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The Army without a General
General
GBJC Scenarios for Sicoris and Ilerda, 49 BC
By Stephen Jackson
After Caesar's rapid advance through
Italy forced Pompey and the Senatorial
party to flee to the east, Caesar turned his
attention to the west. He marched into
Gaul and laid siege to Massilia, then
continued to Spain which was being held
for the Senatorials by Lucius Afranius,
Marcus Petreius and Marcus Terentius
Varro.
Varro stayed in southern Spain and
never engaged Caesar, later handing
over his province after Caesar's win at
Ilerda (by not following in his
ancestor's footsteps at Cannae, he
survived the Civil Wars).
Afranius and Petreius set up a wellstocked base at Ilerda (modern Lérida)
along the Sicoris River, a tributary to
the Ebro. Despite Caesar's derision of
their abilities (he called it "the army
without a general"), these commanders
were highly capable and
experienced. The consul Afranius had
been a successful legate for Pompey for
years. Petreius had similar experience, in
addition to being the general who
defeated the rebel Lucius Sergius Catilina
at Pistoria in 62 BC. Both men had
served for several years in Spain under
Pompey in the latter half of the war
against Quintus Sertorius (81-72 BC, see
C3i Nr. 10).
A mere two days before Caesar was to
arrive, Fabius sent two legions across
the downstream
downstre bridge to forage. Just
after they crossed but before their
escorting cavalry could join them, the
river turned into a torrent and demoldemol
ished the bridge. Fabius at once headed
toward the northern bridge with two
more legions plus cavalry as a relief
force.
Caesar's advance force under Fabius
Maximus arrived some weeks before
Caesar himself and set up camp near
Afranius on the North bank in
preparation of a siege. The Sicoris River
proved difficult for both sides as it would
suddenly rise and wash away bridges.
Fabius built two bridges about four miles
apart to enable his units to forage on the
southern bank. Skirmishing between
foraging parties and cavalry was frequent.
Afranius, noting the opportunity, led
four legions across his own bridge which
happened to be closer than Fabius'
northern bridge. His cavalry surrounded
the two isolated legions under Lucius
Munatius Plancus who immediately
formed square.
Afranius' primary objective was to
keep his army intact and keep
Caesar occupied so that Pompey
could build up forces to retake
Rome. However, the opportunity to
destroy two of Caesar's iso
isolated legions was too good to
miss. If successful he would have
damaged Caesar's prestige
considerably. He pressed Plancus
hard but the square held until
Fabius arrived. Not willing to risk
his force further, Afranius fell
back to his camp. Fabius collected
the shaken legions, and brought
them back to camp, undoubtedly
very glad he didn't have to explain
their loss to Caesar.
When Caesar arrived, he began
digging his siege lines and tried to
tempt Afranius into battle by
deploying closer and closer to
Ilerda and Afranius' camp.
Afranius would also deploy, but at
the top of the hill on which Ilerda
stood. Caesar declined the bait.
They then marched for the moun
mountains
and the Ebro River with their baggage
train, intending to carry on the war and
detain Caesar even longer.
Caesar knew what was a stake if he got
bogged down in Spain. He crossed his
army at a chest-deep
chest
ford. His cavalry
fished out any legionaries who were
swept off their feet. He crossed without
loss. Then he marched after the
Senatorials, sending his superior cavalry
to harass and slow them.
In another of his famed forced marches,
Caesar crossed nearly impassable terrain,
got around Afranius and his baggage
train, and
nd fortified the pass ahead of
them, blocking their route to the Ebro.
The Pompeians sat for a full day,
seemingly dumbfounded, then decided to
break out towards the coast. They would
proceed to Tarraco and split their forces,
carrying on a guerrilla war to
t detain
Caesar. With this in mind they reversed
course and headed back towards Ilerda,
intending to turn east once out of the
mountains.
tains.
One day, Caesar deployed with a mere
three legions, leaving six cohorts behind
in camp. This time Afranius came down
to the base of the hill—and the battle
began.
In heavy fighting, Afranius seized a small
hillock before Caesar's XV Legion could
gain it, forcing the Caesarians back and
shaking their confidence. Caesar
attributed this to "unfairness" of the
Spanish troops, saying they rushed forward without discipline, which upset
Caesar's men as they were unused to such
actions. Interesting logic. Nonetheless,
Caesar came to the aid of the XV with
the IX Legion and forced the Senatorials
back. Caesar's superior cavalry did what
they could, but the terrain was difficult
for them.
Having shaken Caesar's men, Afranius
conducted a fighting withdrawal back up
the hill and into Ilerda. Traffic problems
at the gates resulted in more fatalities
than the battle as Caesar's cohorts
pressed on the retreating men, but
Afranius got them inside without heavy
loss.
After that heavy skirmish—which both
sides claimed as a victory— Caesar
concentrated on hemming Afranius in.
Completely out-classed in cavalry, the
Senatorials rapidly lost the ability to
forage. Afranius and Petreius delayed as
long as they could, buying time for
Pompey. Finally, when the Sicoris was
high and both Caesar's bridges had been
washed away, they crossed and
demolished their own bridge.
Caesar once more maneuvered around
them and blocked them before they
could leave the hills, fortifying the defile
in front of them. With his troops
demoralized
ized by these retreats, and unable
to assault the fortifications, Afranius
capitulated to Caesar's terms. Pompey's
legates were allowed to flee, and the
Pompeian legionaries received their full
pay and discharge. Many immediately
signed up again with Caesar. The victory
at Ilerda showed Caesar at his best. He
achieved complete success in two months
with little bloodshed in a war where he
simply outmaneuvered his opponents.
Sources: Caesar, The Civil Wars; Hans
Delbrück, Warfare in Antiquity; Suetonius,
The Twelve Caesars, Plutarch, Life of Caesar;
Plutarch, Comparison of Caesar and
Alexander.