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The Ottoman Perception of War:
From the Foundation of the Empire to its Disintegration
Mustafa Serdar Palabiyik
Abstract: This article seeks to provide an account of the evolution of the ideas on ‘war’
envisaged by the Ottoman administrators and intellectuals. In doing that, it aims to reveal how
the perception of war had been transformed in line with domestic and external developments
throughout Ottoman history. Accordingly, there had been no uniform perception of war;
rather there are particular dominant perceptions for particular periods. While in the initial
years of the Ottoman state an understanding based on the mobilization of nomadic
communities against the Christian ‘other’, namely the ghaza, had been the case, this rather
religious perception was gradually replaced with a more mundane conception of war in the
mid-16th century onwards. Starting from early seventeenth century, as a result of some
significant defeats of Ottoman armies both in the West and in the East, it was thought that the
survival of state could be ensured through diplomacy not through war. Hence until the
beginning of the 20th century, diplomacy was the key means of politics for the Ottoman
intellectuals. On the other hand, particularly after the end of Hamidian era, in early years of
twentieth century, an understanding of resorting to war for the survival of state was
developed, which would ultimately result in the Ottoman participation of World War I. In
sum, this article examines different representations of war endured in different periods, such
as war as a tool of motivation, war as a way of imperial expansion, war as the source of all
evils, and war as an opportunity for survival of the state.
Key Words: War, Ottoman Empire, ghaza, Katip Çelebi, İbrahim Müteferrika, Abdulhamid
II, Enver Paşa, Cemal Paşa.
Ottomans had long been familiar to the concept of “war” for centuries as members of a
great empire. In their poems, songs, marches, prose, they sometimes expressed how they
admired the peculiar violence and grandeur of war; sometimes how they hated the
destructiveness of its longevity. Ottomans were either soldiers participating in wars, or
peasants levied for maintaining large armies, or commanders and sultans directing the war.
From the lowest individual to the highest in the social hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire, they
were somehow related to war. This article aims to analyse how the concept of war had been
perceived in Turkey from the establishment of the Ottoman Empire to its disintegration. Of
course, this is a very ambitious task to be achieved. First of all, it is not possible to put
forward all aspects of the perception of war by Ottoman statesmen, intellectuals and society in
detail, since the period at hand comprised more than six centuries. Therefore, this article
would only emphasize basic trends in understanding of war in specific periods and how this
understanding had been transformed by changing internal and external conditions.
1. The Perception of War from the Establishment of the Ottoman Empire to the
Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1299-1606)
Since the Ottomans emerged as a significant power alongside the border of ‘Christian’
Byzantine Empire in north-western Anatolia, a rather religious perception of war called
ghaza1 (a form of holy war) became perceived as the legitimate use of force outside the
Cemal Kafadar, “Gaza”, Islam Ansiklopedisi, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, Volume 13, p.
427.
1
borders of Ottoman Beylik.2 Although, the concept of ghaza had such strong religious
background, it was widely used for the legitimization of mundane wars fought for the
establishment and consolidation of the Ottoman state. What is more, it was also used for not
attracting the reaction of surrounding and more powerful rivals in Anatolia and the Ilkhanid
Empire, to which the Ottomans had still been allegiant at that time. The concept of ghaza was
also a tool of motivation among the Turkish tribes in the region.3
However, it is not possible to explain every war of the Ottoman Beylik through the notion
of ghaza. One should not neglect that those who participated in wars had also sought for
material gain, namely slaves or spoils.4 Even in an anonymous religious text book (ilmihal)
written in this period, it was stipulated that ghaza was a way of acquiring proper livelihood.5
However, still, ghaza can be perceived as a tool of legitimization of the Ottoman wars against
Balkan states and Byzantine Empire until mid-fifteenth century. Entitlement of one of the
anonymous chronicles on the Battle of Varna (1444) and some preceding clashes as Gazavat-ı
Sultan Murad bin Sultan Mehemmed Han (Holy Wars of Sultan Murad, son of Sultan
Mehmed Khan) was a consequence of such thinking.
The notion of ghaza continued to shape the perception of war until the conquest of
Constantinople (1453); after the conquest with greater centralization of the state, the
campaigns in the western borders of the Empire were brought under more strict state control.
