Download Variance in Refugee Policies

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Variance in Refugee Policies
Sarah Mori
Creighton University
Research Question
With an estimated 9.7 million refugees worldwide in 2003, of which 807,000 seeking
asylum, (UNHCR, 2003) immigration policy has become the deciding factor in where and
when these individuals will live. Yet, while some countries admit large numbers of refugees
and asylum seekers, other countries have established strict policies designed to keep people
out. Specifically, this paper will look at the asylum and refugee policies of nation-states and
seek to answer the question: Why do some nation-states admit more refugee and asylum
seekers when compared to other nation-states?
An “asylum seeker” is defined as a foreigner who seeks refuge, claiming an inability
or unwillingness to return to the home country because of a well founded fear of persecution
(Gania 2002, 52). Refugees and those seeking political asylum are essentially defined the
same, except those seeking asylum apply at a port of entry to the foreign country, while those
claiming refugee status do so at their country of origin (Eldredge 2001, 73). .
Immigration policy on refugees and asylum seekers has varied over the years among
countries. Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, international borders remained largely
open. Notable exceptions included the United States’ requirement that immigrants pass
health tests, and restrictions held by Japan and China who desired to remain isolated and
culturally homogenous (Plaut 1995, 39). Nonetheless, few limitations and regulations existed
and there was almost no distinction made between an immigrant and a refugee (Plaut 1995,
39). The United State’s procedure on immigration was characterized as an “open door
policy” (Lemay 2004, 1). From 1820 through 1860, 10 million immigrants arrived, mostly
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from northwestern Europe (Lemay 2004, 1). However, this “open door” sentiment began to
change as the nineteenth century drew to a close and the twentieth century began. During this
same time frame, global borders were tightened as countries developed strong national ideals
(Plaut 1995, 40). U.S. policy from 1880 to 1920 was focused on limiting entry on the basis of
health conditions, mental competency and literacy aptitude (Lemay 2004,1). The 1920’s saw
the birth of the quota system, with the U.S. government limiting immigration on the basis of
country of origin.
Following the World Wars, conditions were conducive to displaced people with the
redrawing of borders throughout Europe, the close of colonial empires and the establishment
of communism. These conditions created a need to more aptly handle immigration. During
the Cold War, refugee policy was largely shaped through ideological claims of “escaping
communism” (Boswell 2003, 9). In 1951, the Geneva Convention officially established the
status of the refugee as those individuals with a “well founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion” (Boswell 2003, 9). This definition reflected the effects of communism, and the
emerging concern with human rights that was prominent during this era.
During the 1950’s and 1960’s, many European countries opened up their borders to
encourage immigration for labor purposes. Foreign labor was seen as necessary for post-war
economic rebuilding within states. Countries such as Germany, France, and Belgium
recruited foreign labor to support their expanding industrial structures. Germany is perhaps
the best example of this phenomenon, as their percentage of foreign workers rose from 2
percent to 11 percent between 1960 and 1973 (Boswell 2003, 11).
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Before 1970, immigration issues were decided by a group of political elites and the
general public was excluded from these global issues (Boswell 2003, 9). This changed in the
1970’s as immigration issues entered the political arena. As a result of increased publicity on
immigration agenda, people began to interpret immigration as having a direct effect on
various social issues such as unemployment, welfare, cultural identity and public order
(Boswell 2003, 9). Stricter immigration guidelines caused an increase in those seeking
political asylum and a general concern arose about the impact that immigrants and asylum
seekers had on the overall economy. Governments felt the need to limit illegal immigration
flow and end possible abuse of asylum systems. Thus, political agendas aimed at controlling
immigration through denial of asylum applications seemed justified (Boswell 2003, 10).
Since 1980, the number of asylum applications has increased dramatically due in
large part to improved transportation links combined with deteriorating conditions in
developing countries. With guidelines in place preventing traditional forms of migration,
more individuals are turning to non-conventional forms of entry. Europe especially has seen
a drastic rise in asylum requests in the past twenty years. This increase in applications is
notably apparent when we look at the inflation in numbers from 50,000 applications in 1983
to 684,000 applications in 1992. This number began to decline substantially as stricter
regulations and guidelines dropped the number to 276,000 in 1996. (Loescher and Milner
2003, 596). Still, the number is climbing once again and the number reached 381,000 in 2002
(Loescher and Milner 2003, 596).
During this period of fluctuating trends, Germany took in the largest amount of
asylum seekers, receiving fifty percent of the regional load (Loesher and Milner 2003, 596).
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Germany has since been replaced by the United Kingdom as the largest recipient of asylum
seekers in Western Europe.
