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Mori 1 Variance in Refugee Policies Sarah Mori Creighton University Research Question With an estimated 9.7 million refugees worldwide in 2003, of which 807,000 seeking asylum, (UNHCR, 2003) immigration policy has become the deciding factor in where and when these individuals will live. Yet, while some countries admit large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, other countries have established strict policies designed to keep people out. Specifically, this paper will look at the asylum and refugee policies of nation-states and seek to answer the question: Why do some nation-states admit more refugee and asylum seekers when compared to other nation-states? An “asylum seeker” is defined as a foreigner who seeks refuge, claiming an inability or unwillingness to return to the home country because of a well founded fear of persecution (Gania 2002, 52). Refugees and those seeking political asylum are essentially defined the same, except those seeking asylum apply at a port of entry to the foreign country, while those claiming refugee status do so at their country of origin (Eldredge 2001, 73). . Immigration policy on refugees and asylum seekers has varied over the years among countries. Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, international borders remained largely open. Notable exceptions included the United States’ requirement that immigrants pass health tests, and restrictions held by Japan and China who desired to remain isolated and culturally homogenous (Plaut 1995, 39). Nonetheless, few limitations and regulations existed and there was almost no distinction made between an immigrant and a refugee (Plaut 1995, 39). The United State’s procedure on immigration was characterized as an “open door policy” (Lemay 2004, 1). From 1820 through 1860, 10 million immigrants arrived, mostly Mori 2 from northwestern Europe (Lemay 2004, 1). However, this “open door” sentiment began to change as the nineteenth century drew to a close and the twentieth century began. During this same time frame, global borders were tightened as countries developed strong national ideals (Plaut 1995, 40). U.S. policy from 1880 to 1920 was focused on limiting entry on the basis of health conditions, mental competency and literacy aptitude (Lemay 2004,1). The 1920’s saw the birth of the quota system, with the U.S. government limiting immigration on the basis of country of origin. Following the World Wars, conditions were conducive to displaced people with the redrawing of borders throughout Europe, the close of colonial empires and the establishment of communism. These conditions created a need to more aptly handle immigration. During the Cold War, refugee policy was largely shaped through ideological claims of “escaping communism” (Boswell 2003, 9). In 1951, the Geneva Convention officially established the status of the refugee as those individuals with a “well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Boswell 2003, 9). This definition reflected the effects of communism, and the emerging concern with human rights that was prominent during this era. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, many European countries opened up their borders to encourage immigration for labor purposes. Foreign labor was seen as necessary for post-war economic rebuilding within states. Countries such as Germany, France, and Belgium recruited foreign labor to support their expanding industrial structures. Germany is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon, as their percentage of foreign workers rose from 2 percent to 11 percent between 1960 and 1973 (Boswell 2003, 11). Mori 3 Before 1970, immigration issues were decided by a group of political elites and the general public was excluded from these global issues (Boswell 2003, 9). This changed in the 1970’s as immigration issues entered the political arena. As a result of increased publicity on immigration agenda, people began to interpret immigration as having a direct effect on various social issues such as unemployment, welfare, cultural identity and public order (Boswell 2003, 9). Stricter immigration guidelines caused an increase in those seeking political asylum and a general concern arose about the impact that immigrants and asylum seekers had on the overall economy. Governments felt the need to limit illegal immigration flow and end possible abuse of asylum systems. Thus, political agendas aimed at controlling immigration through denial of asylum applications seemed justified (Boswell 2003, 10). Since 1980, the number of asylum applications has increased dramatically due in large part to improved transportation links combined with deteriorating conditions in developing countries. With guidelines in place preventing traditional forms of migration, more individuals are turning to non-conventional forms of entry. Europe especially has seen a drastic rise in asylum requests in the past twenty years. This increase in applications is notably apparent when we look at the inflation in numbers from 50,000 applications in 1983 to 684,000 applications in 1992. This number began to decline substantially as stricter regulations and guidelines dropped the number to 276,000 in 1996. (Loescher and Milner 2003, 596). Still, the number is climbing once again and the number reached 381,000 in 2002 (Loescher and Milner 2003, 596). During this period of fluctuating trends, Germany took in the largest amount of asylum seekers, receiving fifty percent of the regional load (Loesher and Milner 2003, 596). Mori 4 Germany has since been replaced by the United Kingdom as the largest recipient of asylum seekers in Western Europe. Currently, the top 10 nation-states for asylum seekers are respectively: the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland. When we compare these states’ asylum recipient rates, there is significant variation between them. In 2003, the United Kingdom approved 26,921 asylum applications, compared to 4,703 granted by Germany, 24,921 in the United States, 13,167 in France, 17,682 in Canada, 14,529 in the Netherlands, 2,084 