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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
Berger and Luckmann's Constructionism as an Ideological Basis
for Network Studies
Henrikki Tikkanen
Turku School of Economics and Business Administration
Finland
ABSTRACT
Post-industrial conditions affecting contemporary interorganizational marketing could be
related to such developments as increasing interorganizational resource dependence,
fragmentation of larger industrial networks into smaller cooperative nets characterized by
efficient interaction and the complexity of interorganizational actor bonds, activity links
and resource ties. Thus, new approaches and theories based on different philosophical
assumptions and theoretical perspectives are needed in order to gain better understanding
on the more or less postmodern environment encountered in contemporary
interorganizational business. Recent network research conducted in Sweden and in the
Nordic countries has incrementally developed into quite a different direction, apart from
the original, systems theory - oriented network thinking and the objectivist/realist
philosophical points of departure obvious in most earlier network studies. For example,
Nordic network researchers influenced by the Uppsala School emphasize the subjectivity
and contextuality of research, and adopt an intentional, voluntaristic view of human
behavior. In our opinion, these often implicit postulats refer to a predominantly
relativist/constructivist philosophical orientation. The purpose of this paper is to discuss
constructionism, especially the classic social constructionist approach by Berger and
Luckmann (1966) as an ideological basis for network studies. First, relativism and
constructionism are discussed briefly as scientific orientations on a general level. Second,
some central features of Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social constructionist approach
591
Luckmann (1966) as an ideological basis for network studies. First, relativism and
constructionism are discussed briefly as scientific orientations on a general level. Second,
some central features of Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social constructionist approach
are introduced. Third, the preceding discussion is elaborated to the field of network
research by comparing some central tenets of the social constructionist stance with the
ones of the Nordic network approach and by presenting implications this might have for
empirical network studies. The basic rationale for the discussion as a whole can be
identified in highlighting a philosophical perspective on the basis of which industrial
networks are understood through studying them as entities constructed and reconstructed
through continuous social interaction.
592
INTRODUCTION
The philosophical and social changes often characterized as "postmodern"2 are
increasingly considered as major traits of our times (Bauman 1992). Post-industrial
conditions affecting interorganizational marketing could be related to such developments
as increasing interorganizational resource dependence, fragmentation of larger industrial
networks into smaller cooperative nets characterized by efficient interaction and the
complexity of interorganizational actor bonds, activity links and resource ties. Thus, new
approaches and theories based on different philosophical assumptions and theoretical
perspectives are needed in order to gain better understanding on the more or less
postmodern environment encountered in contemporary interorganizational business. In
the 1990s, one could argue that industrial marketing theory is still imprisoned in a set of
limited approaches/paradigms which appear to be essentially incommensurable^ (see e.g.
Moller 1994). On the one hand, theories and concepts that build on the marketing
management, strategic or organizational buying behavior research traditions prevail in the
existing industrial marketing literature. On the other hand, alternative research traditions
such as the IMP - group interaction/network approach have lately received increasing
attention among industrial marketing researchers.
2 In this paper, we relate postmodemity to the current position in world history signifying the change of
course of modernity or even its end, and postmodernism to the contemporary, critically oriented ways of
describing and assessing societies and social phenomena (Venkatesh et al. 1993).
3 However, Kuhnian incommensurability is usually understood too restrictively. Already in the 1 st edition
of his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn emphasized the unavoidable overlap of
alternative paradigms in a research area. Also the meaning of interaction between the paradigms for the
development of the research area was pointed out (cf. with the idea of multiple realities constructed
through interaction between different individuals or social groups, Berger and Luckmann 1966). In the 2nd
edition of the book, Kuhn (1970) complemented his presentation by introducing the concept of the
disciplinary matrix as an incorporation of different, overlapping and interacting, but essentially
incommensurable paradigms in a scientific discipline.
