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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Summer School, 2008-2009
HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
FEAS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
LECTURER: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özlen Çelebi
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• There are different approaches in classification.
• There are plenty of factors which shape a
country’s foreign policy behaviours/objectives.
• According to Mustafa Aydın:
• There are structural variables and conjunctural
variables. “ One kind, which may be called
structural variables, are continuous, and rather
static. The other, which may be termed
conjunctural variables, are dynamic and subject
to change under the influence of domestic and
foreign developments.”
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• “The structural factors are not directly related
to the international political medium and the
daily happenings of foreign politics. They can
exert a long-term influence over the
determination of foreign policy goals.
Geographical position, historical experiences
and cultural background, together with
national stereotypes and images of other
nations, and long-term economic necessities
would fall into” this category.
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• “Conjucntural variables …are made up of a
web of interrelated developments in domestic
politics and international relations.”
• The structural determinants of Turkish foreign
policy, according to M. Aydın are:
• 1. The historical experiences, specifically the
Ottoman Empire heritage.
• 2. Geographic location of Turkey and
geopolitical conditions.
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• 3. Culture, especially the political culture of
country and the decission-making.
• The basic determinants of Turkish foreign policy
according to Ülman and Sander are:
• 1. Security concerns and alliances.
• 2. Geographic location (neighbours, neighbouring
regions, the straits).
• 3. Administrative structure, understanding of
politics and perceptions of the decision makers.
BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• 4. Economic needs/requirements.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
• 1. Westernization in the sense of modernization and
adoptin western values such as democratic rule, respect to
rule of law and being an independent/sovereign nation sate
within the international system;
• 2. Preserving staus quo: Protecting international peace and
stability; no room for non-pacific solutions (esp. condemning
wars);
• 3. Respect to international law, working in cooperation with
international organizations;
• 4. Balanced and rational foreign policy decision-making.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• I. The Lausanne Conference:
• The Lausanne Conference opened on 21
November 1922, but only after encountering
serious problems as to who was to attend.
• A. Soviet participation: An invitation was
issued to the Soviets on 27 November 1922 on
condition that they could only participate in
those discussions which had to do with the
future of the Straits.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• B. Seperate invitations were issued to the Ankara
government and to that of the Sultan in Istanbul.
Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his colleagues were
anxious to prevent a divided Turkish
representation at Lausanne. The Assembly
abolished the Sultanate on 1 November.
• C. Representatives: Britain, France, Italy, Japan,
Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State, on the one part and Turkey of the other
part.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• D. Parts (4), sections, clauses and articles
(143) of the Treaty.
• II. Negotiations:
• The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July
1923 at Lausanne.
• British diplomatic strategy: Aiding the estb. Of
an independent Turkey as an anti-Soviet
barrier, while protecting British interests.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• The Straits: Britain’s main interests, as Lord Curzon saw them, were
to secure freedom of passage for British warships through the
Straits, and the attachment of disputed province of Mousul to
British-ruled Iraq, rather than to Turkey.
• The British sought to have the Straits opened to warships, while the
Soviets aimed to keep them closed. Meanwhile, the British wished
to prevent the Turks from closing the Straits to Western navies. The
Turks were prepared to allow limited access to the Black Sea for the
navies of non-Black Sea states, so as to maintain a balance of power
against Russia. The result was a compromise under which non-Black
Sea powers gained limited access to that sea, and both sides of the
straits were demilitarised. These arrangemets were going to be
supervised by an international commission.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• The Mousul issue: The Turks based their claim
to the province of Mousul on the grounds that it
was part of the non-Arabic territories which were
included within the putative Turkish State under
the National Pact, 1919-1923
and had
not been under British
PERIOD
occupation at the time of Mudros armistice. The
British were anxious to attach the Mousul
Province to Iraq as a defensive barrier against
Turkey. Moreover, parties were keen to gain
control of rich oil resources of the Province. The
question was left unsettled when the Lausaane
Treaty was signed.
1919-1923 PERIOD
• The exchange of populations between Turkey
and Greece: More than 1 million;
homogenization of the populations and
security concerns.
II. Settlement and Challenges:
A. The domestic politics
B. The settlement of Mousul problem:
1923-1926: Ankara Treaty
1923-1939 PERIOD
• C. Turkey and the settlement of basic foreign policy principles:
• A delicately balanced and multiplied foreign policy based on a larger
historical perspective and political evaluations; rational decisions
and decison makers.
• D. Turkey and relations with the USSR:
• Dec. 1925: Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship and it was renewed
in 1929 with a protocol. Turkish policy makers attributed high
importance to balanced relations with the USSR.
• E. Turkey and relations with Greece:
• Exchange of populations-problems –Patriarchy; problems continued
over properties issue until 1929. In 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos
visited Turkey Oct. 1930). Previously, in June 1930 an agreement
was signed between the two countries which settled the dispute
over properties.
1923-1939 PERIOD
• F.
Turkey and the West:
• Relations with France and the UK.
• G. Hatay issue: 1938 Hatay Republic; 1939 Hatay acceeded to Turkey
following a plebicit.
• H. Turkey, international security and alliances:
• Turkey signed bilateral agreements with her neighbours and the other
international actors such as the USA and the League of Nations. These
treaties were reflecting Turkey’s security concerns, in general, and also the
aim of solving international problems by peaceful methods.
• Alliance in the Balkans:
• Major objective of Turkish policy was to form an entente with at least one,
or preferably two of her balkan neighbours.
• 1933: Entente Cordiale under which Turkey and Greece mutually
guaranteed their common frontier in Thrace and agreed to consult with
one another on all questions of common interests.
• Balkan Pact; 1934 between Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
1923-1939 PERIOD
• 1937 saadabad Pact: Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan
• Turkey obtained an armaments credit from
the British in May 1938 and another one in
Oct. 1939. Anglo-Turkish decleration was
issued on 12 May 1939. Draft treaty betwn
Turkey, France and Britain was signed on 1
Sept. 1939.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• “Although the (Turkish gvt.) had signed a
tripartite alliance with Britain and France in
October 1939, Turkey remained “a de facto
neutral power” throughout the war, resisting
strong pressure from both the Allies and
Germany to join the war on their side. The careful
balancing act is held up as an example of how a
relatively small and militarily backward country
could follow an independent path at a time of
global struggle, and ‘a striking example of a small
state which was no helpless pawn in international
politics.’” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• “This policy could be seen as a natural outcome of
Turkey’s experiences since 1914, and the country’s
relative power and international position.” (Hale, W.)
