatar Serbia Bulgaria 0 Andorra Latvia Lithuania -2 Low Satisfactory High Government's opinion of population growth No Issue Minor Concern Major Concern Government's level of concern about ageing International support for family planning has fallen Basic Research HIV/AIDS Basic Reproductive Health Services Family Planning Services Allocation of international funding for “Population Assistance” from S.W. Sinding 2009. Population Poverty and Economic Development. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 2009 364, 3023-3030. Fertility rebound in developed countries from: Myrskyla et al. 2009 “Advances in development reverse fertility declines” Ageing is an inevitability of the demographic transition from: Productivity Commission 2005: “Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia” Population growth only partly delays ageing 30 30 TFR=2, NOM=0 20 10 10 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 100 80 20 0 2050 100 80 “Real” dependency ratio?: (<20 & >70) / 20-70 60 60 40 Dependency Ratio: (<15 & >65) / 15-65 40 20 Aged dependency: >65 / 15-65 20 0 1960 % over 65 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year 2020 2030 2040 Population (millions) TFR=2, NOM=220,000 0 1960 Proportion of dependents (%) 40 0 2050 Proportion of dependents (%) Population (millions) 40 The “3 Ps”: GDP = Population x Participation x Productivity Assumptions: • Natural resources don’t count. • Diluting, degrading and depleting them will not affect per capita wealth, because they are not in the model. • Job seekers create jobs. • The size of the economy will be proportional to the number of working age people. • The 3 factors are independent. • Population growth will not reduce participation (competition for jobs) or productivity (competition for resources and markets). • Growth rate costs nothing. • The infrastructure, equipment and professional personnel that added people need will be created without penalty. Self-affirming factorisation: • The “Kaya formula” for global emissions is another example: Emissions = Population x GDP/person x Energy Intensity of $ x Carbon intensity of energy Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Gt CO2e p.a.) 7 50 6 40 5 4 30 3 20 Emissions (IPCC) Population (UN) 10 2 1 0 0 1970 1980 1990 Year 2000 2010 Global Population (Billions) 8 60 The first “P”: Population - but wealth is a per capita thing! GDP versus Per Capita GDP • Did population growth help Australia avoid the GFC? 2.0 Population growth rate % annualised per cent change 1.5 % change in GDP per Quarter 1.0 0.5 0.0 % change in GDP per capita per Quarter -0.5 2004 2006 2008 Date 2010 2012 • Negative per capita growth for >4 quarters – made deeper by population % change in GDP in each Quarter growth. % change in GDP per capita in Quarter Population growth rate (annualised percentage) • Population growth delinks GDP from wealth. So, does population growth increase participation or productivity? • The ageing argument: keep the proportion of working age people high. • Productivity Commission 2011 • “Plausible increases in fertility and net migration would have little impact on ageing trends.” • “any effect would be short lived. This is because immigrants themselves age” • “to maintain the age structure of 2003-04 in 2044-45, annual migration during that period would need to be above 3 per cent of Australia’s population, leading to a population of over 100 million by the middle of this century” • Sustainable Australia Report 2013: • “every 50,000 new migrants have roughly half the impact on ageing trends than the previous 50,000.” Models show ageing will reduce participation Productivity Commission (2005) “Economic Implications of an ageing Australia” The unemployed are unlikely to take up the slack because: “Unemployed people and people outside the labour force are generally different from the employed in skill, motivation and aptitude.” The real world experiment • Is the proportion of people employed by the supply of people of 2D governed Graph 2 working age, or by the supply of work? % employed of total population 56 54 52 NORWAY CANADA AUSTRALIA JAPAN DENMARK SWEDEN GERMANY UK 50 48 USA FINLAND 46 44 FRANCE 42 40 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 Old age dependency ratio (%65+/15to64yrs) • There is no correlation between ageing and proportion of people employed. The real world experiment • Is the proportion of people employed governed by the supply of people 2D Graph 2 of working age, or by the supply of work? % employed FTE of total population 56 54 52 50 48 NORWAY CANADA 46 AUSTRALIA SWEDEN DENMARK USA 44 FINLAND JAPAN GERMANY UK 42 FRANCE 40 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 Old age dependency ratio (%65+/15to64yrs) • The differences are even smaller when part-time work is considered. The real world experiment GNI per capita growth, % p.a. 2000-2010 Graph 2 • Does population growth increase 2D productivity? 2.0 SWEDEN 1.8 1.6 1.4 FINLAND GERMANY AUSTRALIA UK 1.2 DENMARK 1.0 CANADA NORWAY 0.8 JAPAN 0.6 USA FRANCE 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 Population growth rate, % p.a. 2000-2010 • There is no trend among nations, nor among municipalities (USA). Are we measuring productivity decline as GDP growth? • Density diseconomies: Infrastructure Australia (2011) • “The cost of providing new infrastructure is rising faster than the rate of inflation — in part, because costlier construction options, such as tunnelling for new roads, now need to be adopted in the large cities.” • Unremunerated costs of labour: Grattan Institute (2013): • on the perimeters of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, more than 90 per cent of jobs are at least an hour away on public transport. • Residential housing debt tripled since 2003. What about wealth distribution? 