in Austria, 1,384 granted by Belgium, 5,514 in Sweden, and 11,802 recognized by Switzerland (UNHCR, 2003). These differences in numbers become more significant when we compare approval rates (the percentage of refugee and asylum applications granted). In 2003, the United Kingdom granted 28% of all asylum applications compared to 5% granted by Germany, 15.5% granted by the United States, 13.3% by France, 41.6% by Canada, 22.8% by the Netherlands, 29.6% by Austria, 16.6% by Belgium, 12.4% by Sweden, and 22.6% positively granted applications by Switzerland (UNHCR, 2003). As we look at the variance in numbers, one can notably distinguish the discrepancy that exists between these top refugee and asylum seeking countries. Uncovering why there is a discrepancy is important and necessary as the global face continues to change year after year. Currently, the world’s population stands at 6.3 billion. At the current rate of global population increase, it is estimated that the world’s population could reach 9 billion people by the year 2050. More importantly, this growth is occurring in the developing world. These developing nations lack the necessary materials to sustain massive growth and their governments are often corrupt and totalitarian in nature. Thus, Mori 5 people leave their home countries as a result of the poverty, internal disorder, and the repression these governments cause. As the population continues to swell, we can only assume that the number of people seeking asylum and refuge will accordingly grow as well. In the past twenty years, the phenomenon of people in flight because of repression has been realized time and again. For example, the humanitarian crisis that emerged as a result of the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991 sent large numbers of refugees into the global community; Kurdish repression in Iraq and Turkey has led to an increased refugee flow; corruption in Afghanistan by warlords and the Taliban led to higher numbers of fleeing peoples, Sri Lanka’s civil war has caused a flood of people seeking refuge; and tyranny in Zimbabwe effectively sent thousands of people to seek the safety zone of the United Kingdom (Loescher and Milner 2003, 597). These mass exoduses of peoples have drastically affected the demographic landscape of the world community. Thus, with more people in flight than ever before, it is necessary to discern why some nations hold their doors open and why others still restrict flows. We need to ask the question: Why, in 2003, did the United Kingdom accept 26,921 asylum applications, when Canada accepted only 17,682? This type of inquiry is essential when we consider the alarming population expansion rate of third world countries. As these populations surge, they will eventually spill over borders and cause a need for uniform improvement in asylum and refugee policy. Currently, approval rates for refugee and asylum applications are steadily decreasing. In 2000, the European Union approval rate for asylum applications was a mere twenty percent (Loescher and Milner 2003, 598). Feared abuse of the asylum system and the rising costs to process applications has caused a severe wane in applications granted. This decline Mori 6 has severe implications to the global population and to those refugees who do in fact utilize the system as a legitimate tool necessary to escape political hardship. Without options, these parties return home to a life of persecution, oppression and violence (Loescher and Milner 2003, 598). Furthermore, restricting refugee and asylum access has led to an increase in levels of illegal immigration and has undermined a country’s obligation to protect legitimate refugees. Without lawful means of entry, these migrant people enter countries through dangerous routes through smuggling and trafficking networks. Limited access has also introduced problems in other policy aspects: damaging race relations, reducing the supply needed labor in various sectors, and oftentimes causing tension to arise between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Boswell 2003, 619). Since limited access seems to facilitate a multitude of problems, we need to determine why some countries restrict entry in the first place. Once we uncover why countries differ in asylum and refugee policy, policy makers can concern themselves with trying to obtain uniform legislation and global cooperation with regard to refugees and asylum seekers in order to redress the global imbalance and problems that arise as a result of limited access. Literature Review There are six relevant studies in the literature that address fluctuating asylum and refugee policy. A study by Holzer, Schneider and Widmer quantitatively examines Switzerland’s inconsistent acceptance of refugee applications across its subdivided state of cantons. Another analysis done by Eric Neumayer (2004) empirically looks at the reasons why some Western European countries are more attractive to asylum seekers than others. Mathew Gibney (1999) examines liberal democratic state’s responsibility to refugees. A Mori 7 further study by Roger Karapin (2003) discusses possible causes of anti-immigration and asylum politics in Germany from 1989 to 1994. Stephen Castles’ (2004) article looks at European countries and asks why migration policies fail. Finally, Christina Boswell (2003) examines influencing factors on European immigration policy. In the first study, Holzer, Schneider and Widmer analyze Switzerland’s inconsistent acceptance of asylum applications. The territory of Switzerland is subdivided into twenty-six cantons and each canton exercises considerable control over its own asylum policy. While the national government has the final decision making power, the Swiss cantons can significantly influence their preferred decision. The authors note that in this decentralized system cantons appear to treat similar asylum applications differently, and they attempt to address the reasons behind this observed discrepancy by asking, “whether asylum applicants with a similar background experience positive or negative discrimination in certain states, and