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					Banking Crises Fin254f: Spring 2010 Lecture notes 2.2a Readings: Reinhart and Rogoff(10) Outline      Bank run theory Location and frequency of runs Crises and financial liberalization Capital flow “bonanzas” Comovements     Equity prices Real estate Capacity Consequences Types of Banking Crises  Repressed  Bank runs financial systems Repressed Financial Systems (Emerging markets)  Developing countries  Government controls most banking  Force consumers to save at banks  Force banks to buy government debt  Government defaults  Wipes out depositors Bank Runs (Anywhere)  What is a bank?  Bank   Borrows short term (deposits) Lends long term (assets/loan portfolio)  Investment banks, Shadow banking, hedge funds … Classic Bank Run  Depositors lose confidence  Withdraw funds  Banks forced to sell assets (loan portfolio)  “Fire sale”/distressed/low prices  Bank can run out of assets and go bankrupt Two Cases  Insolvent bank    Solvent bank      Bank was bankrupt anyway Liabilities>Assets “liquidity crises” Can’t cover short term debt, but basically has good loans (assets) Can still be shut down Bad economic disruption Which one is difficult to tell One Last Question  What is a bank? Policies to Stop Runs  Deposit insurance  Larger banks bailout smaller ones  Clever temporary mergers  Direct government assistance Banks and Recessions  Pretty   strong connections Bernanke, 1930s 1/2 of all US banks fail  Credit constrained models, or credit channel models of business cycles Outline      Bank run theory Location and frequency of runs Crises and financial liberalization Capital flow “bonanzas” Comovements     Equity prices Real estate Capacity Consequences Fraction of Time in Banking Crisis (Independence(or 1800) -> 2008)  Tables 10.1 and 10.2  Developing  Kenya 19.6%,Nigeria 10.2, Zambia 2.2, Argentina 8.8, Russia 1.0 Mexico 9.7, China 9.1, Japan, 8.1, Singapore, 2.3, India 8.6  Developed  France 11.5, Netherlands 1.9, Germany 6.6, UK 9.2, Canada 8.5, US 13 Frequency of Banking Crises  Developing  Nigeria 1, China 10, India 6, Egypt 3, Japan 8, Singapore 1, Argentina 9, Brazil 11, Chile 7, Mexico 7  Developed  Germany 8, Greece 2, UK 12, France 15, US 13, Canada 8, New Zealand 1 Summary  Both developed and developing countries  All regions Crises and Liberalization  Figure 10.1  Obstfeld-Taylor index of capital mobility  3 Arbitrary guess at global capital status year moving average of countries with banking crises  Banking crises probabilities higher after financial liberalization Capital Flows and Banking Crises  Sustained     capital inflow “Capital Bonanza” Three year inflows before crisis Cutoff at 20 percentile (for each country) Over threshold then Bonanza Banking Crises and Bonanza’s  Table 10.7  Prob(Crises) = 0.132  Prob(Crises | Bonanza) = 0.184  Share of countries where conditional prob is greater than unconditional = 0.609 Outline      Bank run theory Location and frequency of runs Crises and financial liberalization Capital flow “bonanzas” Comovements     Equity prices Real estate Capacity Consequences Comovements: House Prices and Bank Crises  Table 10.8  House price cycles coincide with banking crisis years  Magnitudes in price declines similar between developed and developing countries Comovements: Equity Prices and Bank Crises Figure 10.2  Peak in year t-1  Recovery started by t+2, nearly full recovery by t+3  Much shorter than real estate  Two recent examples of “no crisis” stock market movements    Crash of 87 IT bubble in 2001 Comovements: Equity Prices and Bank Crises  Figure 10.3: Number of banks around great depression  1976-1985: US Financial/GDP = 4.9%  1996-2005: US Financial/GDP = 7.5% Outline      Bank run theory Location and frequency of runs Crises and financial liberalization Capital flow “bonanzas” Comovements     Equity prices Real estate Capacity Consequences Bailout Costs  Difficult    See table 10.9 Argentina (High 55, Low 4 ) % of GDP Some types of bailouts payoff eventually  GDP  growth Figure 10.4  Central  to measure government revenue Figure 10.6, 10.8 Government Debt  Government    debt levels, fig 10.10 Increase in Debt (100 = start) Average 3 year increase to 186.3 Ignores state level debt Summary  Crisis   are not limited to The past Emerging markets  Pretty common  Patterns similar
 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                            