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Thrasyllus Author(s): W. James McCoy Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 98, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 264-289 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/293777 Accessed: 03-03-2015 13:14 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Journal of Philology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS The decade following the Athenian defeat in Sicily in 413 markedthe most turbulentconstitutionalperiod in the history of the Athenian democracy. Internaltensions-a logical consequence of any severe military setback-were further heightenedin the case of Athens by the sudden emergence of individualsand factions that conspired against the democracy and temporarilysucceeded in bringingabout majorchanges in the Athenian pattern of government. Yet despite the overt machinationsof oligarchs and opportunists, there remaineda solid core of loyal Athenian patriots who refused to compromise or associate themselves with any anti-democratic movenientand remainedadamantin theirresolve to defend the democracy and to bring the war with Sparta to a successful conclusion. Among this group was Thrasyllus. The extant record of Thrasyllus' life and career is rather scant and seemingly straightforward. From 411 to 406 he served Athens as a soldier and a general and was finally executed in connection with the Arginusaeaffair.Beyond the scattered details of his militarywhereabouts, however, the figure of Thrasyllus is virtually ignored. The ancient sources leave little doubtthat he was a man of integrityand influence, but for some reason they treat him in such a matter-of-factway that the emerging portrait lacks both substance and dimension. Given Thrasyllus' degree of involvement with the major personalities and crucial events of the latter years of the Peloponnesian War,this neglect is regrettable.Indeed a cautious probing beneath the surface of the evidence suggests that Thrasyllus was more controversial than the sources imply. It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to re-examine the testimony relating to his public career and to present more clearly his position in relation to other leaders of the time, such as Alcibiades, Theramenes and Cleophon. Our investigation will show, I think, that Thrasyllusplayed a more conspicuous and importantrole in Athenianaffairsthan is generallyadmitted.1 1 I stressed this point in my unpublished doctoral dissertation: Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates, Yale University (December 1970). AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY98 264-289 (1977) Copyright ? 1977 by The Johns Hopkins University Press This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 265 Schwahn suggests that Thrasyllus was born between 456 and 442.2 There is no record of his father's name or deme: all sources refer to him merely as Thrasyllus. He emerges from obscurity in the capacity of a hoplite serving with the Athenian fleet at Samos in 411.3 If 'hoplite' implies an accurate census classification, he must have possessed at least moderate means.4 It is not known when Thrasyllus joined the Athenian fleet. A reasonable guess is the late summer of 412, when a force of forty-eight triremes (including 1000 hoplites) arrived at Samos.5 If this is true, Thrasyllus was probably there during the winter months, when Alcibiades first began to communicate from Asia Minor with the most influential men of the Athenian fleet.6 But Thrasyllus was not numbered among the ranks of those who conspired against the democratic governments of both Athens and Samos. Nor is it likely that the conspirators took him into their confidence (even though they courted the hoplite element7), since he was never implicated or charged with complicity in their intrigues. Perhaps Thrasyllus would have been willing to accept temporary limitations on the democracy at Athens at this critical time, especially if the Athenians could have mounted a new war offensive with Persian support, but he definitely stood opposed to oligarchy. In fact he was among those Athenians sought out by the Samian democrats when they became aware of the plot to subvert their 2 W. Schwahn, s.v. "Thrasyllos,"RE VIA, 1 (1936)col. 578. 3 Thuc. 8.73.4. 4 Thrasyllusis never identifiedin the sourcesas a trierarchor as belongingto the Athenian liturgicalclass, which duringthe fifth century would indicate propertyholdingsprobablyin excess of four talents (see J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families [Oxford 1971] xxiv). To qualify as a strategos, Thrasyllusapparentlyneededto possess landedpropertyin Attica(Deinarchus 1.71; cf. C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution [Oxford 1952] 191 andn. 7, 224 andn. 10),but it is unlikelythathe was a richlandowner(owingin part to the notable omission of a patronymicin any referenceto Thrasyllus). Moreover,there is no way to determinehow much Thrasylluswas relianton private means of supportduringhis tenure on the strategia, since it is uncertain whether the strategoireceived a public salary even as late as the end of the fifth century. 5Thuc. 8.25.1. Thuc. 8.47.2. 7 Thuc. 8.63.3. 6 This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 266 W. J. McCOY democracy. Thrasyllus responded by enlisting the support of fellow hoplites8 and, according to Thucydides, was one of the chief leaders in suppressing the revolution.9 At first glimpse, therefore, we see Thrasyllus as an energetic leader, a patriot and an ardent supporter of democracy. Thrasyllus again displayed his mettle after news had reached Samos that the Four Hundred had assumed power in Athens. He and the trierarch Thrasybulus bound all the soldiers (especially those suspected of oligarchic sympathies) by the most solemn oaths to maintain the democracy, to live in mutual harmony, to continue a zealous prosecution of the war, and to refrain from peaceful overtures to the inimical Four Hundred.10 When the soldiers voted to depose their former generals, they chose Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus (among others) to fill the vacancies. 1 We are not told whether Thrasyllus shared the enthusiasm of Thrasybulus for Alcibiades' recall or whether he was annoyed in any way by Alcibiades' braggadocio and the vain promises that prompted the fleet not only to elect him as one of their generals, but also to entrust him with all their affairs.12 This, in a sense, was a rebuff to the other newly appointed generals, but it did create, at least for the moment, a salutary esprit de corps. Thrasyllus' first independent command as a general of the fleet occurred in the late summer of 411.13 On this occasion the Spartan admiral Mindarus suddenly evacuated the Peloponnesian base at Miletus and was making his way towards the Hellespont, and Thrasyllus sailed from Samos with fifty-five ships to anticipate his arrival. When Thrasyllus learned that Mindarus had been forced to make a temporary stop at Chios, he was determined to keep him there and posted scouts at strategic points on Lesbos and the Asiatic mainland to track 8 Thuc. 9 Thuc. 10Thuc. 1 Thuc. 8.73.4-6. 8.75.2. 8.75. 8.76.2. 12 Thuc. 8.82.1. A. Andrewes ("The Generals in the Hellespont, 410-407 B.C.," JHS 73 [1953] 4) is of the opinion that Thrasyllus opposed Alcibiades' recall. 13 G. Busolt (Griechische Geschichte III 2 [Gotha 1904] 1515 [hereafter Busolt, G.G.]) suggests that Thrasyllus was probably second in command to Alcibiades at this time. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 267 any movements of the Peloponnesian fleet. He himself proceeded to Methymna where he ordered that provisions be made ready in the event that he needed to use Lesbos as a base of attack against Chios. Next he planned to assault the city of Eresus, which had recently revolted from Athens; he arrived there to find Thrasybulus and a small squadron of five ships already anchored.14 While Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were preparing to besiege Eresus, the fleet of Mindarus stealthily escaped to the Hellespont, which forced the Athenians to abandon their leisurely siege and set out in pursuit.15 Even though the recapture of Eresus would have eliminated an enemy stronghold on Lesbos, the Athenian generals gave priority to protecting the vital grain routes to the Euxine. Battle was finally joined near Cynossema in the straits of the Hellespont where the Athenians (out-numbered by ten ships) won an impressive victory, owing in large part to the skillful maneuvering of their right wing. Thucydides says that Thrasybulus commanded the Athenian right, which confronted Mindarus and the Peloponnesians, whereas Thrasyllus was on the left opposite the Syracusans.16 Diodorus reverses the stations of the Athenian commanders17 and adds the further embellishment that the battle was a stalemate until the sudden appearance of twenty-five ships despatched to the scene by the allies of Athens.l8 Whatever the case, Thrasyllus seems to have made a noteworthy debut in his first naval battle.19 Cynossema by no means restored Athenian naval supremacy in the Aegean and Hellespont, yet the victory had a significant effect on Athenian morale. According to Thucydides,20 14 Thuc. 8.99-100. Thuc. 8.101-03. 