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The "markets as networks" approach (e.g. Johanson and Mattsson 1994, Hakansson and
Snehota 1989) views interorganizational markets as organized behavior systems
manifesting network structures (cf. e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Cook and Emerson
1978, Aldrich and Whetten 1981). The network approach and various theoretical concepts
related to it have sometimes been referred to as an emerging paradigm in
interorganizational exchange and industrial marketing research (Turnbull et al. 1996,
Johanson and Mattsson 1994, cf. Cova 1994). During the last fifteen years, industrial
networks
research
has
been particularly
strong
in
the
pan-European
IMP
(Industrial/International Marketing and Purchasing) research group. The Nordic countries,
especially Sweden and contemporarily also Finland, are particularly well represented in
the research group (Mattsson 1996). The strength of the network approach is often
identified in its high compatibility with the interorganizational business environment
firms actually encounter in their every-day operations (Snehota 1990).
Despite the diverse, interdisciplinary theoretical background of the network approach (see
Moller 1994, cf. Renders 1992), one could argue that the original idea of network
research was to reveal objective system-like network structures related to explaining
interoganizational exchange behavior. The often mentioned metaphor of the global
industrial system as one huge network is a good example of realist confidence in
researchers' abilities to conceptualize the objective features of seemingly limitless
networks, from which one delimits appropriate subsystems in accordance with the
research situation and problem setting. However, network research conducted in Sweden
and in the Nordic countries has incrementally developed into quite a different direction,
apart from the objectivist/realist philosophical points of departure obvious in most early
network studies. Nordic network researchers influenced by the Uppsala School seem to
have developed a world of their own with distinct views of the world, the phenomena
under scrutiny, and with differing terminology (e.g. Henders 1992, 29-33). These views
are most often implicit, incorporated in the expressions and language used in the research
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reports, which, in turn, makes it somewhat difficult to draw an exact demarcation line,
say, between Nordic network research based on its own underlying assumptions, and,
more realistically oriented network research conducted in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Most Nordic network researchers seem to share some common underlying assumptions
about the nature of the contemporary business environment and the behavior of the
business enterprise. This is obvious if one examines recent network research conducted in
Sweden or more generally in the Nordic countries (e.g. Alajoutsijarvi 1996, Havila 1996,
Salmi 1995, Hertz 1993, Henders 1992, or Waluszewski 1989). In short, the following
conceptualization of the world view of the Nordic network researchers seems to emerge
from recent network studies:
(1) the subjectivity and context-boundedness of reality and knowledge, both in business
and research situations.
(2) the emphasis on benevolent, cooperative behavior aiming at mutual goals, which
seems to refer to an intentional, voluntaristic^ view of human nature instead of a
mechanistic, deterministic picture of self-interest seeking network actors.
(3) the reliance on the subjectivistic focal firm's view on its business context instead of,
in accordance with earlier system and network theories, trying to reveal a complete
network system reasoned to be relevant in a research situation.
(4) the general interest in the understanding of the dynamic processes related to various
complex, fragmented and textured network contexts.
The above presented philosophical assumptions concerning ontology, epistemology, and
human nature can be linked to a postmodernistically oriented (Rosenau 1991, Cova and
4 See e.g. Hikansson and Johanson 1992, 34, Ford et al. 1986, 27-28.
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Crespin-Mazet 1996), relativistic/constructivistic^ scientific orientation. According to
Cova and Crespin-Mazet (1996, 207, also Heiskala 1995) a constructivist scientific
orientation, primarily based on the anti-behaviorist heritage of symbolic interactionism
and the seminal book by Berger and Luckmann (1966), is clearly evident in various fields
of social sciences. In essence, constructionism questions the "given" and gives room for a
plurality of "realities" (Cova and Crespin-Mazet 1996, 207). These "realities" or social
constructions can and should also be viewed and assessed in terms of conceptual
frameworks, groups of individuals, situation and time, which, in turn, forges a link
between relativism and constructionism.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss constructionism, especially the social
constructionist approach by Berger and Luckmann (1966) as an ideological basis for
network studies. First, relativism and constructionism are discussed briefly as scientific
orientations on a general level. Second, some central features of Berger and Luckmann's
(1966) social constructionist approach are introduced. Third, the preceding discussion is
elaborated to the field of network research by comparing some central tenets of the social
constructionist stance with the ones of the Nordic network approach and by presenting
implications this might have for empirical network studies. The basic rationale for the
discussion as a whole can be identified in presenting a philosophical perspective on the
basis of which industrial networks can be understood through studying them as entities
constructed and reconstructed through continuous social interaction.
RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIONISM AS GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIENTATIONS
5 Hakansson and Johanson (1993) also seem to identify their position as constructivist by referring to
Berger and Luckmann (1966) when discussing how actors construct network structures.
596
Common to all relativistic (in Easton's terms, conventionalist^) orientations is their
opposition to a view of science as providing true descriptions and explanations of an
independent, external reality. Moreover, relativists argue that theories are accepted on the
basis of convention, not through direct empirical testing. However, there is no consensus
between different relativistic schools of thought on what is actually meant by the concept
of "convention". (Easton 1995a, 432-437)
On a general level, contemporary forms of scientific relativism owe much to the later
works of Wittgenstein, especially his Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein's
earlier writings were decidedly realist in orientation (e.g. Wittgenstein 1922). His later
works specifically rejected the realist view that the meanings of words, phrases, and
propositions are to be found in their referential properties; instead, their meanings are to
be found in the circumstances in which they are used. Therefore, even the meaning of
scientific terms changes radically between the contexts they are used in. (Hunt 1991, 313314) The theories of Kuhn (1962, 1970) and Feyerabend (1975) are often identified as the
most influential conceptions that had an effect on the development of relativism as a
separate philosophy of science. These theories had a totally differing set of premises
compared to the earlier theories on the philosophy of science. Instead of, vide analytical
philosophy, attempting to clarify the language of science, they attempted to generate
general theories of science.
Easton (1995a, 433) perceives cognitive relativism as the mainstream view of relativism,
particularly as it might apply to marketing. Muncy and Fisk (1987, 21) define this very
general form of relativism as "Thus the central tenet of cognitive relativism is that the
"truth " or the evaluation of "truth " is relative to the conceptual schema of an individual,
6 Easton (1995a) uses conventionalism as a broad term including the following relativist scientific
orientations: cognitive relativism, nihilistic relativism, scepticism, conceptual epistemic relativism,
objective epistemic relativism, and critical relativism.
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a group of individuals, or some situational aspect of the context within which the
assertion was made" (cf. Kuhn 1970, 205-207). On the other hand, Easton (1995a, 435436) sees critical relativism as a realistically oriented form of relativism positing that a
research program and theoretical constructs related to it should be judged in accordance
with its mode of production, the criteria according to which the theories are judged within
the program, and the metaphysical beliefs that underwrite it. In other words, the realizable
cognitive and practical aims of a theory must be known so that its applicability in praxis
can be judged. For example Anderson (e.g. 1983, 1986, 1988a, 1988b) strongly argues for
critical relativism which he believes to be the most appropriate scientific approach in
contemporary consumer behavior and marketing research already because of its reliance
on theoretical diversity, integration and information source triangulation. In our opinion,
the above mentioned two forms of relativism, cognitive (conceptual framework)
relativism and critical relativism, should be particularly interesting to a network
researcher.
Easton (1995a, 439) views constructionism? as closely related to conventionalism
(relativism). However, he sees some important ontological differences between the two
orientations. Most importantly, where relativism sees knowledge about reality as relative
to situation and time, constructionism assumes that the reality we study is constructed, for
example through a social process. Following Peter and Olson (1983), we do not want to
make such a clear distinction between relativism and constructionism. Social
constructions can and should also be viewed and assessed in terms of conceptual
frameworks, groups of individuals, situation and time, which, as mentioned already in the
introductory section, forges a direct link between relativism and constructionism.
7 Peter and Olson (1983) use the term constructionist as Easton (1995a, 1995b) uses the term
constructivist. However, they do not make the distinction between relativism (conventionalism) and
constructionism. Easton (1995a, 425) criticizes this as he sees relativist (conventionalist) orientations as
clearly differing from constructivist orientations. However, both orientations seem to share several
metatheoretical tenets related to central ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions.
