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ESNIE European School on New Institutional Economics Institut d’Etudes Scientifiques de Cargèse 21 May 2008 Hans-Bernd Schäfer Rule of Law and Economic Growth GDP Growth in Relation to the Rule of Law World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006) R2 = 0,0095 Average per capita GDP growth 1995-2004 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -2 -1 0 -4 Rule of Law Index 1996 1 2 Law and the Poverty of Nations Capital accumulation explains 30-35% of per capita growth Barro (1997), Hall/Jones 1999), Easterly (2001), Acemoglu/Johnson et. al (2003) Factor mobilisation explains growth in few countries Investment in human capital explains little of growth Good institutions which protect property rights and contracts are crucial for growth (Rodrick/Subramanian/Trebbi 2004) Glaeser/Laporta/Silanes 2004) “Countries with corrupt government officials, severe impediments to trade, poor contract enforcement, and government interference in production will be unable to achieve levels of output per worker anywhere near the norms of western Europe, Northern America, and Eastern Asia”. Hall/Jones 1999 „QJE Fig. Gross national savings (% of GNI) 1970-2003 World Development Indicators 2005 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Middle income Low income High income OECD Capital Stock per Capita vs.Capital Output Ratio 1980ies (Data from King/Levine 1994) 129 Countries 5 4 Capital Output Ratio 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 Capital Stock per Capita 50000 60000 Capital Output Ratio, Algeria, Tunesia, UK (1960-1988) Data from King/Levine (1994) Capital Output Ratio 3,5 3 Algeria 2,5 2 UK 1,5 1 Tunesia 0,5 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 Year (1960=1) Growth in Rich and in Poor Countries 1993-2003 GDP per capita growth (annual %) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 High income Low & middle income State Led Growth Nationalization of key industries including banks and insurance companies Price distortions Import Substitution Planning, Industrial Policy “The most important change in state policies in underdeveloped countries is the common understanding that they should each and all have a national economic development policy…Indeed it is also universally urged that each of them should have an overall, integrated national plan. All underdeveloped countries are now attempting to provide themselves with such a plan, except a few that have not yet been reached by the Great Awakening. Gunnar Myrdal 1957 Washington Consensus (around 1980) • Liberalization • Privatization • Free international trade, free international capital movements • Macroeconomic stabilization (low inflation) • (J. Williamson 1993) Accumulated Growth of Per Capita GDP in Per Cent in Selected Countries from 1993 to 2003 Low Growth High Growth Argentina -3,5 Albania 122,3 Brazil 6,5 Botswana 38,1 Congo, Rep.of -32,5 Chile 38,9 Cote DÕIvoir -3,2 China 133,2 Ecuador -2,6 Cyprus 45,2 Gabon 3,6 Finland 41,6 Honduras -1,3 Hungary 36,4 Nicaragua 4,6 India 55,4 Niger -4,2 Ireland 97,8 Papua New Guinea 0,5 Korea, Rep. of 54,4 Paraguay -9,9 Malays ia 46,6 Sierra Leone -21,6 Poland 50,3 Uganda -11,8 Slovenia 45,1 Ukraine -11,8 Taiwan 46,9 Zimbabwe -20,7 Source: Ca lculated fr om Penn World Ta bles 6.2 , 2000 GDP per capita (US$) GDP per Capita in Eastern Europe (population weighted averages) 6000 5000 4000 8 new EU members in 2004 3000 2000 12 non-EU postSoviet countries 1000 0 3.000 2.500 Russian Federation 2.000 1.500 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991 1.000 1989 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) Shock Therapy in Russia Year Source: Word Development Indicators 2006 GDP in Central European Countries 1990-2004 (World Development Indicators 2006) 6.000 Czech Republic 5.000 Hungary 4.000 Poland 3.000 04 20 02 20 00 20 98 19 96 19 94 19 92 19 90 2.000 19 US Dollars (2000) 7.000 4.000 3.500 3.000 Latin America & Caribbean 2.500 2001 1997 1993 1989 1985 1981 1977 1973 1969 2.000 1965 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) Stagnation in Latin America Year Source: Word Development Indicators 2006 A shift from import substitution policy to free international trade implies a decline of import substituting industries and intends rapid growth of export-oriented industries. If however capital markets are imperfect and intellectual property rights are not protected, expanding becomes difficult. In many Latin American countries “numerous small and middle enterprises have been forced to close down, in many cases not as a result of their long-term inefficiency, but as a consequence of imperfect factor markets which precluded their access to long-term finance, engineering and managerial know-how[1]”. [1] J. Katz (2000), 14.000 10.000 8.000 Argentina 6.000 Brazil 4.000 Chile 2.000 Mexico 0 19 50 19 56 19 62 19 68 19 74 19 80 19 86 19 92 19 98 20 04 Real GDP per capita 12.000 Year 180 160 Arab countries (oil) 140 Arab countries (Nonoil) Low income countries 120 100 80 02 20 98 19 94 19 90 19 86 19 82 19 78 19 74 19 70 60 19 GNP per capita (1986=100) GNP in Arab Countries (from World Development Indicators 2007) Year 2004 2001 1998 1995 1992 1989 1986 1983 