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The Bursting of the Technology Bubble:
International Implications
Presentation at the Hong Kong Institute
for Monetary Research
Hong Kong, 31 May 2001
William R White
Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and
Economic Department
Bank for International Settlements
Overview
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Recent developments.
Some historical context.
Where to from here?
Possible policy responses?
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Recent developments: real (1)
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A sharp slowdown in the US.
Possible recession in Japan.
Some deceleration in the euro area.
Knock-on effects elsewhere.
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Recent developments: real (2)
• Slowing down in many sectors.
• Including investment.
• With international effects.
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Recent developments: nominal
• Inflation generally well behaved.
• But recent uptick in US and euro area.
• Although not elsewhere.
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Recent developments: financial
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Higher then lower policy rates.
Lower then higher long rates.
Falling equity prices.
Widening credit spreads.
Pushing on a string?
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Some historical context: facts (1)
• Precedents pre-World War I.
• Each associated with a New Era.
• Back-to-the-future through deregulation
and globalisation.
• Similarities and differences between
Japan (1985-90) and the US (19952000).
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US and Japanese bubbles: comparison and contrast
Similarities
Differences
Acceleration of GDP
Opening of US economy
(globalised investment goods & Asia’s role?)
Acceleration of labour productivity
Real estate price inflation (worse in Japan)
Decline of CPI inflation
Decline in private savings (worse in the US)
Acceleration of private investment
Private capital flows (Japan out; US in)
Stability of real interest rate
Household & corporate debt buildup (worse in
Japan)
P/E peak (w/ adjustment for JP crossholding)
Equity price inflation
Real appreciation
Fiscal improvement
Deterioration of current account
(not shown in the data, but at end of 1980s in
Japan)
Household savings decline
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Some historical context: theories
• Hayek, Haberler and the Austrian
School.
• Credit expansion and New Era
optimism...
turns to “excessive optimism”...
profits and shares collapse...
leading to distress in the financial system.
• And all without inflation.
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Some historical context: facts (2)
• The equity boom preceding the bust?
• Due to easy policy?
• And credit excesses?
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Where to from here?
• The New Era paradigm.
• The Keynesian paradigm.
• The Austrian paradigm.
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The New Era paradigm
• New technology has pushed up
potential output and profits.
• Buoying share prices, consumption and
investment.
• And giving better control over
inventories.
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The Keynesian paradigm
• Aggregate demand has outstripped
supply.
• Postwar slowdowns have all been
“hard”.
• Possible stagflation could make it
worse.
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The Austrian paradigm
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Many financial imbalances remain.
Many macro imbalances remain.
Possible financial vulnerabilities.
And the need for rebalancing.
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Possible policy responses
• Given a sharp rebound?
• Given a shallow recession?
• Given a deep recession?
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Given a sharp rebound
• Inflation in the US could rise: energy,
ULC and the dollar.
• Underlying imbalances could worsen.
• Could imply the need for tightening.
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Given a shallow recession
• Inflation less of a problem.
• Imbalances are resolved over time.
• Unpleasant, but the best of the possible
alternatives.
• Policy could stay easy for an extended
period.
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Given a deep recession
• Restructure the supply side and
recapitalise banks as quickly as
possible.
• Use monetary and fiscal policies to back
in aggregate demand.
• Both required because Hayek and
Keynes both had a point.
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But cheer up,
it may never happen!
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