Download Thrasyllus Author(s): W. James McCoy Source: The

Thrasyllus
Author(s): W. James McCoy
Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 98, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 264-289
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/293777
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THRASYLLUS
The decade following the Athenian defeat in Sicily in 413
markedthe most turbulentconstitutionalperiod in the history
of the Athenian democracy. Internaltensions-a logical consequence of any severe military setback-were further
heightenedin the case of Athens by the sudden emergence of
individualsand factions that conspired against the democracy
and temporarilysucceeded in bringingabout majorchanges in
the Athenian pattern of government. Yet despite the overt
machinationsof oligarchs and opportunists, there remaineda
solid core of loyal Athenian patriots who refused to compromise or associate themselves with any anti-democratic
movenientand remainedadamantin theirresolve to defend the
democracy and to bring the war with Sparta to a successful
conclusion. Among this group was Thrasyllus.
The extant record of Thrasyllus' life and career is rather
scant and seemingly straightforward. From 411 to 406 he
served Athens as a soldier and a general and was finally executed in connection with the Arginusaeaffair.Beyond the scattered details of his militarywhereabouts, however, the figure
of Thrasyllus is virtually ignored. The ancient sources leave
little doubtthat he was a man of integrityand influence, but for
some reason they treat him in such a matter-of-factway that
the emerging portrait lacks both substance and dimension.
Given Thrasyllus' degree of involvement with the major personalities and crucial events of the latter years of the Peloponnesian War,this neglect is regrettable.Indeed a cautious probing beneath the surface of the evidence suggests that Thrasyllus was more controversial than the sources imply. It is the
purpose of this paper, therefore, to re-examine the testimony
relating to his public career and to present more clearly his
position in relation to other leaders of the time, such as Alcibiades, Theramenes and Cleophon. Our investigation will
show, I think, that Thrasyllusplayed a more conspicuous and
importantrole in Athenianaffairsthan is generallyadmitted.1
1 I stressed this point in my unpublished doctoral dissertation: Theramenes,
Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates, Yale University (December 1970).
AMERICAN
JOURNAL
OF PHILOLOGY98 264-289 (1977)
Copyright ? 1977 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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THRASYLLUS
265
Schwahn suggests that Thrasyllus was born between 456 and
442.2 There is no record of his father's name or deme: all
sources refer to him merely as Thrasyllus. He emerges from
obscurity in the capacity of a hoplite serving with the Athenian
fleet at Samos in 411.3 If 'hoplite' implies an accurate census
classification, he must have possessed at least moderate
means.4
It is not known when Thrasyllus joined the Athenian fleet. A
reasonable guess is the late summer of 412, when a force of
forty-eight triremes (including 1000 hoplites) arrived at
Samos.5 If this is true, Thrasyllus was probably there during
the winter months, when Alcibiades first began to communicate from Asia Minor with the most influential men of the
Athenian fleet.6 But Thrasyllus was not numbered among the
ranks of those who conspired against the democratic governments of both Athens and Samos. Nor is it likely that the
conspirators took him into their confidence (even though they
courted the hoplite element7), since he was never implicated or
charged with complicity in their intrigues. Perhaps Thrasyllus
would have been willing to accept temporary limitations on the
democracy at Athens at this critical time, especially if the
Athenians could have mounted a new war offensive with Persian support, but he definitely stood opposed to oligarchy. In
fact he was among those Athenians sought out by the Samian
democrats when they became aware of the plot to subvert their
2
W. Schwahn, s.v. "Thrasyllos,"RE VIA, 1 (1936)col. 578.
3
Thuc. 8.73.4.
4 Thrasyllusis never identifiedin the sourcesas a trierarchor as belongingto
the Athenian liturgicalclass, which duringthe fifth century would indicate
propertyholdingsprobablyin excess of four talents (see J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families [Oxford 1971] xxiv). To qualify as a strategos,
Thrasyllusapparentlyneededto possess landedpropertyin Attica(Deinarchus
1.71; cf. C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution [Oxford 1952] 191
andn. 7, 224 andn. 10),but it is unlikelythathe was a richlandowner(owingin
part to the notable omission of a patronymicin any referenceto Thrasyllus).
Moreover,there is no way to determinehow much Thrasylluswas relianton
private means of supportduringhis tenure on the strategia, since it is uncertain whether the strategoireceived a public salary even as late as the end of
the fifth century.
5Thuc.
8.25.1.
Thuc. 8.47.2.
7 Thuc. 8.63.3.
6
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266
W. J. McCOY
democracy. Thrasyllus responded by enlisting the support of
fellow hoplites8 and, according to Thucydides, was one of the
chief leaders in suppressing the revolution.9 At first glimpse,
therefore, we see Thrasyllus as an energetic leader, a patriot
and an ardent supporter of democracy.
Thrasyllus again displayed his mettle after news had reached
Samos that the Four Hundred had assumed power in Athens.
He and the trierarch Thrasybulus bound all the soldiers (especially those suspected of oligarchic sympathies) by the most
solemn oaths to maintain the democracy, to live in mutual
harmony, to continue a zealous prosecution of the war, and to
refrain from peaceful overtures to the inimical Four Hundred.10
When the soldiers voted to depose their former generals,
they chose Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus (among others) to fill
the vacancies. 1 We are not told whether Thrasyllus shared the
enthusiasm of Thrasybulus for Alcibiades' recall or whether he
was annoyed in any way by Alcibiades' braggadocio and the
vain promises that prompted the fleet not only to elect him as
one of their generals, but also to entrust him with all their
affairs.12 This, in a sense, was a rebuff to the other newly
appointed generals, but it did create, at least for the moment, a
salutary esprit de corps.
Thrasyllus' first independent command as a general of the
fleet occurred in the late summer of 411.13 On this occasion the
Spartan admiral Mindarus suddenly evacuated the Peloponnesian base at Miletus and was making his way towards the Hellespont, and Thrasyllus sailed from Samos with fifty-five ships
to anticipate his arrival. When Thrasyllus learned that Mindarus had been forced to make a temporary stop at Chios, he
was determined to keep him there and posted scouts at
strategic points on Lesbos and the Asiatic mainland to track
8 Thuc.
9 Thuc.
10Thuc.
1 Thuc.
8.73.4-6.
8.75.2.
8.75.
8.76.2.
12
Thuc. 8.82.1. A. Andrewes ("The Generals in the Hellespont, 410-407
B.C.," JHS 73 [1953] 4) is of the opinion that Thrasyllus opposed Alcibiades'
recall.
13 G. Busolt (Griechische Geschichte III 2 [Gotha 1904] 1515 [hereafter
Busolt, G.G.]) suggests that Thrasyllus was probably second in command to
Alcibiades at this time.
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THRASYLLUS
267
any movements of the Peloponnesian fleet. He himself proceeded to Methymna where he ordered that provisions be
made ready in the event that he needed to use Lesbos as a base
of attack against Chios. Next he planned to assault the city of
Eresus, which had recently revolted from Athens; he arrived
there to find Thrasybulus and a small squadron of five ships
already anchored.14
While Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were preparing to besiege
Eresus, the fleet of Mindarus stealthily escaped to the Hellespont, which forced the Athenians to abandon their leisurely
siege and set out in pursuit.15 Even though the recapture of
Eresus would have eliminated an enemy stronghold on Lesbos, the Athenian generals gave priority to protecting the vital
grain routes to the Euxine. Battle was finally joined near
Cynossema in the straits of the Hellespont where the Athenians (out-numbered by ten ships) won an impressive victory,
owing in large part to the skillful maneuvering of their right
wing. Thucydides says that Thrasybulus commanded the
Athenian right, which confronted Mindarus and the Peloponnesians, whereas Thrasyllus was on the left opposite the
Syracusans.16 Diodorus reverses the stations of the Athenian
commanders17 and adds the further embellishment that the battle was a stalemate until the sudden appearance of twenty-five
ships despatched to the scene by the allies of Athens.l8 Whatever the case, Thrasyllus seems to have made a noteworthy
debut in his first naval battle.19
Cynossema by no means restored Athenian naval supremacy in the Aegean and Hellespont, yet the victory had a
significant effect on Athenian morale. According to
Thucydides,20
14
Thuc. 8.99-100.