Within this framework, the respect for former traditions and significance attached to ghaza
decreased to a large extent. For example, sixteenth century historian Neşrî (?-c.1520)6 wrote
that Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror (r. 1451-1481) abandoned the tradition of the Sultan’s
standing when traditional drums of the army (nevbet) were to be beaten.7 In this period, ghaza
was perceived as the ideology of raiders (akinci) and dervishes, namely anti-centralist
elements of the Empire, and it gradually lost its importance although it had still been utilized
as a source of legitimization of wars. Another significant change in the old war traditions of
the Empire after the conquest of Constantinople was the gradual transformation of the soldiers
and statesmen of the Empire from the ‘friends’ or ‘comrades’ of the Sultan to his ‘subjects’.
The relations between raider commanders in Rumelia, who had still persisted ghaza tradition,
and the central state were largely deteriorated in the reign of Murad II (r. 1421-1481). The
raider commanders were held responsible for the defeat of Ottoman army by SerbianHungarian troops in the Battle of Zlatica in 1443.8 This contributed to further replacement of
ghaza ideology with that of a more mundane understanding of war.The third significant
matter regarding the transformation of the perception of war in the reign of Mehmed II is the
emergence of the idea of ‘world dominance’, particularly after the conquest of Constantinople
and some other significant conquests of this period. The author of Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth (The
History of the Father of Conquest) and a historian lived in the period of Mehmed II, Tursun
Bey (c. 1426-c. 1490) labelled the Sultan as the ‘conqueror of the world’ (sahib-kıran).9 This
2
Beylik was an administrative unit which denoted, in this article, the political entities formed in Anatolia after
the disintegration of the Seljukid Empire in the late thirteenth century. Among many Beylik, Ottoman Empire
was initally one of the smallest ones based on northwestern Anatolia, on the territories adjacent to the Byzantine
Empire. The leader of Beylik was called the ‘Bey’.
3
Kafadar, “Gaza”, Islam Ansiklopedisi, p. 427.
4
Kafadar, ‘Gaza’, İslam Ansiklopedisi, p. 428
5
Kafadar, ‘Gaza’, İslam Ansiklopedisi, p. 428
6
The dates in parentheses indicates the dates of birth and death. The dates with ‘r.’ indicates the dates of reign of
a Sultan.
7
Cemal Kafadar, ‘İki Cihan Aresinde’, Doğu-Batı, Special Issue on Ottomans, No. 19, 1999, pp. 41-61, p. 45.
8
Mustafa Cezar (ed.), Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, 6 Volumes, İskit Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 311
9
Rhoades Murphey, ‘Fatih Sultan Mehmet Döneminde Osmanlı İç ve Dış Siyaseti’, in Güler Eren (ed.) Osmanlı,
12 Volumes, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, Vol. 1, pp. 239-246, p. 241.
understanding would be more visible particularly with the reign of Suleiman I the Magnificent
(r. 1520-1566).
From the mid-fifteenth to late sixteenth century, it can be said that the reasons of Ottoman
wars can be categorized under three headings.10 The first set of reasons includes religious
motivations. Particularly, the battles fought and raids organized in Central Europe were tried
to be legitimized through religious reasons. A sixteenth century Ottoman chronicler
Kemalpaşazade Ahmed Şemseddin (1468-1533) wrote that the in waging wars, the Ottoman
Sultans served for glorifying Islam and acted as the commanders of Muslims.11 These duties
were not only implemented against ‘infidels’ but also against heterodox sects of Islam, such
as Shia, which had been recognized as ‘heretic’ and against those states officially adopting
such heterodox sects, such as Safavids.12 The second set of reasons of war includes the
political motives. Particularly, starting from the third decade of the sixteenth century,
participation of the Ottoman Empire to the newly emerging European state system and to the
alliance structures established among major European states became one of the most
significant reasons of the sixteenth century Ottoman wars. During the sixteenth century,
Ottoman Empire supported France against the Habsburg Empire, which sought to control
whole European continent at that time referring to a similar claim of ‘world dominance’ as of
the Ottomans.13 In sum, in this period, Ottoman Empire was an inevitable partner of European
alliance systems and struggled with Habsburg Empire not only through active military support
via alliances, but also through capitulations, which had supported the economic development
of anti-Habsburg states, such as France, England and the Low Countries.14 The third set of
reasons of the Ottoman wars in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries consisted of humanitarian
motives. According to Kemalpaşazade, saving oppressed people from the rule of oppressors
was a just cause of war and the Ottoman Sultans assigned themselves the duty of relieving
such destitute people from cruel rulers.15
In sum, until late sixteenth century, although the tradition of ghaza had not totally been
disappeared, it was gradually replaced by a more mundane understanding of war. Of course,
this does not necessarily mean that religious motives did not influence the perception of war;
rather it can be said that the link between the perception of war and the perception of religion
was not totally broken, but loosen.