6 Thuc. 8.104-5. 17 Diod. 13.39.4. 18 Diod. 13.40.4. Thucydides makes no mention of Athenian reinforcements. 19 We can infer from Diod. 13.40.6 that Thrasybulus held the chief command at Cynossema since he set up the victory trophy and sent news of the event to Athens. This command seems quite logical owing to Thrasybulus' prior experience as a trierarch. 20 Thuc. 8.106.2, 5. 15 This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 268 W. J. McCOY QpopoVlevot ya Q rnwo r6 r)v IeAojrrovvtJaiov vavrtLov vy av aciuaa ara xa i 6d r rrz xar& f3axi rV Elx2ita odp vyicpo'dv, dnr7AjIyrTaav roV aqcpd; re aavrovi xaraa#qcpe?acOaxal rovi; :roAelOVg grt dtiov; rov Eg rd vavrtx o ... l 6O (?elv. vol rtg ve?C) xal dcpxnoouvr re rati; TeOirTiv t: dvi,ltoarov rv EvrvXtav dxov aavreTg Evipotav aQnrt ;vcqpoQal5 xa txara ryv ordatv xal tv6Outoavacpialv lrt yeyevrjgEvatc :rO^V -z'eQQc(aOr7oav 6vvar& eivat ra& rQayuarTa, advrtiualidvwovrat, 7reQtyeveaOat. 7iv nQOOVl2Cw Thus Cynossema proved to be a psychological turning point in the war not only for the personnel of the fleet but also for the Athenians in Athens who had just recently expelled the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. The victory seemed to soothe the wounds of political strife and served notice to the Peloponnesians that Athens was still a formidable foe. Moreover, Cynossema marked a new plateau in the military careers of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who had won the battle in the absence of Alcibiades. The import of this was not lost on the Athenians at home, many of whom were hostile towards Alcibiades and sought to prevent his complete domination of Athenian affairs. We need only project ahead to the years 410 and 409 when the restored democracy initiated a new war effort in Asia Minor that was to operate independently of Alcibiades and the Hellespontine fleet: the recipient of that command was Thrasyllus. Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War ends abruptly in the midst of describing the activities of the Athenian fleet after the battle of Cynossema, and there is no further mention of Thrasyllus.21 Consequently we are thrown back on the scattered evidence of Xenophon and Diodorus for the remaining years of Thrasyllus' career until his death in 406. Xenophon' s Hellenica begins with a description of two naval battles between Athens and Sparta that occurred late in 411. The first was a skirmish between the squadrons of the Athenian Thymochares and the Spartan Agesandridas;22 the sec21 Thrasyllus might have participated in the Athenian recovery of Cyzicus in the late autumn of 411 (see Thuc. 8.107), even though Diodorus says that Thrasybulus was in charge of this campaign (13.40.6). 22 Xen. Hell. 1.1.1. Xenophon's brevity prevents us from making any sense out of this battle, except that it resulted in a Spartan victory. He omits mention This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 269 ond, a more significant, yet indecisive engagement in the Hellespont,23 in which Diodorus reports that Thrasyllus commanded the left wing opposite the Spartan Mindarus.24 The outcome of this second battle turned on the unexpected arrival of Alcibiades with no more than twenty ships from Samos, which caused the Peloponnesians to retreat to the Asiatic shoreline near Abydos. Here, with the aid of the Persian satrap Pharabazus, the Spartans withstood the efforts of the Athenians to land, and the latter finally withdrew across the straits to Sestus.25 The Athenians then left forty ships at Sestus and sent out the remainder of the fleet in different directions in quest of money. Thrasyllus sailed to Athens to report what had happened and to ask for troops (especially hoplites) and ships.26 It is reasonable to suppose that Alcibiades, as commanderin-chief, delegated these various tasks to his fellow generals and that he exercised the utmost discretion in selecting Thrasyllus for the mission to Athens. The latter was a particularly delicate assignment as it marked the first known attempt on the part of the fleet to ask for direct aid from Athens after the deposal of the Four Hundred,27 but Thrasyllus' credentials seem to have fit the occasion. In the first place, he was a of the site, the exact number of ships involved (he does say that Thymochares commanded a 'few ships'), and when it was fought (we can be confident that it occurred in the late autumn or early winter of 411). Diodorus (13.41) says that this Spartan fleet numbered fifty and that it was totally destroyed off Mt. Athos (with the exception of twelve crewmen). When we combine the evidence it follows that the Athenians were totally outnumbered and that the battle was fought before either fleet reached the northern Aegean. 23 Xen. Hell. 1.1.2-7. 24 Diod. 13.45.7. Xenophon gives a more abbreviated account of this battle than Diodorus (13.45-46). Also the authors are at variance as regards the number of ships accompanying Alcibiades, the actual site of the battle, the advent of a storm and high winds, and the number of ships captured and recovered by the Athenians. 25 26 Xen. Hell. 1.1.8. 28 Following the battle of Cynossema, Diodorus (13.40.6) says, Thrasybulus merely informed Athens of the victory and nothing more. The mission of Thrasyllus, however, combined the announcement of another naval victory (i.e. Abydos) with a specific request for military reinforcements. In Xen. Hell. 1.1.1 we learn that Thymochares had been sent to the northern Aegean (?) with This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 270 W. J. McCOY former hoplite and as such surely qualified for membership in the new government of the Five Thousand.28 Secondly, he was not then a controversial figure, and while he had proven his loyalty to democracy as a form of government he had never, so far as we know, been actively involved in Athenian politics. Finally, Thrasyllus, as a general of the Athenian fleet, had been an active participant in the recent military activities in the Hellespont area and thus could supply a first-hand account of the current situation and stress the need for reinforcements (especially hoplites) in the hope of forcing a final showdown with a recuperating Peloponnesian navy.29 Alcibiades and his fellow generals had no delusions about the current state of the Athenian economy. By this time the ordinary and special reserve funds were doubtless exhausted, and the collection of annual revenues was so pathetic that the Hellespontine generals could hardly anticipate financial aid.30 So theirs was a different request: manpower and ships.3' Naturally this in itself would involve a vital sacrifice on the part of the Athenian government, but the Athenians in Athens would find themselves even more hard-pressed if the Spartans and a few ships, but Xenophon does not reveal what promptedthis maneuver, whetherthe city acted on its own accordor respondedto a distress signalfrom the fleet. The formerseems more likely in that the Athenianswere probably eager to track the squadronof Agesandridasthat had recently defeated the Atheniansunderthe commandof Thymocharesoff Eretriain Euboea (Thuc. 8.95) and had been summonedby Mindarusto join him in the Hellespont (Diod. 13.41).On the second naval battlebetween Thymocharesand Agesandridas,see above n. 22. 28 Thuc. 8.97.1; Arist. Ath. Pol. 33.1. See above p. 265 and n. 4. 29 Diodorus (13.47.2) says that Mindarus,after his defeat at Abydos, requested both soldiers and ships from Sparta.In the meantime,he and Pharnabazus,the Hellespontinesatrap,werepreparingto lay siege to variousAsiatic cities still allied to Athens. 30 W. S. Ferguson, The Treasurers of Athena (Cambridge 1932) 38 (hereafter Ferguson, Treasurers); R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 370. 