Currently, the top 10 nation-states for asylum seekers are respectively: the United
Kingdom, Germany, the United States, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium,
Sweden and Switzerland. When we compare these states’ asylum recipient rates, there is
significant variation between them. In 2003, the United Kingdom approved 26,921 asylum
applications, compared to 4,703 granted by Germany, 24,921 in the United States, 13,167 in
France, 17,682 in Canada, 14,529 in the Netherlands, 2,084 in Austria, 1,384 granted by
Belgium, 5,514 in Sweden, and 11,802 recognized by Switzerland (UNHCR, 2003).
These differences in numbers become more significant when we compare approval
rates (the percentage of refugee and asylum applications granted). In 2003, the United
Kingdom granted 28% of all asylum applications compared to 5% granted by Germany,
15.5% granted by the United States, 13.3% by France, 41.6% by Canada, 22.8% by the
Netherlands, 29.6% by Austria, 16.6% by Belgium, 12.4% by Sweden, and 22.6% positively
granted applications by Switzerland (UNHCR, 2003). As we look at the variance in numbers,
one can notably distinguish the discrepancy that exists between these top refugee and asylum
seeking countries.
Uncovering why there is a discrepancy is important and necessary as the global face
continues to change year after year. Currently, the world’s population stands at 6.3 billion. At
the current rate of global population increase, it is estimated that the world’s population
could reach 9 billion people by the year 2050. More importantly, this growth is occurring in
the developing world. These developing nations lack the necessary materials to sustain
massive growth and their governments are often corrupt and totalitarian in nature. Thus,
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people leave their home countries as a result of the poverty, internal disorder, and the
repression these governments cause. As the population continues to swell, we can only
assume that the number of people seeking asylum and refuge will accordingly grow as well.
In the past twenty years, the phenomenon of people in flight because of repression
has been realized time and again. For example, the humanitarian crisis that emerged as a
result of the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991 sent large numbers of refugees into the global
community; Kurdish repression in Iraq and Turkey has led to an increased refugee flow;
corruption in Afghanistan by warlords and the Taliban led to higher numbers of fleeing
peoples, Sri Lanka’s civil war has caused a flood of people seeking refuge; and tyranny in
Zimbabwe effectively sent thousands of people to seek the safety zone of the United
Kingdom (Loescher and Milner 2003, 597). These mass exoduses of peoples have drastically
affected the demographic landscape of the world community.
Thus, with more people in flight than ever before, it is necessary to discern why some
nations hold their doors open and why others still restrict flows. We need to ask the question:
Why, in 2003, did the United Kingdom accept 26,921 asylum applications, when Canada
accepted only 17,682? This type of inquiry is essential when we consider the alarming
population expansion rate of third world countries. As these populations surge, they will
eventually spill over borders and cause a need for uniform improvement in asylum and
refugee policy.
Currently, approval rates for refugee and asylum applications are steadily decreasing.
In 2000, the European Union approval rate for asylum applications was a mere twenty
percent (Loescher and Milner 2003, 598). Feared abuse of the asylum system and the rising
costs to process applications has caused a severe wane in applications granted. This decline
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has severe implications to the global population and to those refugees who do in fact utilize
the system as a legitimate tool necessary to escape political hardship. Without options, these
parties return home to a life of persecution, oppression and violence (Loescher and Milner
2003, 598).
Furthermore, restricting refugee and asylum access has led to an increase in levels of
illegal immigration and has undermined a country’s obligation to protect legitimate refugees.
Without lawful means of entry, these migrant people enter countries through dangerous
routes through smuggling and trafficking networks. Limited access has also introduced
problems in other policy aspects: damaging race relations, reducing the supply needed labor
in various sectors, and oftentimes causing tension to arise between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving countries (Boswell 2003, 619).
Since limited access seems to facilitate a multitude of problems, we need to determine
why some countries restrict entry in the first place. Once we uncover why countries differ in
asylum and refugee policy, policy makers can concern themselves with trying to obtain
uniform legislation and global cooperation with regard to refugees and asylum seekers in
order to redress the global imbalance and problems that arise as a result of limited access.
Literature Review
There are six relevant studies in the literature that address fluctuating asylum and
refugee policy. A study by Holzer, Schneider and Widmer quantitatively examines
Switzerland’s inconsistent acceptance of refugee applications across its subdivided state of
cantons. Another analysis done by Eric Neumayer (2004) empirically looks at the reasons
why some Western European countries are more attractive to asylum seekers than others.
Mathew Gibney (1999) examines liberal democratic state’s responsibility to refugees. A
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further study by Roger Karapin (2003) discusses possible causes of anti-immigration and
asylum politics in Germany from 1989 to 1994. Stephen Castles’ (2004) article looks at
European countries and asks why migration policies fail. Finally, Christina Boswell (2003)
examines influencing factors on European immigration policy.