2.
The Perception of War from the Treaty of Zsitvatorok to the Reign of Selim III
(1606-1789)
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, in the East, Ottomans engaged in a long battle
with the Safavids between 1578 and 1590; whereas in the West they fought with Habsburgs
between 1593 and 1606. Besides longevity of these wars and exhaustion of economic
resources, Ottoman Empire faced technologically better equipped armies, particularly in the
West. The Treaty of Zsitvatorok signed with Habsburg Empire in 1606 had a symbolic
significance. Before this Treaty, the Habsburg Emperor was called by the Ottomans as the
‘Bey of Vienna’, meaning an inferior status vis-à-vis the Ottoman Sultan. However, in this
Treaty the Habsburg Emperor was called as ‘Kayzer’ (Caesar) and this meant that, at least
legally, he was perceived as equal to the Ottoman Sultan. In other words, the Ottoman
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, transcripted and edited by Şefaettin Severcan, Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınları, Ankara, 1996, p. LVI.
11
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, p. LVI
12
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, p. LIX
13
For a detailed analysis of Ottoman-European relations in the early modern period, see Mustafa Serdar
Palabıyık, Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Construction of Modern Europe, Unpublished M.Sc.
Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara, 2005.
14
The capitulations were granted to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the Netherlands in 1612.
15
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, p. LXII
10
Empire, whose diplomacy was based on the principle of non-recognition of any European
state as an equal of the Ottoman Empire and pursuance of continuous warfare except for
temporary truces, had begun to abandon such a strict policy.16
The long wars of the seventeenth century were not only perceived as a matter of distress by
Anatolian people, who contributed these wars both in material terms and in terms of
manpower; but also by the esteemed elite of the capital, particularly by the poets. It is not
therefore surprising that one of the rarest types of Ottoman classical poetry called sulhiyye (a
long poem written to praise peace) had often encountered towards the end of seventeenth and
beginning of the eighteenth century. These poems were generally written in the aftermath of a
war to praise peace and tranquillity. 17 In one of these poems written by seventeenth century
poet praising the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) Nâbî expressed the depressed mood of Ottoman
individual who had been bored of wars and declared his gratitude to the Ottoman
administrators providing peace. Another sulhiyye penned by Sâbit for the signature of the
Treaty of Pasarowitz in 1718 also welcomes the end of war and emergence of peace with grace
to God. These poems show that, while holy wars fought for religion and state had been
depicted as a festival just two centuries ago, in the beginning of eighteenth century, war was
reflected as a very negative concept.
Besides the psychological pressure of longevity of wars, relative failures in these wars
forced seventeenth century intellectuals to think on the reasons of these failures. One of the
most prominent intellectuals of this period, Katip Çelebi (1609-1657) cited some oft-referred
reasons as deterioration of the order of Janissary corps, incapacities of some statesmen,
economic difficulties, etc. However, he also added another significant reason for the lack of
precise victories, namely negligence of the ‘science of geography’.18 This stipulation was one
of the earliest serious warnings about considering scientific methods on war.