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The mainstream constructivist orientation can be seen as a mixture of interpretivist,
humanistic and naturalistic orientations. Reality is constructed socially, and, thus, the
world view does not need to be monolithic across different social groups. However, some
overlap in world views is needed in order to keep group interaction going. Basic axioms
related to the constructivist orientation include e.g.: human beings construct multiple
realities, the researcher and the phenomena are mutually interactive, the aim of research is
to produce ideographic knowledge, cause and effect cannot be separated, research inquiry
cannot be value free, and knowledge is socially constructed. (Easton 1995a, 440-445, cf.
Berger and Luckmann 1966, Lincoln and Guba 1985)
Furthermore, Lagerspetz (1996) distinguishes between what he calls "the two
constructionisms". On the one hand, one can identify a strict constructionist approach
with strong isolationist tendencies^ 9 Qn the other hand, there is a less strict,
phenomenologically oriented form of constructionism that views social reality primarily
as a context-specific, interpreted reality (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966). In this paper,
we primarily refer to
the
latter, non-nihilistic
orientation
when
discussing
constructionism.
BERGER AND LUCKMANN'S SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
Despite the recent, sometimes fuzzy discussion around the concept of constructionism as
a philosophical stance, it could be argued that Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social
constructionism is the most important single contribution behind the non-strict
8 For example, solipsism (lat. solus = alone, ipse=self), the most extreme form of constructionism, views
the self as all that exists and that can be known. Thus, the world is a product of human mind created by
the individual. (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 239)
9 Easton (1995a) seems to equal all forms of constructionism more or less with the strict, isolationist
approach positing the non-existence of a concrete world.
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10
constructionist perspective. In their seminal book "The Social Construction of Reality",
Berger and Luckmann (1966) presented an analysis of knowledge in everyday life in the
context of a theory of society as a dialectical process between objective and subjective
realities.
In Berger and Luckmann's terms (1996, 13) "reality" is defined as "...a quality
appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own
volition (we cannot 'wish them away') ". Furthermore, "knowledge" is defined "...as the
certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics." Does
the adoption of this kind of ontological and epistemological position then not
automatically mean adhering to realism? Seemingly inspired by the above definitions,
Cova and Crespin-Mazet (1996, 207) and Heiskala (1995, 156-157) connect social
constructionism with the realist assertion of social structures that exist independently^.
However, both Cova and Crespin-Mazet and Heiskala also recognize that in Berger and
Luckmann's thinking, "reality" is not perceived as existing "out there". In this sense,
Berger and Luckmann's position does not automatically seem to represent the
contemporary scientific or transcendental realism as advocated, for example, by Bhaskar
(1986, see also 1979, cf. Giddens 1984). Instead, social structures change and develop
through socialization occurring in specific interaction contexts, which, in turn leaves
room for a plurality of context-specific "realities" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 33-35).
As Berger and Luckmann themselves state (1966, 15) "Sociological interest in questions
of 'reality' and 'knowledge' is thus initially justified by the fact of their social relativity".
In addition to this, Berger and Luckmann (1966, 26-27) specifically want to exclude the
(philosophical) problem of epistemology by adopting a broad, relativist position to the
scope of the sociology of knowledge: "The sociology of knowledge must concern itself
10 On the other hand, Easton (1995a, 441) views Berger and Luckmann's social constructionism as a
strictly non-realist approach. Easton perceives all forms of constructionism as more or less nihilistic and,
thus, questionable as a metatheoretical basis for a scientific study (cf. Easton 1995b).
600
11
with everything that passes for 'knowledge" in society'. In other words, Berger and
Luckmann (1966, 27) are particularly concerned with "common-sense" knowledge that
constitutes the reality of everyday life (cf. Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1992, Lukka and Kasanen
1995), not with philosophical "ideas" or "Weltanschauungen".