• -Decision-making: lessons from history+ rationality:
“…Turkey had practically nothing to gain and
everything to lose by joining the war.” (Hale, W.)
• “Turkey’s wartime diplomasy can be seen as subject
to significant shifts, adapted to the circumstances of
a series of fairly distinct phases, and to changes
within these phases.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Turkish army’s limits: outdated equipment and lack of
modern training.
• Baku Plan:
• In March 1940 France proposed a plan for bombing the
Soviet oil fields at Baku, to weaken the Soviet support to
Germany. The attacking aircraft would need to overfly
Turkey. However the plan was dropped because of the
British perception and evaluations about probabale results
of such an operation regarding Turkey’s involvement in it:
“Aggression by the Allies against the Soviet Union might
give the Turks an excuse to stay out of the war, and Turkey’s
role as the bastion of the British position in the Middle East
made it essential to retain Turkish support.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Fall of Paris:
• The collapse of France in June 1940 dramatically
reversed the expectations about the likely course
of the war and Turkey’s role in it. Turkey’s
possible participation in the war had depended
on the assumption that the French fleet would be
available to oppose Italy in the Mediterranean, if
need be, and that the German army would be
fully occupied in fighting a long war on the
western front.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940; on 7 October
1940, German troops began to enter Romania. The
Turkish response to the Italian decleration of war was a
decleration of non-belligerence issued by the
government on 26 June 1940 which also cited the
protocol to the Tripartite Treaty which absolved Turkey
from joining the war if this would involve it in armed
conflict with the SU. Turkey also claimed that the treaty
has been done with both Britain and France, however,
France was now out of the war/invaded, and unable to
assume its obligations.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• “Although the events of 1940 forced the Turks to reconsider their
position this did not lead to a rapid rapproachement with Germany.
Initially Germany’s aim was to secure the neutrality of Turkey…After
the dramatic German victories in the summer of 1940, von Papen
urged Berlin that Germany should go further, by trying to convert
Turkey into a pro-German neutral so as to facilitate a German attack
on the British in the Middle East. Hints were meanwhile dropped to
the Turks that Germany would oppose such concessions if Turkey
made some concrete demonstrations of sympathy for Germany,
including the dismissal of Saracoğlu…this demand was categorically
dismissed by İnönü. Meanwhile trade relations formed the main
business of Turkish-German diplomacy…In 1940, disagreements
over trade agreements with Britain led Turkey to secure a new
commercial agreement with Germany. However, its duration was
limited to only one year, the volume of trade was still limited, and
did not include chromite.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Soviet factor:
• Throughout the war a crucial concern for Turkey was the policy of SU. “In
July 1940 Stalin accepted British mediation for an improvement in
relations with Turkey, but insisted that this should be based on the
participation of the Black Sea powers…in the defence of the Straits. This
was unacceptable” for Turkey and the proposal came to nothing.
“Moreover, Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union were inevitably
overshadowed by those of Stalin with Hitler.” (Hale, W.) Stalin added the
Soviet ambissions on the Straits onto the agenda between SU and
Germany. Germans responded Stalin by “presenting him with a draft
agreement on 26 November (1940) which …proposed a joint committment
to detach Turkey from its alliance with Britain…and to secure a revision of
the Montreaux Convention giving the Soviet Union free naval access
through the straits. However, Molotov regarded this as insufficient, and
demanded the establishment of Soviet military and naval bases at the
straits.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• If Turkey agreed to join a projected fourpower pact …then the other powers would
guarantee its independence and territory. If
not, then ‘the required military and diplomatic
measures’ would be taken.” (Hale, W.)
• “These demands were too much for Hitler.
Evidently, he did not want to hand over
control over the straits and Bulgaria to
Stalin.”(Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Britsh proposal to Turkey : Following the fall of
France, a pro-Vich administration was
established in Syria. Britain, during the
summer of 1940 considered plans to
intervene into Syria to prevent it coming
under a direct German or Italian control.
Turkey, accordingly, could be offered territory
in Syria (Aleppo)“…as an inducement for
cooperating in this.”However, Turkey showed
no ineterest and the idea was dropped.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• German proposal to Turkey: In 1941, Germany planned to send
warplanes to Iraq to play some role in fighting against the British
forces there and in the larger area of Middle East. “The quickest
way …was to draw on the Vichy stocks in Syria.” The only railway
from Syria to Iraq passed through Turkish territory, and the
operation thus depended on Turkey’s permission. In negotiations
(June) Turkey insisted on a defined/limited number of German
troops accross Turkish territory. However, it was late to negotiate
since the British had moved forces into Iraq and overthrown Rashid
Ali government. Britain also was preparing to invade Syria. They
once more offered Turkey the plan about Aleppo.The proposal was
again turned down by Turkey. “With the idea of collaboration with
Turkey now dropped, a mixed force of British, Indian, Australian,
Arab and Free French Forces invaded Syria...Turkey had thus been
able to get out of the crisis without any serious involvement on
either side.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• German advances in the Balkans: In the Spring of 1941,
German advances in the Balkans were Turkey’s main focus
of concern.Hitler conquered Yugoslavia and Greece and
German forces were now in full occupation of Romania and
Bulgaria. “…on 4 March 1941, Hitler wrote a personal letter
to İnönü assuring him that the German occupation of
Bulgaria was in no way directed against Turkey, but purely
against the British in Greece,…(Hale, W.) On 18 June 1941,
the Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and NonAggression was signed in which the two governments
agreed to respect each other’s territorial integrity and to
‘abstain from all action aimed directly or indirectly against
one another.’” (Hale, W.) Only 4 days later German forces
invaded the SU. (Operation Barbarossa)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Trade was a significant factor in Turkish-German relations “Here, a
vital issue for both the Germans and British was the supply of
chromite, which is an essential ingredient in steel-making. Germany
had no domestic supplies, but Turkey had accounted for about 16
per cent of world production in 1939…In October 1939 the Turks
had proposed to the British that they should sell them 200,000 tons
of chromite per year for the next two years…However, in
negotiations with the British, Numan Menemencioğlu also insisted
that Britain should buy agreed quantities of Turkey’s other exports,
on the grounds that Germany…would refuse to take these products
if chromite were not also on offer. The British turned this deal
down, and only promised to buy 50,000 tons of chromite per year
in 1941 and 1942…”(Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• “In their 1940 trade agreement with Germany,the Turks had
withheld chromite, but the failure to reach an exclusive long-term
agreement with the British left them free to reverse this later. In
October 1941 a new arrangement was reached with Germany,
known as the ‘Clodius agreement’…Under this, Germany was to
receive a maximum of 90,000 tons of chromite in 1943 (that is,
after the contract with the British expired) and 45,000 tons in 1944.