Thuc. 8.101-03.
6 Thuc. 8.104-5.
17 Diod. 13.39.4.
18
Diod. 13.40.4. Thucydides makes no mention of Athenian reinforcements.
19 We can infer from Diod. 13.40.6 that Thrasybulus held the chief command
at Cynossema since he set up the victory trophy and sent news of the event to
Athens. This command seems quite logical owing to Thrasybulus' prior experience as a trierarch.
20
Thuc. 8.106.2, 5.
15
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268
W. J. McCOY
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Thus Cynossema proved to be a psychological turning point in
the war not only for the personnel of the fleet but also for the
Athenians in Athens who had just recently expelled the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. The victory seemed to soothe the
wounds of political strife and served notice to the Peloponnesians that Athens was still a formidable foe. Moreover, Cynossema marked a new plateau in the military careers of
Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who had won the battle in the
absence of Alcibiades. The import of this was not lost on the
Athenians at home, many of whom were hostile towards Alcibiades and sought to prevent his complete domination of
Athenian affairs. We need only project ahead to the years 410
and 409 when the restored democracy initiated a new war effort in Asia Minor that was to operate independently of Alcibiades and the Hellespontine fleet: the recipient of that
command was Thrasyllus.
Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War ends
abruptly in the midst of describing the activities of the Athenian fleet after the battle of Cynossema, and there is no further
mention of Thrasyllus.21 Consequently we are thrown back on
the scattered evidence of Xenophon and Diodorus for the remaining years of Thrasyllus' career until his death in 406.
Xenophon' s Hellenica begins with a description of two naval
battles between Athens and Sparta that occurred late in 411.
The first was a skirmish between the squadrons of the Athenian Thymochares and the Spartan Agesandridas;22 the sec21
Thrasyllus might have participated in the Athenian recovery of Cyzicus in
the late autumn of 411 (see Thuc. 8.107), even though Diodorus says that
Thrasybulus was in charge of this campaign (13.40.6).
22 Xen. Hell. 1.1.1.
Xenophon's brevity prevents us from making any sense
out of this battle, except that it resulted in a Spartan victory. He omits mention
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THRASYLLUS
269
ond, a more significant, yet indecisive engagement in the Hellespont,23 in which Diodorus reports that Thrasyllus commanded the left wing opposite the Spartan Mindarus.24 The
outcome of this second battle turned on the unexpected arrival
of Alcibiades with no more than twenty ships from Samos,
which caused the Peloponnesians to retreat to the Asiatic
shoreline near Abydos. Here, with the aid of the Persian satrap
Pharabazus, the Spartans withstood the efforts of the Athenians to land, and the latter finally withdrew across the straits
to Sestus.25 The Athenians then left forty ships at Sestus and
sent out the remainder of the fleet in different directions in
quest of money. Thrasyllus sailed to Athens to report what had
happened and to ask for troops (especially hoplites) and
ships.26
It is reasonable to suppose that Alcibiades, as commanderin-chief, delegated these various tasks to his fellow generals
and that he exercised the utmost discretion in selecting
Thrasyllus for the mission to Athens. The latter was a particularly delicate assignment as it marked the first known attempt
on the part of the fleet to ask for direct aid from Athens after
the deposal of the Four Hundred,27 but Thrasyllus' credentials
seem to have fit the occasion. In the first place, he was a
of the site, the exact number of ships involved (he does say that Thymochares
commanded a 'few ships'), and when it was fought (we can be confident that it
occurred in the late autumn or early winter of 411). Diodorus (13.41) says that
this Spartan fleet numbered fifty and that it was totally destroyed off Mt. Athos
(with the exception of twelve crewmen). When we combine the evidence it
follows that the Athenians were totally outnumbered and that the battle was
fought before either fleet reached the northern Aegean.
23
Xen. Hell. 1.1.2-7.
24
Diod. 13.45.7.
Xenophon gives a more abbreviated account of this battle than Diodorus
(13.45-46). Also the authors are at variance as regards the number of ships
accompanying Alcibiades, the actual site of the battle, the advent of a storm
and high winds, and the number of ships captured and recovered by the Athenians.
25
26
Xen. Hell. 1.1.8.
28
Following the battle of Cynossema, Diodorus (13.40.6) says, Thrasybulus
merely informed Athens of the victory and nothing more. The mission of
Thrasyllus, however, combined the announcement of another naval victory
(i.e. Abydos) with a specific request for military reinforcements. In Xen. Hell.
1.1.1 we learn that Thymochares had been sent to the northern Aegean (?) with
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270
W. J. McCOY
former hoplite and as such surely qualified for membership in
the new government of the Five Thousand.28 Secondly, he was
not then a controversial figure, and while he had proven his
loyalty to democracy as a form of government he had never, so
far as we know, been actively involved in Athenian politics.
Finally, Thrasyllus, as a general of the Athenian fleet, had
been an active participant in the recent military activities in the
Hellespont area and thus could supply a first-hand account of
the current situation and stress the need for reinforcements
(especially hoplites) in the hope of forcing a final showdown
with a recuperating Peloponnesian navy.29
Alcibiades and his fellow generals had no delusions about
the current state of the Athenian economy. By this time the
ordinary and special reserve funds were doubtless exhausted,
and the collection of annual revenues was so pathetic that the
Hellespontine generals could hardly anticipate financial aid.30
So theirs was a different request: manpower and ships.3' Naturally this in itself would involve a vital sacrifice on the part of
the Athenian government, but the Athenians in Athens would
find themselves even more hard-pressed if the Spartans and
a few ships, but Xenophon does not reveal what promptedthis maneuver,
whetherthe city acted on its own accordor respondedto a distress signalfrom
the fleet. The formerseems more likely in that the Athenianswere probably
eager to track the squadronof Agesandridasthat had recently defeated the
Atheniansunderthe commandof Thymocharesoff Eretriain Euboea (Thuc.
8.95) and had been summonedby Mindarusto join him in the Hellespont
(Diod. 13.41).On the second naval battlebetween Thymocharesand Agesandridas,see above n. 22.
28 Thuc. 8.97.1; Arist. Ath. Pol. 33.1. See above p. 265 and n. 4.
29 Diodorus
(13.47.2) says that Mindarus,after his defeat at Abydos, requested both soldiers and ships from Sparta.In the meantime,he and Pharnabazus,the Hellespontinesatrap,werepreparingto lay siege to variousAsiatic cities still allied to Athens.
30 W. S. Ferguson, The Treasurers of Athena (Cambridge 1932) 38 (hereafter
Ferguson, Treasurers); R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 370.
31
J. Hatzfeld (Alcibiade [Paris 1958] 265) underscores this point and
suggests that Alcibiades' request was a reasonableone since the Athenians
could sparerowersandfoot-soldierswithoutweakeningthe defense of Athens.
Hatzfeld, with referenceto IG I2 105, also emphasizesthat the dockyardsat
the Piraeus had recently been restored throughthe liberal generosity of Archelaus of Macedon and were once again in a position to construct new
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THRASYLLUS
271
their Persian allies came to control the Hellespont. The
strategy of the Hellespontine generals seems to have been as
follows: if the fleet could be reinforcedby the beginningof the
campaigningseason of 410, it would be in an advantageous
position to overwhelm the Peloponnesian navy, to dominate
the Hellespont, and, if necessary, to fight a land war in Asia.
The potentialbenefits, therefore,wouldjustify the risks; at the
very least, the fleet and the city would finally be joined in a
common cause.
Alcibiades was probably optimistic that Thrasyllus would
succeed in procuring additional levies: surely the Five
Thousand,which had alreadyvoted Alcibiades'recall,32would
see the wisdom of this request and respond with all possible
haste and generosity. But immediate assistance was not
forthcoming, and Thrasyllus did not join his comrades in the
Hellespont in the early springof 410. In fact he did not arrive
there until the fall of 409, and then only by a circuitousroute.33
The effect of this extensive delay could have been disastrous;
as it was, the fleet was usually scatteredin differentdirections
in search of money and supplies for survival. Militarily it
waited on the movements of the Peloponnesians.34Even after
the Atheniansannihilatedthe Peloponnesiansat Cyzicus in the
triremes. But Meritt's restorationand dating of this inscriptionto 407/406
instead of 411/410,weaken, if not demolish, Hatzfeld's second argument(B.