whether political variables influence these eventual tendencies” (Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 2000, 259). The researchers posed several hypotheses to explain the observed cantonal variation: the claimant’s individual background, a canton’s linguistic affiliation, the population size of a canton, the proportional size of the foreign resident population, the behavior of cantonal authorities and the organizational structure of the cantons. The results found that a claimant’s background has the strongest influence on whether an asylum seeker would be positively recognized or not. Further, the decentralized system, the foreign resident population and the general attitude of Swiss citizens toward immigrants also seems to affect policy fluctuation. Mori 8 Yet, while this study is relevant in uncovering why there is asylum policy inconsistency in Switzerland, it does not examine the global environment. Since this study exclusively looks at the political happenings within one country, we do not know if the aforementioned results pertain to similar phenomena in other nation-states. Given that this study is extremely narrow in scope, it does not answer the larger question: why international asylum and refugee policy variation exists. Conversely, Neumayer’s study does evaluate a larger picture in asylum policy. His study looks at Western European countries and asks why some asylum seekers prefer certain Western European countries to others when deciding where to live. Specifically he poses the question, “What makes some West European countries more attractive than others?” He defines an asylum seeker as a “utility maximizer who chooses the destination country with the highest net benefit” (Neumayer 2004, 155). With this definition, he takes asylum policy adjudication out of the control of national governments, and places it in the hands of individual asylum seekers. Accordingly, the hypotheses he presents reflect supposed net benefits offered in countries that could attract asylum seekers. These are: a healthy economy, low transition and adaptation rates, close geographical proximity, and a generous welfare program. Neumayer’s results indicate that economy was only a minor indicator of country choice, in that economically richer European countries accept a higher per capita share of asylum seekers but other economic factors such as a low unemployment rate, high social and welfare expenditures, and a high economic growth rate, do not positively correlate to an increased number of asylum applicants. However, his findings do attribute low transition rates and geographical proximity as a relevant factor in high numbers of asylum applications. Mori 9 Specifically, countries receive high number of asylum applications from countries of origin that speak the same language and who are geographically close. Welfare was not analyzed as a hypothesis, in that he could not quantify welfare programs to adequately examine a possible relationship. While Neumayer’s study does identify some casual factors in asylum choice (such as the economy) it is too narrow in scope, in that he focuses on European countries and does not look at the global community. Furthermore, Neumayer’s dependent variable considers why asylum seekers choose particular countries, and not why countries choose these asylum seekers. If we are to fully understand asylum policy, we need to substitute countries as the dependent variable and ask why different countries vary in asylum policy. In Mathew Gibney’s (1999) analysis of liberal democratic states’ responsibilities to refugees, he puts forth five possible hypotheses to explain asylum and refugee policy variation among nation-states: the needs of the claimants, the state’s economy, integration history, the actions of other states and the population with regard to the number of entrants. First, Gibney proposes that the needs of the claimants may determine whether a country grants asylum. A person will be likely granted admittance if the cost to do so is low and they satisfy one of the following conditions, “the person claiming asylum is in desperate need and is inside the borders of the state, or the person’s situation has been brought about by the state that they are attempting to enter” (Gibney 1999, 176). Additionally, the state’s economy may be a casual factor in whether an application is granted. He states that when an economy suffers, asylum acceptance rates lower since citizens view new entrants as competition in an already competitive job market. Mori 10 Further, Gibney writes that a country’s immigration history could account for differing asylum procedures. A nation that was built upon the foundation of immigrants may be more receptive to those claiming refugee and asylum status. There may be a primary difference between European countries where immigration played a small role in development, and the colonial states that were pioneered by immigrants (Gibney 1999, 176). These states are often referred to as “integrationist states” in that “what separates outsiders from insiders is that the outsiders are immigrants and the insiders were immigrants” (Gibney 1999, 176). Accordingly, within these states, acceptance of immigrants (and asylum seekers) may be seen as necessary to bolster citizen nationalism and maintain a sense of historical foundation. Moreover, these states may also be better equipped to handle immigrant assimilation as a result of past experience and built up infrastructure needed for swift cultural transitions. Gibney goes on to assert that the actions of other nations can affect asylum policy. For example, an unfriendly state could use asylum policy to discard unwelcome citizens onto another political community. For example, Cuba has encouraged emigration to the United States as a technique to end economic sanctions (Gibney 1999, 177). In circumstances such as these, it may be pertinent for these countries to restrict flows since, “the main beneficiary of it’s (the United States) asylum policies is the repressive regime” (Gibney 1999, 177). Further, collective state action can help place refugees when