The Clodius agreement also provided for the sale by Germany of
substantial amounts of military and other essential equipment to
Turkey. In the summer of 1942 Turkey received a loan of 100 million
Reichsmarks for the purchase of arms from Germany-supplies
which Britain could not match at the time…The signature of the
Clodius agreement partly derived from the British failure to accept
the proposed exclusive deal with Turkey, but it is likely that it also
reflected İnönü’s desire not to provoke Germany by witholding
supplies of chromite…” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• “Obviously, the beginning of ‘Barbarossa’ also effected Turkey’s relations
with both Moscow and London, since Britain and the Soviet Union were
now fighting on the same side. Their first concern was to try to allay
Turkish suspicions about Soviet ambitions at the straits. Accordingly, on 28
July 1941, Stalin held told İnönü that he had no interest in revising the
Montreaux Convention.” (Hale, W.) On 10 August, Britain and the SU
issued a joint decleration “stating their fidelity to Montreuax rules…”.
“However, it does not appear that the Turks were reassured by these
statements. Their suspicions were naturally strengthened by the AngloSoviet invasion and occupation of neighbouring Iran in August 1941.”
(Hale, W.)
• “…both the British and Soviet governments realised that the best they
could do would be to try to keep Turkey as a neutral buffer at this
stage...However, behind the scenes, and by August 1942, Churchill was
trying to persuade his two allies (which now included the United States)
that their next priority must be try to knock Italy out of the war, and bring
Turkey in.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
•
“Clearly, the full entry of the United States into the war following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 was probably the decisive event which
determined that, in the long run, the Axis would lose the war. However,…Turkey’s
position was not effectively changed until the winter of 1942-43-first by the
German defeat at el-Alamein in October-November 1942 and the consequent
allied landings in Algeria and Morocco, which ended the Axis threat to the Middle
East, …”(Hale, W.) Turkey had to deal with a political environment in which the
Allies’ campaign was to bring Turkey into the war, esp. Following the developments
with the Casablanca Conference (Jan. 1943) where there remained no possibility
of a negotiated peace between Germany and the Allies…Turkish policy was
determined, first by the fear that if Turkey joined the war on the Allied side with
inadequate preparation or support it would still be very vulnerable to a retaliatory
attack by Germany. Equally, Stalin might use Turkish entry into the war as an
excuse for Soviet entry into Turkey. On the other hand, if Turkey bluntly rejected
the Allies’ proposals then it would be left dangerously isolated, and in a very weak
position to resist Soviet ambitions at the straits and elsewhere in the post-war
world.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• İnönü and his cabinet decide to play for time, to avoid
committing country to war unless it’s an offensive one
and to keep the balance in their relations with the
Allies.
• “The initiative for bringing Turkey into the war came
principally from Winston Churchill…It depended on
bringing military supplies into Turkey via Syria and
elsewhere, and originally assumed that Turkey would
invade the Balkans in the spring of 1943, so as to strike
Germany’s southern flank. The main obstacles to this
project was the reluctance of the Turks to get dragged
into the war, objections from the British Foreign
Office,…, and from military commanders…
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• The Adana Meeting: İnönü decided to talk directly with Churchill at
a meeting in a train parked near Adana on 30-31 July 1943. “İnönü’s
main objective was to avoid committing Turkey to war against the
Axis, and in turn to obtain the maximum amount of military
supplies for Turkey and to warn Churchill about Stalin’s likely postwar intentions…When Churchill suggested that air bases should be
prepared in Turkey for the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Turks
responded that even if German was now not what it had been,
Germany was still capable of reacting by overrunning the straits,
and reducing İstanbul and Turkey’s few industrial installations to
rubble.Hence, it was eventually agreed that Britain would not ask
for any immediate committments from Turkey, …If it became
belligerent,
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Turkey’s territory would be fully guaranteed by Britain
after the war…The only clear and immediate
committment on both sides was that Turkey should
receive an increased flow of arms and infrastructural
support.”(Hale, W.)
• Following the Adana meeting Turkish policy was to
postpone the date at which they might be required to
enter the war indefinitely.
• 1943: Italy collapsed. Britain began to invade
Dodacanese. However, Germany was still a strong
power in the eastern Mediterranean and Dodacanese
operation turned into a disaster for the British.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• The Moscow meetings: The meetings at Moscow were
held between Eden, Molotow and the US Secretary of
State, Hull between 19 October and 1 November 1943.
Molotov, at the meetings proposed that Turkey should
be told to join the Allies. The USA had its own proposal
that Turkey should be asked to allow the establishment
of Allied air bases in Turkey and to enter the war by the
end of 1943.
• The 1st Cairo meeting: Eden put these proposals to
Menemencioğlu at a meeting in Cairo (5-8 November
1943). Menemencioğlu, on behalf of Turkey did not
accept these proposals.
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Turkey stated in a message of 22 November that Turkey was prepared to
enter the war “in principle” if only it received adequate protection against
a German attack.
• The Tehran Conference: The question about Turkey’s entrance to war was
also discussed at the Tehran Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt and
Stalin ( 28 November-1 December 1943). The conference concluded that it
was “most desirable” for Turkey to enter the war by the end of the year,
and fixed 14 February 1944 as the date by which it should become an
active participant.
