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The Chinese Nation One way of conceiving the nature of mental states is in terms of the role they play. For example, to be in pain or to possess the belief that it is raining is to be in an internal state brought about by a certain set of inputs, which relates in characteristic ways to other internal states and which gives rise to certain kinds of behavioural outputs. We are very familiar with the idea that something is defined in functional terms – consider carburettors (the part of an engine which controls the mix of air and petrol) and antibiotics (a substance which kills disease causing bacteria). It’s not what they’re made from that determines what they, but what they do. The same can be said of mental states. This approach is known as Functionalism. Now, taking Functionalism as the view that the mind is a functional entity, we can see that it is easy to think of mindedness as being realised in a computing device. The human mind is a massively complex functional arrangement. While beyond current technological capacities, we can understand a computing device as instantiating or realising just such a complex functional arrangement. Where there is mindedness of sufficient complexity, we shall find a good candidate for personhood. Daniel Dennett reports that in 1974 Lawrence Davis gave a colloquium at MIT in which he presented one such unorthodox implementation. Dennett summarizes Davis’ thought experiment as follows: Let a functionalist theory of pain (whatever its details) be instantiated by a system the subassemblies of which are not such things as C-fibers (roughly – neurons) and reticular (netlike) systems but telephone lines and offices staffed by people. Perhaps it is a giant robot controlled by an army of human beings that inhabit it. When the theory’s functionally characterized conditions for pain are now met we must say, if the theory is true, that the robot is in pain. That is, real pain, as real as our own, would exist in virtue of the perhaps disinterested and businesslike activities of these bureaucratic teams, executing their proper functions. In ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, published in 1978, Ned Block envisions the entire population of China implementing the functions of neurons in the brain. This scenario has subsequently 1 been called ‘The Chinese Nation’ or ‘The Chinese Gym’. We can suppose that every Chinese citizen would be given a call-list of phone numbers, and at a preset time on implementation day, designated ‘input’ citizens would initiate the process by calling those on their call-list. When any citizen’s phone rang, he or she would then phone those on his or her list, who would in turn contact yet others. No phone message need be exchanged; all that is required is the pattern of calling. The call-lists would be constructed in such a way that the patterns of calls implemented the same patterns of activation that occur in someone’s brain when that person is in a mental state — pain, for example. The phone calls play the same functional role as neurons causing one another to fire. Block was primarily interested in qualia, and in particular, whether it is plausible to hold that the population of China might collectively be in pain, while no individual member of the population experienced any pain. Explain why Block’s thought experiment is a challenge to the view that a machine could possess a mind. Parts of the above are excerpted from David Cole, ‘The Chinese Room Argument’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/chinese-room 2