31 J. Hatzfeld (Alcibiade [Paris 1958] 265) underscores this point and suggests that Alcibiades' request was a reasonableone since the Athenians could sparerowersandfoot-soldierswithoutweakeningthe defense of Athens. Hatzfeld, with referenceto IG I2 105, also emphasizesthat the dockyardsat the Piraeus had recently been restored throughthe liberal generosity of Archelaus of Macedon and were once again in a position to construct new This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 271 their Persian allies came to control the Hellespont. The strategy of the Hellespontine generals seems to have been as follows: if the fleet could be reinforcedby the beginningof the campaigningseason of 410, it would be in an advantageous position to overwhelm the Peloponnesian navy, to dominate the Hellespont, and, if necessary, to fight a land war in Asia. The potentialbenefits, therefore,wouldjustify the risks; at the very least, the fleet and the city would finally be joined in a common cause. Alcibiades was probably optimistic that Thrasyllus would succeed in procuring additional levies: surely the Five Thousand,which had alreadyvoted Alcibiades'recall,32would see the wisdom of this request and respond with all possible haste and generosity. But immediate assistance was not forthcoming, and Thrasyllus did not join his comrades in the Hellespont in the early springof 410. In fact he did not arrive there until the fall of 409, and then only by a circuitousroute.33 The effect of this extensive delay could have been disastrous; as it was, the fleet was usually scatteredin differentdirections in search of money and supplies for survival. Militarily it waited on the movements of the Peloponnesians.34Even after the Atheniansannihilatedthe Peloponnesiansat Cyzicus in the triremes. But Meritt's restorationand dating of this inscriptionto 407/406 instead of 411/410,weaken, if not demolish, Hatzfeld's second argument(B. D. Meritt,"Archelaosand the Decelean War,"in ClassicalStudiesPresented to Edward Capps [Princeton 1936] 246-52; Athenian Financial Documents [Ann Arbor 1932] 110-15;see also R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions [Oxford 1969] 277-80 [hereafter SGHI]). See below n. 86. 32 Thuc. 8.97.3. 33 For a brief discussion of the chronologicalcontroversy surroundingthe date of Thrasyllus'departurefrom Athens, see below n. 41. 34 Whenthe SpartanMindarushad left Abydos with sixty ships en route to Cyzicus (whichhadrecentlybeen recoveredby the Athenians),Alcibiadeshad no other choice but to follow him. Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.12) says that Alcibiadeswas aboutto embarkwhen he wasjoined by Theramenes,who arrived from Macedonia with twenty ships, and Thrasybulus, who arrived from Thasos with another twenty. Diodorus (13.49.2) contends that Theramenes had left Macedoniato join Thrasybulusin Thraceand that both generalswere summonedto the Hellespont for action against Mindarus.ConsequentlyAlcibiades was able to muster eighty-six ships to engage Mindarus(Xen. Hell. 1.1.13),who commandedeighty ships at the time of the battle (Diod. 13.50.2). This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 272 W. J. McCOY spring of 410,35 the Hellespontine generals were unable to follow up their victory on land.36 It was a frustrating situation but one that might have been prevented had Athens cooperated. There are several possible reasons for this lack of commitment by the Five Thousand. Even though Thrasyllus' unexpected arrival might have been greeted with a degree of skepticism, the Athenians apparently gave his request a fair hearing. We can infer, I believe, from a remark of Xenophon referring to the year 410 (when the Athenians actually voted to grant Thrasyllus' request37) that the Athenians were willing to support the Hellespontine fleet perhaps as early as the end of 411. If this is true, their willingness was not matched by their resolution, and no immediate action was taken. The most obvious deterrent was a depleted treasury.38 Another factor may have If the squadrons of Theramenes and Thrasybulus had not arrived, however, Alcibiades could hardly have anticipated an actual engagement. This incident points out the perilous nature of the Athenian position in the Hellespont. 35 Xen. Hell. 1.1.18. The Athenians captured the entire fleet of the Peloponnesians; the Syracusans burned their own ships to prevent their capture. 36 Andrewes (JHS 73 [1953] 2) attributes the relative inactivity of the Hellespontine fleet to the lack of sufficient hoplite forces to wage a land war against the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus. Hence the Athenian generals, even after their victory at Cyzicus, were forced to content themselves with operations to acquire money and supplies (see Xen. Hell. 1.1.20-22; Diod. 13.64). Alcibiades raised large sums from the citizens of Cyzicus and then sailed to Perinthus, where he was admitted inside the walls, and Selymbria, where he was denied admission but received money. A customs-house was set up at Chrysopolis where a 10 percent tax was collected on all cargoes sailing in and out through the Bosporus (see Polyb. 4.44.4); a garrison of thirty ships and two generals (including Theramenes) were stationed there. Theramenes was also enjoined to lay siege to Chalcedon and Byzantium. Thrasybulus was sent to Thrace to bring the cities there over to the Athenians. Alcibiades himself raided the satrapy of Pharnabazus where he realized booty money. These pursuits occupied the Hellespontine fleet through the remainder of 410 and much of 409. 37 Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.34) says that as a result of the Agis episode: ol oVv Fart T QoOvs6OreQotfoav b?p' a ixE, xat 'AOrlvaibltT) Ooao9vt; w 6tt&rafra .. ., which seems to indicate a prior willingness on the part of the EiTrl iavro Athenians to comply with Thrasyllus' request. 38 See above n. 30. The financial plight of the Five Thousand is further underscored by Diodorus (13.47.6-8) in his description of the activities of Theramenes, a general of the Five Thousand. Theramenes' first assignment was to prevent the building of a causeway between Boeotia and Euboea, but he was quickly forced to abandon this enterprise and concentrate instead on certain Aegean islands where he successfully devastated enemy territory and This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 273 been the number of sea-going ships immediately available in the Piraeus dockyards.39But we might also suspect political interplay at work. Theramenes, the guiding light of the Five Thousand and a leading advocate of Alcibiades' recall, was absent from Athens on a military assignment,40and perhaps the other leaders of the new governmentwere not so inclined to sponsor any measure that would enhance the prestige of Alcibiades (who, after all, had never responded to the invita- collected greatsums of booty. He also visited alliedstates andreceivedmoney from those inhabitantswho were bent on revolution(doubtlessa punishment inflicted on known supportersof oligarchy). At Paros he even expelled an oligarchy and exacted a monetary fine from the participants.According to Diodorus, Therameneswas motivated by a desire ... rov; re nroiTrag xat avd,uaxov; avanravoat rcEvEiaqo0Qov, which argues that the Athenians had once again resorted to the eisphora, or direct propertytax, in order to meet expenditures.On eisphora, see below n. 57. 39 We have no means of telling how many ships the Athenianscould have mobilized by the beginningof the campaigningseason of 410, but there are indicationsthat this fleet wouldhave numberedfarless thanthe fifty thatwere requested and finally authorizedto Thrasyllus(Xen. Hell. 1.1.34). After the naval disasteroff Eretriain the late summerof 411, Thucydides(8.89.1) says that the Athenianswere able to man only twenty ships. Xenophon says that Thymochareshad merely a 'few ships' underhis commandat the time of his second engagementwith Agesandridas(see above n. 22), but he does not reveal the fate of this defeated Atheniansquadron.After the Five Thousand had been established, Theramenes(Diod. 13.47.6-8)set sail to Euboea with thirty ships and proceededto use this same fleet for variousoperationsin the Aegean islands (see above n. 38). Diodorusthen says that Theramenes cowv aro6lovassisted the Macedonianking Archelausat Pydna(13.49.1),a fleet that Xenophon(Hell. 1.1.12) numbersat twenty ships. But these twenty ships did not returnto Athens;insteadthey accompaniedTheramenesto Thraceand the Hellespont(see above n. 34). Hence it is unlikelythat the city of Athens had anythingresemblinga largefleet at its disposal in the springof 410, and given the nearbankruptcyof the Atheniantreasuryit was difficultto undertakenew construction(even though Diodorus [11.43] contends that the AthenianAssembly continuedto vote twenty new shipsper annum for the Athenianfleet throughoutthe fifth century). When Thrasyllus eventually left Athens for Samos and Ionia at the beginningof summer(409), Xenophon(Hell. 1.2.1) in additionto the fifty triremes says, he set sail rlpcqtOevra:r.oia a/3acwv; these would also includecavalrytransports.A fleet of this size could not have been assembleduntil Athens againhad public money to spend, which did not occur until the latter half of 410. 