• The 2nd Cairo meeting: These proposals were put to İnönü at a second
Cairo meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill on 4-6 December 1943. İnönü
continued to stress Turkey’s military inadequacy, and the shortfall in
supplies from the British. “Turkey’s participation in the war, İnönü argued,
would depend on nthe organization of a joint Allied offensive in the
Balkans…İnönü realised that Roosevelt was sceptical about the idea of
bringing Turkey in, and exploited this difference between Britain and the
United States to delay action.” (Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• Finally, it was understood that Turkey would committ itself to accept a
military mission to discuss the preparation of the proposed air bases and
to reserve the right to decide by 15 Feb. 1944 whether Turkey would allow
the Allies to use them.
• Von Papen was very well informed about the Cairo conference. A German
agent called Cicero, “…made it clear to the Turks that accepting Allied
aircraft on Turkish soil would mean immediate war with Germany and,
was assured by Menemencioğlu 0n 18 December that Turkey would
remain neutral…on 12 December, the Turkish government duly informed
the Allies that Turkey would exercise its option not to receive Allied air
detachments by the target date of 15 February.A military mission arrived
in Ankara, but left on 4 February 1944 after making no progress, and the
British decided to stop their programme of re-equpping Turkey.By the
middle of the year, the Soviet government had indicated that it had lost
interest in bringing Turkey into war, and opposed the use of British or US
forces in the area…”(Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
•
•
•
The Moscow meeting of October 1944: Churchill and Stalin met and delineated the
spheres of influence in eastern Europe and the Balkans. In this
meeting/conference the Turkish Straits issue was once more put on the table.
“…Stalin claimed thatthe Montreaux Convention was ‘unsuitable’ and a
‘spearhead’ aimed at Russia: he could not accept a situation in which Turkey might
‘grip Russian trade by the throat’, he maintained. Against the advice of Eden and
the Foreign Office, Churchill responded that Britain would have no objection to
allowing free passage for Soviet warships through the straits, and that the
Convention was now ‘inadmissable’ and ‘obsolete’.” (Hale, W.) The question came
back onto the agenda at Yalta, (Big Three meeting) ( 4-11 February 1945)
“The most contentious issues in relations between Turkey and the Allies during the
spring and summer of 1944 was caused by Allied pressure on Turkey to break
commercial and diplomatic relations with Germany…On 20 April, Menemencioğlu
announced that chromite shipments to Germany would cease immediately…The
process was rounded off on 2 August when Turkey formally broke off diplomatic
relations with Germany…”(Hale, W.)
1939-1945: WWII and TFP
• One of the decisons taken at Yalta was that to
the effect that membership of the proposed
UNO would be restricted to those states which
had joined the war on the Allied side before
the end of Feb. 1945. This decison led Turkey
to declare war on Germany and Japan on 23
February.
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
• I. Post-War Settlements and the New World
System:
 A bi-polar world system;
 Conflictual relations between the two major
blocks;
Rapid escalation of tensions;
Establishment of military and economic
cooperation organizations within the each block
and/or non-block members.
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
• II.
Turkey and Foreign Relations:
• According to W. Hale: “For the Turks, the most important feature of the
post-war world, was its bipolarity, and the fact that the United States and
Soviet Union were the only two players who really mattered…the range of
Turkey’s options was far more limited than it had been during the early
period. It could not opt out of the Cold War, relying on a balance of power
between the two Cold War blocks to maintain its security, like most of its
Arab neighbours and and other Asian and African states, without running
the serious risk of Soviet agression or political domination.”
• Was there a well-founded basis for such an argument to develop during
the late 1940 and early 1950s in Turkey? It worths to question and to think
about it.
• “Nor did it have sufficient economic, technical and military resources to
protect itself, if it choese neutrality. On this account, it was virtually bound
to seek place in the Western alliance.” (Hale, W.)
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
• “In March 1945 the Soviet government officially denounced the
Treaty of Friendship which it had signed in 1925. Three months
later, on 7 June 1945, Molotov told Selim Sarper, …thet in return for
renewing the treaty the Soviet Union would demand a new straits
convention, negotiated solely between Turkey and the Soviet
Union. This would provide for the free passage of Soviet warships
through the straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the
establishment of Soviet bases at the straits, and the retrocession to
Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan which had
been returned to Turkey in 1921.” (Hale, W.)
• The same issue was brought on to the meeting table of Big Three at
Potsdam. Stalin failed to gain British or the Us support for these
demand on the Straits. However, Turkish policy makers had some
serious doubts about the British position. “Hence, Turkey had to try
to secure US assistance.” (Hale, W.)
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
•
•
•
A.
Relations with the USA and the EEC countries:
“On 2 November 1945, the United States presented a note to the Turkish
government proposing an international conference to discuss the revision of the
Montreaux Convention, at which the United States would support the principle of
free passage for the warships of Black Sea powers, and limited access for the fleets
of non-Black Sea states…The fact that this response excluded the proposal for the
establishment of Soviet bases was the most important point from the Turkish
viewpoint…by the beginning of 1946 President Truman had been converted by
Soviet actions in Iran and elsewhere where to adopt a much tougher approach
than it had demonstrated at Potsdam.
Truman’s forecast of likely Soviet actions appeared to be born out in March 1946
as the Soviet Union reinforced its substantial military presence in Iranian
Azerbaijan, thus threatening both Iran and eastern Turkey, as well as strengthening
its forces in Bulgaria which could have been used against either Turkey or Greece.
An important boost to Turkish morale came on 6 April 1946, when the battleship
USS Missouri paid a visit to İstanbul, to wide public acclaim.” (Hale, W.)
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
• Meanwhile, the diplomatic tussle over the straits continued. (From 7
August 1946 to 26 October 1946) Finally, the Soviet government informed
the British that a conference to consider a new straits regime would be
“premature”. “Meanwhile, Britain was in dire economic straits. On 21
1947 Clement Attlee’s government announced that it would no longer be
able to carry the burden of economic support to Greece and
Turkey…British and US leaders had been convinced for over a year that the
defence of Greece and Turkey was essential for the protection of Western
interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle east.” (Hale, W.)