In the first study, Holzer, Schneider and Widmer analyze Switzerland’s inconsistent
acceptance of asylum applications. The territory of Switzerland is subdivided into twenty-six
cantons and each canton exercises considerable control over its own asylum policy. While
the national government has the final decision making power, the Swiss cantons can
significantly influence their preferred decision. The authors note that in this decentralized
system cantons appear to treat similar asylum applications differently, and they attempt to
address the reasons behind this observed discrepancy by asking, “whether asylum applicants
with a similar background experience positive or negative discrimination in certain states,
and whether political variables influence these eventual tendencies” (Holzer, Schneider and
Widmer 2000, 259).
The researchers posed several hypotheses to explain the observed cantonal variation:
the claimant’s individual background, a canton’s linguistic affiliation, the population size of a
canton, the proportional size of the foreign resident population, the behavior of cantonal
authorities and the organizational structure of the cantons.
The results found that a claimant’s background has the strongest influence on whether
an asylum seeker would be positively recognized or not. Further, the decentralized system,
the foreign resident population and the general attitude of Swiss citizens toward immigrants
also seems to affect policy fluctuation.
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Yet, while this study is relevant in uncovering why there is asylum policy
inconsistency in Switzerland, it does not examine the global environment. Since this study
exclusively looks at the political happenings within one country, we do not know if the aforementioned results pertain to similar phenomena in other nation-states. Given that this study is
extremely narrow in scope, it does not answer the larger question: why international asylum
and refugee policy variation exists.
Conversely, Neumayer’s study does evaluate a larger picture in asylum policy. His
study looks at Western European countries and asks why some asylum seekers prefer certain
Western European countries to others when deciding where to live. Specifically he poses the
question, “What makes some West European countries more attractive than others?” He
defines an asylum seeker as a “utility maximizer who chooses the destination country with
the highest net benefit” (Neumayer 2004, 155). With this definition, he takes asylum policy
adjudication out of the control of national governments, and places it in the hands of
individual asylum seekers.
Accordingly, the hypotheses he presents reflect supposed net benefits offered in
countries that could attract asylum seekers. These are: a healthy economy, low transition and
adaptation rates, close geographical proximity, and a generous welfare program.
Neumayer’s results indicate that economy was only a minor indicator of country
choice, in that economically richer European countries accept a higher per capita share of
asylum seekers but other economic factors such as a low unemployment rate, high social and
welfare expenditures, and a high economic growth rate, do not positively correlate to an
increased number of asylum applicants. However, his findings do attribute low transition
rates and geographical proximity as a relevant factor in high numbers of asylum applications.
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Specifically, countries receive high number of asylum applications from countries of origin
that speak the same language and who are geographically close. Welfare was not analyzed as
a hypothesis, in that he could not quantify welfare programs to adequately examine a
possible relationship.
While Neumayer’s study does identify some casual factors in asylum choice (such as
the economy) it is too narrow in scope, in that he focuses on European countries and does not
look at the global community. Furthermore, Neumayer’s dependent variable considers why
asylum seekers choose particular countries, and not why countries choose these asylum
seekers. If we are to fully understand asylum policy, we need to substitute countries as the
dependent variable and ask why different countries vary in asylum policy.
In Mathew Gibney’s (1999) analysis of liberal democratic states’ responsibilities to
refugees, he puts forth five possible hypotheses to explain asylum and refugee policy
variation among nation-states: the needs of the claimants, the state’s economy, integration
history, the actions of other states and the population with regard to the number of entrants.
First, Gibney proposes that the needs of the claimants may determine whether a
country grants asylum. A person will be likely granted admittance if the cost to do so is low
and they satisfy one of the following conditions, “the person claiming asylum is in desperate
need and is inside the borders of the state, or the person’s situation has been brought about by
the state that they are attempting to enter” (Gibney 1999, 176).
Additionally, the state’s economy may be a casual factor in whether an application is
granted. He states that when an economy suffers, asylum acceptance rates lower since
citizens view new entrants as competition in an already competitive job market.
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Further, Gibney writes that a country’s immigration history could account for
differing asylum procedures. A nation that was built upon the foundation of immigrants may
be more receptive to those claiming refugee and asylum status. There may be a primary
difference between European countries where immigration played a small role in
development, and the colonial states that were pioneered by immigrants (Gibney 1999, 176).
These states are often referred to as “integrationist states” in that “what separates outsiders
from insiders is that the outsiders are immigrants and the insiders were immigrants” (Gibney
1999, 176). Accordingly, within these states, acceptance of immigrants (and asylum seekers)
may be seen as necessary to bolster citizen nationalism and maintain a sense of historical
foundation. Moreover, these states may also be better equipped to handle immigrant
assimilation as a result of past experience and built up infrastructure needed for swift cultural
transitions.
Gibney goes on to assert that the actions of other nations can affect asylum policy.
