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AS & AD Account for price movements AGGREGATE DEMAND AND SUPPLY • So far, we have assumed for simplicity that in the short-run, general Price and Wage levels are fixed. • This means that changes in Demand lead to changes in real GDP, and not prices. • However, it is clear that prices and wages adjust over time, and that we have to relax the fixed-price assumption. • One way of looking at this is to derive Aggregate Supply and Demand curves, where real demand and supply (GDP) are related to the general price level • We can then see how changes to demand (from fiscal and monetary policy actions, etc) interact to produce changes in Real GDP and the price level. • This will be a first step towards looking at Inflation. CHANGING P AND MS/P • Suppose the general price level changes (and nothing else changes – i.e. ceteris paribus) • The immediate effect is that the Real Money Supply changes: • ms Ms/P so as P increases, real money supply (ms) decreases, assuming nominal money supply is (Ms) unchanged • A lower ms immediately implies an excess of md over ms , and thus a higher interest rate (r) • In turn this leads to a lower level of total demand for output (i.e. aggregate demand) because: Ip = Ia + b.r (b <0) • A graphical version: (note P2 > P1 > P0) CHANGES IN P AND AGGREGATE DEMAND • Effect of P on AD r LM2 LM1 LM0 r2 r1 r0 As P increases, real ms falls, r increases, AD falls 0 IS Y2 Y1 Y0 Y P P2 P1 P0 0 AD Y2 Y1 Y0 Y SLOPE OF IS-CURVE AND AD-CURVE r LM2 LM1 The IS-Curve shows how Y Responds to changes in r ISB is steeper than ISA Result: steeper ADB ISB 0 LM0 ISA Y P ADB 0 ADA Y AGGREGATE DEMAND SHIFTS • Monetary Policy: An expansion of Ms, leading to a real expansion of (Ms/P) will boost Aggregate Demand, via lower interest rates. This is depicted as a shift in the AD curve. • Later we will see that if there is an inflationary result, this will further lower the real interest rate (= nominal int rate minus inflation) • Fiscal Policy: an increase in G or a reduction in T (fiscal stimulus) will increase AD at any given interest rate and price level: again a shift in the AD curve. • We can illustrate these diagrammatically: MONETARY EXPANSION AND AD-SHIFT • Effect of Ms on AD r As Ms increases, real ms increases, r falls, AD increases (shifts up) LM1 LM2 r0 r1 r2 0 P assumed constant, but the exact outcome will depend on AS as well (later) LM0 IS Y0 Y1 Y Y2 P P0 0 AD2 AD1 AD0 Y0 Y1 Y2 Y A FISCAL STIMULUS AND AD-SHIFT • Effect of (G – T) on AD r LM r1 As (G – T) increases, IS shifts, AD increases (shifts out) r0 0 P assumed constant, but the exact outcome will depend on AS as well (later) IS0 Y0 IS1 Y Y1 P P0 0 AD1 AD0 Y0 Y1 Y LABOUR MARKET AND AGG. SUPPLY (1) • • • • • • • How does the Supply of Output respond to changes in the Price level? Output (Y): Y = f(N, K) MPN : dY/dN > 0 and d2Y/dN2 < 0 Firms employ labour (N) such that wage (W) = P. MPN or: W/P = MPN Next, some assumptions about price and wage flexibility. In the short run we can assume that most prices respond to supply and demand shocks • However wage rates are an exception: typically wages are viewed as being inflexible in the short-run: wage contracts are negotiated for periods of 1 to 3 years, for a variety of reasons • Initially Nd = f(W/P); dNd /dw < 0 Ns = g(W/P); dNs /dw > 0 • Where w W/P LABOUR MARKET AND AGG. SUPPLY (2) • Initial equilibrium at W/P0, etc If P increases, W/P1 falls , and Nd increases to N1 W/P1 is not a full Equilibrium: not on Ns curve. Upward pressure on W Long-run adjustment Increases W, restores W/P, and N N0 W/P Ns W/P0 W/P1 Nd 0 N0 N1 N SHORT-RUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY (1) • If W is relatively inflexible (compared with P), then the short-run response is that Output tends to increase when P rises, because real w falls, and tends to fall when P falls (because real w increases). • Hence an upward-sloping S.R Aggregate Supply curve: P SAS 0 Y SHORT-RUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY (2) • P increases to P2, W1 constant: w decreases, N increases, Y increases P W1 SAS P2 P1 w w1 w2 Y1 Y2 Y ND N1 N2 Y=f(N, K) N LONG-RUN AGGREGATE SUPPLY • P increases to P2, W2 eventually adjusts: SAS shifts; LAS vertical P W2 LAS W1 SAS1 SAS2 P2 P1 w w1 Y1 Y ND N1 Y=f(N, K) N RESPONSE TO AD SHOCKS (SR) • SAS vertical as Y Y* • AD1 AD2: small Pa, large Ya • AD3 AD4: larger Pb, smaller Yb P SAS Pb Pa AD1 0 Ya AD2 Yb AD3 AD4 Y RESPONSE TO AD SHOCKS (LR) • • Initially AD-shift increases Y Y2 In LR, AS SAS2 and LAS P3, Y1 P LAS SAS2 SAS1 P3 P2 P1 AD1 0 Y1 Y2 AD2 Y KEYNESIAN VERSUS CLASSICAL VIEWS • Prior to the great Depression of the 1930s the prevailing (“Classical”) view was that the Macroeconomy tended to full-employment equilibrium • Deviations were viewed as short-lived, and the key to adjustment was flexibility of prices and wages • The experience of the 1930s shattered this view, and the Keynesian perspective became dominant • Much later, in the late 60s and the 70s, the Keynesian orthodoxy was obviously deficient in dealing with inflation. • Also with “fine-tuning” to counter relatively mild recessions was seen to be problematic: hence a revival of classical and monetarist views • Recently, the emergence of a very serious recession, with echoes of the 1930s prompts a renewed emphasis on Keynes THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (1) • What Keynes demonstrated was that an economy could get trapped in a high-unemployment equilibrium: this necessitated government policy intervention, primarily in the form of a fiscal stimulus. • The experience of the 1930s stemmed from a rapid expansion of credit in the 1920s, overinvestment in housing and other assets, followed by a financial collapse. The result of this was a drastic fall in Aggregate Demand. (sounds familiar?) • Fiscal expansion was the only way to counter this Aggregate Demand deficiency: Monetary policy alone would not work • What we need to understand is why the economy might be stuck in an under-employment equilibrium and why decisive fiscal policy measures might be necessary to solve the problem THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (2) • Keynes argued that Nominal Wages are relatively inflexible, even when there is high unemployment and perhaps price deflation • However what matters is the real wage (W/P), and if there is a need to reduce real wages (W/P), then perhaps increasing P rather than reducing W may be more effective. • This may be because of Money Illusion (an idea which we sometimes find troublesome): however if W is reduced, do people perceive that it may apply to them only? (i.e. relative as well as absolute W) • Falling P may increase (Ms/P). Result: – falling r boosts AD (Keynes effect) – increase in (Ms/P) increases real wealth and thus AD (Pigou effect) • But real value of Debt also increases in a Deflation • Also expectations of further deflation may depress AD THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (3) • Keynes also argued that Md may become practically infinitely elastic at low interest rates (liquidity preference theory) • This effectively limits the scope for reductions in interest rates as a stimulant to AD • Note that even if the nominal interest rate should go to zero, deflation implies a higher real interest rate, and so monetary policy may inevitably be quite restrictive in a deflation r = i – e • So if e = – 4% and i = 1%, then r = +5% • However there are problems: – information and timing of fiscal interventions financing – public debt accumulation Summary of AS • We have a distinction between short run and long run • The Short run is for fixed expectations – AS(Pe) – SRAS – Quite flat: Explains why ISLM works as approx • LR is how long it takes for real wages to adjust – Expectations adjust – Workers to act on exp – ISLM wont work in LR • In LR Y is unaffected by P LRAS P AS(Pe) Y* Y • Note the Notation AS(Pe) – Alternative to SAS – Makes explicit that the SR is for fixed price expectations – When price expectations change workers (and others) will demand higher wages – SAS will shift up • What