• 1. 1947 Truman Doctrine:
• The Truman Doctrine took the form of a speech to both houses of
Congrees delivered on 12 March 1947, in which president asked for
approval of a USD 400 million aid programme to Greece and Turkey, to last
until the end of June 1948. The programme was passed by large majorities
in both houses. (USD 300 million to Greece and USD 100 million to Turkey)
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
• 2. 1948 Marshall Plan and OEEC:
• Turkey began to receive Marshall Aid in 1948 following the
economic cooperation agreement in 4 July 1948.
• Marshall Plan (5 June 1947)
• Turkey also became a member of OEEC (12 July 1947) (later OECD)
in 1948.
• B. International Organizations:
• 1. NATO:
• Turkey’s first application and refusal (1948) (“…in November 1948,
Turkey formally submitted an unsuccessful application for
inclusion in any future Atlantic Pact” (Hale, W.) ) ; (Turkey
applied bec. Of the security concerns, bot there were other reasons
as well such as Turkey’s acceptance as a member of Western
community. Turkey also applied for admission to the Council of
Europe, which was accepted in August 1949.)
TFP During 1945-1960 Period
Turkey’s second application in 1950;
Turkey and the Korean War: 1950-1953
Middle East Command Project: Turkey had to overcome some obstacles before
her NATO membership: Truman administration, initially tended to see Turkey
as part of the Middle East rather than Europe, and assumed that US interests
in the region were minimalcompared with those of Britain.
1951: US support to Turkey’s membership in NATO
1952: Membership
• 2.
•
•
•
•
3.
C.
D.
E.
Balkan Defence Pact: 1954, Turkey, Greece and former FR of
Yugoslavia
The Baghdad Pact (then CENTO, then RCD) : 1957
Middle Eastern Developments and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)
Turkey and the missile Crisis (“Cuba for
Turkey trade”) (1963)
Turkey, Greece and the Cyprus issue
Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s
• 1. Relations with the USA and NATO:
• A. 1969 Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement (JDCA): Rights and
authorities related to the USA and NATO military bases in Turkey were
arranged. It was an umbrella agreement which merged all the previous
bilateral agreements of the same kind between Turkey and the USA.
• 2. Opium Issue: The USA administration were demanding from the
Turkish administrations to cancel the opium raising and to declare it
outlaw since 1969 (the Nixon administration). Pressures were increased
during 1970. In 1970 Turkey limited the opium cultivated fields. However,
it was not enough for the US. Prime Minister Nihat Erim, who established
the interim government following the 12 March 1971, military decleration,
has declared that Turkey could negotiate for the abolishment of opium
raising. The USA adm. Offered 30.000 USD to Turkey to be distributed to
the farmers as compensation and Erim governmt. Accepted this ofer:
Banned the opium cultivation.
Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s
• The USA adm. Sent only 1/3 of the promised compensation. Bülent Ecevit
established the government in 1973 and lifted the abolishment decision in
1974. The USA decisiomaking bodies reacted in a strong way. They applied
the deceion of embargo on Turkey after the Cyprus intervention!
• The USA lifted up the economic (trade) embargo on Turkey in 1975 (6
October). However, in order to lift the arms embargo the USA had a
precondition: To revise the status of military bases in Turkey and sign a
DECA.
• DECA was signed in 26 Marc 1976 at Washington between Turkey and the
USA. However, the US Congress refused to approve it mainly because
there was not a major change since then 1969 JDCA. Thus, 1976 DECA
cpould not enter into force. The USA started to negotiate with the Greek
administration for a DECA. When the Greeks learnt that Turkey was
offered a 1 billion USD loan while Greece was offered only 200.000.000
they wthdrew from the negotiations. The USA administration then
recommended to the Congress to approve a ratio between Turkey and
Greece: 70% of the loan offered to Turkey had to be spared to Greece.
Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s
• This cretaed the famous and problematic 7/10 ratio between Turkey and
Greece. The US Congress approved a law in August 1977 by which it was
permitted a Foreign Military Sale to Turkey amounted 175.000.000 USD in
1978.
• 2. Relations with the USSR:
• The two countries’ top level administrators paved the reciprocal visits
throughout the 1960s. It can be claimed that Turkey was following a
relatively balanced and autonomous policy (than block politics) towards
the USSR. The two countries have accepted a Good Neighbourhood
Decleration in April 1972. Top level visits continued during the 1970s and
have led to the decleration of a document on cordial relations and good
neighbourhood. These had reflections on economic relations, as well. In
1975, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed. In
1978 a protocol was signed which was covered economic/trade relations
for three years, including petroleum sales to Turkey from the USSR (3
billion tons/year).
Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s
• 3. Relations with the EC:
• A. The Second Stage of the Ankara Agreement:
Additional Protocol and the Financial Protocol
• B. 1974: The Cyprus impact
• C. 1975: Greek application for full membership
at EC
• D. 1977-78: Deterriorated relations end the
frozen relations.
• 4. Relations with the Middle Eastern countries
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING
1980s
• According to W. Hale:
• “During the first half of the 1980s, Turkish foreign
policy-particularly in relation to the superpowersentered a phase of re-engagement in the western
alliance, in the sense that the previous tension in
Turkish-US relations abated markedly, talk of
altering Turkey’s position within NATO subsided,
and some of the old suspicion and hostility
returned to Turkish-Soviet relations.
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING
1980s
• As in the case of the previous phase, this
realignment had both international and
domestic political causes.”
• International: The second stage of Cold War
(Iran, Afghanistan…)
• Internal: 12 September 1980, coup.;
November 1982, new cons.; the elections in
November 1983)
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING
1980s
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Özal era (as PM and then, President)
Relations with the West:
1. The USA
A. DECA: 1980; 1985 to 1987/88
B. Lobbies (Armenian and Greek)
C. Middle East: Iran; Iran-Iraq war; Rapid Deployement Force Task
D. US loans and credits; foreign military sales: Conditions on the
Cyprus issue and later on, human rights and the PKK issue
2. The USSR:
A. Military concerns (+)
B. Financial support (-): After 1989 (+)
3. Europe: Turkey’s relations with the EC?
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING
1980s
• 4. Cyprus issue: 1983, TRNC
– Özal and TRNC: economic considerations
• 5. The Middle East:
• A. Iran-Iraq War: 1980-1988
• B. PLO and Turkey (1981 events, 1982 Lebanon events; Sabra and
Shatilla massacres; Arafat’s second visit to Turkey, 1986; Palestinian
Intifada (1987); recognition of the Palestinian State, 1988.)