D. Meritt,"Archelaosand the Decelean War,"in ClassicalStudiesPresented
to Edward Capps [Princeton 1936] 246-52; Athenian Financial Documents
[Ann Arbor 1932] 110-15;see also R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of
Greek Historical Inscriptions [Oxford 1969] 277-80 [hereafter SGHI]). See
below n. 86.
32 Thuc. 8.97.3.
33 For a brief discussion of the
chronologicalcontroversy surroundingthe
date of Thrasyllus'departurefrom Athens, see below n. 41.
34 Whenthe
SpartanMindarushad left Abydos with sixty ships en route to
Cyzicus (whichhadrecentlybeen recoveredby the Athenians),Alcibiadeshad
no other choice but to follow him. Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.12) says that Alcibiadeswas aboutto embarkwhen he wasjoined by Theramenes,who arrived
from Macedonia with twenty ships, and Thrasybulus, who arrived from
Thasos with another twenty. Diodorus (13.49.2) contends that Theramenes
had left Macedoniato join Thrasybulusin Thraceand that both generalswere
summonedto the Hellespont for action against Mindarus.ConsequentlyAlcibiades was able to muster eighty-six ships to engage Mindarus(Xen. Hell.
1.1.13),who commandedeighty ships at the time of the battle (Diod. 13.50.2).
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272
W. J. McCOY
spring of 410,35 the Hellespontine generals were unable to follow up their victory on land.36 It was a frustrating situation but
one that might have been prevented had Athens cooperated.
There are several possible reasons for this lack of commitment by the Five Thousand. Even though Thrasyllus' unexpected arrival might have been greeted with a degree of skepticism, the Athenians apparently gave his request a fair hearing.
We can infer, I believe, from a remark of Xenophon referring
to the year 410 (when the Athenians actually voted to grant
Thrasyllus' request37) that the Athenians were willing to support the Hellespontine fleet perhaps as early as the end of 411.
If this is true, their willingness was not matched by their resolution, and no immediate action was taken. The most obvious
deterrent was a depleted treasury.38 Another factor may have
If the squadrons of Theramenes and Thrasybulus had not arrived, however,
Alcibiades could hardly have anticipated an actual engagement. This incident
points out the perilous nature of the Athenian position in the Hellespont.
35 Xen. Hell. 1.1.18. The Athenians
captured the entire fleet of the Peloponnesians; the Syracusans burned their own ships to prevent their capture.
36 Andrewes (JHS 73 [1953] 2) attributes the relative inactivity of the Hellespontine fleet to the lack of sufficient hoplite forces to wage a land war against
the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus. Hence the Athenian generals, even after
their victory at Cyzicus, were forced to content themselves with operations to
acquire money and supplies (see Xen. Hell. 1.1.20-22; Diod. 13.64). Alcibiades
raised large sums from the citizens of Cyzicus and then sailed to Perinthus,
where he was admitted inside the walls, and Selymbria, where he was denied
admission but received money. A customs-house was set up at Chrysopolis
where a 10 percent tax was collected on all cargoes sailing in and out through
the Bosporus (see Polyb. 4.44.4); a garrison of thirty ships and two generals
(including Theramenes) were stationed there. Theramenes was also enjoined
to lay siege to Chalcedon and Byzantium. Thrasybulus was sent to Thrace to
bring the cities there over to the Athenians. Alcibiades himself raided the
satrapy of Pharnabazus where he realized booty money. These pursuits occupied the Hellespontine fleet through the remainder of 410 and much of 409.
37 Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.34) says that as a result of the Agis episode: ol oVv
Fart
T QoOvs6OreQotfoav b?p' a ixE, xat
'AOrlvaibltT) Ooao9vt; w 6tt&rafra
.. ., which seems to indicate a prior willingness on the part of the
EiTrl iavro
Athenians to comply with Thrasyllus' request.
38 See above n. 30. The financial plight of the Five Thousand is further
underscored by Diodorus (13.47.6-8) in his description of the activities of
Theramenes, a general of the Five Thousand. Theramenes' first assignment
was to prevent the building of a causeway between Boeotia and Euboea, but he
was quickly forced to abandon this enterprise and concentrate instead on
certain Aegean islands where he successfully devastated enemy territory and
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THRASYLLUS
273
been the number of sea-going ships immediately available in
the Piraeus dockyards.39But we might also suspect political
interplay at work. Theramenes, the guiding light of the Five
Thousand and a leading advocate of Alcibiades' recall, was
absent from Athens on a military assignment,40and perhaps
the other leaders of the new governmentwere not so inclined
to sponsor any measure that would enhance the prestige of
Alcibiades (who, after all, had never responded to the invita-
collected greatsums of booty. He also visited alliedstates andreceivedmoney
from those inhabitantswho were bent on revolution(doubtlessa punishment
inflicted on known supportersof oligarchy). At Paros he even expelled an
oligarchy and exacted a monetary fine from the participants.According to
Diodorus, Therameneswas motivated by a desire ... rov; re nroiTrag xat
avd,uaxov; avanravoat rcEvEiaqo0Qov, which argues that the Athenians had
once again resorted to the eisphora, or direct propertytax, in order to meet
expenditures.On eisphora, see below n. 57.
39 We have no means of telling how many ships the Athenianscould have
mobilized by the beginningof the campaigningseason of 410, but there are
indicationsthat this fleet wouldhave numberedfarless thanthe fifty thatwere
requested and finally authorizedto Thrasyllus(Xen. Hell. 1.1.34). After the
naval disasteroff Eretriain the late summerof 411, Thucydides(8.89.1) says
that the Athenianswere able to man only twenty ships. Xenophon says that
Thymochareshad merely a 'few ships' underhis commandat the time of his
second engagementwith Agesandridas(see above n. 22), but he does not
reveal the fate of this defeated Atheniansquadron.After the Five Thousand
had been established, Theramenes(Diod. 13.47.6-8)set sail to Euboea with
thirty ships and proceededto use this same fleet for variousoperationsin the
Aegean islands (see above n. 38). Diodorusthen says that Theramenes cowv
aro6lovassisted the Macedonianking Archelausat Pydna(13.49.1),a fleet that
Xenophon(Hell. 1.1.12) numbersat twenty ships. But these twenty ships did
not returnto Athens;insteadthey accompaniedTheramenesto Thraceand the
Hellespont(see above n. 34). Hence it is unlikelythat the city of Athens had
anythingresemblinga largefleet at its disposal in the springof 410, and given
the nearbankruptcyof the Atheniantreasuryit was difficultto undertakenew
construction(even though Diodorus [11.43] contends that the AthenianAssembly continuedto vote twenty new shipsper annum for the Athenianfleet
throughoutthe fifth century). When Thrasyllus eventually left Athens for
Samos and Ionia at the beginningof summer(409), Xenophon(Hell. 1.2.1)
in additionto the fifty triremes
says, he set sail rlpcqtOevra:r.oia a/3acwv;
these would also includecavalrytransports.A fleet of this size could not have
been assembleduntil Athens againhad public money to spend, which did not
occur until the latter half of 410.
40 See above n. 39. After Theramenesjoined the Hellespontinefleet (see
above nn. 34 and 36), he apparentlydid not returnto Athens until after the
battle of Arginusaein 406.
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274
W. J. McCOY
tion of the Five Thousandto returnto Athens). In any case,
given the developments of the spring and summerof 410, the
Atheniansbeganto view theirgeneralconduct of the war in an
entirely different perspective, and the career of Thrasyllus
suddenly took a new course.
Any analysis of the events of 410 is unfortunatelyhampered
from the startby serious chronologicalproblems.One involves
the 'missing year' in Xenophon's Hellenica;41 another concerns the somewhat haphazard fashion in which both
Xenophon and Diodorus present their narratives, especially
their departurefrom strict chronologicalorder and the lack of
detail regardingthe activities of the restored democracy. The
combined literarytestimony cannot resolve the dilemma;and
although epigraphicalevidence sheds importantlight on the
matter,there are far too many gaps in our informationand far
too many questions unraised or unanswered by our extant
sources for us to be completely comfortablewith any reconstruction.In such a situationplausiblehypothesis must suffice.