40 See above n. 39. After Theramenesjoined the Hellespontinefleet (see above nn. 34 and 36), he apparentlydid not returnto Athens until after the battle of Arginusaein 406. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 274 W. J. McCOY tion of the Five Thousandto returnto Athens). In any case, given the developments of the spring and summerof 410, the Atheniansbeganto view theirgeneralconduct of the war in an entirely different perspective, and the career of Thrasyllus suddenly took a new course. Any analysis of the events of 410 is unfortunatelyhampered from the startby serious chronologicalproblems.One involves the 'missing year' in Xenophon's Hellenica;41 another concerns the somewhat haphazard fashion in which both Xenophon and Diodorus present their narratives, especially their departurefrom strict chronologicalorder and the lack of detail regardingthe activities of the restored democracy. The combined literarytestimony cannot resolve the dilemma;and although epigraphicalevidence sheds importantlight on the matter,there are far too many gaps in our informationand far too many questions unraised or unanswered by our extant sources for us to be completely comfortablewith any reconstruction.In such a situationplausiblehypothesis must suffice. If we accept the late dating for Thrasyllus' departurefrom Athens and subsequent arrival in Ionia (i.e. the beginning of 41 Xenophon, in Hellenica 1 and 2, presumes to continue the narrative of Thucydides (albeit with inferior results) and to record the events of the last seven years of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon himself, following the system of Thucydides, dates these years by season, but the interpolator of Hellenica 1 and 2 attempts to furnish additional information by inserting the names of eponymous ephors and archons. In so doing, however, he fails to make specific reference to the beginning of a certain new year amid the contents of Hellenica 1, namely 410/409 (perhaps because of his oversight in noting the approach of spring 408/407, i.e. Hell. 1.4.2); see Ferguson, Treasurers, 43-45. This omission has given rise to at least two lines of interpretation that affect the date of Thrasyllus' departure from Athens. According to the theory first offered by Dodwell, who suggested the insertion of the missing year at Hell. 1.1.11, Thrasyllus would have set sail in the summer of 409. Haacke, on the other hand, first argued that the missing year belongs somewhere after Hell. 1.4.21, which would date Thrasyllus' expedition to Ionia to the same time, but a year earlier. An imposing array of scholars has added support to both sides of this controversy, but the arguments bolstering Dodwell's theory are more convincing and, taken as a whole, provide a more plausible reconstruction of the events of 410 and 409; see in particular J. Beloch, "Zur Chronologie der letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Krieges," Philologus 43 (1884), especially 275-82. For a general review of this problem see G. E. Underhill, A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon (Oxford 1900) xxxv-xlii. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 275 summer, 40942), it follows that he was present in Athens throughout the year 410. Naturally, he, like other Athenians, was intimately affected by the tide of good fortune that touched Athens during the spring and summer months, but in his case the repercussions were far more dramatic. There are four items in particular that contributed directly or indirectly to his gaining new stature and prominence: the Athenian victory at Cyzicus, the restoration of the democracy, the successful repulsion of Agis' attack, and the improving status of the Athenian treasury. Let us examine each in turn. The battle of Cyzicus was fought at the earliest in April.43 The news of this overwhelming Athenian victory not only caused great jubilation in Athens, but also produced a new outburst of energy and enthusiasm for the war.44 The Athenians were so confident that they could eventually defeat the Peloponnesians that they even rejected Spartan overtures for peace.45 Diodorus says that the Athenians were optimistic of future victory because they had Alcibiades at the head of their forces.46 But when the time came for Athens again to lend active support to the war effort, it was Thrasyllus, not Alcibiades, who was the prime beneficiary. It was probably owing to the spirit of elation over Cyzicus that the Athenians turned their thoughts towards the restoration of the democracy. Now that the military crisis appeared over, Athens could return to its reckless ways. The government of the Five Thousand had outlived its usefulness, and at least by the beginning of the official year 410/409 it had quietly succumbed to the restored democracy.47 Elected to the first 42 See above n. 41. 43 Underhill (A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon, xl) dates the battle of Cyzicus c. April; Ferguson (Cambridge Ancient History V, 343) in April; Meiggs (The Athenian Empire, 371) before midsummer 410. 44 Diod. 13.52.1. But Diodorus is in error when he says that the Athenians immediately despatched 1000 hoplites, 100 cavalry, and fifty triremes to Alcibiades. 45 Diod. 13.52.2-53.2. 46 Diod. 13.53.4: TTre6 ol 'AOTrvalotrol; re ev?jUCEorQjaaiveGraQOevrec; ai ac Xovrec Ev rT) rov 'AAx1ftdarlv adcp7qyslaOaL riv jroA,&alxai yEydAa;ExMa6 l6iwv 6vvdl,ewv, raxw;O ovro r4yv 'yetov'av dvaxTrraaoOat. 47 There is evidence to indicate that the democracy was restored even before the official archon year 410/409. Meritt (Athenian Financial Documents, 62, This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 276 W. J. McCOY strategia of the new government was Thrasyllus.48 As strategos Thrasylluswon immediateacclaim. When the Spartanking Agis attackedthe walls of Athens fromhis base at Decelea, Thrasylluswas appointedto command a make-shift militia that, when drawn up in battle formation near the Lyceum, thwartedAgis' plans andforced him to withdraw.As a result of this incident, accordingto Xenophon, the Athenians were rt z7roOv6UTrEQotto grant Thrasyllus' initial request and voted reinforcements to the extent of 1000 hoplites, 100 cavalry and fifty triremes.49 Surely an authorizationof this size could not have been possible without the real or potential availability of public money.50Indeed, if we examine the relevant literaryand epigraphicalevidence, there is every indicationthat the Athenian 94-114; see also "Athenian Calendar Problems," TAPA 95 [1964] 210-11) has pointed out, with reference to IG I2 304A, that part of the first prytany of 410/409 actually belongs to the archon year 411/410. See also SGHI, 258; Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 5-6; G. E. M. de Ste Croix, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," Historia 5 (1956) 1. 48 On Thrasyllus as strategos in 410/409, see J. Beloch, Die attische Politik (Leipzig 1884) 311-12; C. Forara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 (Wiesbaden 1971) 68 (hereafter Fornara, Generals). 49 Xen. Hell. 1.1.33-34. It is possible that the Agis episode preceded the restoration of the democracy. If so, Thrasyllus' command was either an extraordinary one (such as Cleon's at Pylos in 425), or one directly attributable to his election as strategos by the fleet, which the Athenians apparently recognized as valid. But the fact that Agis was probably motivated by the appearance of grain ships (from the Euxine ?) sailing into the Piraeus (Xen. Hell. 1.1.35) suggests a possible date of mid-summer at the earliest. The shipment of grain from the Euxine would not have occurred until after the battle of Cyzicus and not with any regularity until the Hellespontine fleet controlled the straits of the Bosporus. Besides, the principal Pontic grain for export was winter wheat (see Theophr. Hist. PI. 8.45) and the height of the shipping season was summer, not later than August (see E. C. Semple, The Geography of the Mediterranean Region [New York 1932] 356-63). Whatever the case, there is no evidence to contradict that Thrasyllus was serving at this time as a strategos of the restored democracy (see Hatzfeld, "La fin du Regime de Theramene," REA 40 [1938] 123). 50 In addition to the hoplites and cavalry we need also reckon with the 7000-8500 nautai who sailed with the fleet of Thrasyllus, 5000 of whom were equipped as peltasts (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1); on nautai see B. Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley 1975) 210-40. If we reckon that the crew of a trireme numbered 200, the manpower of this fleet might have totalled 10,000. At three obols a day a man (Jordan 116), this was a sizeable expense. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 277 economy was on the upswing in the summer of 410. By now the successful enterprises of the Hellespontine generals had assured an unmolested convoy of grain ships into the Piraeus,51and it is also probable that certain allies who had been dilatoryin paying Athens her due (especially the EixoaTr tax, first instituted in 414 to supplant the oQoco52) made every effort to restore themselves to good standing.53Apparentlythe Athenians even decided to reinstitutethe collection of 9o6gog at this time and drew up a new assessment list dating to the Great Panathenaeaof 410 (Hekatombaion28).54 Still another indication of the improvementin Athenian finances (or financial outlook) is evident in the context of a decree of the Assembly (IG I2 109) dated to the third prytany of 410/409,55 whereby the Athenians resolved to pay back their debt to the treasury of Athena and to establish a reserve fund on the Acropolis. One might reasonably suspect that some or all of these financially-oriented decisions were offshoots of the grand euphoriathat gripped Athens in the wake of Cyzicus, the restorationof the democracy, and the successful defense against Agis. But if the Atheniansdid commit themselves prematurely to any of these items, the accounts of the tamiai of Athena for 410/409(IG I2 304A) show that their financialpredictionswere far from rash. Here we see that the tamiai made regulardisbursementsto the hellenotamiaias early as the first prytanyof 410/409,which is all the more extraordinarysince, accordingto Ferguson,56this boardof tamiai "inheriteda practicallyempty treasury." The hellenotamiai, in turn, distributedthese and Xen. Hell. 1.1.35. Thuc. 8.28.4. 53 See Ferguson,Treasurers,38-39. Xenophon(Hell. 1.3.9) says that, when Chalcedon was recovered in 409, the terms of the settlement included a provisionthat Chalcedonregularlypay its normaltributeand at the same time 51 52 make up arrears: ... V5nore2etVTv 6oeov Kaxri6oviovg oaovjtr EciOeoaavxai r&ao6CetA6oueva xei#ara dzo6ofvat .... 'AOrivaiot; 54 Meritt,"The TributeAssessmentof 410 B.C.," Hesperia 6 (1936)386-89; see also Meritt,H. T. Wade-Gery,and M. F. McGregor,TheAthenianTribute Lists I (Cambridge,Mass., 1939)A13 andp. 208 (hereafterATL).For a discussion of the date of this 'last assessment' see Meiggs, The AthenianEmpire, 438-39. 55 See ATL I D9 and pp. 213-14. 56 Ferguson, Treasurers, 38. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions W.J. McCOY 278 other funds (imperial revenues) for a variety of purposes, perhaps including the projected campaign of Thrasyllus.57 But even if sufficient money was available for Thrasyllus in the summer of 410-which is very unlikely-it is doubtful that there were fifty triremes in the Piraeus dockyards ready for 57 See Ferguson, Treasurers, 39-40; Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 5-6; ATL III, 365-66.Thereis no explicitreferenceinIG I2304Athatthe tamiaiprovidedthe lhellenotamiaiwith fundsfor the expeditionof Thrasyllus.On the thirtiethday of the sixth prytany,however, a paymentof fifty-seventalents 1000drachmai from Samos was allocatedto the hellenotamiai;and on the thirty-sixthday of the ninth prytany a composite payment, again from Samos, which totalled approximatelyforty talents, was allocated to the generals and trierarchson "must Samos. Andrewes contends that the entire Samian dvoyuoAoyrluaTa certainly representthe expenditureon Thrasyllus'Ionian campaign,whose startingpoint was Samos." Ferguson, on the other hand, is less dogmatic, particularlywith regardto the destinationof the paymentin the sixth prytany: "This may have gone to help outfit Thrasyllus,but it went more probablyto Samos, like the other monies paid from 'the fund from Samos' . . . The authorsof the ATL are totally non-committal:"Money fromthe allies, which didnot come to Athens, was used in the field butneverthelesscreditedas loans from the Goddess .... It cannot be argued that the money (i.e. the dvo/uooyrjuaTafrom Samos) was not used by Thrasyllosbecause his name does not appearin the inscription...." I am more inclinedto Ferguson'spoint of view, especially since I interpret Hell. 1.1.34and 1.2.1 to meanthat the Atheniansvoted Thrasyllusa new levy and not one that was to be raised amongthe remnantsof the fleet at Samos (which,afterall, neededmoneyto survive).If the hellenotamiaidid not borrow fromthe treasuryof Athenato defraythe expenses of Thrasyllus'expedition, presumablytherewere amplefunds in the imperialtreasuryfor this purposeat least by 409. Court fines, as well as revenue from Piraeus and the eikoste, might have contributeda limited amount,but two other possibilities suggest themselvesas morelucrativesources of revenue. 1)The Atheniansapparently had occasional recourse to the eisphora after the Sicilian disaster;Diodorus hintsof this in 13.47.7andagainin 13.64.4.Schwahn("Die attischeeisphora," RhM 82 [1933]250, n. 2) suggeststhatthe Athenianslevied such an eisphorain the year 409, which R. Thomsen (Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in AncientAthens [Copenhagen1964]177)assesses at not less than 200 talents. Perhapsthe eisphoraof 409 post-datedthe departureof Thrasyllus,but it could also be arguedthat it occurredduringthe early monthsof 409, when imperial activities were relatively quiet, and that the money realized was applied, if only in part, to Thrasyllus'campaign.2) If Meritthas correctly identifiedthe fragmentsof a tributeassessmentlist of 410 (see above n. 54), it is reasonable to suppose that the majorityof paymentswere made at Athens at the time of the GreatDionysia of 409 (late Marchor early April). If this is so, perhapsa portion of this money was also earmarkedfor Thrasyllus'campaign.In any case it is worth notingthat Thrasyllusdid not set sail in the spring,but at the beginningof summer409 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1). This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 279 immediate embarking.58Besides, the present situation in the Hellespont and Asia Minor was by no means critical, and Alcibiades and his fellow commanders seemed to be managing well enough on their own. So the Athenians in Athens spent the remainingmonths of 410 and the early months of 409 preparing and mobilizing the fleet that had been authorized for Thrasyllus,who finally set sail at the beginningof the summer of 409.59 Where Thrasyllus went is somewhat puzzling. Instead of sailing to the Hellespont to rejoin Alcibiades, he went first to Samos and from there to Ionia. This tack can perhaps be explainedby the fact that Alcibiadesand his comradeswere no longer in the perilous position in which they had found themselves in the winterof 411 (when Thrasylluswas sent to Athens for reinforcements).Moreover, the Atheniangovernment(i.e. the restoreddemocracy)was probablyeager to establisha new offensive front and at the same time to reassert control over former tribute-payingallies who had recently switched their allegianceto the Peloponnesians.60In this respect, Thrasyllus' new army would complementthe fleet in the Hellespont inasmuch as it was specially equipped to operate on land.61 Nevertheless, we might equally suspect another purpose behind Thrasyllus'venture into Ionia-a plan to counterbalance ratherthan augmentthe successes of Alcibiades. No one could dispute that the remarkablerecovery of Athens was due in large part to the naval victories of Alcibiades, but there were certainly some Athenianswho were wary of Alcibiades' ambitions and anxious to preclude his complete dominationof the Athenianstate. Still others regardedhim as an outlaw, since he had never returnedto Athens to answer the chargesconnected with his alleged profanationof the EleusinianMysteries, to say 58 See above n. 39; see also Hatzfeld,REA 40 (1938) 123. 59 Both Hatzfeld (Alcibiade 277) and E. F. Bloedow (Alcibiades Reexamined [Wiesbaden1973]58) thinkthatThrasylluswas responsiblefor Athens'fortifying Thoricusnear Lauriumprobablyduringthe springof 409 (see Xen. Hell. 1.2.1). If Xenophonis the sourcefor this conjecture,he does not mentionthat Thrasylluswas involved in this operation. 60 Diod. 13.52.1. 61 In addition to the 1000 hoplites who were assigned to his expedition, Thrasyllusalso equipped5000of his nautai as peltasts so that they couldact in the capacity of light infantry.See above n. 50; see also H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 18 and n. 3. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 280 W. J. McCOY nothing of his treasonous alliances with the Spartans and Tissapheres.62 The solution to the 'Alcibiades problem' was simple, at least in theory: if Athens could achieve military victories independent of Alcibiades, his charisma could be undermined. Apparently the new leaders of the demos were convinced that they had found a new champion in Thrasyllus, who by now had proven his ability as a competent commander both on land and on sea. Diodorus tells us that Cleophon was the most influential popular spokesman at this time,63 and it is tempting to imagine that Cleophon, a political foe of Alcibiades,64 was partly responsible for directing Thrasyllus' 62 Fornara (Generals, 67-69) suggests that when Alcibiades was elected general by the Athenian fleet at Samos in 411 he was "presumably" the eleventh general. From this time until his return to Athens in 407 Alcibiades held the irregular position of a quasi-independent strategos; in short, "his position was very likely not 'official'." Xenophon (Hell. 1.4.10) says that Alcibiades was elected general in 407 though still an exile (qevyovra). Andrewes (JHS 73 [1953] 3) comments: "It was even uncertain, until the demos had fully committed itself at the elections (of 407), whether his (Alcibiades) recall from exile (in 411) was still regarded as valid." 63 Diod. 13.53.2. See also Lys. 13.8; Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.1; Aeschin. 3.150; Phil. fr. 118 (F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker III B [Leiden 1964] 139). Although there is no record of Cleophon's public activities before 410, it is doubtful that he was a political tyro at this time. Indeed W. R. Connor (The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens [Princeton 1971] 147) describes Cleophon as a man of great eloquence and a great master of civic affairs. Cleophon was a popular butt of the Athenian comic poets and was maligned on the stage as early as 411 (Ar. Thesm.). Also his name appears on six extant ostraca that must date to the last known ostrakophoria in 416 (see E. Vanderpool, "New Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," Hesperia 37[1968] 120; Ostracism at Athens [Cincinnati 1970] 28; Thomsen, The Origin of Ostracism [Copenhagen 1972] 81, n. 186). Aristotle's (Ath. Pol. 28.3) mention of Cleophon as the first to introduce the diobelia in 410 argues for prior experience in public finance. Indeed Beloch ("Zur Finanzgeschichte Athens," RhM 39 [1884] 249; see also Busolt, G.G. III 2, 1535-36, 1405-6, n. 2) would have Cleophon as a member of the college ofporistai, a financial board established after the Sicilian disaster. 16 64 F. Camon ("L'Ostracismo di Iperbolo," Giornale Italiano difilologia [1963] 147, n. 19) suggests a coalition between Hyperbolus and Cleophon dating to the time of the ostrakophoria of 416 (owing to the ostraca inscribed with Cleophon's name; see above n. 63). There is no evidence to support this conjecture, but it could mark a possible terminus post quem for Cleophon's hostility towards Alcibiades. See also Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 3. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 281 campaign to Ionia. The temptation becomes all the more tantalizing when we note that during the years 410 to 406 the prestige of Cleophon and Thrasyllus seems to rise and fall simultaneously.65 As a target for attack, the Ionian satrapy of Tissaphernes was an excellent choice. Not only was it a hot-bed of rebellion against the Athenian imperial system, but it was militarily vulnerable. This was especially true since the Peloponnesians had temporarily deserted Tissaphernes for Pharnabazus,66 leaving the former in a quandary about the overall defense of his province.67 Thrasyllus initiated his Ionian campaign by attacking Pygela: Xenophon says that he laid waste the surrounding 65 Hatzfeld(REA 40 [1938] 121-23;see also Alcibiade 266) sees Thrasyllus as the central figure behind the collapse of the Five Thousand (which he energetically opposed) and the subsequent restoration of the democracy: aroundhim congregatedCleophonand other malcontentswith the resultthata coalition was formed that eventually spelled the doom of Theramenes'government.This, I believe, is creditingThrasylluswith too muchinvolvementin politicalmatters.There can be little doubtthat Thrasylluswas an enthusiastic supporterof the restoreddemocracyand was ready to serve the new government in any capacity, but, like Thrasybulus,he preferredto concentrateon militaryassignmentsand leave the politicalexpertise to others. 66 After the Atheniandefeat in Sicily, Tissaphernesmade an alliance with Spartawherebyhe hoped to reassertPersiancontrolover those Greekcities in his satrapythat were memberstates of the Athenianempire. But his policy lacked uniformity.Not only did he act at odds with his neighboringfellow satrapPharnabazus,but he also continuedto renegeon his agreementwith the Spartans(in particular,by failing to provide the Peloponnesiancrews with regularpay and by delaying the promised arrivalof the Phoenician navy). Hence, from the end of 411 until 407 (when Cyrus arrivedon the scene), the Spartanscooperatedmore closely with Pharnabazusand left Tissaphernesin the lurch. Persia's entry into the PeloponnesianWarshould have been decisive, but as Meiggs(TheAthenianEmpire,353)says: "The mainresponsibility for the ... ineffectivenessof Persia(priorto 407) rested with Tissaphernes." It is interestingto note that Tissaphernesvisited the satrapyof Pharnabazus shortlyafter the battle of Abydos in 411 (Xen. Hell. 1.1.9; Thuc. 8.109) in an attemptto regainthe supportof the Peloponnesians.We are not told what, if anything,this visit accomplished.The next mentionof Tissaphernesoccurs in Xenophon'snarrativewhen ThrasyllusattacksEphesusin the summerof 409. 67 Tissapherneswas an opportunistand controlled only a limited fighting force. When the Peloponnesianstransferredtheir principalsphere of activity to the Hellespontdistrict,Tissapherneswas forced to rely primarilyon native supportto complementhis own troops in case his satrapywas invaded. Despite the fact that many Ioniancities switchedtheirallegianceto the Pelopon- This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 282 W. J. McCOY country, assaulted the fortifications, and annihilateda relief force sent from Miletus, after which he set up a trophy. Then he sailed for Notium and from there marched against Colophon, which surrenderedwithoutopposition. He next made a raid into the Lydian country, burningvillages and seizing huge quantities of money, slaves and moveable property. Further plunderingof Lydia, however, was curtailed by the sudden appearanceof the Persian commanderStages, and Thrasyllus retreatedto the coast. By now Tissapherneswas well awareof Thrasyllus' presence and his intention to attack Ephesus. When the attack finally came, Tissaphernes had mustered a large defense force and managedto rout the Athenians, killing about400 of them. As a result, Thrasyllus'Ionianventurecame to an abruptend.68 In the face of his defeat at Ephesus, Thrasyllusdid not return to Athens. Instead he sailed for Lesbos and the Hellespont in the late summer or early fall of 409. En route he encountereda squadronof twenty-five Syracusanships and succeeded in capturingfour of them with crews. He sent all prisnesians in 412, at least three of them (Miletus, Antandrus, and Cnidus) defied Tissaphernes and thwarted the permanent establishment of Persian military garrisons within their borders. In addition, there were other cities that soon objected to the utter insensitivity of Spartan control and realized that they had been 'liberated' from Athenian domination only to be 'enslaved' by Sparta and ultimately Persia. Hence the democratic factions within these cities were doubtless eager for an opportunity to reestablish ties with Athens (see Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, 355-71). Even during his dealings with the Spartans, Tissaphernes, fearing that they might plunder his territory, kept them satisfied with money and bribes; see Thuc. 8.57.1: 'rtl 6& 4poel~ro MdAiara yU rfr; ryv iJretgov. See also Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 240; H. rT rrjae,t 7roOjoaCaout Trocpf75 D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge 1968) 247. Since Tissaphernes counted on Peloponnesian troops to gain his major objectives (see Meiggs 354), their present preoccupation in the Hellespont left him in a difficult situation. 