During the Tulip Period (1718-1730), which provided a temporary relief from wars, the
tradition of writing small but effective pamphlets on the backwardness of the Empire and the
reasons of failures in the wars consolidated. Particularly the writings of Defterdar Sarı Mehmet
Paşa (1655-1717) and İbrahim Müteferrika (1674-1745) were of great significance. In the
pamphlet written by Sarı Mehmet Paşa entitled Nesayih-ül Vüzera ve’l Ümera (The Advices of
Viziers and Rulers), he wrote that the reasons of Ottoman failure can be founded in the
corruption of Ottoman state institutions as well as the inaptness and disorder of the Janissary
corps. Although some of the remedies that he offered were realized by the Ottoman
administration, as Enver Ziya Karal said such ‘individual disciplinary precautions’ did not
produce fertile results.19 Ibrahim Müteferrika, a Hungarian renegade, who had established the
first printing house of the Ottoman Empire wrote in his masterpiece, Usul-ül Hikem fi Nizamül Ümem (Scientific Methods on the Order of Nations) that the Muslims should have been
informed about the position of their adversaries. They had to act far-sightedly and they had to
learn, as far as possible, European methods of governance and warfare, European institutions,
strategies and tactics.20. The writings of Müteferrika were also in line with the writings of
seventeenth century British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, on human nature. The traces of two
of the most important premises of realist international relations theory, namely an essentially
evil human nature and permanence of power struggle in interstate relations, can be found in
Ali İbrahim Savaş, ‘Genel Hatlarıyla Osmanlı Diplomasisi’, Eren (ed.), Osmanlı, Vol. 1, pp. 643-659, p. 644
For these poems see Ali Fuat Bilkan, ‘İki Sulhiyye Işığında Osmanlı Toplumunda Barış Özlemi’, Hasan Celal
Güzel [et. al.] (ed.) Türkler, 21 Volumes, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, Vol. 12, pp. 598-605.
18
Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Katip Çelebi’den Seçmeler, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1968, p. 114.
19
Enver Ziya Karal, ‘Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayununda Batının Etkisi’, Hasan Celal Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), Türkler,
Vol. 14, pp. 688-707, p. 700.
20
By the way, it is important to note that İbrahim Müteferrika could read and write in six different languages:
Hungarian, French, Latin, Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Thus it is not surprising that he could even make
quotations from ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Aristotle and Democritos in his book.
16
17
these writings. His pamphlet is also important because it generally underestimated religious
motives of war, while emphasizing political motives.
Such pamphlets of the first half of eighteenth century were followed by ambassadorial
reports (sefaretname), which included analysis of how European armies and states gained
supremacy vis-à-vis Ottoman army and Ottoman State. One of such ambassadorial reports
written by Giritli Ahmet Resmî Efendi (1694-1783) criticized those war-mongering elite who
wanted continuous wars for returning to the old glorious days of the Empire.21 He argued that
determining the foreign policy of the Empire solely on the basis of war was nothing but a
ruinous enterprise.
In sum, during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Ottoman society perceived war as a
negative concept and declared their distress and uneasiness from long and exhausting wars.
What is more, in this period, the reasons of continuous defeats were analysed and a scientific
approach to war was tried to be developed.
3.
The Perception of War from the Reign of Selim III until the Disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire (1789-1918)
The idea of deterioration of Ottoman institutions in the seventeenth century resulted in
temporary precautions in the first half of the eighteenth century. However, the concrete defeats
of Ottoman armies and collapse of Ottoman institutions were quite evident in the late
eighteenth century. This resulted in the necessity of more serious and radical measures to
remedy the illnesses of the Empire.
When Selim III reigned as the 28th Ottoman Sultan in 1789, he convened most of the
esteemed statesmen of the period and demanded them to prepare reports for the reasons of and
the remedies to the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire. The military reform proposals
included in these reports can be categorized under three categories: (1) the reports prepared by
conservatives, which demanded returning to the old customs and methods, laws and
regulations of Suleiman I era; (2) the reports prepared by reformers, which demanded
Janissary’s adoption of new European methods and technology; (3) the reports prepared by
radicals, which argued that the old army formation could not be reformed, so it should be
abandoned and a new army should be established.22
The usage of diplomacy was also consolidated during the Selim III period and permanent
diplomatic representations were established; on the other hand, there were steps taken for the
establishment of the European-style army. Before his sultanate Mühendishane-i Berr-i
Humayun (Royal Military Engineering Academy) was established in 1773 and two decades
later, in 1793, he opened Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun (Royal Naval Engineering
Academy). Such military schools mushroomed in subsequent periods. Mekteb-i Ulum-i
Harbiye (War Sciences College) and Mekteb-i Harbiye (Military Academy) were founded in
1834 and 1846 respectively.