• C. Relations with Israel: decreasing diplomatic relations (1980,
Jerusalem case)
• D. Relations with Syria: PKK issue; water problem
• E. Relations with Iraq: PKK ; Peshmerges and their escape to Turkey,
1988-89: deterriorating relations with Iraq and Iraq’s violence on
Turkmen’s in Iraq.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• I. The End of the Cold War ?
• The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the SU and
the Eastern Block, altered Turkey’s international
environment as profoundly as either of the two previous
transformations, of 1918-23 and 1945.
• * The security threat from the SU had effectively ended.
A series of small successor states had emerged in the
Black Sea region, Central Asia and Transcucasia.Turkey
now was surrounded by smaller neighbours which were
weaker than itself both militarily and economically.
• * Turkey’s foreign policy agenda expanded into new
areas. However, Turkey remained a committed member
of NATO and an aspirant for full EU membership.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• TFP during the 1990s was profoundly affected by the global
transformation. However, the domestic political
environment also had a strong influence over the direction
of foreign policy. Turgut Özal’s hold on power was severely
reduced by his party’s defeat in the general elections of
1991, and ended with his death in 1993. This opened a
phase of serious governmental instability, which severely
limited government abilities to formulate or implement
effective policies. More radical political currents-primarily
those of politicised Islam- also tried to challenge previously
accepted positions. The rise of Kurdish seperatism had
profound effects on TFP. Finally, economic demands and
ambitions came to have an increased role in foreign policy
making.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• II. Turkey and the West After the Cold War:
• A. Turkey and the United States:
• 1. In 1992, when TurkeySDECA with the USA came up for renewal, it
was extended for only one year. Turkey then asked for a
renegotition of its terms, but in practice the agreement was
renewed on an annual basis. Meanwhile, the US military presence
in Turkey was drastically reduced. This was part of the US’ global
policy of reducing its military commitments worldwide. By the mid1994 8 of the 12 US military bases previously established in Turkey
had been closed orhanded over to the Turkish forces. The vital
NATO airbase at İncirlik continued in operation and it was to be of
crucial importance during the Gulf war of 1991 and its aftermath.
US military aid to Turkey was also scaled down substantially- partly
because of congressional opposition over human rights and other
issues, but partly also because there seemed to be less need for it.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• 2. Common interests and common approaches:
• a. Both countries supported the admission of new
Eastern European members to NATO, and that of the states
of the former SU to the OSCE, NATO’s PfP, and the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council.
• b. In the early 1990s, the US helped to sponsor the idea
that Turkey could be projected as a model of democracy
and the liberal economic system in the newly independent
states of Central Asia.
• c. The US gvt. Strongly supported the plan to built an
“East-West energy corridor” linking the states of the
Caspian basin to the world markets via Turkey, and avoiding
Russian territory.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• d. Turkey also played an active role in supporting
actions by the UN and then by the USA and the rest
of NATO, in BiH.
• e. For both sides, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was a
critical turning point, since it gave Turkey an
important actual and potential role in US policy in
the Middle East:
• -2 Aug. 1990: Iraq invade Kuwait;
• -6 Aug. 1990: The UN Resn. No. 661 (economic
embargo to Iraq);
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• -8 Aug. 1990: It was announced that Turkey would suspend all commercial
dealings with Iraq and close the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık.
• The Turkish gvt. had also have to face with crucial questions of sending
troops to join the war in the gulf; or to open a second front against Iraq; or
to allow the coalition powers to use İncirlik for attacks on targets in N.
Iraq. This has led to a political crises in Turkey which caused to the
resignation of two ministers and the Chief of General Staff. Opposition was
supported by M. Yılmaz, who was one of the most important figures
within ANAP. Finally, Turkey gave permission to the coaltion forces to use
İncirlik for regular aircraft sorties. The second wave of the crisis came with
the flood of Kurdish refugees from Iraq to Iran and Turkey, mainly. (April
1991)
• 7 April 1991: Özal’ proposal to establis a “safe heaven” in N. Iraq. The idea
was adopted by the British and US gvts. Under the UN Sec. Coun. Resn No.
688 an intl. Force was stationed at Silopi. Virtually most of the refugees
returned to Iraq by the end of May as part of “Operation Provide
Comfort.”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• *No fly zones in Iraq north of the 36th paralell and south of the
32nd paralell were established.
• For T. Özal the primary reason for supporting the coalition in the
Gulf war was that it would re-establish Turkey’s strategic
importance in the eyes of the western powers, esp. The USA. He
also hoped that the war would result in the fall of S. Hussein and
his replacement with a democratic regime in Iraq which could work
out a settlement with the Kurds, restore Baghdad’s control in the
north of the country and thus prevent the PKK from using it as a
base for its attacks in Turkey. However, S. Hussein stood in power
and Turkey’s economic losts grew stemming from the trade
embargo against Iraq. Turkey did not receive a major support from
her Western allies and thus had to maintain and actually develop
eceonomic ties wit ME countries.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• More critically, the question of continuing the
mandate for “the Operation Provide Comfort”
turned out to be a problematic one in Turkey.
It was feared that it might be used by the USA
for other operations in the ME, over which
Turkey had no control or that it was a part of a
Western project to promote the establishment
of an independent Kurdish state. The name of
the operation was changed to “Northern
watch” as from the beginning of 1997.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• According to K. Kirişçi, “…a key point of convergence between the
United States and Turkey was thier common interest in the
emergence of democratic, secular, pro-Western regimes in the area
and their desire to prevent the rebuilding of a Soviet/Russian
empire.”
