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Planning the CREZ 345 kV System for Multi-contingencies CREZ Technical Conference January 26, 2010 Bernie Pasternack AEP Service Corporation 1   The build out of the CREZ 345 kV system will have enormous impacts on the planning and operation of ERCOT’s bulk transmission system. The required level of reliability will be greater than past expectations.   Impact of system failures Variability of transmission loading patterns 2 Agenda      TPL-001-1 Overview Performance Requirements Raising the Bar for EHV Other Notable Changes Summary 3 TPL-001-1 Drafting Team Roster         John Odom, FRCC (Chair) Bob Millard, RFC Darrin Church, TVA Bill Harm, PJM Doug Hohlbaugh, FirstEnergy (Vice Chair) Julius Horvath, Wind Energy TX Bob Jones, Southern Brian Keel, SRP          Ron Mazur, Manitoba Hydro Tom Mielnik, MidAmerican Bernie Pasternack, AEP Bob Pierce, Duke Chifong Thomas, PG&E Jim Useldinger, KCPL Dana Walters, National Grid Active observers NERC Staff Coordinator – Ed Dobrowolski 4 Project Scope  Standards Involved        TPL-001-0.1 TPL-002-0a TPL-003-0 TPL-004-0 TPL-005-0 TPL-006-0.1 (NERC A, No Contingency) (NERC B, Single Contingency) (NERC C, Multiple Contingency) (NERC D, Extreme Contingency) (RRO Regional and Interregional Studies) (RRO Data, Reports, as requested by NERC) Applicable Entities Involved    Planning Authority (Planning Coordinator) Transmission Planner Regional Reliability Organization NERC Website Project 2006-02 http://www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Assess-Transmission-Future-Needs.html 5 Project Scope Create a new standard that: 1. Has clear, enforceable requirements 2. Is not a Least Common Denominator standard 3. Addresses the issues raised in the SAR and issues raised by FERC and others 6 FERC Order 693 Inputs FERC is looking for a clearer Standard that “raises the bar” on reliability  Consider a full range of variables to identify critical system conditions  Ensure simulations replicate real-time expectations  Should not allow for firm load shedding or curtailment of firm transfers in response to single contingencies 7 Project Status  Draft 5 authorized by Standards Committee for 30 day pre-ballot pool period   NERC Website Project 2006-02 January 20, 2010 through February 19, 2010 Plan to ballot in early Q1 2010    10 day ballot period Need to achieve quorum (75% of Registered Ballot Body) Approval requires 2/3 approval from ballot body http://www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Assess-Transmission-Future-Needs.html 8 Table 1 Performance Requirements Planning Events         P0: P1: P2: P3: P4: P5: P6: P7: Normal System Single Contingency Single Contingency [higher impact] Generator + 1 Stuck Breaker Protection System Failure Overlapping contingencies [Non-gens, Two P1 Events] Common Structure [2 circuits] •Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event. •Require Corrective Action Plans for inability to meet performance requirements 9 Table 1 Performance Requirements Planning Events, Table Components (Columns)        Category (P0, P1, … P7) Initial system condition Event Fault Type (3-phase or Single Line to Ground) BES Level (EHV or HV) Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed Consequential Load Loss: All Load that is no longer served by the Transmission System as a result of Transmission Facilities being removed from service by a Protection System operation designed to isolate the fault. Non-Consequential Load Loss: Non-Interruptible Load loss that does not include: (1) Consequential Load Loss, (2) the response of voltage sensitive Load, or (3) Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment. 10 Table 1 – Performance If the event analyzed involves BES Requirements elements at multiple System voltage Planning Events, Table levels, the lowest System voltage level for stated performance criteria applies regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and loss of Non-Consequential Load 11 TPL-001-1 EHV Performance  Areas where “bar was raised” for EHV    Single contingency (P2-2 & P2-3) Stuck Breaker (P4) Protection System Failure (P5) 12 Raising the EHV Bar    WHY ? EHV is the backbone of the transmission system; it must be the strongest link EHV failures lead to major blackouts Even if probability is low, impact is high 13 AEP’s Perspective  Eastern AEP (PJM) EHV system planned to a higher standard       Contingencies are surrogates Normal ratings for single contingencies N-2 instead of N-1-1 Superimpose heavy transfers Multiple generators plus single or dbl circuit lines Result is a robust system with flexibility to accommodate unforeseen conditions 14 TPL-001-1 Other Relevant Changes      Near term Off-peak steady state and stability studies specifically required Specific consideration of spare equipment strategy Explicit requirement to do near term short circuit analysis, meet performance requirements, and define corrective actions Specific requirement to assess proposed generation in long term horizon Requires consideration of outages and performance deficiencies on neighbors’ systems 15 TPL-001-1 Contingency Analysis Clarity   Simulate removal of all elements that Protection and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect Consider impact of successful or unsuccessful high speed reclosing   High speed reclosing is closing within one second Generator low voltage ride through   Trip unit in simulation if voltage is less than ride through voltage limitations Ride-through can be known or assumed 16 Summary   Build out of the CREZ 345 kV system will require a higher level of reliability New TPL Standard raises the bar, particularly for EHV   FERC is a driver Must protect the backbone of the grid 17 Summary   Simulation of contingencies must replicate actions of Protection Systems and controls New TPL standard will produce a more robust and flexible system 18 Questions ? 19