The speech that Selim III delivered for his coronation was significant for understanding his
thoughts on war and diplomacy. In his speech he tried to increase the mood of statesmen and
army through using religious motives in describing victory and defeat. According to Koran, he
said, the believers were heralded with victory so long as they meet three criteria: abandonment
of mundane passions, unconditional obedience to their authorities and abandonment of fear of
death because of the honour of martyrdom.23 Hence, once more, it was perceived that the
Sipahi Çataltepe, ‘III. Selim Devri Askeri Islahatı ve Nizam-ı Cedid Ordusu’, Eren (ed.), Osmanlı, Vol. 7, pp.
241-249, p. 242.
22
Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 98
23
Quoted from Enver Ziya Karal, III. Selim’in Hatt-ı Humayunları, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara,
1999, p. 23.
21
religious understanding of war and victory was not totally disappeared from Ottoman
discourse.
While Ottoman Empire had been recruiting French soldiers and experts to modernize its
army and relied on French assistance, it was a shocking experience for the Ottoman public
opinion as well as for the Sultan when Napoleon Bonaparte, the young and ambitious French
general, surprisingly invaded Egypt in 1798. On the one hand, he wanted to resist this
invasion; on the other hand, being aware of Ottoman unpreparedness he could not declare war
on France and he tried to surpass this dilemma. Within this framework, invasion of Egypt
brought the option of establishing alliances once more into the agenda. The alliances made
with Russia in 1797 and with Britain in 1799 were protective measures taken to ensure
maintenance of the Empire, meaning that different from earlier alliances the Ottoman state is
the weaker partner and the demanding side.24 From the invasion of Egypt onwards, the
resolution of the problem called the ‘Eastern Question’ was tied to such alliances and at the
core of the Ottoman diplomacy there was the effort to maintain them.
When it comes to the perception of war in the nineteenth century, it can be said that the
nineteenth century, Ottoman intellectuals, particularly the intellectuals of Tanzimat era and the
Young Ottoman movement, preferred to stop further deterioration of Ottoman institutions
through focusing on the internal problems of the Empire rather than engaging in a belligerent
foreign policy to get the lost territories back. In other words, they preferred peace rather than
war, and they tried to operationalize the long thought reforms to ameliorate the illnesses of the
state.
One of the most interesting wars of this century was of course the Crimean War (18531856). This war is the first and only war that the Ottoman Empire fought in side with France
and Britain against Russia. Another significant aspect of this war was that the ordinary people
increased their support towards the state and the army since they became more aware of the
situation of the Empire and they acted consciously to contribute the prevention of total
collapse. Particularly, the emergence of Ottoman newspapers in the mid-nineteenth century
informed the people living in Istanbul and some other big cities on the causes and course of the
war and this contributed to increasing awareness of the public opinion.25
Ottoman intellectuals began to discuss the concept of ‘civilization’ in a more systematic
way in the second half of the nineteenth century and this resulted in the evaluation of the
concept of war within the framework of these discussions on European civilization. In other
words, as in other fields, in the field of war, many Ottoman intellectuals argued for the
adoption of European mode of scientific and technological evolution and the perception of war
through European lenses. For example, one of the most important intellectuals of this period,
Namık Kemal (1840-1888) wrote in the first issue of his newspaper, İbret, that he was
confident in the future of the Ottoman Empire and the among the reasons of this optimism he
cited the nature of new Ottoman troops.26 What is more, he criticized pessimist views arguing
that the Ottoman Empire had nothing to cope with its adversaries; rather, he referred the new
weapons and naval and military achievements among the instruments for the endurance of the
state.27 However, still, he argued that the future of the state could be guaranteed not through
wishing deteriorating conditions for the adversaries of the Ottoman Empire, but through
accumulating more power.28
Savaş, ‘Genel Hatlarıyla Osmanlı Diplomasisi’, p. 655.
Besim Özcan, ‘Kırım Savaşı (1853-1856)’, Eren (ed.), Osmanlı, Vol. 2, pp. 97-112, p. 109
26
İbret, No. 1, 13 June 1872; in Mustafa Nihat Özön (ed.) Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, Yapı Kredi Yayınları,
İstanbul, 1997, p. 48.