crises emerge. The joint program to re-settle Vietnamese refugees in the 1970’s and 1980’s was largely successful (Gibney 1999, 177) and demonstrates how the influence of combined countries can affect asylum procedure. Mori 11 Finally, Gibney’s article proposes population and the number of entrants as a function of fluctuating asylum legislation. He suggests that the larger the population, the more receptive the country will be to asylum seekers, since a large population can absorb large numbers of entrants with little backlash. He compares Luxemburg to the United States to exemplify his point, in that a population size as large as the United States would feel less implications in accepting two-thousand refugees than a country like Luxemburg with a relatively small population. While Gibney puts forth considerable effort to explain policy inconsistency across borders, he does not quantify his hypotheses into concrete findings. Thus, his hypotheses have no grounding in analytical research or numeric evidence. This is necessary if we are to consider his hypotheses as founded and factual. Another article written by Roger Karapin (2003) looks at anti-asylum policies in Germany from 1989 to 1994, and suggests possible reasons for the negative shift. He puts forth a four-fold argument to explain this phenomenon: (1) “nonviolent, reform-oriented, tactically conventional mobilization by resident groups against asylum seekers was widespread in this period,” (2) “nonviolent local mobilization against asylum seekers was spurred by a combination of suddenly increased grievances and alliances between citizen initiatives and local political elites” (3) “mobilization by anti-immigration and pro-immigrant citizen initiatives was part of the democratic political process at the local level” (4) “local national movement against asylum seekers was an important part of the national movement against asylum seekers in the early 1990’s . . .and (it) helped force the adoption of a popular constitutional amendment that restricted the right to asylum” (Karapin 2003, 2). Mori 12 Karapin seems to successfully argue that Germany’s negative shift in asylum policy was due to the influence of politics at the local level. Yet, his analysis only applies to Germany and does not account for other nation-states. Moreover, his focus appears to explain a trend over the course of time and fails to explain policy variation at a single point in time among all world countries. A third study, written by Stephen Castles (2004), discusses why immigration and asylum policy fail in the goals they attempt to accomplish. He states that asylum policy often achieves the opposite end of its original objective and points to three factors that seem to play a influencing role in shaping migration policy formation: “the social dynamics of the migratory process, factors linked to globalization, transnationalism and the North-South relationships, (and) factors within political systems” (Castles 2004, 208). Castles aims to explain how policy formation is influenced and why it fails to achieve the desired end. Yet, he does not address why immigration or asylum legislation fluctuates. His unit of analysis appears to be immigrants and thus we still need to look at why policy is inconsistent among countries. Further, without empirical evidence, we cannot legitimize Castle’s findings. Thus, while Castles does effectively bring forth an argument in why policy fails, the reasons for asylum and refugee discrepancy between nation-states are not fully answered. Finally, Christina Boswell (2003) analyzes the European Union’s growing tendency to restrict migration through external and preventative approaches. She states that to control flow, the European Union engages in external control by “strengthening borders, combating illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking, or readmitting migrants who have crossed into the EU illegally” (Boswell 2003, 619). Preventative measures address factors that make Mori 13 people move in the first place. Boswell goes on to discuss the political and institutional elements that drive these EU policies, and how and why these policies emerged. She states that a “restrictive, control-oriented” refugee policy has resulted from external pressures. Moreover, migration has increasingly become perceived as a security threat to receiving countries, in that it is linked to “organized crime, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism” (Boswell 2003, 623). This perception, whether true or not, allowed policy makers to direct these fears into stricter refugee and immigration law. Boswell does base her argument in observable trends, yet without empirical data to demonstrate her hypotheses, her reasoning falls short. Her thought that policy reflects external control and public sentiment is merely presupposing without concrete data to verify her opinions. Again, she focuses on European countries and neglects similar phenomenon in other nation-states around the world. Hypothesis and Theory Why do some nation-states accept more asylum seekers than other nation-states? I will hypothesize that countries with high levels of democracy, more developed economies, and low population density will correlate to high acceptance rates. That is, as a country’s democratic level rises, do does the likelihood that they will welcome more asylum seekers into their borders. Additionally, a nation-state that has low population density is more likely to accept larger numbers. Finally, a country that is economically stable is more apt to allow higher numbers of asylum seekers. The first independent variable of my hypothesis states that countries with higher levels of democracy will accordingly accept larger numbers of asylum seekers. Typically, a democratic country is considered to be a free society in which every citizen has a voice in Mori 14 their local and federal government. Thus, there is a greater possibility that a population in a democratic society would influence their government to relax the national borders when compared to a country with an authoritarian population with little or