• “In the early 1990s…many US decision-makers even promoted
Turkey’s market oriented economy, democracy, and secularism as a
model for Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Many
also talked about Turkey becoming a bridge between the West and
those nations…both governments also saw those countries’
admissions to OSCE, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and
North Atlantic Cooperation Council as critical to consolidating a new
geopolitics in the ex-Soviet sphere of influence.”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• “By the end of 1990s,…,there seemed to be
growing convergence between Turkey and the
United States toward a more common
geostrategic stance to enhance the region’s
independence from Russia and economic
integration with the world. A key instrument
in this effort was to support the opening of an
‘east-west energy corridor,’ oil and gas
pipelines that went through Turkey instead of
Russia. (the so-called New Great Game)”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• “Regarding regional economic development …the
two countries appear to have similar approaches.
Two good examples are the US support given to
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
and Turkey’s membership in the European
Union.”
• “All these developments coincided with a period
when Turkey had begun to develop relations with
Israel, especially after the September 1993 IsraelPalestine Libertaion Organization Agreement.”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• Another important issue of cooperation between
Turkey and the USA involved UN and NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.
• At the same time there were/are still important areas
of diagreement, based on differing interests, over the
status of N. Iraq and the Kurdish issue, sanctions agains
Iraq, the Armenian issue, Cyprus and Turkish-Greek
relations, and relations with Iran and Syria. The Kurdish
issue was exaceerbated because of US annual human
right case reports.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• B. Turkey and EU:
• 1. Impacts of EU’s deeper and enlarged relations with the
CEECs on relations with Turkey: post-Cold war politics;
1991, Mastricht Treaty; 1992, Lisbon Summit; 1993
Copenhagen criteria.
• 2. Customs Union: 1994/1995
• 3. Impact of the Cyprus issue and the relations with Greece:
• 1996, Kardak crisis,
• 4. Human rights issue
• 5. 1997, Luxembourg meeting, 1997 Amsterdam Summit
and the new treaty and Agenda 2000
• 6. 1998, Cardiff Summit and the “Strategy for Turkey”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• 7. 1999 Helsinki Summit and forthcoming
developments: 1999 Progress Report and Turkey’s
official candidacy for EU membership; Association
Membership Document (for Turkey, 4 December 2000)
• 8. 2001 NAP( 24 March); 2001, Gotteburg Summitt and
approval of Turkey’s NAP; 2001 Laeken Summit
(perspective on membership negotiations are the
next); 2003 and 2005 revions; December 2004,
negotiations to be started at October 2005.
• The latest progress report (2008)
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• C. Turkey and the Balkans
• 1. General: There are some basic factors which determine
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region. One of
them is
historical links between Turkey and the regional countries. These
historical links have been
established during the time of the
Ottoman Empire. Physical and human entities which are still living
in the region make Turkey to stay in tune with the regional
developments. Besides the very existency of Turkish origin people
living in the Balkans there lies another factor at the heart of
Turkey’s policy towards the region: Greece or to balance Greece in
the Balkans. Furthermore, the geopolitical and strategic concerns
in Turkey consist a strong basis for Turkish policy makers to attribute
high importance to the Balkans area.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• The stability in the region has an utmost importance from the Turkish
point of view. As Uzgel has stated “Maintaining stability in the Balkans
became essential for Turkey’s security.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) Above all,
“…Turkey’s relations with the United States significantly affected the
former’s diplomatic and political activity, military engagement, and
growing influence in the Balkans.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) It seems so that
ineterests Turkey and the USA were accepted as in conformity with each
other if it is the case of cooperation in the Balkans. This proximity of
policies of Turkey and the USA, besides the geographic approximaty of
Turkey to the Balkans region provoked reactions from Greece and
Moscow. These countries were doubtful about Turkey’s increasing
attention and influence over the region. “Athens, Moscow, and Belgrade
objected to Turkey’s involvement in the Balkans and even tried to prevent
its involvement in multilateral peace-keeping operations. Nevertheless,
Turkey found allies in Albania, Romania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria.
It also enjoyed US backing for its policies.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) One of the
main concerns of Turkish policy makers during the 1990s was about Turkey
as being encircled and / or contained in the Balkans by an “Orthodox axis.”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• Turkey, tried to balance her relations with the
USA on this basis as well. Furthermore, unlike
other issues, Turkish-US cooperation in the
Balkans did not create any public reaction or
significant criticism in Turkey and was received
warmly im many of the Balkan countries
(except Greece and Yugoslavia)
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
•
•
•
•
2.
Relations with the regional countries:
a.
Albania:
Following the end of Cold war period Albania had to face the challenges raised by
the issues such as the Kosovo issue, the status of the Albanian minority in
Macedonia, the issue of northern Epirus with Greece and illegal migration of
Albanians into Greece. “The 1990s witnessed many high level visits, military
agreements between ‘Turkey and Albania’ and even the dispatching of Turkish
troops to Albania.”(Uzgel, İ.) Turkish army officers took part in training the
Albanian army. Turkey financially supported that country during the caotic days of
the collapse of the finacial firms/bankers in the “pyramid”. Turkey supported
Albanian membership both in NATO and the Organization of Islamic
Countries(OIC). In July 2008, Albania (together with Croatia) signed the Accession
protocols and (they) became official NATO members on 1 April 2009. Albania
became member of OIC in August 1992.
b.
BiH:
“During the war in Bosnia, the Turkish and US positions followed similar courses:
both supported Bosnia’s struggle for survival.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• Turkey secretly provided arms to Bosnians, and the United States winked
at Iran’s arms shipments to Bosnian muslims despite the UN arms
embargo imposed on all warring sides.” (Uzgel, İ.) Actually, all the warring
sides had their own sources of arms trade. The most significant divergence
in the US and Turkish approaches to the conflict was the US government ‘s
ambivalent attitude toward using force against the Bosnian Serbs. Turkey
insisted on stronger actions ranging from lifting the arms embargo to
bombing Serbian positions in Bosnia. In addition, Turkey presented a plan
for stronger measures to end the violance to the United Nations, the
Organization of Islamic countries, OSCE, and the Council of Europe.”
(Uzgel, İ.)