27
İbret, No. 3, 17 June 1872; in Özön (ed.) Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, p. 56.
28
İbret, No. 2, 15 June 1872; in Özön (ed.) Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi, p. 52.
24
25
Another prominent Ottoman intellectual emphasizing the negative effects of ignorance of
Western military technology and sciences of war was Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895). He
was the official chronicler in the Hamidian era and his chronicle Tarih-i Cevdet gives
significant clues for the understanding of war in the second half of the nineteenth century. One
chapter of this chronicle carried the title of ‘On the Science of War’ and this chapter
summarized the evolution of sciences of war from the first establishment of regular armies in
the period of Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, until the nineteenth century.29 Ahmet
Cevdet Paşa also explained the regression of the Ottoman Empire through Ottoman failure to
adopt Western military technology and repeated a long tradition descending from eighteenth
century onwards. According to Cevdet Paşa as a result of negligence of new strategy and
tactics in the Ottoman Empire, from the late eighteenth century onwards war was abandoned as
a method of inter-state relations and it was replaced by diplomacy.30 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa
emphasized a vicious circle here. Long wars made diplomacy an essential element of Ottoman
foreign policy; this resulted in neglecting military development, and in the wars emerging after
relative periods of peace, Ottoman armies defeated more fatally.
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa presented two of his writings, Tezakir and Maruzat, in which he not
only discussed historical events but also their historical ramifications, to Sultan Abdülhamid II
(r. 1876-1909). Abdülhamid II ruled the Empire during the last quarter of the nineteenth and
the first decade of the twentieth century, and his controversial personality led him to be
labelled either positively as the ‘Glorious Khakan’ or negatively as the ‘Red Sultan’. The
perception of war during Hamidian era was not much different from the previous period and
the idea of avoiding war and resorting diplomacy through establishing and switching alliances
prevailed. For the Sultan himself, even if the wars ended with victory, their cost was
unaffordable by the Ottoman Empire.31 The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 was a good example
of such wars. At the end of the war, although the Ottoman Empire had an evident victory, with
the intervention of Great Powers, it had to cede all the territories it had occupied and accepted
only a small amount of war indemnity given by Greece.32
The policy of balancing the Great Powers, which was a peculiar characteristic of the
Hamidian era, was abandoned with the dethronement of the Sultan in 1909. The War of Tripoli
and the Balkan Wars, which had erupted after the dethronement, transformed the perception of
war both of the governing elite and of the public opinion. This transformation was quite
evident in the letters of Enver Paşa (1881-1922), which were addressed to an unidentified
woman, whom he probably met when he served in Germany. The letters sent to this mysterious
lady on the eve of Tripoli and Balkan Wars showed the desire of war of a young and ambitious
soldier. In this period such young soldiers as Enver Paşa thought that war was an inevitable
opportunity for the survival of the state. For example, on August 16, 1912, from his
headquarters near Derne in Libya, Enver Paşa wrote that he feared from a peace, which would
end all his efforts to save the Empire.33 In another letter of Enver Paşa dated June 7, 1913, he
wrote “Balkans is filled with clouds which are gradually threatening peace; that’s so good!”34
Unfortunately Enver Paşa could not foresee that Balkan Wars brought more misery than life to
Turkey.
In this period, some of Ottoman intellectuals began to argue for taking Germany as a
model, because of its rapid industrialization and successful modernization. Particularly
29
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, 3 Volumes, Üçdal Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1976, Vol.1, pp. 167-175.
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, p. 173.
31
Engin Akarlı, ‘II. Abdülhamid: Hayatı ve İktidarı’, in Eren (ed.), Osmanlı, Vol. 2, pp. 253-274, p. 257.
32
Bayram Kodaman, ‘II. Abdülhamid Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler’, in Eren (ed.), Osmanlı, Vol. 2, pp. 275-285,
p. 279.
33
Şükrü Hanioğlu (ed.) Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, p. 165.
34
Hanioğlu (ed.) Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa, p. 245.