If we accept the late dating for Thrasyllus' departurefrom
Athens and subsequent arrival in Ionia (i.e. the beginning of
41 Xenophon, in Hellenica 1 and 2, presumes to continue the narrative of
Thucydides (albeit with inferior results) and to record the events of the last
seven years of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon himself, following the system of Thucydides, dates these years by season, but the interpolator of Hellenica 1 and 2 attempts to furnish additional information by inserting the names
of eponymous ephors and archons. In so doing, however, he fails to make
specific reference to the beginning of a certain new year amid the contents of
Hellenica 1, namely 410/409 (perhaps because of his oversight in noting the
approach of spring 408/407, i.e. Hell. 1.4.2); see Ferguson, Treasurers, 43-45.
This omission has given rise to at least two lines of interpretation that affect the
date of Thrasyllus' departure from Athens. According to the theory first offered by Dodwell, who suggested the insertion of the missing year at Hell.
1.1.11, Thrasyllus would have set sail in the summer of 409. Haacke, on the
other hand, first argued that the missing year belongs somewhere after Hell.
1.4.21, which would date Thrasyllus' expedition to Ionia to the same time, but
a year earlier. An imposing array of scholars has added support to both sides of
this controversy, but the arguments bolstering Dodwell's theory are more
convincing and, taken as a whole, provide a more plausible reconstruction of
the events of 410 and 409; see in particular J. Beloch, "Zur Chronologie der
letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Krieges," Philologus 43 (1884), especially
275-82. For a general review of this problem see G. E. Underhill, A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon (Oxford 1900) xxxv-xlii.
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THRASYLLUS
275
summer, 40942), it follows that he was present in Athens
throughout the year 410. Naturally, he, like other Athenians,
was intimately affected by the tide of good fortune that
touched Athens during the spring and summer months, but in
his case the repercussions were far more dramatic. There are
four items in particular that contributed directly or indirectly to
his gaining new stature and prominence: the Athenian victory
at Cyzicus, the restoration of the democracy, the successful
repulsion of Agis' attack, and the improving status of the
Athenian treasury. Let us examine each in turn.
The battle of Cyzicus was fought at the earliest in April.43
The news of this overwhelming Athenian victory not only
caused great jubilation in Athens, but also produced a new
outburst of energy and enthusiasm for the war.44 The Athenians were so confident that they could eventually defeat the
Peloponnesians that they even rejected Spartan overtures for
peace.45 Diodorus says that the Athenians were optimistic of
future victory because they had Alcibiades at the head of their
forces.46 But when the time came for Athens again to lend
active support to the war effort, it was Thrasyllus, not Alcibiades, who was the prime beneficiary.
It was probably owing to the spirit of elation over Cyzicus that
the Athenians turned their thoughts towards the restoration of
the democracy. Now that the military crisis appeared over,
Athens could return to its reckless ways. The government of
the Five Thousand had outlived its usefulness, and at least by
the beginning of the official year 410/409 it had quietly succumbed to the restored democracy.47 Elected to the first
42
See above n. 41.
43 Underhill (A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon, xl) dates the
battle of Cyzicus c. April; Ferguson (Cambridge Ancient History V, 343) in
April; Meiggs (The Athenian Empire, 371) before midsummer 410.
44 Diod. 13.52.1. But Diodorus is in error when he
says that the Athenians
immediately despatched 1000 hoplites, 100 cavalry, and fifty triremes to Alcibiades.
45 Diod. 13.52.2-53.2.
46 Diod. 13.53.4: TTre6 ol 'AOTrvalotrol; re ev?jUCEorQjaaiveGraQOevrec; ai
ac Xovrec Ev rT) rov 'AAx1ftdarlv adcp7qyslaOaL
riv
jroA,&alxai yEydAa;ExMa6
l6iwv 6vvdl,ewv, raxw;O ovro r4yv 'yetov'av dvaxTrraaoOat.
47 There is evidence to indicate that the democracy was restored even before
the official archon year 410/409. Meritt (Athenian Financial Documents, 62,
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276
W. J. McCOY
strategia of the new government was Thrasyllus.48
As strategos Thrasylluswon immediateacclaim. When the
Spartanking Agis attackedthe walls of Athens fromhis base at
Decelea, Thrasylluswas appointedto command a make-shift
militia that, when drawn up in battle formation near the
Lyceum, thwartedAgis' plans andforced him to withdraw.As
a result of this incident, accordingto Xenophon, the Athenians
were rt z7roOv6UTrEQotto grant Thrasyllus' initial request and
voted reinforcements to the extent of 1000 hoplites, 100
cavalry and fifty triremes.49
Surely an authorizationof this size could not have been
possible without the real or potential availability of public
money.50Indeed, if we examine the relevant literaryand epigraphicalevidence, there is every indicationthat the Athenian
94-114; see also "Athenian Calendar Problems," TAPA 95 [1964] 210-11) has
pointed out, with reference to IG I2 304A, that part of the first prytany of
410/409 actually belongs to the archon year 411/410. See also SGHI, 258;
Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 5-6; G. E. M. de Ste Croix, "The Constitution of the
Five Thousand," Historia 5 (1956) 1.
48 On Thrasyllus as strategos in 410/409, see J. Beloch, Die attische Politik
(Leipzig 1884) 311-12; C. Forara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501
to 404 (Wiesbaden 1971) 68 (hereafter Fornara, Generals).
49 Xen. Hell. 1.1.33-34. It is possible that the Agis episode preceded the
restoration of the democracy. If so, Thrasyllus' command was either an
extraordinary one (such as Cleon's at Pylos in 425), or one directly attributable
to his election as strategos by the fleet, which the Athenians apparently
recognized as valid. But the fact that Agis was probably motivated by the
appearance of grain ships (from the Euxine ?) sailing into the Piraeus (Xen.
Hell. 1.1.35) suggests a possible date of mid-summer at the earliest. The
shipment of grain from the Euxine would not have occurred until after the
battle of Cyzicus and not with any regularity until the Hellespontine fleet
controlled the straits of the Bosporus. Besides, the principal Pontic grain for
export was winter wheat (see Theophr. Hist. PI. 8.45) and the height of the
shipping season was summer, not later than August (see E. C. Semple, The
Geography of the Mediterranean Region [New York 1932] 356-63). Whatever
the case, there is no evidence to contradict that Thrasyllus was serving at this
time as a strategos of the restored democracy (see Hatzfeld, "La fin du Regime
de Theramene," REA 40 [1938] 123).
50 In addition to the hoplites and cavalry we need also reckon with the
7000-8500 nautai who sailed with the fleet of Thrasyllus, 5000 of whom were
equipped as peltasts (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1); on nautai see B. Jordan, The Athenian
Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley 1975) 210-40. If we reckon that the
crew of a trireme numbered 200, the manpower of this fleet might have totalled
10,000. At three obols a day a man (Jordan 116), this was a sizeable expense.
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THRASYLLUS
277
economy was on the upswing in the summer of 410. By now
the successful enterprises of the Hellespontine generals had
assured an unmolested convoy of grain ships into the
Piraeus,51and it is also probable that certain allies who had
been dilatoryin paying Athens her due (especially the EixoaTr
tax, first instituted in 414 to supplant the oQoco52) made every
effort to restore themselves to good standing.53Apparentlythe
Athenians even decided to reinstitutethe collection of 9o6gog
at this time and drew up a new assessment list dating to the
Great Panathenaeaof 410 (Hekatombaion28).54 Still another
indication of the improvementin Athenian finances (or financial outlook) is evident in the context of a decree of the Assembly (IG I2 109) dated to the third prytany of 410/409,55
whereby the Athenians resolved to pay back their debt to the
treasury of Athena and to establish a reserve fund on the
Acropolis.
One might reasonably suspect that some or all of these
financially-oriented decisions were offshoots of the grand
euphoriathat gripped Athens in the wake of Cyzicus, the restorationof the democracy, and the successful defense against
Agis. But if the Atheniansdid commit themselves prematurely
to any of these items, the accounts of the tamiai of Athena for
410/409(IG I2 304A) show that their financialpredictionswere
far from rash. Here we see that the tamiai made regulardisbursementsto the hellenotamiaias early as the first prytanyof
410/409,which is all the more extraordinarysince, accordingto
Ferguson,56this boardof tamiai "inheriteda practicallyempty
treasury." The hellenotamiai, in turn, distributedthese and
Xen. Hell. 1.1.35.