• “The United States decided to act decisively after atrocities in Srebrenica
in June 1995 and the massacre at the marketplace in Sarajevo the next
month. The United States, coupling diplomacy with the bombing of
Serbian positions and an advance by Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation
forces, brought the Serbs to the conference
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• table…Turkey strongly supported the Dayton Agreement, which
halted fighting between the Serbs and the Bosnians…The Turkish
government contributed 1.000 troops to the peacekeeping forces
based at Sarajevo and Zenica.” (Uzgel, İ.) Turkey also actively
involved in “train and equip” projects to militarily strengthen the
Bosnian-Croatian Federation. The United States provided about 100
million USD and Turkey trained several hundreds of Bosnian
officers. Turkey forged a similar relationship with Albania. The
military cooperaton between Turkey and Bosnia and Albania was
hoped to give Turkey an upper hand in the competition with Greece
in the region. Turkey also planned to develop efficient and large
scale economic ties with Bosnia. However, despite efforts by some
construction companies, “…Turkey’s economic ties lagged far
behind its political-military ties with Bosnia.” (Uzgel, İ.)
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
c.
Bulgaria:
Todor Zhivkov was in power between 1959 and 1989. This is
a joke about his era:
Zhivkov , towards the end of his era, wanted to meet with
Bridget
Bardot, a once upon a time famous movie star. BB
accepted to meet with him on a condition: She has asked
Zhivkov to open all the border
gates of Bulgaria. When
Zhivkov was informed about this condition he
replied by
saying that “Oh, well! She wants to meet with me alone.”
(Since he knew that Bulgarians would flow out of border if they
would have a chance.) Gypsies heard about the story and said: “
Oh, well! Finally we’ll have a country of our own.”
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• “Turkey’s relations with Bulgaria also improved significantly,
especially because of the Turkish minority of 1 million in Bulgaria.
Altough that group was subject to a harsh assimilation policy of the
Todor Zhivkov regime, especially in the 1980s, the transition to a
democratic system brought about radical changes in the minority’s
issues.
• The change in status was marked by the establishment of the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms…mainly composed of members
of the Turkish community.
• Bulgaria’s geographic position is a major consideration for Turkey
because sits astride Turkey’s land route to Europe.” (Uzgel, İ.) With
the end of the Cold war Bulgaria chose a policy of “equidistance”
toward Turkey and Greece. Bulgaria’s quest for security and its
emphasis on demilitarization and good neighborliness contributed
to Turkey’s security in the Balkans. Turkey and Bulgaria signed the
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• Sofia Document in December 1991, pledging not to hold
military exercises within 15 kilometres of their mutual
border as well as to establish military cooperation.In 1992,
two countries signed another agreement on good
neighborliness, friendship and security. Turkey gave support
to Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and the EU. Bulgaria
became a NATO member in 2004 and an EU member in
2007.
• A number of factors have contributed to the improvement
of relations between Turkey and Bulgaria such as the
Turkish minority in Bulgaria, desperate economic conditions
in Bulgaria and that country’s need to develop better
economic relations with her neighbors, Bulgarian reversed
attitude to PKK and terrorism issue in the early 1990s.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
•
•
•
•
•
•
d.
Croatia:
Turkey and Croatia were started negotiations with the EU in 3 October 2005 and became nonpermanent members in the UN SC in 2009. Croatia became NATO member in 2009.
e.
Kosovo:
“The Kosovo problem and its turn to violance, which led to NATO intervention in March 1999,
posed one of the most complex foreign policy issues for Turkey and placed it into a delicate
positon…Turkey had been concerned about the situation in Kosovo from the beginning. Its first
contact with the Kosovar Albanians was in 1992 when their leader, Ibrahim Rugova, visited
Ankara…There were several restraints on Turkey’s policy toward the Kosovo Albanians. First,
The conflict in Kosovo threatened the delicate balance in Macedonia, with which Turkey had
developed close ties…In addition, relations had been strained between the Kosovar Albanians and
the small Turkish minority …that had never sided with the Albanians…Turkey’s most important
diplomatic initiative during the crisis was the visit of Foreign Minister İsmail Cem to Belgrade in
1998…Turkey proposed that Kosovo’s autonomy should be restored and the rights of the Albanians
respected, but also stressed support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and maintainig existing
borders.
Kosovo declared independence on 17 Feb. 2008 and Turkey recognized Kosovo on 18 Feb. 2008.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• f.
i.
Greece:
Problems related to the Aegean Sea: Territorial
waters; continental shelf; demilitarization of the
islands; and FIR.
Problems related to minorities in Istanbul and
Western Thrace.
The Cyprus issue:
Establishment of the TRNC
The EU impact(brfore and after 1999)
S-300 case
Approximity talks/meetings
Annan Plan and the reactions of both sides: Main thesis
and the clash of interests.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
•
•
•
•
•
•
g.
Montenegro: Declared independence in 3 June 2006, Turkey recognized in
12 June 2006. Applied for NATO membership at 2008, and the same year it was
given NATO MAP.
h.
Republic of Macedonia:
Macedonia declared independence in Sept. 1991. Turkey became the second
country to recognize Macedonia and the first country to open an embassy in
Skopje in 1993. A military cooperation agreement was signed in March 1995
envisaging technical assistance to Macedonai and allowed the Macedonian officals
to be trained in Turkey.
“Among Macedonia’s many problems, the one with Greece was the most
dangerous…Turkey regarded Macedonia’s survival as an essential condition for
stability in the Balkans…the Turkish minority in Macedonia (3.85% of the
population) is also a factor in bilateral relations.
i.
Romania:
“Turkey’s relations with Romania …were shaped by three factors: Romania’s desire
for accession to NATO, Turkey’s sensitivity over PKK activities in Romania, and
Romania’s emergence as Turkey’s biggest trade partner in the Balkans.
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
•
•
•
•
j.
3.
a.
b.
Serbia
Regional organizations:
Southeastern Cooperation Process
Regional Cooperation Council
TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s
• Turkey and the relations with the Russian
Federation and the Caucasus States
• (Lecture by Burçin Canar )
• Turkey and the Energy Politics
• (Lecture by Dr. Cenk Pala)
• Turkey and the issue of East Turkistan
• (Lecture by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erkin Ekrem)
• Turkey and the Middle East
• (Lecture by Fatih Koraş)