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The Army without a General General GBJC Scenarios for Sicoris and Ilerda, 49 BC By Stephen Jackson After Caesar's rapid advance through Italy forced Pompey and the Senatorial party to flee to the east, Caesar turned his attention to the west. He marched into Gaul and laid siege to Massilia, then continued to Spain which was being held for the Senatorials by Lucius Afranius, Marcus Petreius and Marcus Terentius Varro. Varro stayed in southern Spain and never engaged Caesar, later handing over his province after Caesar's win at Ilerda (by not following in his ancestor's footsteps at Cannae, he survived the Civil Wars). Afranius and Petreius set up a wellstocked base at Ilerda (modern Lérida) along the Sicoris River, a tributary to the Ebro. Despite Caesar's derision of their abilities (he called it "the army without a general"), these commanders were highly capable and experienced. The consul Afranius had been a successful legate for Pompey for years. Petreius had similar experience, in addition to being the general who defeated the rebel Lucius Sergius Catilina at Pistoria in 62 BC. Both men had served for several years in Spain under Pompey in the latter half of the war against Quintus Sertorius (81-72 BC, see C3i Nr. 10). A mere two days before Caesar was to arrive, Fabius sent two legions across the downstream downstre bridge to forage. Just after they crossed but before their escorting cavalry could join them, the river turned into a torrent and demoldemol ished the bridge. Fabius at once headed toward the northern bridge with two more legions plus cavalry as a relief force. Caesar's advance force under Fabius Maximus arrived some weeks before Caesar himself and set up camp near Afranius on the North bank in preparation of a siege. The Sicoris River proved difficult for both sides as it would suddenly rise and wash away bridges. Fabius built two bridges about four miles apart to enable his units to forage on the southern bank. Skirmishing between foraging parties and cavalry was frequent. Afranius, noting the opportunity, led four legions across his own bridge which happened to be closer than Fabius' northern bridge. His cavalry surrounded the two isolated legions under Lucius Munatius Plancus who immediately formed square. Afranius' primary objective was to keep his army intact and keep Caesar occupied so that Pompey could build up forces to retake Rome. However, the opportunity to destroy two of Caesar's iso isolated legions was too good to miss. If successful he would have damaged Caesar's prestige considerably. He pressed Plancus hard but the square held until Fabius arrived. Not willing to risk his force further, Afranius fell back to his camp. Fabius collected the shaken legions, and brought them back to camp, undoubtedly very glad he didn't have to explain their loss to Caesar. When Caesar arrived, he began digging his siege lines and tried to tempt Afranius into battle by deploying closer and closer to Ilerda and Afranius' camp. Afranius would also deploy, but at the top of the hill on which Ilerda stood. Caesar declined the bait. They then marched for the moun mountains and the Ebro River with their baggage train, intending to carry on the war and detain Caesar even longer. Caesar knew what was a stake if he got bogged down in Spain. He crossed his army at a chest-deep chest ford. His cavalry fished out any legionaries who were swept off their feet. He crossed without loss. Then he marched after the Senatorials, sending his superior cavalry to harass and slow them. In another of his famed forced marches, Caesar crossed nearly impassable terrain, got around Afranius and his baggage train, and nd fortified the pass ahead of them, blocking their route to the Ebro. The Pompeians sat for a full day, seemingly dumbfounded, then decided to break out towards the coast. They would proceed to Tarraco and split their forces, carrying on a guerrilla war to t detain Caesar. With this in mind they reversed course and headed back towards Ilerda, intending to turn east once out of the mountains. tains. One day, Caesar deployed with a mere three legions, leaving six cohorts behind in camp. This time Afranius came down to the base of the hill—and the battle began. In heavy fighting, Afranius seized a small hillock before Caesar's XV Legion could gain it, forcing the Caesarians back and shaking their confidence. Caesar attributed this to "unfairness" of the Spanish troops, saying they rushed forward without discipline, which upset Caesar's men as they were unused to such actions. Interesting logic. Nonetheless, Caesar came to the aid of the XV with the IX Legion and forced the Senatorials back. Caesar's superior cavalry did what they could, but the terrain was difficult for them. Having shaken Caesar's men, Afranius conducted a fighting withdrawal back up the hill and into Ilerda. Traffic problems at the gates resulted in more fatalities than the battle as Caesar's cohorts pressed on the retreating men, but Afranius got them inside without heavy loss. After that heavy skirmish—which both sides claimed as a victory— Caesar concentrated on hemming Afranius in. Completely out-classed in cavalry, the Senatorials rapidly lost the ability to forage. Afranius and Petreius delayed as long as they could, buying time for Pompey. Finally, when the Sicoris was high and both Caesar's bridges had been washed away, they crossed and demolished their own bridge. Caesar once more maneuvered around them and blocked them before they could leave the hills, fortifying the defile in front of them. With his troops demoralized ized by these retreats, and unable to assault the fortifications, Afranius capitulated to Caesar's terms. Pompey's legates were allowed to flee, and the Pompeian legionaries received their full pay and discharge. Many immediately signed up again with Caesar. The victory at Ilerda showed Caesar at his best. He achieved complete success in two months with little bloodshed in a war where he simply outmaneuvered his opponents. Sources: Caesar, The Civil Wars; Hans Delbrück, Warfare in Antiquity; Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, Plutarch, Life of Caesar; Plutarch, Comparison of Caesar and Alexander.