For example, an unfriendly state could use asylum policy to discard unwelcome citizens onto
another political community. For example, Cuba has encouraged emigration to the United
States as a technique to end economic sanctions (Gibney 1999, 177). In circumstances such
as these, it may be pertinent for these countries to restrict flows since, “the main beneficiary
of it’s (the United States) asylum policies is the repressive regime” (Gibney 1999, 177).
Further, collective state action can help place refugees when crises emerge. The joint
program to re-settle Vietnamese refugees in the 1970’s and 1980’s was largely successful
(Gibney 1999, 177) and demonstrates how the influence of combined countries can affect
asylum procedure.
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Finally, Gibney’s article proposes population and the number of entrants as a function
of fluctuating asylum legislation. He suggests that the larger the population, the more
receptive the country will be to asylum seekers, since a large population can absorb large
numbers of entrants with little backlash. He compares Luxemburg to the United States to
exemplify his point, in that a population size as large as the United States would feel less
implications in accepting two-thousand refugees than a country like Luxemburg with a
relatively small population.
While Gibney puts forth considerable effort to explain policy inconsistency across
borders, he does not quantify his hypotheses into concrete findings. Thus, his hypotheses
have no grounding in analytical research or numeric evidence. This is necessary if we are to
consider his hypotheses as founded and factual.
Another article written by Roger Karapin (2003) looks at anti-asylum policies in
Germany from 1989 to 1994, and suggests possible reasons for the negative shift. He puts
forth a four-fold argument to explain this phenomenon: (1) “nonviolent, reform-oriented,
tactically conventional mobilization by resident groups against asylum seekers was
widespread in this period,” (2) “nonviolent local mobilization against asylum seekers was
spurred by a combination of suddenly increased grievances and alliances between citizen
initiatives and local political elites” (3) “mobilization by anti-immigration and pro-immigrant
citizen initiatives was part of the democratic political process at the local level” (4) “local
national movement against asylum seekers was an important part of the national movement
against asylum seekers in the early 1990’s . . .and (it) helped force the adoption of a popular
constitutional amendment that restricted the right to asylum” (Karapin 2003, 2).
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Karapin seems to successfully argue that Germany’s negative shift in asylum policy
was due to the influence of politics at the local level. Yet, his analysis only applies to
Germany and does not account for other nation-states. Moreover, his focus appears to explain
a trend over the course of time and fails to explain policy variation at a single point in time
among all world countries.
A third study, written by Stephen Castles (2004), discusses why immigration and
asylum policy fail in the goals they attempt to accomplish. He states that asylum policy often
achieves the opposite end of its original objective and points to three factors that seem to play
a influencing role in shaping migration policy formation: “the social dynamics of the
migratory process, factors linked to globalization, transnationalism and the North-South
relationships, (and) factors within political systems” (Castles 2004, 208).
Castles aims to explain how policy formation is influenced and why it fails to achieve
the desired end. Yet, he does not address why immigration or asylum legislation fluctuates.
His unit of analysis appears to be immigrants and thus we still need to look at why policy is
inconsistent among countries. Further, without empirical evidence, we cannot legitimize
Castle’s findings. Thus, while Castles does effectively bring forth an argument in why policy
fails, the reasons for asylum and refugee discrepancy between nation-states are not fully
answered.
Finally, Christina Boswell (2003) analyzes the European Union’s growing tendency
to restrict migration through external and preventative approaches. She states that to control
flow, the European Union engages in external control by “strengthening borders, combating
illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking, or readmitting migrants who have crossed
into the EU illegally” (Boswell 2003, 619). Preventative measures address factors that make
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people move in the first place. Boswell goes on to discuss the political and institutional
elements that drive these EU policies, and how and why these policies emerged. She states
that a “restrictive, control-oriented” refugee policy has resulted from external pressures.
Moreover, migration has increasingly become perceived as a security threat to receiving
countries, in that it is linked to “organized crime, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism”
(Boswell 2003, 623). This perception, whether true or not, allowed policy makers to direct
these fears into stricter refugee and immigration law.
Boswell does base her argument in observable trends, yet without empirical data to
demonstrate her hypotheses, her reasoning falls short. Her thought that policy reflects
external control and public sentiment is merely presupposing without concrete data to verify
her opinions. Again, she focuses on European countries and neglects similar phenomenon in
other nation-states around the world.
Hypothesis and Theory
Why do some nation-states accept more asylum seekers than other nation-states? I
will hypothesize that countries with high levels of democracy, more developed economies,
and low population density will correlate to high acceptance rates. That is, as a country’s
democratic level rises, do does the likelihood that they will welcome more asylum seekers
into their borders. Additionally, a nation-state that has low population density is more likely
to accept larger numbers. Finally, a country that is economically stable is more apt to allow
higher numbers of asylum seekers.