Berger and Luckmann's (1966, 28-29) perspective to the nature of social reality is
primarily based on Durkheimian theory of society, especially as presented in Durkheim
(1895/1980), and on the assertion of the constitution of social reality through subjective
meanings derived from Weber (1921/1956). In addition to this, Berger and Luckmann
introduced a dialectical perspective adapted from Marx to highlight the social
construction of every-day knowledge as an interplay between objective and subjective
realities. In Berger and Luckmann's (1966, 43-48) approach, the face-to-face situation is
the most important mode of interpersonal communication and interaction. "The most
important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situation, which is the
prototypical case of social interaction. All other cases are derivatives of it." (p. 43) Thus,
the social reality of everyday life (from a single actor's viewpoint) is apprehended in a
continuum of typifications, progressively anonymous as one moves away from the faceto-face situation. "At one pole of the continuum are those others with whom I frequently
and intensively interact in face-to-face situations
my 'inner circle', as it were. At the
other pole are highly anonymous abstractions, which by their very nature can never be
available in face-to-face interaction. Social structure is the sum total of these
typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them. As
such, social structure is an essential element of the reality of everyday life." (p. 48)
Further (non-strict) constructionist theorists such as Garfmkel and Goffman have
presented slightly differing theoretical perspectives. The common denominator between
Berger and Luckmann, Garfmkel and Goffman is their view to "reality" as a social
construct, formed in an interplay of intentional, conscious social actors and interpreted by
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12
participative researchers. On the other hand, it is difficult to connect the contemporary,
extremely heterogeneous field of French philosophical cultural analysis sometimes
referred to as "constructionist" (e.g. Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Lyotard,
Baudrillard etc.) with Berger and Luckmann's approach. (Heiskala 1995, 166-167)
In addition to sociology, the "humanistic" approach to the sociology of knowledge
presented by Berger and Luckmann has had considerable relevance for several areas of
social sciences. However, in the field of management studies the constructionist approach
has been scarce^. As will be discussed in the following section, we perceive an excellent
match between the social constructionist orientation and the basic metatheoretical features
of the North-European network approach.
The social constructionist program by Berger and Luckmann (1966, 34) considers
(Schutzian and Husserlian) phenomenological analysis as the method best suited to clarify
the foundations of knowledge in everyday life. They characterize the method as follows
(p.34): "(phenomenological analysis), a purely descriptive method and, as such,
"empirical" but not "scientific" - as we understand the nature of the empirical
sciences"^. Furthermore, (p. 34) "The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or
rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic
hypotheses, as well from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena
analysed." The above quotations actually include about everything Berger and Luckmann
11 However, humanistic and/or phenomenologically oriented approaches closely related to social
constructionism have recently received increasing attention also among business researchers, see e.g.
Pihlanto(1992).
12 It must be stated that the concept of "scientific" had quite a different meaning as Berger and
Luckmann's book was originally published in the 1960s. Those days, "scientific" or "scientificity"
primarily meant the adoption of a nomothetic, usually quantitative orientation to empirical research.
However, in contemporary social sciences the concept of "scientific" has a considerably broader meaning.
Nowadays, also ideographic phenomenological analyses would probably pass for "scientific" research in
most occasions.
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13
say about the methodological implications of their conception of reality as a social
construct. In endnote 1 of the chapter 2 of their book, they explicitly refer to Schutz's
work (see e.g. 1970) in order to give an example of the application of the
phenomenological method to the analysis of social world. In addition to this, Berger and
Luckmann include no further methodological discussion or references in their treatise.
Thus, it is primarily left for the readers to imagine how the social constructionist program
by Berger and Luckmann might be realized empirically in field studies. In the following
section, some possible methodical avenues are presented through which this problem
could be solved in conducting empirical network studies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It is easy to identify parallel thinking in, on the one hand, Berger and Luckmann's
emphasis on face-to-face interaction as the primary means of the social construction of
reality and, on the other hand, in the way how social interaction between individuals in
organizations is seen as the primary explanatory factor in the formation of business
relationships and networks (e.g. Hakansson and Sharma 1996, 122, Renders 1992, 20,
Ford et al. 1996, 28; cf. Moller 1994). Furthermore, some interesting similarities can be
found in Berger and Luckmann's and central network theorists' texts. For an example,
"Although the social stock of knowledge appresents the everyday world in an integrated
manner, differentiated according to zones of familiarity and remoteness, it leaves the
totality of that world opaque." (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 59) On the other hand, "The
industrial networks are opaque and unbounded. Concerning the opacity, all actors have
rather clear views of their own relationships with other actors, albeit the views of
interacting actors are not necessarily consistent. Different individuals in an actor may
also have inconsistent views of the relationships with other actors. Generally the actors'
cognitive models are less differentiated and clear about less distant relations in the
network and the cognitive models of distant actors may differ widely." (Hakansson and
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Johanson 1993, 40) Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann's (1966) perspective to the
incremental objectification and institutionalization of social constructs such as
interpersonal relationships may be paralleled with the emphasis on the relative stability of
institutionalized relationships in industrial networks apparent in many central texts (e.g.