determines Y*? – – – – – Natural rate Incentives Technology “growth” Not anything that just affects price THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (4) • Here: flat LM: fiscal policy effective; monetary policy ineffective r LM1 LM2 E1 E2 IS2 IS1 0 Y1 Y2 y THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (5) • Here: inelastic IS curve: monetary policy ineffective; fiscal policy effective r IS1 IS2 LM1 LM2 E2 E1 0 Y1 Y2 y THE KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE (6) • The problem may also be shown in terms of AS and AD • Shock to AD; SAS may be slow to change P LAS SAS0 AD 1931, 2009 AD 1929, 2007 0 Y0 Y* Y SR IMPACT OF AD AND AS SHOCKS (1) • AD: positive shock inflationary pressure • Implies positive correlation between inflation and output, etc AS P AD1 0 AD2 Y SR IMPACT OF AD AND AS SHOCKS (2) • AS: negative shock inflationary pressure • Implies negative correlation between inflation and output, etc P AS2 AS1 AD 0 Y INFLATION AND TREND OUTPUT: USA 1960-2005 Policy in AS-AD Model • Suppose there is an increase in G • AD shifts right – For all P, there is higher AD, because govt component has risen – Could derive this from IS-LM – Same for MP • For fixed expectations i.e. SR – – – – Move along AS New (temp) eqm at B Y increases P increases (but not by much) • P rising implies real wage falling – P>Pe • Pe will adjust upwards – W increase – SRAS shifts up • Keep going until output returns to “natural level” • How long does transition take? – Theory: depends. Instantaneous? – Empirics: about 2 years – see diagram LRAS AS(Pce) P C AS(PAe) B A AD1 AD0 Y* Y • Be clear on the reasons why there is no long run effect – In order to get more output need to pay more people higher wages – Higher wages imply firms need to charge higher prices – Higher prices negate the higher wages as far as workers are concerned – We go back to original values of real variables – Only affect nominal variables • Policy is ineffective! • We can only get an increase in Y in long run i.e. increase in Y* – If induce people to work more – Need increase in real wage – Technology – Efficiency – Lower taxes? • Reganomics • Supply side economics • Voodoo economics Reagan Style Tax Cut • Cut personal taxes – – – – – Idea is that this will improve incentives People will work more Shift the LRAS to the right Increase Y* and reduce P Note that SRAS shifts also as expectations adjust to the new lower level • But cutting taxes will shift the AD curve to right – SR boom – LR return to Y* with higher P • Which happened? – Both – Demand effect larger LRAS0 LRAS0 P AS(Pe) AS(Pe) AD0 Y* Y1* Y Dealing With Shocks • The AS-AD diagram shows how an economy will automatically adjust to a shock • Start from LR eqm – Y=Y* – Pe=P • Suppose there is a fall in AD – Eqm moves from A to B – Y<Y* • This can only be a temporary eqm • At B, P<Pe – Real wages are higher than expected • Prices fall, but by more than nominal wages • See labour market diagram – Workers are expensive – Explains the decline in output – Over time workers will • Reduce price expectations • Reduce wage demands • SRAS shifts down • Process continues until LR eqm is restored at C – Real wage returns to original level – Y=Y* – Pe=P but at new lower level LRAS P SRAS(P0e) SRAS(P1e) A B C AD0 AD1 Y* Y • So the economy will automatically work itself out of recession • Mechanism depends on wage adjustment – Mirror image of previous discussions – Workers respond to lower prices by demanding lower wages – Reasonable? • Yes real wages return to normal • No long term decline in real wages – Realistic? • No! see data • Nominal wages are rigid • Have to wait for productivity – Have lower wage increases than otherwise • All this takes time – 3+ years • Alternative is for Government to expand AD – Shift AD back – Return to long run equilibrium A • Rationale for stabilization policy – After WTC, cut interest rates – Enough? Or too much? • Debate over which is best – Policy: “long and variable lags” – Automatic: “long run we are all dead” – Calls for “flexibility” after EMU