The first independent variable of my hypothesis states that countries with higher
levels of democracy will accordingly accept larger numbers of asylum seekers. Typically, a
democratic country is considered to be a free society in which every citizen has a voice in
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their local and federal government. Thus, there is a greater possibility that a population in a
democratic society would influence their government to relax the national borders when
compared to a country with an authoritarian population with little or no say in government
affairs.
However, some would say that while a democratic country seems to reflect the will of
the people, this does not necessarily mean that a country will relax border control. The
majority of the population may in fact support tight borders that would restrict asylum flow.
Hence, we would then have a situation where a democratic country would not accept large
numbers of asylum seekers.
Yet, this critique fails to mention that in a democratic society, a minority still has the
right to lobby government, oftentimes with much success. For example, in 1979 the
Taiwanese minority in America were successfully able to lobby the United States’ congress
in passing a Taiwan Relations Act that helped to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan, even
though a larger number of Chinese opposed such ruling. So, since a democracy reflects all
citizens, and each citizen could potentially lobby government to achieve their desired end (in
this case- lenient asylum policy), a democratic country could successfully be lobbied by
majorities as well as minorities in implementing lenient policy.
Secondly, I will hypothesize that a country with a better developed economy will
admit more asylum seekers than those countries that are not as economically advanced.
Reasoning follows that an affluent economy would be better equipped to handle more asylum
seekers than those countries with weak economical growth. A strong economy means
financial strength, and a country that is financially strong can afford to handle the financial
burden of that occurs with larger numbers of incoming peoples. Thus, if a country can afford
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to let in more asylum seekers, they will be more likely to do so than countries with poor
economies ill-equipped to financially support migrating peoples.
There are those that would say that an economically stable government does not
necessarily guarantee a laissez faire attitude with regard to border control. On the contrary, a
rich country may not want to allow in more peoples, since these incoming individuals would
serve no purpose except to drain the economy of the stability it has achieved. Yet, while a
rich country does not guarantee high acceptance rates, I would still hold that an affluent
economy is more likely to accept larger quantities of asylum seekers than those countries
with weak economies. True, strong economies have a choice in whether to admit migrating
peoples; but countries with weak economies have little choice since they would not be able to
financially support large numbers.
The third variable of my hypothesis states that a country’s population density (people
per square feet) may be an indicator of changing asylum policy. That is, a country with high
population density would be expected to also have restrictive immigration policy and a
country with low population density would be expected to take in high numbers of asylum
seekers. Logically, if a country has less spatial room to offer to foreign peoples, policy
makers will enact legislation to restrict inward flow to prevent overcrowding. Thus, countries
like the United States with a low population density of 29.77 people per square kilometer and
Canada with a population density of 3.36 people per square kilometer, would be expected to
have lenient immigration policies; whereas countries with high population densities like
China with 133.69 people per square kilometer, and Germany with 234.86 people per square
kilometer would exhibit rigid asylum restrictions (CIA, 1999).
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However, many would point to countries like the United Kingdom with a high
population density of 244.69 people per square kilometer, and a relatively high acceptance
rate of 28%. Examples such as this seem to weaken the supposed relationship between low
population density and border leniency. Yet, this critique seems to hold for only a few
outlying countries, and thus when we look at global trends in population density, I think that
the population data will accordingly relate to asylum policy.
There are others who hold that asylum policy could be explained by other casual
hypotheses such as: the religiosity of the country, population diversity, and global events
inciting policy inconsistency. Yet, while these hypotheses at first glance seem relevant,
further exploration uncovers a superficial relationship.
The religious level within a country is the first hypothesis that could potentially
explain the variation in asylum policy. That is, as a country’s religious level rises, so does the
likelihood that their asylum policy will be less restrictive and more open. Reasoning follows
that if a country’s population has high religious levels, they will accordingly feel morally
obligated to assist the refugees of the world. This public moral sentiment would be made
known to policy makers, who would then enact legislation that would mirror this obligatory
attitude in less restrictive borders and guidelines.
It seems to hold that the welcoming of refugees into foreign lands does carry religious
roots. The Israelites and Greeks were one of the first peoples to view their churches as
sanctuaries, whereby God gave protection to those who sought shelter in religious places.
Conversely, the Romans, who did not hold with such religious practices, were not known to
grant asylum at all (Plaut 1995, 46). Furthermore, in the16th Century, Geneva became a place
of refuge for French Protestants, regardless of age or sex, to escape Catholic persecution.
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Modern day Israel may also be an example of this religious phenomenon in which Israel’s
“law of return” states that every Jew has a right to settle in the land (Plaut 1995, 46).