2D Graph 2 • Does a growing workforce create more opportunities for the needy? Lowest quintile % share of income 11 JAPAN 10 FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN 9 GERMANY DENMARK 8 CANADA 7 FRANCE UK 6 AUSTRALIA USA 5 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 Old Age Dependency Ratio (%65+/15to64yrs) • The most youthful nations have the poorest poor. • “Because immigration makes labour more abundant relative to the existing stock of capital and land, it tends to increase the returns to the latter at the expense of labour.” – Productivity Commission 2011 What about wealth distribution? 2D Graph 2 • The GINI coefficient measures inequality of income: 0.42 USA 0.40 GINI coefficient 0.38 0.36 UK AUSTRALIA 0.34 FRANCE CANADA 0.32 0.30 GERMANY 0.28 FINLAND 0.26 NORWAY 0.24 DENMARKSWEDEN JAPAN 0.22 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 Old Age Dependency Ratio (%65+/15to64yrs) • Greater inequality is associated with worse physical health, mental health, drug abuse, education, imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, trust and community life, violence, teenage pregnancies, and child well-being (Wilkinson & Pickett, “The Spirit Level” 2009) What about Pensions and Health Care Costs? • If the labour market is oversupplied, pensions only replace unemployment and disability benefits. • Raising the pension age by 3-5 years negates change in working age proportion. … but is not needed if labour supply holds up. • The worst trends for retirement funding are housing inflation and casualised work. … a generational time-bomb imposed by population growth. Can population growth offset Health Care Costs? • Most increase in health costs is due to changing treatment technologies and expectations. • Cost is related more to proximity to death than to age. • Proportion of adults with <15 years life expectancy in creases at half the rate of old-age dependency. • Proportion of adults with disabilities increases even less. • However, death rate will increase with ageing – only partly offset by population growth. • Why is expanding construction regarded as economic boom, but expanding health care regarded as a burden? Remeasuring Ageing Remeasuring Ageing 1.0 0.8 Old Age Dependency: 65+ / 15-to-64 Adults with <15 years Life Expectancy / > 15 years Adults with disability / able adults Ratio 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2005-10 2025-30 2045-50 USA 2005-10. 2025-30. 2045-50. Japan Data from Sanderson & Sherbov, “Remeasuring Ageing” Science 329:1287-1288, October 2010. What about the cost of growth rate? • A higher population growth rate means a greater proportion of total economic activity dedicated to expanding infrastructure, equipment and skills. • For each 1% p.a. population growth, around 7-10% of GDP is needed for expansion. • Govt infrastructure spending has been around 1.85% of GDP per 1% p.a. growth. • The increased burden is proportional to the lifespan of the assets to be multiplied. • If infrastructure lasts 50 years, maintenance requires creation of 2% of the stock per year. 2% population growth doubles this burden. • This is an “opportunity cost” – income that would otherwise be available for wellbeing of existing people. Cost of ageing vs. growth • Difference in all age-related costs between stabilising around 25 million (IGR1) and “Big Australia” projection (IGR3) is 1% of GDP by 2050. • Public Infrastructure cost of growth has historically been around 2.6% of GDP (1.85% per 1% population growth) but is currently over 3.3% an rising. (Not included in the IGRs.) • Expect energy and materials costs to outpace inflation. • More than doubles the cost of decarbonising the economy. • Loss of biodiversity, food and water security, public amenity and quality of life. Dependency Ratio A: Gross National Income (GNI) distributed per capita to age categories Young Young Young Young Old Old Old Old Working age Working age Uganda Australia Working age European Union Working age Japan B: Inclusion of capacity expansion (on behalf of the not-yet-added) to distribution of GNI Not yet added Young Not yet added Young Old Not yet added Young Young Old Old Old Working age Working age Working age Working age Uganda Australia European Union Japan 3.3% p.a. 1.5% p.a. 0.3% p.a. -0.1% p.a. Dependency Ratio A: Gross National Income (GNI) distributed per capita to age categories Young Young Young Young Old Old Old Old Working age Working age Uganda Australia Working age European Union Working age Japan B: Inclusion of capacity expansion (on behalf of the not-yet-added) to distribution of GNI Not yet added Young Not yet added Young Old Not yet added Young Young Old Old Old Working age Working age Working age Working age Uganda Australia European Union Japan 3.3% p.a. 1.5% p.a. 0.3% p.a. -0.1% p.a. Depopulation Dividends German perspectives (Kluge et al. 2013): • Smarter? - greater proportion with higher ed. • Cleaner? - fewer greenhouse gases. • Richer? - concentration of inheritance. • Healthier? - greater proportion of life in wellness. • Happier? - more leisure in the life cycle. In summary: Population growth • Delinks GDP from wealth • Doesn’t strengthen workforce • Doesn’t increase productivity • Increases poverty and inequality • Diverts income from wellbeing to infrastructure creation • Reduces per capita resources • Increases climate change and biosphere impacts • Creates increasingly interdependent and brittle socioeconomic conditions. Remember the Millennium Bug? • Like ageing, the trigger conditions are inevitably reached. • But the dire consequences are conspicuous only by their absence. • In the mean time, we are turning our backs on real threats.