30
Germany’s victory over France in 1871 resulted in the replacement of admiration to France
with admiration to Germany. One of the most important representatives of pro-German
movement was Cenap Şehabettin. In his travelogue entitled Avrupa Mektupları (Letters from
Europe) one can easily see his admiration to Germany; this piece also included his perception
of war. While he wrote on the military structure of Germany he wrote that interstate relations
were based on power and he emphasized “inevitable” supremacy of the strong over the weak.35
The perception of war as the only way of survival continued until the eve of the World War
I and became one of he most significant ideological factors in the Ottoman decision to enter
the war. For example, Cemal Paşa explained the reason why the Ottoman Empire had entered
the war as such: “Gentlemen, if the Ottoman Empire had not participated in war, the
independence of the country would have been in a grave danger”.36 Halil Bey (1874-1948), the
speaker of the Ottoman Parliament emphasized that the Ottoman Empire could only maintain
its territorial integrity through participating in the war. What is more, Ottoman victory, for
Halil Bey, would not only save the Ottoman Empire but also all Muslims and Turks living out
of the borders of the Empire.37 Enver Paşa made a similar comment in saying that they would
not only succeed in the protection of the Ottoman throne but also in the provision of survival
of the whole Islamic community.38
Another significant issue regarding the Ottoman participation to World War I was
declaration of jihad by the declaration of the text entitled ‘The Holy Jihad Declaration’ which
was signed by şeyhülislam Ürgüplü Hayri Efendi (1867-1921) and approved by Sultan
Mehmed V (r. 1909-1918) on November 14, 1914. This text was translated into many
languages spoken in Muslim countries and sent to these countries. What is more, in order to
attract the support of the Shia community, the Shia religious figures of Necef, Kerbela and
Kazımiye were demanded to issue fetva for the legitimacy to participate in the war.39 Thus, in
the World War I, the Ottoman Empire hopelessly tried to attract all Muslim material and
human sources into World War I; however it failed; since most of the Muslim communities
were under control of colonial powers and fought under colonial armies against the Ottoman
Empire. This also showed the limits of Caliphate in the new age.
Conclusion
This article aimed to analyse the perception of “war” in Turkey from the establishment of
the Ottoman Empire to its disintegration. In doing that, it tried to reveal how the perception of
war has been transformed in line with the domestic and external developments. In the final
analysis, it can be said that there is no uniform perception of war; rather there are some
particular dominant perceptions for particular periods. In the initial years of the Empire, in
order to direct the energy of nomadic tribes to the Christian ‘other’, the perception of ghaza
prevailed, despite the fact that even in these years this ‘other’ sometimes appeared as the ally
of the Ottomans. However, with the centralization of the Empire particularly after midfifteenth century onwards, religious dimensions of the understanding of war had been replaced
by a more secular understanding, perceiving war as a mundane issue. Although, in this period,
Ottoman Sultans perceived themselves as superior to their European or Asian counterparts, as
a result of long and tiresome wars of seventeenth century and subsequent Ottoman defeats, war
had been defined as a process between equal rulers.
35
Cenap Şehabettin, Avrupa Mektupları, T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1995, p. 39.
Hasan Babacan, ‘Enver Paşa’, Hasan Celal Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), Türkler, Vol. 13, pp. 263-273, p. 269.
37
Babacan, ‘Enver Paşa’, p. 270.
38
Babacan, ‘Enver Paşa’, p. 270.
39
Sadık Sarısaman, ‘I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Türk Cephelerinde Psikolojik Harp’, Hasan Celal Güzel [et. al.] (eds.),
Türkler, Vol. 13, pp. 453-468, p. 458.
36
During eighteenth century Ottoman defeats were tried to be remedied through development
of a more scientific understanding of war, particularly in the writings of intellectuals such as
Katip Çelebi and İbrahim Müteferrika. Nineteenth century, on the other hand, was the period,
in which war had been discredited and diplomacy was perceived to be the most viable tool for
the survival of the state. Despite such an understanding favouring avoidance of war, towards
the end of this century and particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century, Young
Turks, who had dethroned Abdülhamid II and established parliamentary regime once more,
adopted the perception of ‘war for the survival of state’. This would result in the Ottoman
participation to the World War I and subsequent disintegration of the Empire.
All in all, war has always been a part of Ottoman society although there is no uniform
perception of it. Rather depending on domestic and external circumstances the perception of
war varied. It has been perceived as a tool of motivation, as a way of expansion, or as an
opportunity for the survival of state.