Download Persian responsibility in the Persian Wars

To what extent were the Persians responsible for their own defeat in the
Persian Wars?
To a considerable extent, the Persians were responsible for their own defeat in the wars of
490 and 480-79 BC. Their commanders made crucial mistakes at Marathon and Salamis that
caused their forces to be routed by the Greeks. Even so, there were other factors at work.
When Darius’ army set out in 490 BC, it outnumbered the Greeks by three to one.
However, thanks to the quick thinking and persuasive power of the Athenian general
Miltiades, the Greeks were able to block its advance at Marathon.
Having fought with the Persians in Thrace, Miltiades knew that their equipment was
inferior. They relied on their cavalry to destroy the enemy. It was for this reason that he
deployed his forces in the high ground, where the Persian cavalry could not be utilised.
Both sides faced off against each other for several days, with neither willing to strike first
and give away the advantage. Finally, Miltiades ordered his forces to attack. Herodotus’
account does not tell us why he took this risk, but it would seem to be because the Persian
cavalry were absent at that time. A Byzantine source called the Suda supports this view. If
so, it was a crucial mistake on the part of the Persians.
Miltiades now took full advantage of the situation. When the Greeks got to within a mile
of the Persian line, he ordered that the centre be weakened and the flanks reinforced. He
then directed his troops to run towards the Persians, to minimise the impact of their
archers. As the battle raged, Miltiades ordered his flanks to close in on the Persians,
trapping them in a killing zone. Now the Persians made their second crucial error. Most
broke and ran – some back to their ships, others into the nearby swamp where they
drowned. The rest were cut to pieces by the Greeks.
Although the Persians sailed on to Athens, Miltiades’ army got there first, so they had little
choice but to return home to lick their wounds. The First Persian War was over.
When the Persians returned to Greece in 480, they came with a far greater force and
better strategy. This invasion was land and sea, with the navy keeping the army supplied.
The plan worked well for the Persians up until their arrival at Salamis. Xerxes had captured
Athens, and now he had the Greek navy bottled up in the narrow straits. The Greek ships
could not stay there indefinitely. All Xerxes had to do was wait for them to emerge, then his
bigger fleet could destroy them. However, as A.T. Olmstead has noted, he needed a
spectacular victory, and so was tricked into acting rashly. Themistocles sent a trusted slave
into the Persian camp, claiming that the Greek navy was in disarray. Xerxes believed the
story, and sent the bulk of his fleet into the straits – exactly as Themistocles wanted.
Expecting the Greek navy to be retreating, the Persians were taken by surprise and
surrounded. In the ensuing battle they lost over 200 triremes. The Greeks lost a mere 40.
It was now that Xerxes made his second big mistake. So incensed was he by the defeat, he
executed some of his captains. This incensed the others, and they sailed their ships home.
According to Olmstead, it was this as much as the defeat at Salamis that deprived him of his
navy. Unable now to supply his army, Xerxes was forced to return home with the bulk of it.
The Greeks went on to defeat the remnants of Xerxes’ army at Plataea, thanks again to the
absence of the cavalry. They then pursued the navy to Asia Minor, where they destroyed it.
The Second Persian War was over.
In many ways, the Persians were architects of their own defeat. Though their preparations
were meticulous and their forces vastly larger than those of their adversary, their tactics and
weapons were inferior. They also had less cohesion and motivation than the Greeks. More
than anything, though, their leadership was inferior. Miltiares and Themistocles were far
better generals than counterparts – particularly Xerxes, who made serious tactical errors.