Thuc. 8.28.4.
53 See
Ferguson,Treasurers,38-39. Xenophon(Hell. 1.3.9) says that, when
Chalcedon was recovered in 409, the terms of the settlement included a
provisionthat Chalcedonregularlypay its normaltributeand at the same time
51
52
make up arrears: ... V5nore2etVTv
6oeov Kaxri6oviovg
oaovjtr EciOeoaavxai r&ao6CetA6oueva
xei#ara dzo6ofvat ....
'AOrivaiot;
54 Meritt,"The TributeAssessmentof 410 B.C.," Hesperia 6 (1936)386-89;
see also Meritt,H. T. Wade-Gery,and M. F. McGregor,TheAthenianTribute
Lists I (Cambridge,Mass., 1939)A13 andp. 208 (hereafterATL).For a discussion of the date of this 'last assessment' see Meiggs, The AthenianEmpire,
438-39.
55 See ATL I D9 and
pp. 213-14.
56
Ferguson, Treasurers, 38.
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W.J. McCOY
278
other funds (imperial revenues) for a variety of purposes,
perhaps including the projected campaign of Thrasyllus.57 But
even if sufficient money was available for Thrasyllus in the
summer of 410-which is very unlikely-it is doubtful that
there were fifty triremes in the Piraeus dockyards ready for
57 See
Ferguson, Treasurers, 39-40; Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 5-6; ATL III,
365-66.Thereis no explicitreferenceinIG I2304Athatthe tamiaiprovidedthe
lhellenotamiaiwith fundsfor the expeditionof Thrasyllus.On the thirtiethday
of the sixth prytany,however, a paymentof fifty-seventalents 1000drachmai
from Samos was allocatedto the hellenotamiai;and on the thirty-sixthday of
the ninth prytany a composite payment, again from Samos, which totalled
approximatelyforty talents, was allocated to the generals and trierarchson
"must
Samos. Andrewes contends that the entire Samian dvoyuoAoyrluaTa
certainly representthe expenditureon Thrasyllus'Ionian campaign,whose
startingpoint was Samos." Ferguson, on the other hand, is less dogmatic,
particularlywith regardto the destinationof the paymentin the sixth prytany:
"This may have gone to help outfit Thrasyllus,but it went more probablyto
Samos, like the other monies paid from 'the fund from Samos' . . . The
authorsof the ATL are totally non-committal:"Money fromthe allies, which
didnot come to Athens, was used in the field butneverthelesscreditedas loans
from the Goddess
....
It cannot be argued that the money (i.e. the
dvo/uooyrjuaTafrom Samos) was not used by Thrasyllosbecause his name
does not appearin the inscription...."
I am more inclinedto Ferguson'spoint of view, especially since I interpret
Hell. 1.1.34and 1.2.1 to meanthat the Atheniansvoted Thrasyllusa new levy
and not one that was to be raised amongthe remnantsof the fleet at Samos
(which,afterall, neededmoneyto survive).If the hellenotamiaidid not borrow
fromthe treasuryof Athenato defraythe expenses of Thrasyllus'expedition,
presumablytherewere amplefunds in the imperialtreasuryfor this purposeat
least by 409. Court fines, as well as revenue from Piraeus and the eikoste,
might have contributeda limited amount,but two other possibilities suggest
themselvesas morelucrativesources of revenue. 1)The Atheniansapparently
had occasional recourse to the eisphora after the Sicilian disaster;Diodorus
hintsof this in 13.47.7andagainin 13.64.4.Schwahn("Die attischeeisphora,"
RhM 82 [1933]250, n. 2) suggeststhatthe Athenianslevied such an eisphorain
the year 409, which R. Thomsen (Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in
AncientAthens [Copenhagen1964]177)assesses at not less than 200 talents.
Perhapsthe eisphoraof 409 post-datedthe departureof Thrasyllus,but it could
also be arguedthat it occurredduringthe early monthsof 409, when imperial
activities were relatively quiet, and that the money realized was applied, if
only in part, to Thrasyllus'campaign.2) If Meritthas correctly identifiedthe
fragmentsof a tributeassessmentlist of 410 (see above n. 54), it is reasonable
to suppose that the majorityof paymentswere made at Athens at the time of
the GreatDionysia of 409 (late Marchor early April). If this is so, perhapsa
portion of this money was also earmarkedfor Thrasyllus'campaign.In any
case it is worth notingthat Thrasyllusdid not set sail in the spring,but at the
beginningof summer409 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1).
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THRASYLLUS
279
immediate embarking.58Besides, the present situation in the
Hellespont and Asia Minor was by no means critical, and Alcibiades and his fellow commanders seemed to be managing
well enough on their own. So the Athenians in Athens spent
the remainingmonths of 410 and the early months of 409 preparing and mobilizing the fleet that had been authorized for
Thrasyllus,who finally set sail at the beginningof the summer
of 409.59
Where Thrasyllus went is somewhat puzzling. Instead of
sailing to the Hellespont to rejoin Alcibiades, he went first to
Samos and from there to Ionia. This tack can perhaps be
explainedby the fact that Alcibiadesand his comradeswere no
longer in the perilous position in which they had found themselves in the winterof 411 (when Thrasylluswas sent to Athens
for reinforcements).Moreover, the Atheniangovernment(i.e.
the restoreddemocracy)was probablyeager to establisha new
offensive front and at the same time to reassert control over
former tribute-payingallies who had recently switched their
allegianceto the Peloponnesians.60In this respect, Thrasyllus'
new army would complementthe fleet in the Hellespont inasmuch as it was specially equipped to operate on land.61
Nevertheless, we might equally suspect another purpose behind Thrasyllus'venture into Ionia-a plan to counterbalance
ratherthan augmentthe successes of Alcibiades. No one could
dispute that the remarkablerecovery of Athens was due in
large part to the naval victories of Alcibiades, but there were
certainly some Athenianswho were wary of Alcibiades' ambitions and anxious to preclude his complete dominationof the
Athenianstate. Still others regardedhim as an outlaw, since he
had never returnedto Athens to answer the chargesconnected
with his alleged profanationof the EleusinianMysteries, to say
58
See above n. 39; see also Hatzfeld,REA 40 (1938) 123.
59
Both Hatzfeld (Alcibiade 277) and E. F. Bloedow (Alcibiades Reexamined
[Wiesbaden1973]58) thinkthatThrasylluswas responsiblefor Athens'fortifying Thoricusnear Lauriumprobablyduringthe springof 409 (see Xen. Hell.
1.2.1). If Xenophonis the sourcefor this conjecture,he does not mentionthat
Thrasylluswas involved in this operation.
60 Diod. 13.52.1.
61
In addition to the 1000 hoplites who were assigned to his expedition,
Thrasyllusalso equipped5000of his nautai as peltasts so that they couldact in
the capacity of light infantry.See above n. 50; see also H. W. Parke, Greek
Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 18 and n. 3.
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280
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nothing of his treasonous alliances with the Spartans and Tissapheres.62 The solution to the 'Alcibiades problem' was
simple, at least in theory: if Athens could achieve military
victories independent of Alcibiades, his charisma could be undermined. Apparently the new leaders of the demos were convinced that they had found a new champion in Thrasyllus, who
by now had proven his ability as a competent commander both
on land and on sea. Diodorus tells us that Cleophon was the
most influential popular spokesman at this time,63 and it is
tempting to imagine that Cleophon, a political foe of Alcibiades,64 was partly responsible for directing Thrasyllus'
62
Fornara (Generals, 67-69) suggests that when Alcibiades was elected general by the Athenian fleet at Samos in 411 he was "presumably" the eleventh
general. From this time until his return to Athens in 407 Alcibiades held the
irregular position of a quasi-independent strategos; in short, "his position was
very likely not 'official'."
Xenophon (Hell. 1.4.10) says that Alcibiades was elected general in 407
though still an exile (qevyovra). Andrewes (JHS 73 [1953] 3) comments: "It
was even uncertain, until the demos had fully committed itself at the elections
(of 407), whether his (Alcibiades) recall from exile (in 411) was still regarded as
valid."