no say in government affairs. However, some would say that while a democratic country seems to reflect the will of the people, this does not necessarily mean that a country will relax border control. The majority of the population may in fact support tight borders that would restrict asylum flow. Hence, we would then have a situation where a democratic country would not accept large numbers of asylum seekers. Yet, this critique fails to mention that in a democratic society, a minority still has the right to lobby government, oftentimes with much success. For example, in 1979 the Taiwanese minority in America were successfully able to lobby the United States’ congress in passing a Taiwan Relations Act that helped to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan, even though a larger number of Chinese opposed such ruling. So, since a democracy reflects all citizens, and each citizen could potentially lobby government to achieve their desired end (in this case- lenient asylum policy), a democratic country could successfully be lobbied by majorities as well as minorities in implementing lenient policy. Secondly, I will hypothesize that a country with a better developed economy will admit more asylum seekers than those countries that are not as economically advanced. Reasoning follows that an affluent economy would be better equipped to handle more asylum seekers than those countries with weak economical growth. A strong economy means financial strength, and a country that is financially strong can afford to handle the financial burden of that occurs with larger numbers of incoming peoples. Thus, if a country can afford Mori 15 to let in more asylum seekers, they will be more likely to do so than countries with poor economies ill-equipped to financially support migrating peoples. There are those that would say that an economically stable government does not necessarily guarantee a laissez faire attitude with regard to border control. On the contrary, a rich country may not want to allow in more peoples, since these incoming individuals would serve no purpose except to drain the economy of the stability it has achieved. Yet, while a rich country does not guarantee high acceptance rates, I would still hold that an affluent economy is more likely to accept larger quantities of asylum seekers than those countries with weak economies. True, strong economies have a choice in whether to admit migrating peoples; but countries with weak economies have little choice since they would not be able to financially support large numbers. The third variable of my hypothesis states that a country’s population density (people per square feet) may be an indicator of changing asylum policy. That is, a country with high population density would be expected to also have restrictive immigration policy and a country with low population density would be expected to take in high numbers of asylum seekers. Logically, if a country has less spatial room to offer to foreign peoples, policy makers will enact legislation to restrict inward flow to prevent overcrowding. Thus, countries like the United States with a low population density of 29.77 people per square kilometer and Canada with a population density of 3.36 people per square kilometer, would be expected to have lenient immigration policies; whereas countries with high population densities like China with 133.69 people per square kilometer, and Germany with 234.86 people per square kilometer would exhibit rigid asylum restrictions (CIA, 1999). Mori 16 However, many would point to countries like the United Kingdom with a high population density of 244.69 people per square kilometer, and a relatively high acceptance rate of 28%. Examples such as this seem to weaken the supposed relationship between low population density and border leniency. Yet, this critique seems to hold for only a few outlying countries, and thus when we look at global trends in population density, I think that the population data will accordingly relate to asylum policy. There are others who hold that asylum policy could be explained by other casual hypotheses such as: the religiosity of the country, population diversity, and global events inciting policy inconsistency. Yet, while these hypotheses at first glance seem relevant, further exploration uncovers a superficial relationship. The religious level within a country is the first hypothesis that could potentially explain the variation in asylum policy. That is, as a country’s religious level rises, so does the likelihood that their asylum policy will be less restrictive and more open. Reasoning follows that if a country’s population has high religious levels, they will accordingly feel morally obligated to assist the refugees of the world. This public moral sentiment would be made known to policy makers, who would then enact legislation that would mirror this obligatory attitude in less restrictive borders and guidelines. It seems to hold that the welcoming of refugees into foreign lands does carry religious roots. The Israelites and Greeks were one of the first peoples to view their churches as sanctuaries, whereby God gave protection to those who sought shelter in religious places. Conversely, the Romans, who did not hold with such religious practices, were not known to grant asylum at all (Plaut 1995, 46). Furthermore, in the16th Century, Geneva became a place of refuge for French Protestants, regardless of age or sex, to escape Catholic persecution. Mori 17 Modern day Israel may also be an example of this religious phenomenon in which Israel’s “law of return” states that every Jew has a right to settle in the land (Plaut 1995, 46). Yet, while this religious explanation can clarify why some nations (such as Israel) welcome certain refugees, it fails to answer why they do not welcome other refugees that identify with a religion other than the majority religion. Yes, Israel welcomes Jewish refugees. However, it does not welcome all refugees. 