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Mass vs. EPA– Summary of Findings
The Supreme Court decided this case based on two main issues: standing and the
“merits” of the case. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
I.
Standing
The Court held that petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of the
rulemaking petition, which asked the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA). At the heart of the
question of standing is whether petitioners can show that the action injures him in a
“concrete and personal way.” To ensure this, the Court held in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife that, “a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury.”
However, if there is a litigant “to whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests’ the litigant ‘can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”
The Court asserted that this was applicable in this case because Congress has given a
procedural right “to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld,” which is what
petitioners were attempting to do in this case.
The Court noted that states have given up certain sovereign prerogatives to the federal
government; for example, one state cannot force another state to reduce their GHG
emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with a foreign country, nor can it use its
police powers to reduce all types of in-state motor vehicle emissions because in some
cases this might be pre-empted by federal regulations. These types of sovereign powers
are lodged in the federal government, and Congress has mandated EPA to protect states,
including Massachusetts, “by prescribing standards applicable to the ‘emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the
Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.’”
The Court then went on to apply the Lujan test to this case. First, the EPA’s refusal to
regulate GHG emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both
“‘actual’” and “‘imminent.’” The Court relied on the National Research Council’s
report Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, in describing the
harms associated with climate change and the Court stated that EPA “regards [the report]
as an ‘objective and independent assessment of the relevant science.’” One of the harms
described is the rise in sea level. The Court stated that rising sea level has already begun
to swallow some of Massachusetts' coastal land according to petitioners’ affidavits,
which the Court pointed out went unchallenged. The Court found that because
Massachusetts owns a substantial part of the state’s coastal land, “it has alleged a
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.”
The Court next looked to the second part of the Lujan test – causation. To this, the Court
states that, “EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA’s
refusal to regulate such emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries.” Also,
EPA’s claim that its decision not to regulate GHG emissions contributes so
insignificantly to petitioners' injuries that it cannot be dragged into federal court to
answer for them, and its argument that there is no realistic possibility that the relief
petitioner is seeking would mitigate global climate change and remedy their injuries,
were both without merit, according to the Court. The Court stated that just because the
EPA’s actions to regulate carbon dioxide would be an incremental step in addressing
climate change, does not mean that this cannot be addressed in a federal court or that
a federal court would lack jurisdiction. Agencies do not often resolve massive problems
in “one fell regulatory swoop” – it is usually a step-by-step process. Moreover, the
Court noted that reducing domestic automobile emissions would hardly be an
incremental step because U.S. motor-vehicle emission make a significant contribution
to GHG concentrations and, therefore, global warming.
Third, the Court found that “a ‘substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested’
will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce the risk.” Just because regulating vehicle
emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, does not mean that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to determine whether EPA “has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”
The Court “attach[ed] considerable significance” to two things: EPA’s “‘agree[ment]
with the President that, ‘we must address the issue of global climate change (quoting
remarks announcing George W. Bush’s Clear Skies and Global Climate Initiatives);’”
and to EPA’s “ardent support for various voluntary emission-reduction programs.” The
Court concluded by saying that the rise in sea level associated with global warming has
already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts, and that this risk would be
reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they are seeking.
II.
The Merits – Does the CAA authorize EPA to regulate GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles if it determines that such emissions contribute to climate change?
A. Does the EPA have the authority to regulate GHG emissions?
The Court found that the CAA does give EPA this authority. The CAA requires the
EPA to adopt standards for emissions of “any air pollutant” from any motor vehicles
which, “in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger health or welfare.” The EPA asserted that
Congress did not intend it to regulate substances that contribute to climate change and,
therefore, carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” within the meaning of this provision.
The Court determined that the text of the statute ruled out EPA’s interpretation. The
Court characterizes the CAA’s definition of the term air pollutant as “sweeping” and
said that it includes “‘any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including
any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air...’” The Court said that the statute is unambiguous because,
“[o]n its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and
underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word ‘any.’ Carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt ‘physical [and]
chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted into . . . the ambient air.’”
EPA also argued that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles
because this would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job that it says Congress has
given to the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Court rejected this argument
and said, “[t]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its
environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s
‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to
promote energy efficiency. The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to
think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.”
B. If the EPA does have the authority to regulate GHG emissions, can they
refuse to do so if they deem it “unwise”?
The Court said that although the Agency does have some latitude under the statute, the
CAA states that EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that GHGs
do not contribute to climate change, or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to
why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether the GHGs have
such an effect. The Court stated that the EPA refused to comply with this statutory
requirement, instead offering a “laundry list of reasons not to regulate.” The Court said
that not only was it clear that these reasons had nothing to do with whether GHG
emissions contribute to climate change, but that they offered even less of a “reasoned
justification for declining to form a scientific judgment.” Additionally, EPA cannot
avoid its statutory obligation by relying on the claim of uncertainty surrounding the
climate change issue and therefore conclude that it would be better not to regulate at
this time. To this argument, the Court stated, “[i]f the scientific uncertainty is so
profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether
greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so. That EPA would
prefer not to regulate greenhouse gases because of some residual uncertainty . . . is
irrelevant. The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make an
endangerment finding.” Because the EPA offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal
to decide whether GHGs cause or contribute to climate change, the Court found that
EPA’s action was “‘arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law,’”
and therefore, the Court had the authority under the CAA to reverse such action.
The Court concluded this part of the opinion by stating that it did not, nor did it need to,
reach the question of whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or
whether policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions if the EPA makes such a finding. The
Court held only that, “EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction within the
statute.”