63 Diod. 13.53.2. See also
Lys. 13.8; Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.1; Aeschin. 3.150;
Phil. fr. 118 (F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker III B
[Leiden 1964] 139).
Although there is no record of Cleophon's public activities before 410, it is
doubtful that he was a political tyro at this time. Indeed W. R. Connor (The
New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens [Princeton 1971] 147) describes
Cleophon as a man of great eloquence and a great master of civic affairs.
Cleophon was a popular butt of the Athenian comic poets and was maligned on
the stage as early as 411 (Ar. Thesm.). Also his name appears on six extant
ostraca that must date to the last known ostrakophoria in 416 (see E. Vanderpool, "New Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," Hesperia 37[1968] 120; Ostracism at Athens [Cincinnati 1970] 28; Thomsen, The Origin of Ostracism
[Copenhagen 1972] 81, n. 186). Aristotle's (Ath. Pol. 28.3) mention of
Cleophon as the first to introduce the diobelia in 410 argues for prior experience in public finance. Indeed Beloch ("Zur Finanzgeschichte Athens," RhM
39 [1884] 249; see also Busolt, G.G. III 2, 1535-36, 1405-6, n. 2) would have
Cleophon as a member of the college ofporistai, a financial board established
after the Sicilian disaster.
16
64 F. Camon ("L'Ostracismo di Iperbolo," Giornale Italiano difilologia
[1963] 147, n. 19) suggests a coalition between Hyperbolus and Cleophon
dating to the time of the ostrakophoria of 416 (owing to the ostraca inscribed
with Cleophon's name; see above n. 63). There is no evidence to support this
conjecture, but it could mark a possible terminus post quem for Cleophon's
hostility towards Alcibiades. See also Andrewes, JHS 73 (1953) 3.
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THRASYLLUS
281
campaign to Ionia. The temptation becomes all the more tantalizing when we note that during the years 410 to 406 the
prestige of Cleophon and Thrasyllus seems to rise and fall
simultaneously.65
As a target for attack, the Ionian satrapy of Tissaphernes
was an excellent choice. Not only was it a hot-bed of rebellion
against the Athenian imperial system, but it was militarily vulnerable. This was especially true since the Peloponnesians had
temporarily deserted Tissaphernes for Pharnabazus,66 leaving
the former in a quandary about the overall defense of his province.67 Thrasyllus initiated his Ionian campaign by attacking
Pygela: Xenophon says that he laid waste the surrounding
65
Hatzfeld(REA 40 [1938] 121-23;see also Alcibiade 266) sees Thrasyllus
as the central figure behind the collapse of the Five Thousand (which he
energetically opposed) and the subsequent restoration of the democracy:
aroundhim congregatedCleophonand other malcontentswith the resultthata
coalition was formed that eventually spelled the doom of Theramenes'government.This, I believe, is creditingThrasylluswith too muchinvolvementin
politicalmatters.There can be little doubtthat Thrasylluswas an enthusiastic
supporterof the restoreddemocracyand was ready to serve the new government in any capacity, but, like Thrasybulus,he preferredto concentrateon
militaryassignmentsand leave the politicalexpertise to others.
66 After the Atheniandefeat in
Sicily, Tissaphernesmade an alliance with
Spartawherebyhe hoped to reassertPersiancontrolover those Greekcities in
his satrapythat were memberstates of the Athenianempire. But his policy
lacked uniformity.Not only did he act at odds with his neighboringfellow
satrapPharnabazus,but he also continuedto renegeon his agreementwith the
Spartans(in particular,by failing to provide the Peloponnesiancrews with
regularpay and by delaying the promised arrivalof the Phoenician navy).
Hence, from the end of 411 until 407 (when Cyrus arrivedon the scene), the
Spartanscooperatedmore closely with Pharnabazusand left Tissaphernesin
the lurch. Persia's entry into the PeloponnesianWarshould have been decisive, but as Meiggs(TheAthenianEmpire,353)says: "The mainresponsibility
for the ... ineffectivenessof Persia(priorto 407) rested with Tissaphernes."
It is interestingto note that Tissaphernesvisited the satrapyof Pharnabazus
shortlyafter the battle of Abydos in 411 (Xen. Hell. 1.1.9; Thuc. 8.109) in an
attemptto regainthe supportof the Peloponnesians.We are not told what, if
anything,this visit accomplished.The next mentionof Tissaphernesoccurs in
Xenophon'snarrativewhen ThrasyllusattacksEphesusin the summerof 409.
67
Tissapherneswas an opportunistand controlled only a limited fighting
force. When the Peloponnesianstransferredtheir principalsphere of activity
to the Hellespontdistrict,Tissapherneswas forced to rely primarilyon native
supportto complementhis own troops in case his satrapywas invaded. Despite the fact that many Ioniancities switchedtheirallegianceto the Pelopon-
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W. J. McCOY
country, assaulted the fortifications, and annihilateda relief
force sent from Miletus, after which he set up a trophy. Then
he sailed for Notium and from there marched against Colophon, which surrenderedwithoutopposition. He next made a
raid into the Lydian country, burningvillages and seizing huge
quantities of money, slaves and moveable property. Further
plunderingof Lydia, however, was curtailed by the sudden
appearanceof the Persian commanderStages, and Thrasyllus
retreatedto the coast. By now Tissapherneswas well awareof
Thrasyllus' presence and his intention to attack Ephesus.
When the attack finally came, Tissaphernes had mustered a
large defense force and managedto rout the Athenians, killing
about400 of them. As a result, Thrasyllus'Ionianventurecame
to an abruptend.68
In the face of his defeat at Ephesus, Thrasyllusdid not return to Athens. Instead he sailed for Lesbos and the Hellespont in the late summer or early fall of 409. En route he encountereda squadronof twenty-five Syracusanships and succeeded in capturingfour of them with crews. He sent all prisnesians in 412, at least three of them (Miletus, Antandrus, and Cnidus) defied
Tissaphernes and thwarted the permanent establishment of Persian military
garrisons within their borders. In addition, there were other cities that soon
objected to the utter insensitivity of Spartan control and realized that they had
been 'liberated' from Athenian domination only to be 'enslaved' by Sparta and
ultimately Persia. Hence the democratic factions within these cities were
doubtless eager for an opportunity to reestablish ties with Athens (see Meiggs,
The Athenian Empire, 355-71). Even during his dealings with the Spartans,
Tissaphernes, fearing that they might plunder his territory, kept them satisfied
with money and bribes; see Thuc. 8.57.1: 'rtl 6& 4poel~ro MdAiara yU rfr;
ryv iJretgov. See also Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 240; H.
rT rrjae,t 7roOjoaCaout
Trocpf75
D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge 1968) 247. Since Tissaphernes counted on Peloponnesian troops to gain his major objectives (see
Meiggs 354), their present preoccupation in the Hellespont left him in a difficult situation.
68 Xen. Hell. 1.2.1-11; see also Diodorus (13.64.1), who incorrectly identifies
Thrasyllus as Thrasybulus.
Tissaphernes did not react to Thrasyllus' invasion of his territory until he
was informed of an imminent attack against Ephesus, a city that had apparently submitted to Persian control without protest; at least Tissaphernes had
offered sacrifice there at the shrine of Artemis before his visit to the Hellespont
late in 411 (Thuc. 8.109.2). In fact, Xenophon says that Tissaphernes rallied
support for the defense of Ephesus on a religious pretext, namely "for the
protection of Artemis."