68 Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-11; see also Diodorus (13.64.1), who incorrectly identifies Thrasyllus as Thrasybulus. Tissaphernes did not react to Thrasyllus' invasion of his territory until he was informed of an imminent attack against Ephesus, a city that had apparently submitted to Persian control without protest; at least Tissaphernes had offered sacrifice there at the shrine of Artemis before his visit to the Hellespont late in 411 (Thuc. 8.109.2). In fact, Xenophon says that Tissaphernes rallied support for the defense of Ephesus on a religious pretext, namely "for the protection of Artemis." This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 283 oners back to Athens with the exception of a certain Alcibiades, a cousin of the general Alcibiades.69Xenophon says that he put him to death by stoning (xarTiEvacv).70 If this is true, it was hardly a fitting way to ingratiatehimself with the man he was now about to rejoinafter an absence of almost two years.71 Thrasyllus and his troops received a cool reception when they finally arrived at Sestus. Naturally the reinforcements were a welcome sight, but their delay had hinderedthe offensive ability of the fleet with the result that little or no headway could be made against the Peloponnesians and their Persian allies. In fact, the Spartans and Syracusans had been given sufficient time to rebuildtheir navies that had been destroyed at Cyzicus.72Xenophon says that at first there was little fraternizing between the men of Alcibiades and those of Thrasyllus,73 and we can safely assume a similar attitude of disdain on the part of Alcibiades towards Thrasyllus,perhapseven a certain smugness when he learned of Thrasyllus' defeat at Ephesus. This situation was doubtless intensified by Thrasyllus' official position as strategos of Athens,74 whereas Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, Theramenes and others held their commands only by the 'quasi-official' sanction of the fleet.75 69 Xen. Hell. 1.2.12-13. P. Bicknell (Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy [Wiesbaden 1972] 98-100 [hereafter Bicknell, Studies]) identifies the victim as Alcibiades of Phegous. See also D. MacDowell, Andokides' On the Mysteries (Oxford 1962) 104; Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 173, n. 1. 70 Xen. Hell. 1.2.13. An alternate reading would substitute aJrivoaev or even adztevaev for xaritevaev. Whatever the case, as Bicknell sucxareETea; cinctly states (Studies, 97): "the fate of Alcibiades of Phegous remains a mystery." 71 Bicknell (Studies, 97) and others assume that Alcibiades and Thrasyllus were acting in cooperation at the time of the incident off Lesbos. This seems unlikely when we consider what happened when Thrasyllus and his troops joined the Hellespontine fleet. 72 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-25. Busolt (G.G. III 2, 1529-32, n. 1) and others are of the opinion that the Peloponnesians (or possibly only the Syracusans) had rebuilt their navy within a few months of the battle of Cyzicus (c. April 410); cf., however, Beloch, Philologus 43 (1884) 276, and Underhill, A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon, xl-xlii. 73 Xen. Hell. 1.2.15; see also Plut. Ale. 29. 74 On Thrasyllus as strategos in 409/408 see Beloch, Die attische Politik, 312, and Fornara, Generals, 69. 75 See Forara, Generals, 67. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 284 W. J. McCOY Yet the combined army fortified Lampsacus and spent the winter of 409/408 there.76 During that winter the joint forces of Alcibiades and Thrasyllus defeated the troops of Pharnabazus at Abydos.77 But whereas the rigors of this and subsequent campaigns (e.g. Chalcedon and Byzantium in 408) succeeded in breaking down the barriers of antagonism among the soldiers,78 there can be little doubt (especially in light of the events of 407 and 406) that Alcibiades continued to view Thrasyllus with suspicion and contempt-and perhaps the feeling was mutual. Thrasyllus finally returned to Athens in the summer of 407.79 Alcibiades followed soon thereafter when he had been assured of his election to the new strategia for 407/406.80 His popularity had reached a new high, and his recent victories in the Hellespont seemed to cast an even darker shadow on Thrasyllus' defeat in Ionia. Joining Alcibiades on the strategia was his friend and military colleague Thrasybulus,81 but the name of Thrasyllus is conspicuously missing from the list of generals: presumably he returned to private life. It is also curious that the sources make no mention of Cleophon at this time. It seems that, with the 'resurrection' of Alcibiades, both Thrasyllus and Cleophon experienced a simultaneous eclipse. Alcibiades' reputation, however, suffered irrevocable damage in the spring of 406 when the Athenian fleet (under the command of Antiochus) was defeated off Notium by Lysander. Even though Alcibiades himself was not directly involved, his enemies in Athens used the occasion to discredit 76 77 78 Xen. Hell. 1.2.15. Xen. Hell. 1.2.16; Plut.Alc. 29.2. Plut.Alc. 29.2; Xen. Hell. 1.2.17, 3.2-7, 3.14-22.Accordingto Xenophon, Alcibiadescame to Thrasyllus'aid at Chalcedon. 79 Xen. Hell. 1.4.10.Thrasylluswas againa strategosin 408/407;see Beloch, Die attische Politik, 312, and Fornara, Generals, 69. 80 Xen. Hell. 1.4.11-12. 81 Xen. Hell. 1.4.10; Diod. 13.69.3. Adeimantuswas also elected strategos (Xen. Hell. 1.4.21; Diod. 13.69.3), and he, too, might have been a close associate of Alcibiades.He was a fellow demesmanfromScambonidae,who had been implicatedin the profanationof the Mysteriesin 415 and had then gone into exile (Andoc. 1.16). Adeimantus'absence from the strategia of 406/405 (elected after the fall of Alcibiades)hints that he was a political ally of Alcibiades. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 285 and depose him. At the next strategic elections (for 406/405), Alcibiades and his close associates (e.g., Thrasybulus, Adeimantus and Theramenes) were bypassed, and the new board consisted of men who had proven their loyalty to the democracy. Among them was Thrasyllus.82 Is it mere coincidence that Cleophon also reemerges at this time? According to late sources,83 it was Cleophon who indicted Alcibiades for and it seems that he was also the treason (yeapr' reQo6oaoaS), instigator of banishment proceedings against Critias, the son of Callaeschrus,84 who had originally moved Alcibiades' recall in 411, or perhaps 408/407.85 The final episode in Thrasyllus' life pertains to the naval battle that was fought near the Arginusae Islands in the summer of 406. The Athenians, under the command of Thrasyllus and seven other generals, won an impressive victory and proved to themselves that they could hold their own without Alcibiades,86 but the occasion was marred when the generals failed to give their immediate attention to the rescue of the shipwrecked and the recovery of the dead. The event that might have turned the scales of war in favor of Athens did just 82 Xen. Hell. 1.5.16. See also Lys. 21.7, a passage which Andrewes (JHS 73 [1953]4) interpretsto meanthatThrasyllus"was the leadingfigureopposed to Alcibiades." 83 Himerius,Eclogues, 36.16;Photius,Bibliotheca, 377. G. Gilbert(Beitrage zur innern Geschichte Athens [Leipzig 1887] 366) and Beloch (Die attische Politik, 84) agree that this took place after Notium. 84 See Arist. Rhet. 1.15.1375b32. See also Wade-Gery, "Kritias and Herodes," CQ 39 (1945)25; 33, n. 1, and H. C. Avery, "Critiasand the Four Hundred,"CP 58 (1963) 166-67. 85 Plut.Alc. 33.1. For the 408/407date see Andrewes,JHS 73 (1953)3, n. 7. 86 Xenophon (Hell. 1.6.24) says that the Atheniansoutfitted 110 triremes within a month's time and assigned to these ships all men of militaryage whether slave or free; cf. Diodorus(13.97.1), who says that sixty ships were made ready at great expense. IG I2 105 records an Atheniandecree in honor of Archelausof Macedonia. Merittand others (see above n. 31) have rejecteda 411/410datingin favor of 407/406,and suggestthat Alcibiadeswas originallyresponsiblefor this alliance with Archelaus.If this is true, the majorityof this new fleet would have been constructedin Macedoniaunderthe directionof Athenianshipwrightsand then sent to Athens where the ships were mannedand quicklydespatchedto Ionia. This explainshow the Athenianswere able to send out such a largereliefforce to assist Conon in so short a time. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 286 W. J. McCOY the reverse. The trial of the generals which followed was a legal mockery wherein political jealousies brought out the worst in the Athenians-a situation that was hardly conducive to promoting internal unity in the midst of war. But even more crippling was the Athenian decision to execute the Arginusae generals, or at least the six who returned to Athens. By this one foolhardy action, the Athenians quickly reduced the already sparse ranks of qualified military leaders: it is little wonder that Arginusae was the last Athenian military victory of the Peloponnesian War. In order to assess Thrasyllus' role in this chain of events, we must first examine the somewhat divergent testimonies of Xenophon and Diodorus.87 Xenophon says that immediately after the victory the Athenians returned to the Arginusae Islands where they reassembled and reckoned their losses. This must have taken considerable time since the fleet had been scattered in the course of the fighting.88 The eight generals in command then met in private to determine what they should do next, and this meeting entailed additional delay. Diomedon proposed that the whole fleet take part in picking up the disabled vessels and shipwrecked sailors. Erasinides, on the other hand, favored the immediate despatch of the whole fleet to Mytilene to engage the Spartan squadron that was blockading the Athenian general Conon. Thrasyllus contended that both objectives could be met and suggested that the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus, with some of the taxiarchs and forty-seven ships, be put in charge of the rescue operations and that the rest of the fleet sail to Mytilene. Apparently this com87Xen. Hell. 1.6.15-38; Diod. 13.97-100. On the Arginusae affair in general see G. Grote, A History of Greece VI4 (London 1872) 392-430; P. Cloche, "L'Affaire des Arginuses," Revue historique 130 (1919) 4-68; L. F. Herbst, Die Schlacht bei den Arginusen (Hamburg 1855); M. Valeton, "De praetoribus Atheniensium qui victoriam reportaverunt apud Arginusas insulas," Mnemosyne 48 (1920) 34-79; and most recently Andrewes, "The Arginousai Trial," Phoenix 28 (1974) 112-22. 