Hakansson and Johanson 1992, 28, 31, 34, Hakansson 1992,136-137).
According to Berger and Luckmann's perspective, a focal organization and its net, for
example a steel mill and its network context, would be viewed by the researcher as social
constructs formed and re-formed through every-day interaction, including all possible
variants or modes of interaction and based on the often divergent interpretations the
interacting individuals make on their situations and contexts (cf. Ford et al. 1986,
"inconsistency"). However, this does not mean that all of the features of the steel mill
would automatically transform into something vague, unreal and "constructed". Some
natural objects related to the operation of the steel mill, e.g. buildings, production
equipment or finished steel plates, naturally appear rather real and tangible to all actors in
the organization and its network. This is irrespective whether network actors are defined
as individuals or more collectively as intraorganizational departments or as whole
business organizations. In addition to this, certain intangibles such as traditional routines
related to production activities or established interaction patterns in long-term business
relationships appear more or less objectified and real to the relevant actors involved. All
this forms the contextual "objective reality" which the network actors "cannot wish away"
(very easily). On the other hand, the "subjective reality" is formed internally by the actors
through their varying interpretations on their situations and contexts. It is the ongoing
dialectical process between the external (objective and objectified/institutionalized)
realities and the internal (subjective and interpreted) realities of the relevant actors that
eventually makes the steel mill and its network emerge as a social construct. Through this
process, some of the former objectifications regarding, for example, the features of
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15
existing business relationships remain the same and others develop and change
incrementally as the interaction continues.
To the network researcher, this means that he or she has to construct an understanding on
the "objectified" features of the network under scrutiny. In a sense, the researcher has to
try to "follow the story/history" how the studied network context and the central actors'
interpretations
on
it
have
developed
through
the
process
of
objectification/institutionalization. In the course of doing this, of course, varying
phenomenologically oriented methods can be used.
For example, empirical network studies influenced by social constructionism might be
realized by using a method that resembles the socio-technical graph as presented by Cova
and Crespin-Mazet (1996). The socio-technical graph, based on social constructonism and
the sociology of innovation and modified to be applicable in contemporary management
studies, actually represents a form of phenomenological analysis. In its intensity, it may
be argued to come close to action research. As also Cova and Crespin-Mazet (1996, 220)
state: "The narrative (i.e. the case description and analysis, text in parenthesis added) is
no longer seen as an immature and non-scientific research method (cf. footnote 11). On
the other hand, the researcher's main skill is his/her capacity to follow a story." This
stance appears to be well in line with, for example, Czarniawska's comment on Weick's
"Sensemaking in Organizations", 1997, 113: "Although stories simplify the world, and
are therefore useful as guides for action, they simplify it less than the kind of formal
models which we learned to reverse as true science" (also Weick 1995, 60-61).
Berger and Luckmann's view of the phenomenological analysis as the preferred method
for the empirical realization of the constructionist stance is consistent with the high
reliance on ideographic deep case studies in empirical network research (e.g. Mattsson
1996, 15, Renders 1992, 34-37). Good examples of recent empirical network studies
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16
based on an interpretative, actor-centered methodological approach (for alternative
methodological approaches in business studies, see e.g. Arbnor and Bjerke 1994) are
Alajoutsijarvi (1996), Salmi (1995), Hertz (1993), Renders (1992) or Waluszewski
(1989). On a general level, the interpretative phenomenological analysis comes close to
Petti grew's (e.g. 1990) often cited contextualist approach, in which phenomena are
described and analyzed in their settings. According to Pettigrew, these descriptions and
analyses are to be confirmed qualitatively/subjectively, taking into account the contextual
and multi-faceted nature of meanings in heterogeneous research situations. Subjectivistic
studies based on a profound situational and contextual understanding create practically
oriented, situationally relevant results, also on a theoretical level (cf. e.g. Evered and
Louis 1981, 389). The traditional "statistical" generalizability of these results is most
often so narrow that the connection between theory and praxis remains quite tangible.
However, we do not see this as a problem for the "scientificiry" of the network approach.
Context and situation specific implications, both theoretical and practical, exhibit a great
value, at least as rich descriptions of phenomena in their contexts. The attempt is not to
generalize or draw conclusions beyond the applicability of the specific research results^.
However, all too often have case studies resulted in relatively shallow case descriptions
and vague analyses that have not allowed neither a meaningful analysis nor a proper
theoretical discussion (Pihlanto 1994). This is true also when it comes to qualitative
network studies, where a real phenomenological orientation has been scarce. Until now,
several network researchers have had too much of a "puzzle-solving" approach to the use
of the network theory and traditionally preferred methods such as "the case study" in their
research. A more profound understading of alternative underlying philosophical
perspectives and available research methods is needed more or less desperately. In line
13 e.g. Lukka and Kasanen (1995) call this kind of generalization "contextual generalization". On the
other hand, because of the statistically oriented connotations of the word "generalization" it might appear
more reasonable to refer to, for example, existence claims (mostly based on common sense knowledge,
Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1992).
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17
with the evolving relativistic/constructivistic philosophical orientation, network
researchers should seriously start considering the use of more intensive research methods
that would enable a more profound understanding of the studied network phenomena. In
our opinion, several qualitative methods related to the action-oriented or subjectivist
research paradigm other than "the case study", so far relatively unknown among network
researchers, would come in question. These could include, for example, human action
research,
participant
observation,
ethnomethodology,
or
various
further
phenomenological approaches (see Pihlanto 1992). The most important common
denominator between the above methods is the centrality of the actors' perceptions and
interpretations of their worlds and contexts.
We believe there is a strong case for using Berger and Luckmann's social constructionism
as one possible ideology guiding a researcher in the process of realizing an empirical
network study, even irrespective of the chosen method. Berger and Luckmann's approach
can influence the researcher's way of perceiving the emergence of the studied
phenomena, and, thus, evidently lead to a more thorough and grounded understanding on
these as a result of the empirical research process.
In our opinion, the assertions presented in this paper could be crystallized into the
following, broad philosophical guidelines for network researchers:
1. Network researchers perceive intra- and interorganizational networks as their ontology.
However, realities encountered in network studies should primarily be viewed as
subjective situational interpretations related to the adopted conceptual framework, the
studied network context and individuals acting in it, and the research situation and the
researcher. Thus, the knowledge produced by network studies is always bound and
limited to the studied context and situation.
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18
2. The objective of the network researcher is to construct a thorough and holistic picture
of the studied network structures and processes in their contexts. The major challenge
is to use intensive research methods and innovative triangulation between different
informants and heterogeneous sources of information that ultimately lead to a more
thorough understanding on the objects and phenomena under scrutiny than what
already exists. That is, the researcher should be fully aware of that individuals in
organizations act on a voluntaristic and intentional basis, constructing their own, more
or less compatible realities of the studied phenomena. The researcher should also
acknowledge that the understanding he or she is able to achieve on the basis of an
empirical study also is another social construct linked to and bound by the phenomenon
under investigation, the specific research situation and the conceptual framework used.
3. Another important challenge for the network researcher is how to communicate the
achieved understanding comprehensively to the audience, i.e. to the business and the
academic world. This is often a very difficult task as the research report should be, on
the one hand, comprehensive enough for the transfer of the core understanding to the
readers, and, on the other hand, compact enough for making possible an easy overview
of the central points made in the text. It is then primarily up to the audience to apply the
findings of the study to their own, differing purposes and contexts.
608
19
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