Yet, while this religious explanation can clarify why some nations (such as Israel)
welcome certain refugees, it fails to answer why they do not welcome other refugees that
identify with a religion other than the majority religion. Yes, Israel welcomes Jewish
refugees. However, it does not welcome all refugees. 16th Century Geneva may have
welcomed Protestants, but it failed to welcome other religions as well. This theory fails in the
context in which it was brought forth: that a religious country (not specifying religion) would
welcome refugees regardless of religion, sex, race or other demographic characteristics.
Additionally, some scholars maintain that population diversity within a country could
explain asylum and refugee policy fluctuation. For example, historically, the United States
has been known as a “country of immigrants” and its policy on immigration has past
reflected this diversity. From 1820 to 1860 the United States boasted of an “open door”
policy and welcomed the refugees of the world (Lemay 2004, 93). These new entrants, once
inside the borders, can affect policy formation by lobbying government officials to broaden
immigration legislation. This trend has been noted in the United States and Australia as
waves of immigrants have oftentimes successfully influenced policy regarding family
reunion programs across international borders (Gibney 1999, 174).
However, there is additional research to support the reverse idea: that an ethnically
diverse population would be more likely to tighten borders than a homogeneous population.
Germany could be a prime example illustrating this point. With Germany classified as one of
the top ten asylum seeking regions and with more than eight percent of Germany’s
population foreign born, Germany could be called a country of immigration (Munz and
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Weiner 1997, 3). Thus, with the first hypothesis stating that diversity contributes to lenient
immigration policy, we could expect Germany to typify this characteristic. Indeed, Germany
has fluctuated with regard to its immigration policy from the high acceptance rate of fortythree percent in 1985 to the low rate of five percent in 1991. Yet, this dip in acceptance rates
seems to reflect the public opinion of the growing diversification of the country. As the
foreign population has increased, public opinion has steadily become more resentful of these
foreign residents (Munz and Weiner 1997, 3).
Furthermore, one could point to the United States as another example of this trend.
While the United States did open its borders during the nineteenth century, it has since
tightened control. In fact, when we look at the pattern of U.S. immigration policy within the
past fifteen years, developing policy seems to reflect a “vigorous new consensus to restrict
immigration” (Munz and Weiner 1997, 60). So whereas the United States might still be
classified as the “land of asylum” (Lemay 2004, 93), the turn to restrictive policy suggests
the opposite.
Thus, while the literature may illustrate evidence supporting the diversity hypothesis,
with facts supporting opposing trends it becomes difficult to ascertain its validity. Moreover,
while diversity at certain points in time could possibly explain changing policy, with
historical data supporting opposing claims, it seems that diversity is not the causal factor, and
another variable may be influencing the policy discrepancy.
Global events have been cited in the literature as a potential factor of a nation-state’s
asylum policy. For example, large waves of immigrants could influence a country to close its
borders, or a humanitarian crisis could pressure a country to relax border control. The flood
of Haitians to the United States in 1991 could be one such example of events inciting policy
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action. The fear that the United States was being “overtaken” provoked policy makers to
close U.S. ports and may have stimulated stricter asylum procedures (Munz and Weiner
1997, 61). Furthermore, during the 1990’s Germany reacted to the emigration potential from
the former Soviet Union with a tightening of borders. In fact, an asylum law passed in 1993
reflected this sentiment as strict changes in immigration law made it difficult for those
desiring asylum and refugee status (Munz and Weiner 1997, 154). Additionally, Canada
relaxed its policy during the Indochinese emergency in 1979 when it received reports that
Indochinese were roaming aimlessly at sea. (Plaut 1995, 122). Additionally, Italy responded
to the outpouring of refugees from Somalia, Albania and Kosovo by awarding these people
with humanitarian and temporary protection status (Boswell 2003, 60).
However, while there seems to be some relationship between global events and
immigration policy, it is incorrect to attribute all immigration legislative endeavors to these
happenings. Yes, we may see past examples of humanitarian crises stimulating accepting
attitudes (for example: Canada’s acceptance of the Indochinese), but I am reluctant to admit
that these events alone cause variation. It would be better if it was stated that, at times, events
can stir policy action. But, this hypothesis fails to answer why there is variation in policy
when there is no huge outpouring of refugees or massive humanitarian crises to deal with.
Thus, this hypothesis’ focus is too narrow, and does not account for the wider picture.
Methodology
To test the hypothesis, I created a data set that included my dependent variable: a
country’s recognition rate of refugee seekers, and my three independent variables: economy,
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population density, and a country’s measured democratic level. All four variables were
interval in nature.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided the
necessary data for my dependent variable. UNHCR measured one hundred and forty five
countries’ (positive) recognition rates of refugee seekers for the year 2003. The recognition
rates were measured as a function of all positively accepted refugees divided by those
accepted and rejected.
A 2003 survey published by Freedom House provided data for two of my
independent variables: a country’s measured democratic level, and a country’s economic
level (measured through its respective gross domestic product per capita).