1980 1977 1974 1971 1968 1965 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 600 500 400 300 200 India 100 0 Source: Word Development Indicators 2006 Year 2004 2001 1998 1995 1992 1989 1986 1983 1980 1977 1974 1971 1968 1965 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 China 200 0 Source: Word Development Indicators 2006 550 500 Sub-Saharan Africa 450 2001 1997 1993 1989 1985 1981 1977 1973 1969 400 1965 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 600 Year Source: Word Development Indicators 2006 “The cross-national literature has been unable to establish a strong causal link between any particular design feature of institutions and economic growth. We know that growth happens when investors feel secure, but we have no idea what specific institutional blueprints will make them feel more secure in a given context. The literature gives us no hint as to what the right levers are. Institutional function does not uniquely determine institutional form.”[1] [1] D. Rodrick (2006) The Barcelona Consensus (2004) • … both basic economic reasoning and international experience suggest that institutional quality -such as respect for the rule of law and property rights- plus a market orientation with an appropriate balance between market and state, and attention to the distribution of income, are at the root of successful development strategies. • Moreover, the institutions that put these abstract principles into reality matter, and developing countries should work hard to improve their institutional environments. But effective institutional innovations are highly dependent on a country´ s history, culture and other specific circumstances. What Makes Law Reform so difficult? • Why do people with power accept limits to their power? An even more pointed formulation is: why do people with guns obey people without guns? An economic twist is: why would the rich even voluntarily part with a portion of their wealth? In legal theory, the parallel question runs: why do politicians sometimes hand over power to judges? Why do politicians allow judges, who control neither purse nor sword, to overturn and obstruct their decisions and sometimes even send office holders to jail?...Societies may approximate the rule of law if they consist of a large number of power wielding groups, compromising a majority of the population, and if none of them becomes so strong as to be able thoroughly to dominate the others. We may be able to loosen the grip of a few organized interests on power by forcing them to share political leverage with a variety of other groups. This is polyarchie; it is also rough justice, the only kind human beings will ever experience. Formulated differently, the balancing of many partialities is the closest we can come to impartiality. This may not sound particularly ideal, but it is nevertheless historically quite rare and very difficult to achieve.[1] • [1] S. Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law” (2003) Neglect of finance and corporate governance in development economics What matters most 1. Property 2. Finance and corporate governance 3. Contract 4. Torts Fig. Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 1970-2003 From World Development Indicators 2005 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Middle income Low income High income OECD Distribution of Assets and Collaterals in 60 Developing countries, 200-2003 (Data from Safavian/Fleisig/Steinbuks,2006) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Percentage of Total Assets Land and Building Percentage of Collaterals Accounts Received Machinery Market capitalization of listed companies (current US$) (bill) Data from World Dev. Indicators, 2005 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 High income Low & middle income Market capitalization of listed companies (current US$) (bill) Data from World Dev. Indicators 2005 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 China India Russian Federation Enforcement of Shareholders Rights and Market Capitalization (from Claeessens/Klingebiel/Schmuckler, 2002) Value of control-block votes/Firm Value in % Value of control-block votes in relation to rule of law 70 60 Czech Republic 50 40 Mexico Korea (Rep.) 30 Italy Brazil France Chile Australia 20 UK 10 South Africa Hong Kong 0 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 Rule of Law Index, 1998 1,5 2 2,5 Widely held Family State Argentina 0 65 15 Hong Kong 10 70 5 Mexico 0 100 0 Singapore 15 30 45 South Korea 55 20 15 France 60 20 15 Germany 50 10 25 Italy 20 15 40 UK 100 0 0 USA 80 20 0 The ex-post and ex-ante approach to corporate governance Regulation vs. Civil liability Rules versus Standards Qualification and loyalty of judges (Black, R. Kraakman, and J. Hay, 1996) Crosslisting The institutional element of cross listing „rent a regulator“ The increasing number of cross listed companies in developing countries Cross listing and share prices (Karyoli 1998 Reese/Weisbach, Didenko 2005) Large barriers to entry and to exit in developing countries -Licensing laws -overregulation -labor relations -dismissal, -bancruptcy procedure, -establishing a firm -tax law Consequence: development of a large informal sector which evades law altogether Source: Schneider 2004