16th Century Geneva may have welcomed Protestants, but it failed to welcome other religions as well. This theory fails in the context in which it was brought forth: that a religious country (not specifying religion) would welcome refugees regardless of religion, sex, race or other demographic characteristics. Additionally, some scholars maintain that population diversity within a country could explain asylum and refugee policy fluctuation. For example, historically, the United States has been known as a “country of immigrants” and its policy on immigration has past reflected this diversity. From 1820 to 1860 the United States boasted of an “open door” policy and welcomed the refugees of the world (Lemay 2004, 93). These new entrants, once inside the borders, can affect policy formation by lobbying government officials to broaden immigration legislation. This trend has been noted in the United States and Australia as waves of immigrants have oftentimes successfully influenced policy regarding family reunion programs across international borders (Gibney 1999, 174). However, there is additional research to support the reverse idea: that an ethnically diverse population would be more likely to tighten borders than a homogeneous population. Germany could be a prime example illustrating this point. With Germany classified as one of the top ten asylum seeking regions and with more than eight percent of Germany’s population foreign born, Germany could be called a country of immigration (Munz and Mori 18 Weiner 1997, 3). Thus, with the first hypothesis stating that diversity contributes to lenient immigration policy, we could expect Germany to typify this characteristic. Indeed, Germany has fluctuated with regard to its immigration policy from the high acceptance rate of fortythree percent in 1985 to the low rate of five percent in 1991. Yet, this dip in acceptance rates seems to reflect the public opinion of the growing diversification of the country. As the foreign population has increased, public opinion has steadily become more resentful of these foreign residents (Munz and Weiner 1997, 3). Furthermore, one could point to the United States as another example of this trend. While the United States did open its borders during the nineteenth century, it has since tightened control. In fact, when we look at the pattern of U.S. immigration policy within the past fifteen years, developing policy seems to reflect a “vigorous new consensus to restrict immigration” (Munz and Weiner 1997, 60). So whereas the United States might still be classified as the “land of asylum” (Lemay 2004, 93), the turn to restrictive policy suggests the opposite. Thus, while the literature may illustrate evidence supporting the diversity hypothesis, with facts supporting opposing trends it becomes difficult to ascertain its validity. Moreover, while diversity at certain points in time could possibly explain changing policy, with historical data supporting opposing claims, it seems that diversity is not the causal factor, and another variable may be influencing the policy discrepancy. Global events have been cited in the literature as a potential factor of a nation-state’s asylum policy. For example, large waves of immigrants could influence a country to close its borders, or a humanitarian crisis could pressure a country to relax border control. The flood of Haitians to the United States in 1991 could be one such example of events inciting policy Mori 19 action. The fear that the United States was being “overtaken” provoked policy makers to close U.S. ports and may have stimulated stricter asylum procedures (Munz and Weiner 1997, 61). Furthermore, during the 1990’s Germany reacted to the emigration potential from the former Soviet Union with a tightening of borders. In fact, an asylum law passed in 1993 reflected this sentiment as strict changes in immigration law made it difficult for those desiring asylum and refugee status (Munz and Weiner 1997, 154). Additionally, Canada relaxed its policy during the Indochinese emergency in 1979 when it received reports that Indochinese were roaming aimlessly at sea. (Plaut 1995, 122). Additionally, Italy responded to the outpouring of refugees from Somalia, Albania and Kosovo by awarding these people with humanitarian and temporary protection status (Boswell 2003, 60). However, while there seems to be some relationship between global events and immigration policy, it is incorrect to attribute all immigration legislative endeavors to these happenings. Yes, we may see past examples of humanitarian crises stimulating accepting attitudes (for example: Canada’s acceptance of the Indochinese), but I am reluctant to admit that these events alone cause variation. It would be better if it was stated that, at times, events can stir policy action. But, this hypothesis fails to answer why there is variation in policy when there is no huge outpouring of refugees or massive humanitarian crises to deal with. Thus, this hypothesis’ focus is too narrow, and does not account for the wider picture. Methodology To test the hypothesis, I created a data set that included my dependent variable: a country’s recognition rate of refugee seekers, and my three independent variables: economy, Mori 20 population density, and a country’s measured democratic level. All four variables were interval in nature. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided the necessary data for my dependent variable. UNHCR measured one hundred and forty five countries’ (positive) recognition rates of refugee seekers for the year 2003. The recognition rates were measured as a function of all positively accepted refugees divided by those accepted and rejected. A 2003 survey published by Freedom House provided data for two of my independent variables: a country’s measured democratic level, and a country’s economic level (measured through its respective gross domestic product per capita). Freedom House surveyed each country’s democratic level based upon a country’s political rights. To accurately measure a country’s political freedom, every country was evaluated with a checklist divided into three categories: electoral process, political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Under each category, questions were