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THRASYLLUS
283
oners back to Athens with the exception of a certain Alcibiades, a cousin of the general Alcibiades.69Xenophon says
that he put him to death by stoning (xarTiEvacv).70
If this is
true, it was hardly a fitting way to ingratiatehimself with the
man he was now about to rejoinafter an absence of almost two
years.71
Thrasyllus and his troops received a cool reception when
they finally arrived at Sestus. Naturally the reinforcements
were a welcome sight, but their delay had hinderedthe offensive ability of the fleet with the result that little or no headway
could be made against the Peloponnesians and their Persian
allies. In fact, the Spartans and Syracusans had been given
sufficient time to rebuildtheir navies that had been destroyed
at Cyzicus.72Xenophon says that at first there was little fraternizing between the men of Alcibiades and those of Thrasyllus,73 and we can safely assume a similar attitude of disdain on
the part of Alcibiades towards Thrasyllus,perhapseven a certain smugness when he learned of Thrasyllus' defeat at
Ephesus. This situation was doubtless intensified by Thrasyllus' official position as strategos of Athens,74 whereas Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, Theramenes and others held their
commands only by the 'quasi-official' sanction of the fleet.75
69
Xen. Hell. 1.2.12-13. P. Bicknell (Studies in Athenian Politics and
Genealogy [Wiesbaden 1972] 98-100 [hereafter Bicknell, Studies]) identifies
the victim as Alcibiades of Phegous. See also D. MacDowell, Andokides' On
the Mysteries (Oxford 1962) 104; Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 173, n. 1.
70 Xen. Hell. 1.2.13. An alternate reading would substitute aJrivoaev or even
adztevaev for xaritevaev. Whatever the case, as Bicknell sucxareETea;
cinctly states (Studies, 97): "the fate of Alcibiades of Phegous remains a
mystery."
71 Bicknell (Studies, 97) and others assume that Alcibiades and Thrasyllus
were acting in cooperation at the time of the incident off Lesbos. This seems
unlikely when we consider what happened when Thrasyllus and his troops
joined the Hellespontine fleet.
72 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-25. Busolt (G.G. III 2, 1529-32, n. 1) and others are of
the opinion that the Peloponnesians (or possibly only the Syracusans) had
rebuilt their navy within a few months of the battle of Cyzicus (c. April 410);
cf., however, Beloch, Philologus 43 (1884) 276, and Underhill, A Commentary
on the Hellenica of Xenophon, xl-xlii.
73 Xen. Hell. 1.2.15; see also Plut. Ale. 29.
74 On Thrasyllus as strategos in 409/408 see Beloch, Die attische Politik, 312,
and Fornara, Generals, 69.
75 See
Forara, Generals, 67.
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284
W. J. McCOY
Yet the combined army fortified Lampsacus and spent the
winter of 409/408 there.76
During that winter the joint forces of Alcibiades and Thrasyllus defeated the troops of Pharnabazus at Abydos.77 But
whereas the rigors of this and subsequent campaigns (e.g.
Chalcedon and Byzantium in 408) succeeded in breaking down
the barriers of antagonism among the soldiers,78 there can be
little doubt (especially in light of the events of 407 and 406) that
Alcibiades continued to view Thrasyllus with suspicion and
contempt-and perhaps the feeling was mutual. Thrasyllus finally returned to Athens in the summer of 407.79 Alcibiades
followed soon thereafter when he had been assured of his election to the new strategia for 407/406.80 His popularity had
reached a new high, and his recent victories in the Hellespont
seemed to cast an even darker shadow on Thrasyllus' defeat in
Ionia. Joining Alcibiades on the strategia was his friend and
military colleague Thrasybulus,81 but the name of Thrasyllus is
conspicuously missing from the list of generals: presumably he
returned to private life. It is also curious that the sources make
no mention of Cleophon at this time. It seems that, with the
'resurrection' of Alcibiades, both Thrasyllus and Cleophon
experienced a simultaneous eclipse.
Alcibiades' reputation, however, suffered irrevocable damage in the spring of 406 when the Athenian fleet (under the
command of Antiochus) was defeated off Notium by Lysander. Even though Alcibiades himself was not directly involved, his enemies in Athens used the occasion to discredit
76
77
78
Xen. Hell. 1.2.15.
Xen. Hell. 1.2.16; Plut.Alc. 29.2.
Plut.Alc. 29.2; Xen. Hell. 1.2.17, 3.2-7, 3.14-22.Accordingto Xenophon,
Alcibiadescame to Thrasyllus'aid at Chalcedon.
79
Xen. Hell. 1.4.10.Thrasylluswas againa strategosin 408/407;see Beloch,
Die attische Politik, 312, and Fornara, Generals, 69.
80
Xen. Hell. 1.4.11-12.
81 Xen. Hell.
1.4.10; Diod. 13.69.3. Adeimantuswas also elected strategos
(Xen. Hell. 1.4.21; Diod. 13.69.3), and he, too, might have been a close associate of Alcibiades.He was a fellow demesmanfromScambonidae,who had
been implicatedin the profanationof the Mysteriesin 415 and had then gone
into exile (Andoc. 1.16). Adeimantus'absence from the strategia of 406/405
(elected after the fall of Alcibiades)hints that he was a political ally of Alcibiades.
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THRASYLLUS
285
and depose him. At the next strategic elections (for 406/405),
Alcibiades and his close associates (e.g., Thrasybulus,
Adeimantus and Theramenes) were bypassed, and the new
board consisted of men who had proven their loyalty to the
democracy. Among them was Thrasyllus.82 Is it mere coincidence that Cleophon also reemerges at this time? According to
late sources,83 it was Cleophon who indicted Alcibiades for
and it seems that he was also the
treason (yeapr' reQo6oaoaS),
instigator of banishment proceedings against Critias, the son of
Callaeschrus,84 who had originally moved Alcibiades' recall in
411, or perhaps 408/407.85
The final episode in Thrasyllus' life pertains to the naval
battle that was fought near the Arginusae Islands in the summer of 406. The Athenians, under the command of Thrasyllus
and seven other generals, won an impressive victory and
proved to themselves that they could hold their own without
Alcibiades,86 but the occasion was marred when the generals
failed to give their immediate attention to the rescue of the
shipwrecked and the recovery of the dead. The event that
might have turned the scales of war in favor of Athens did just
82 Xen. Hell. 1.5.16. See also
Lys. 21.7, a passage which Andrewes (JHS 73
[1953]4) interpretsto meanthatThrasyllus"was the leadingfigureopposed to
Alcibiades."
83 Himerius,Eclogues, 36.16;Photius,Bibliotheca, 377. G. Gilbert(Beitrage
zur innern Geschichte Athens [Leipzig 1887] 366) and Beloch (Die attische
Politik, 84) agree that this took place after Notium.
84 See Arist. Rhet. 1.15.1375b32. See also Wade-Gery, "Kritias and
Herodes," CQ 39 (1945)25; 33, n. 1, and H. C. Avery, "Critiasand the Four
Hundred,"CP 58 (1963) 166-67.
85 Plut.Alc. 33.1. For the 408/407date see Andrewes,JHS 73 (1953)3, n. 7.
86
Xenophon (Hell. 1.6.24) says that the Atheniansoutfitted 110 triremes
within a month's time and assigned to these ships all men of militaryage
whether slave or free; cf. Diodorus(13.97.1), who says that sixty ships were
made ready at great expense.
IG I2 105 records an Atheniandecree in honor of Archelausof Macedonia.
Merittand others (see above n. 31) have rejecteda 411/410datingin favor of
407/406,and suggestthat Alcibiadeswas originallyresponsiblefor this alliance
with Archelaus.If this is true, the majorityof this new fleet would have been
constructedin Macedoniaunderthe directionof Athenianshipwrightsand then
sent to Athens where the ships were mannedand quicklydespatchedto Ionia.
This explainshow the Athenianswere able to send out such a largereliefforce
to assist Conon in so short a time.
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W. J. McCOY
the reverse. The trial of the generals which followed was a
legal mockery wherein political jealousies brought out the
worst in the Athenians-a situation that was hardly conducive
to promoting internal unity in the midst of war. But even more
crippling was the Athenian decision to execute the Arginusae
generals, or at least the six who returned to Athens. By this
one foolhardy action, the Athenians quickly reduced the already sparse ranks of qualified military leaders: it is little wonder that Arginusae was the last Athenian military victory of the
Peloponnesian War.