Freedom House surveyed each country’s democratic level based upon a country’s
political rights. To accurately measure a country’s political freedom, every country was
evaluated with a checklist divided into three categories: electoral process, political pluralism,
and the functioning of the government. Under each category, questions were asked that were
appropriate to that topic. A country’s political rank was based upon the raw number score
assigned by each question.
Once each score was tallied, Freedom House assigned each country a number ranking
between one and seven. A rank of one represented the highest democratic level and the
highest amount of freedom. A rank of seven represented the lowest level of political freedom.
According to Freedom House, a country considered “free” had elected leaders with fair
elections, a competitive party system, minority representation and self governance. A country
categorized as “less free” or “not free” typically exhibited corrupt governments, violence,
political discrimination of minorities, one party dominance or civil war.
Mori 21
Additionally, Freedom House listed each country’s gross domestic product. Thus, a
“good” economy would exhibit a high gross domestic product per capita (GDP). For
example, the United State’s GDP of $34,142 would be representative of a good economy,
while Sudan’s GDP of $1,797 would typify a weak economy.
Data for my third independent variable (population density) was gathered using the
2002 publication of the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book. The fact book listed each
country’s population density, defined in terms of people per square mile.
To test the relationship between the dependent and three independent variables, a
multi-variant linear regression will be used. Linear regression tests the relative strength of the
correlation between the variables and measures the strength of the independent variables
influence upon the dependent variables. The independent variable’s impact upon the
dependent variable will be reflected in the standardized coefficient (B). That is, B describes
the change in the dependent variable with every unit change in the independent variable,
measured in units of standard deviation. B allows us to discern which independent variable
has the strongest influence upon the dependent variable. Additionally, assessing the T value
allows us to reject or not reject the null hypothesis. Specifically, a T value describes where
the slope of the relationship falls, if the null is true. If the T value is larger than 2, and has a
significance level lower than .05, we can reject the null hypothesis (no relationship between
the independent and dependent variable) and ascribe causality between the independent and
dependent variables. Lastly, the R square (coefficient of determination) tells us the
proportion of variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variable(s).
Mori 22
Analysis
To test the possible relationship between the independent variables and the dependent
variable, a multi-variant linear regression was used (Table 1). My hypothesis predicted that a
country with a strong economy, a high level of democracy and a low population density
would accordingly have a higher acceptance rate of refugee seekers. However, upon review
of the linear regression numbers, one can clearly see that out of the three independent
variables, economic strength measured in gross domestic product per capita was the only
variable significantly linked to a country’s positive recognition rate of refugee seekers.
Democracy level and population density were shown not to be a significant relation to the
dependent variable.
Table I. Regression Data Explaining 2003 Asylum
Policy Variation In 145 Countries
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Standardized Coefficients
T
Sig.
6.182
.000
Beta
Constant
50.950
8.241
Democracy Level
1.957
1.609
.125
1.216
.226
Pop. Density (People/Sq. Mile)
.000
.002
.008
.099
.921
GDP (per capita)
-.001
.000
-.362
-3.479
.001
y = 50.950 + 1.957x + .000x1 - .001x2.
The equation of the line that accounts for all three independent variables is y = 50.950
+ 1.957x + .000x1 - .001x2. This equation allows us to interpret the numerical relationship
between gross domestic product per capita and a country’s recognition rate. Specifically,
holding democracy level and population density constant, as a country’s gross domestic
product increases one dollar, a country’s recognition rate accordingly decreases .001 percent.
Mori 23
As stated previously, economic level measured in gross domestic product per capita is
the only variable with a significant impact upon the dependent variable. The significance
level is .001, considerably lower than the .05 needed to demonstrate causality. The T value of
-3.479 supports this finding, since the tested relationship is 3.479 standard deviations away
from the mean in the distribution of sample slopes (which is higher than the two standard
deviations needed to reject the null). With these numbers, we can reject the null hypothesis
stating economy has no effect upon a country’s refugee acceptance rate.
While these numbers confirm that economy does influence recognition rates, the
relationship is inverted. That is, a country with a strong economy is less likely to have high
recognition rates when compared to a country with a weaker economy. This finding does not
support my original hypothesis that stated a wealthier economy would accept larger numbers
of refugee seekers (since it was thought that a strong economy would be better equipped to
handle the financial burden of increased numbers of refugees).
A country’s democratic level was not shown to be significantly related to a country’s
positive refugee recognition rate. The significance level is .228, well above the .05 needed to
demonstrate causality. The T value of 1.216 supports this finding since the tested relationship
is a mere 1.216 standard deviations away from the mean in the distribution of sample slopes,
and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that states there is no relationship between
democracy levels and recognition rates.
Additionally, a country’s population density was not shown to have a significant
effect upon the dependent variable. With a significance level of .921, we find no relationship
between population density and a country’s acceptance levels of refugee seekers. The T value
of .099 supports this finding.
Mori 24
When we look at Table II, the Adjusted R Square value of .179 tells us that the
hypothesis explains 17.9% of the variation in the dependent variable of recognition rates.
Table II. Data Explaining Refugee Policy
Variation in 145 Countries
Model
R
1
.447a
R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.200
.179
30.19706
Conclusion
Overall, my hypothesis is refuted. Population density and democracy level are not
significantly related to a country’s recognition rate. Additionally, while gross domestic
product per capita is significantly related to the dependent variable, the relationship is the
exact opposite of my original hypothesis. I hypothesized that a country with a high GDP
would accordingly have a higher recognition rate; however, the regression data points to a
relationship in which countries with a higher GDP tend to have lower recognition rates.
Yet, while this finding did not confirm my original hypothesis, it is extremely
important when we consider the huge numbers of people seeking refuge each year. Basically,
countries that can afford to accept high numbers of refugees do not in fact do so. We can
only speculate as to why this phenomenon exists. Perhaps rich countries do not accept large
numbers of refugees for selfish reasons, or speculation that accepting high numbers would
damage an affluent economy. Yet, this “selfish” explanation does not explain why a country
like Canada, with a high GDP per capita of $27,840 also has a relatively high acceptance rate
Mori 25
of 49.6%. Obviously, Canada does not have a “fear” of damaging their strong economy.
Thus, there must be other explanations other than pure selfish motivation for refusing refugee
applications.
We could speculate that variation could be explained by un-quantifiable variables
such as a country’s political ideology and global events occurring around the world. For
example, Canada is known to boast of a more “liberal” attitude toward political and social
issues. This could be an explanation as to why Canada is more lenient with refugee policy.
Furthermore, policy variation could potentially be explained when we look at global
events occurring around the world. For example, a humanitarian crisis could spur a country
to relax its borders and grant larger numbers of asylum. On the other hand, large waves of
immigrants could incite a country to close its borders. Generally speaking, global events have
the potential to influence a country to either relax or tighten policy.
The flood of Haitians to the United States in 1991 could be one such example of
events inciting legislative action. The fear that the United States was being “overtaken”
provoked policy makers to close U.S. ports and may have stimulated stricter asylum
procedures (Munz and Weiner 1997, 61). Furthermore, during the 1990’s Germany reacted to
the emigration potential from the former Soviet Union with a tightening of borders. In fact,
an asylum law passed in 1993 reflected this sentiment as strict changes in immigration law
made it difficult for those desiring asylum status (Munz and Weiner 1997, 154).
On the counter side, humanitarian crises could encourage a nation to welcome fleeing
refugees. For example, Canada relaxed its policy during the Indochinese emergency in 1979
and 1980. Reports of Indochinese roaming aimlessly at sea influenced Canada to welcome
60,000 refugees (Plaut 1995, 122). Additionally, Italy responded to the outpouring of
Mori 26
refugees from Somalia, Albania and Kosovo by awarding these people with humanitarian
and temporary protection status (Boswell 2003, 60).
Yet, while we can speculate that these variables could explain the discrepancy among
countries, they are numerically immeasurable and thus the potential relationship may never
be statistically proven. Supposing one could quantify these variables, this is an area in which
further research would be needed.
Still, while my hypothesis was refuted, the found relationship between GDP and a
country’s recognition rate has enormous implications to worldwide refugee seekers. It tells
refugee seekers not to look for refuge in countries with good economies, since there is a good
chance that their application will be rejected. They instead have a better chance at acquiring
refugee status in countries with low GDP per capita. Significantly, countries with weak
economies appear to be handling more than their share of the global refugee burden. Yet, this
phenomenon seems inherently wrong considering strong economies should be obligated to
accept higher numbers since they can afford to do so.
Additionally, this data has an effect upon world organizations that work for bettering
refugee rights, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty
International. Perhaps the best way to improve refugee rights would be to lobby
economically strong countries that do not accept their proportional share of migrating
peoples.
In conclusion, if this paper succeeds in one aspect it is this: extreme refugee policy
variation exists between countries, and this variation exists between countries with weak and
strong economies. There is an obvious problem with this discrepancy, since wealthy
countries should feel obligated to accept larger numbers of refugees than poorer countries.
Mori 27
However, without further research in the afore-mentioned areas, this finding may be
superficial in nature. Still, this paper has succeeded in demonstrating a gross divergence
amongst countries that perhaps should not be there, or should be otherwise related. That is,
countries with strong economies should accept larger numbers, since they appear financially
equipped to do so. Yet, for some reason we can only speculate upon, the relationship is quite
different.
Mori 28
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