asked that were appropriate to that topic. A country’s political rank was based upon the raw number score assigned by each question. Once each score was tallied, Freedom House assigned each country a number ranking between one and seven. A rank of one represented the highest democratic level and the highest amount of freedom. A rank of seven represented the lowest level of political freedom. According to Freedom House, a country considered “free” had elected leaders with fair elections, a competitive party system, minority representation and self governance. A country categorized as “less free” or “not free” typically exhibited corrupt governments, violence, political discrimination of minorities, one party dominance or civil war. Mori 21 Additionally, Freedom House listed each country’s gross domestic product. Thus, a “good” economy would exhibit a high gross domestic product per capita (GDP). For example, the United State’s GDP of $34,142 would be representative of a good economy, while Sudan’s GDP of $1,797 would typify a weak economy. Data for my third independent variable (population density) was gathered using the 2002 publication of the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book. The fact book listed each country’s population density, defined in terms of people per square mile. To test the relationship between the dependent and three independent variables, a multi-variant linear regression will be used. Linear regression tests the relative strength of the correlation between the variables and measures the strength of the independent variables influence upon the dependent variables. The independent variable’s impact upon the dependent variable will be reflected in the standardized coefficient (B). That is, B describes the change in the dependent variable with every unit change in the independent variable, measured in units of standard deviation. B allows us to discern which independent variable has the strongest influence upon the dependent variable. Additionally, assessing the T value allows us to reject or not reject the null hypothesis. Specifically, a T value describes where the slope of the relationship falls, if the null is true. If the T value is larger than 2, and has a significance level lower than .05, we can reject the null hypothesis (no relationship between the independent and dependent variable) and ascribe causality between the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, the R square (coefficient of determination) tells us the proportion of variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variable(s). Mori 22 Analysis To test the possible relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, a multi-variant linear regression was used (Table 1). My hypothesis predicted that a country with a strong economy, a high level of democracy and a low population density would accordingly have a higher acceptance rate of refugee seekers. However, upon review of the linear regression numbers, one can clearly see that out of the three independent variables, economic strength measured in gross domestic product per capita was the only variable significantly linked to a country’s positive recognition rate of refugee seekers. Democracy level and population density were shown not to be a significant relation to the dependent variable. Table I. Regression Data Explaining 2003 Asylum Policy Variation In 145 Countries Unstandardized Coefficients Model B Std. Error Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 6.182 .000 Beta Constant 50.950 8.241 Democracy Level 1.957 1.609 .125 1.216 .226 Pop. Density (People/Sq. Mile) .000 .002 .008 .099 .921 GDP (per capita) -.001 .000 -.362 -3.479 .001 y = 50.950 + 1.957x + .000x1 - .001x2. The equation of the line that accounts for all three independent variables is y = 50.950 + 1.957x + .000x1 - .001x2. This equation allows us to interpret the numerical relationship between gross domestic product per capita and a country’s recognition rate. Specifically, holding democracy level and population density constant, as a country’s gross domestic product increases one dollar, a country’s recognition rate accordingly decreases .001 percent. Mori 23 As stated previously, economic level measured in gross domestic product per capita is the only variable with a significant impact upon the dependent variable. The significance level is .001, considerably lower than the .05 needed to demonstrate causality. The T value of -3.479 supports this finding, since the tested relationship is 3.479 standard deviations away from the mean in the distribution of sample slopes (which is higher than the two standard deviations needed to reject the null). With these numbers, we can reject the null hypothesis stating economy has no effect upon a country’s refugee acceptance rate. While these numbers confirm that economy does influence recognition rates, the relationship is inverted. That is, a country with a strong economy is less likely to have high recognition rates when compared to a country with a weaker economy. This finding does not support my original hypothesis that stated a wealthier economy would accept larger numbers of refugee seekers (since it was thought that a strong economy would be better equipped to handle the financial burden of increased numbers of refugees). A country’s democratic level was not shown to be significantly related to a country’s positive refugee recognition rate. The significance level is .228, well above the .05 needed to demonstrate causality. The T value of 1.216 supports this finding since the tested relationship is a mere 1.216 standard deviations away from the mean in the distribution of sample slopes, and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that states there is no relationship between democracy levels and recognition rates. Additionally, a country’s population density was not shown to have a significant effect upon the dependent variable. With a significance level of .921, we find no relationship between population density and a country’s acceptance levels of refugee seekers. The T value of .099 supports this finding. Mori 24 When we look at Table II, the Adjusted R Square value of .179 tells us that the hypothesis explains 17.9% of the variation in the dependent variable of recognition rates. Table II. Data Explaining Refugee Policy Variation in 145 Countries Model R 1 .447a R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate .200 .179 30.19706 Conclusion Overall, my hypothesis is refuted. Population density and democracy level are not significantly related to a country’s recognition rate. Additionally, while gross domestic product per capita is significantly related to the dependent variable, the relationship is the exact opposite of my original hypothesis. I hypothesized that a country with a high GDP would accordingly have a higher recognition rate; however, the regression data points to a relationship in which countries with a higher GDP tend to have lower recognition rates. Yet, while this finding did not confirm my original hypothesis, it is extremely important when we consider the huge numbers of people seeking refuge each year. Basically, countries that can afford to accept high numbers of refugees do not in fact do so. We can only speculate as to why this phenomenon exists. Perhaps rich countries do not accept large numbers of refugees for selfish reasons, or speculation that accepting high numbers would damage an affluent economy. Yet, this “selfish” explanation does not explain why a country like Canada, with a high GDP per capita of $27,840 also has a relatively high acceptance rate Mori 25 of 49.6%. Obviously, Canada does not have a “fear” of damaging their strong economy. Thus, there must be other explanations other than pure selfish motivation for refusing refugee applications. We could speculate that variation could be explained by un-quantifiable variables such as a country’s political ideology and global events occurring around the world. For example, Canada is known to boast of a more “liberal” attitude toward political and social issues. This could be an explanation as to why Canada is more lenient with refugee policy. Furthermore, policy variation could potentially be explained when we look at global events occurring around the world. For example, a humanitarian crisis could spur a country to relax its borders and grant larger numbers of asylum. On the other hand, large waves of immigrants could incite a country to close its borders. Generally speaking, global events have the potential to influence a country to either relax or tighten policy. The flood of Haitians to the United States in 1991 could be one such example of events inciting legislative action. The fear that the United States was being “overtaken” provoked policy makers to close U.S. ports and may have stimulated stricter asylum procedures (Munz and Weiner 1997, 61). Furthermore, during the 1990’s Germany reacted to the emigration potential from the former Soviet Union with a tightening of borders. In fact, an asylum law passed in 1993 reflected this sentiment as strict changes in immigration law made it difficult for those desiring asylum status (Munz and Weiner 1997, 154). On the counter side, humanitarian crises could encourage a nation to welcome fleeing refugees. For example, Canada relaxed its policy during the Indochinese emergency in 1979 and 1980. Reports of Indochinese roaming aimlessly at sea influenced Canada to welcome 60,000 refugees (Plaut 1995, 122). Additionally, Italy responded to the outpouring of Mori 26 refugees from Somalia, Albania and Kosovo by awarding these people with humanitarian and temporary protection status (Boswell 2003, 60). Yet, while we can speculate that these variables could explain the discrepancy among countries, they are numerically immeasurable and thus the potential relationship may never be statistically proven. Supposing one could quantify these variables, this is an area in which further research would be needed. Still, while my hypothesis was refuted, the found relationship between GDP and a country’s recognition rate has enormous implications to worldwide refugee seekers. It tells refugee seekers not to look for refuge in countries with good economies, since there is a good chance that their application will be rejected. They instead have a better chance at acquiring refugee status in countries with low GDP per capita. Significantly, countries with weak economies appear to be handling more than their share of the global refugee burden. Yet, this phenomenon seems inherently wrong considering strong economies should be obligated to accept higher numbers since they can afford to do so. Additionally, this data has an effect upon world organizations that work for bettering refugee rights, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty International. Perhaps the best way to improve refugee rights would be to lobby economically strong countries that do not accept their proportional share of migrating peoples. In conclusion, if this paper succeeds in one aspect it is this: extreme refugee policy variation exists between countries, and this variation exists between countries with weak and strong economies. There is an obvious problem with this discrepancy, since wealthy countries should feel obligated to accept larger numbers of refugees than poorer countries. Mori 27 However, without further research in the afore-mentioned areas, this finding may be superficial in nature. Still, this paper has succeeded in demonstrating a gross divergence amongst countries that perhaps should not be there, or should be otherwise related. That is, countries with strong economies should accept larger numbers, since they appear financially equipped to do so. Yet, for some reason we can only speculate upon, the relationship is quite different. Mori 28 Bibliography Boswell, Christina 2003. European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion. Malden: Blackwell. Boswell. Christina 2003. “The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy.” International Affairs 79:619-638. Castles, Stephen 2004. “Why Migration Policies Fail.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27:205-227. 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