In order to assess Thrasyllus' role in this chain of events, we
must first examine the somewhat divergent testimonies of
Xenophon and Diodorus.87 Xenophon says that immediately
after the victory the Athenians returned to the Arginusae Islands where they reassembled and reckoned their losses. This
must have taken considerable time since the fleet had been
scattered in the course of the fighting.88 The eight generals in
command then met in private to determine what they should do
next, and this meeting entailed additional delay. Diomedon
proposed that the whole fleet take part in picking up the disabled vessels and shipwrecked sailors. Erasinides, on the other
hand, favored the immediate despatch of the whole fleet to
Mytilene to engage the Spartan squadron that was blockading
the Athenian general Conon. Thrasyllus contended that both
objectives could be met and suggested that the trierarchs
Theramenes and Thrasybulus, with some of the taxiarchs and
forty-seven ships, be put in charge of the rescue operations and
that the rest of the fleet sail to Mytilene. Apparently this com87Xen. Hell. 1.6.15-38; Diod. 13.97-100. On the Arginusae affair in general
see G. Grote, A History of Greece VI4 (London 1872) 392-430; P. Cloche,
"L'Affaire des Arginuses," Revue historique 130 (1919) 4-68; L. F. Herbst,
Die Schlacht bei den Arginusen (Hamburg 1855); M. Valeton, "De praetoribus
Atheniensium qui victoriam reportaverunt apud Arginusas insulas,"
Mnemosyne 48 (1920) 34-79; and most recently Andrewes, "The Arginousai
Trial," Phoenix 28 (1974) 112-22.
88 Athenianlosses consistedof twenty-fiveships with all theircrews, except
for a few men who were carriedashore(Xen. Hell. 1.6.33-34;Xenophonlater
records a speech of Euryptolemuswho says that only twelve ships were lost
[Hell. 1.7.30]). See also Diod. 13.100.3.If the crew of each triremewas 200,
anywherefrom 2400-5000 men were lost or drownedat Arginusae.
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THRASYLLUS
287
promise proposal was acceptable to all.89But a sudden storm
prevented the execution of either assignment, and the entire
fleet remainedinactive for the night.90
The account of Diodorusgives a slightly differentpicture of
the events following the battle. He says that when the Spartans retreatedin defeat, the Atheniangeneralsdeliberatedon a
course of action. Some thoughtthey should pick up the dead;
others were of the opinionthat they should immediatelysail to
Mytilene and raise the Spartan siege of Conon. Meanwhile a
great storm arose that caused the soldiers to panic and oppose
pickingup the dead. Whenthe stormbecame more intense, the
Athenians had no choice but to seek refuge at the Arginusae
Islands. Diodorus is silent about Thrasyllus'compromisethat
involved Theramenes and Thrasybulus,but he does say that
Thrasyllusheld the chief commandon that day (o6 'v bzrri ;
yc/iovtia
Excivrv royv?j7Meav).91This is very telling evidence,
particularlywhen combined with the testimony of Xenophon.
It indicates, I think, that political undercurrentswere at work
at Arginusae.92
Thrasyllus must have realized that the generals would be
held accountablefor any failureto rescue the shipwreckedand
to pick up the dead for burial. This responsibility rested
squarely on their shoulders, and perhaps weighed heaviest of
all on Thrasyllushimself, who supposedlywas the commander
of the day. After Diomedon and Erasinides had made their
proposals, therefore,Thrasyllussaw the perfect opportunityto
extricate both himself and all his colleagues from a very precarious situation by suggesting that Theramenes and
Thrasybulusbe put in chargeof the rescue operations:afterall,
they were experienced and capable officers, and whatever the
outcome they could be held fully liable. Thrasyllusmight still
89
Xen. Hell. 1.7.29.
90Both Xenophonand Diodorusalso attest to
poor weatherconditionsthe
day before the battle of Arginusae:Xenophon(Hell. 1.6.28)mentionsa thunderstorm;Diodorus(13.97.4) strongwinds.
91Diod. 13.97.6. Diodorus, almost out of habit, confuses Thrasybuluswith
Thrasyllus,as is againthe case in this passage; see above n. 68.
92
Jordan (The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period, 133, n. 72) considers
Diodorus' evidence untrustworthyand argues for collegiate commandat Arginusae.
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W. J. McCOY
have felt some resentment towards Theramenes and
Thrasybulus because of their close association with Alcibiades, and he might even have conjured up some unpleasant
memories of the fall of 409 when he finally rejoined the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont following his debacle at Ephesus.
Perhaps, too, he was counting on Athenian hostility towards
the friends of Alcibiades to condemn Theramenes and
Thrasybulus if something went wrong. But if so, his calculations were thwarted by nature and by his underestimating the
influence of Theramenes. Thrasyllus and five other generals
obeyed the summons of the demos and returned to Athens,
only to be found guilty of misconduct and condemned to
death.93
The name of Cleophon, whom we have earlier tried to link
with Thrasyllus, is notably missing from the entire Arginusae
affair, which is quite surprising considering his political activity after Notium. A certain Archedemus was the leading demagogue at this time, and it was he who initiated proceedings
against the general Erasinides, the results of which set the
emotional scene for the subsequent trial of all the generals.
Lysias implies that this Archedemus was on friendly terms
with the family of Alcibiades,94 an association that has prompted Beloch to conclude that the friends of Alcibiades actively
cooperated in discrediting and condemning the Arginusae generals who had been elected to the strategia in the wave of
sentiment against Alcibiades that arose after the Athenian defeat at Notium.95 This suggestion is very persuasive, for it
could explain the absence of Cleophon, who, as an outspoken
enemy of Alcibiades, would not have taken part in such a
vendetta. Moreover, if Cleophon had ever promoted the military career of Thrasyllus, it would have been politically expedient for him to remain silent. Whatever the reason for his
temporary political obscurity, Cleophon soon regained his position as the leading spokesman of the Assembly. Perhaps he
93 Two of the
Arginusae generals, i.e. Protomachus and Aristogenes, preferred to go into voluntary exile rather than return to Athens (Xen. Hell. 1.7.2;
Diod. 13.101.5). By so doing, they seemed to acknowledge their guilt and
severely compromised their colleagues.
94
Lys. 14.25.
95 Beloch, Die attische Politik, 88.
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THRAS YLLUS
289
took advantageof the 'post-trialpurge', when the Athenians,
in their customary fickle manner, turned against those who
they believed had deceived them duringthe trial.96If so, this
would lend some credence to Aristotle's statement that
Cleophon was responsible for persuadingthe Athenians to reject Spartanovertures for peace sometime after Arginusae.97
CertainlyCleophonhad reestablishedhis influenceby the time
of Aegospotamiin 405, when he was stronglyopposed to peace
with Sparta on any terms.98
The death of Thrasyllus and his five colleagues was an irreparableloss for Athens and another vicious example of the
inability of the Athenian demos to exercise reason and restraintin a matterof critical importance.The victims of Athenian displeasurewere often innocent. At the very least, some
deserved a better fate, especially those who had proven their
loyalty and devotion to the democracy. Thrasyllusis a case in
point. He was neithera politiciannor corruptedby politics, but
because of an honest attempt to serve the Athenian state in a
militarycapacity he became enmeshed in a political nightmare
that eventually cost him his life.
W. JAMESMcCoY
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
CHAPEL HILL
96
Xen. Hell. 1.7.35. Cleophon might, in part, have been responsible when
Theramenes' election to the strategia of 405/404 was annulled at his dokimasia;
see Lys. 13.10.
97
Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.1. Cf., for example, J. Kirchner (Prosopographia Attica I [Berlin 1901] 577, #8638) and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen I [Berlin 1893] 130-31), who contend that Aristotle is confusing Cleophon's role after Arginusae with his rejection of Spartan peace proposals after Cyzicus in 410. See also Grote, A History of Greece VI4, 431.
98 Lys. 13.10; Aeschin. 2.76; 3.150. Cleophon's election as strategos in 406/
405 or 405/404 (see Schol. Ar. Frogs 679; Lys. 13.12) is unproven. See Fornara, Generals, 70, and D. M. Lewis, "Double Representation in the
Strategia," JHS 81 (1961) 123.
In 404, while Theramenes was absent from Athens trying to negotiate a
possible peace treaty with Lysander, Cleophon was arrested, tried, and condemned to death (Lys. 30.10-13, 13.12; Xen. Hell. 1.7.35). According to Lysias
(14.48), he died a poor man. Despite his involvement in Athenian financial
matters, Cleophon is never accused of or implicated in bribery or
peculation-a trait he shared in common with Thrasyllus.
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