88 Athenianlosses consistedof twenty-fiveships with all theircrews, except for a few men who were carriedashore(Xen. Hell. 1.6.33-34;Xenophonlater records a speech of Euryptolemuswho says that only twelve ships were lost [Hell. 1.7.30]). See also Diod. 13.100.3.If the crew of each triremewas 200, anywherefrom 2400-5000 men were lost or drownedat Arginusae. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRASYLLUS 287 promise proposal was acceptable to all.89But a sudden storm prevented the execution of either assignment, and the entire fleet remainedinactive for the night.90 The account of Diodorusgives a slightly differentpicture of the events following the battle. He says that when the Spartans retreatedin defeat, the Atheniangeneralsdeliberatedon a course of action. Some thoughtthey should pick up the dead; others were of the opinionthat they should immediatelysail to Mytilene and raise the Spartan siege of Conon. Meanwhile a great storm arose that caused the soldiers to panic and oppose pickingup the dead. Whenthe stormbecame more intense, the Athenians had no choice but to seek refuge at the Arginusae Islands. Diodorus is silent about Thrasyllus'compromisethat involved Theramenes and Thrasybulus,but he does say that Thrasyllusheld the chief commandon that day (o6 'v bzrri ; yc/iovtia Excivrv royv?j7Meav).91This is very telling evidence, particularlywhen combined with the testimony of Xenophon. It indicates, I think, that political undercurrentswere at work at Arginusae.92 Thrasyllus must have realized that the generals would be held accountablefor any failureto rescue the shipwreckedand to pick up the dead for burial. This responsibility rested squarely on their shoulders, and perhaps weighed heaviest of all on Thrasyllushimself, who supposedlywas the commander of the day. After Diomedon and Erasinides had made their proposals, therefore,Thrasyllussaw the perfect opportunityto extricate both himself and all his colleagues from a very precarious situation by suggesting that Theramenes and Thrasybulusbe put in chargeof the rescue operations:afterall, they were experienced and capable officers, and whatever the outcome they could be held fully liable. Thrasyllusmight still 89 Xen. Hell. 1.7.29. 90Both Xenophonand Diodorusalso attest to poor weatherconditionsthe day before the battle of Arginusae:Xenophon(Hell. 1.6.28)mentionsa thunderstorm;Diodorus(13.97.4) strongwinds. 91Diod. 13.97.6. Diodorus, almost out of habit, confuses Thrasybuluswith Thrasyllus,as is againthe case in this passage; see above n. 68. 92 Jordan (The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period, 133, n. 72) considers Diodorus' evidence untrustworthyand argues for collegiate commandat Arginusae. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 288 W. J. McCOY have felt some resentment towards Theramenes and Thrasybulus because of their close association with Alcibiades, and he might even have conjured up some unpleasant memories of the fall of 409 when he finally rejoined the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont following his debacle at Ephesus. Perhaps, too, he was counting on Athenian hostility towards the friends of Alcibiades to condemn Theramenes and Thrasybulus if something went wrong. But if so, his calculations were thwarted by nature and by his underestimating the influence of Theramenes. Thrasyllus and five other generals obeyed the summons of the demos and returned to Athens, only to be found guilty of misconduct and condemned to death.93 The name of Cleophon, whom we have earlier tried to link with Thrasyllus, is notably missing from the entire Arginusae affair, which is quite surprising considering his political activity after Notium. A certain Archedemus was the leading demagogue at this time, and it was he who initiated proceedings against the general Erasinides, the results of which set the emotional scene for the subsequent trial of all the generals. Lysias implies that this Archedemus was on friendly terms with the family of Alcibiades,94 an association that has prompted Beloch to conclude that the friends of Alcibiades actively cooperated in discrediting and condemning the Arginusae generals who had been elected to the strategia in the wave of sentiment against Alcibiades that arose after the Athenian defeat at Notium.95 This suggestion is very persuasive, for it could explain the absence of Cleophon, who, as an outspoken enemy of Alcibiades, would not have taken part in such a vendetta. Moreover, if Cleophon had ever promoted the military career of Thrasyllus, it would have been politically expedient for him to remain silent. Whatever the reason for his temporary political obscurity, Cleophon soon regained his position as the leading spokesman of the Assembly. Perhaps he 93 Two of the Arginusae generals, i.e. Protomachus and Aristogenes, preferred to go into voluntary exile rather than return to Athens (Xen. Hell. 1.7.2; Diod. 13.101.5). By so doing, they seemed to acknowledge their guilt and severely compromised their colleagues. 94 Lys. 14.25. 95 Beloch, Die attische Politik, 88. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THRAS YLLUS 289 took advantageof the 'post-trialpurge', when the Athenians, in their customary fickle manner, turned against those who they believed had deceived them duringthe trial.96If so, this would lend some credence to Aristotle's statement that Cleophon was responsible for persuadingthe Athenians to reject Spartanovertures for peace sometime after Arginusae.97 CertainlyCleophonhad reestablishedhis influenceby the time of Aegospotamiin 405, when he was stronglyopposed to peace with Sparta on any terms.98 The death of Thrasyllus and his five colleagues was an irreparableloss for Athens and another vicious example of the inability of the Athenian demos to exercise reason and restraintin a matterof critical importance.The victims of Athenian displeasurewere often innocent. At the very least, some deserved a better fate, especially those who had proven their loyalty and devotion to the democracy. Thrasyllusis a case in point. He was neithera politiciannor corruptedby politics, but because of an honest attempt to serve the Athenian state in a militarycapacity he became enmeshed in a political nightmare that eventually cost him his life. W. JAMESMcCoY THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL 96 Xen. Hell. 1.7.35. Cleophon might, in part, have been responsible when Theramenes' election to the strategia of 405/404 was annulled at his dokimasia; see Lys. 13.10. 97 Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.1. Cf., for example, J. Kirchner (Prosopographia Attica I [Berlin 1901] 577, #8638) and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen I [Berlin 1893] 130-31), who contend that Aristotle is confusing Cleophon's role after Arginusae with his rejection of Spartan peace proposals after Cyzicus in 410. See also Grote, A History of Greece VI4, 431. 98 Lys. 13.10; Aeschin. 2.76; 3.150. Cleophon's election as strategos in 406/ 405 or 405/404 (see Schol. Ar. Frogs 679; Lys. 13.12) is unproven. See Fornara, Generals, 70, and D. M. Lewis, "Double Representation in the Strategia," JHS 81 (1961) 123. In 404, while Theramenes was absent from Athens trying to negotiate a possible peace treaty with Lysander, Cleophon was arrested, tried, and condemned to death (Lys. 30.10-13, 13.12; Xen. Hell. 1.7.35). According to Lysias (14.48), he died a poor man. Despite his involvement in Athenian financial matters, Cleophon is never accused of or implicated in bribery or peculation-a trait he shared in common with Thrasyllus. This content downloaded from 161.111.100.64 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 13:14:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions