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The Decision to Use the Bomb
The modern nuclear arsenals and the struggle to control nuclear weaponry have brought new significance
and controversy to the American use of the atomic bomb in World War II. This reading selection describes
the circumstances surrounding the decision to use the atomic bomb. There is considerable debate among
historians about the necessity of using the bomb to force Japan's surrender; there is perhaps even greater
controversy concerning the moral principle involved in subjecting the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki to this weapon. This latter point is raised, but not answered, at the end of the essay.
World War II was the second world-wide war in less than a generation's time. The World War I had erased
any romantic illusions about the nature of modern war; World War II saw the complete mobilization of
entire populations and economies in the waging of the war. It was fought with grim determination on every
side. In such conditions, each side carried out acts of great brutality in the frustration and necessity of
achieving victory.
For the first time outside a civil war, fighting spread beyond the armies to whole populations: Hitler used
aerial bombing to try to break the spirit of the British; the Japanese used aerial bombing and soldiers
against the Chinese civilian population; both Japan and Germany used their military forces to subdue
resistance in occupied nations; and the allied forces used bombing to carry the war beyond the battle front
and break the opposition of enemy populations. By the end of the war, technology had advanced to the
point where such bombings were terrible: the allied bombing of Dresden killed tens of thousands of people,
and the American firebombing of Tôkyô in March 1945 probably killed more than 100,000 people.
During this period, wartime technology raced ahead, as each side attempted to be the first to develop the
techniques and equipment that would enable it to win. Many nations sought to decipher the secrets of
atomic energy, but the United States was the first to develop the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb.
Prelude to the Bomb: On April 1, 1945, the Allies invaded the southern Japanese island of Okinawa, and
their victory there after bitter and bloody fighting with heavy losses on both sides proved that Japan could
not win the war. It also proved, however, that invasion of the Japanese homeland would cause massive
casualties on both sides. As American ground forces swept Okinawa clean of Japanese troops, the local
civilians were caught in the middle. Subjected to gun fire, bombing, and infantry combat by the American
advance, they were prevented from surrendering by the Japanese troops. Okinawa only served to confirm
everyone's idea of how the final battle for the main islands of Japan would be fought.
The surrender of Okinawa caused the Japanese cabinet to collapse and a new, pro-peace prime minister and
foreign minister pressed the army to allow negotiations. The Japanese military, however, trapped in its own
mystique of rigid determination and self-sacrifice in the name of the nation and emperor, insisted on strict
terms.
Just at this point, the atomic bomb became a reality. The first successful test of the atomic weapon was held
on July l6, 1945. The United States now had the choice of using it to try to end the war in another way. All
other forms of attack, from the grim battle for Okinawa to the terrible fire bombing of Japan's cities, had
failed to deter the leaders in Tôkyô. Perhaps the atomic bomb would resolve the crisis without a need for
invasion. President Truman, who had already left for Potsdam to meet with Churchill and Stalin, left
instructions that the bomb was not to be used against Japan until after the Allies had agreed on and issued a
declaration.
The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, issued by the Allied powers and calling for "unconditional surrender,"
was not acceptable to the Japanese military, despite the declaration's threat that failure to surrender would
be met by "complete destruction" of the military and the "utter devastation of the Japanese home land."
Following ten days of Japanese silence, the atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, on the city of
Hiroshima.
The Impact on Japan: It was reported the next day to the Japanese Army General Staff that "the whole city
of Hiroshima was destroyed instantly by a single bomb." On August 8 the army was further rocked by the
news that the Russians, who had remained neutral to Japan throughout the war, had attacked Japanese
forces on the Asian mainland. But despite the prime minister's insistence that Japan must accept surrender,
the army insisted on total, last-ditch resistance. The news, midway through this conference, that the city of
Nagasaki had also been destroyed by another atomic bomb, did not sway them from their determination.
Finally, the Japanese prime minister and his allies agreed that the only course was to have the emperor
break the deadlock by expressing his view. The emperor's statement that Japan's suffering was unbearable
to him and that he wished for surrender broke the military's opposition and began the process of ending the
war in the Pacific.
Assessing the Decision: Was it necessary to use the atomic bomb to force Japan to surrender? This is a
subject of heated debate among historians. Some point to the existence of a pro-peace faction in Japan,
resisting the army and growing in strength. This faction had already tried to express Japan's interest in
peace through the Russians, whom they believed were still neutral. In fact, the Russians had secretly agreed
at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 to attack the Japanese.
Moreover, Japanese offensive capabilities were exhausted. The navy and air force were almost totally
destroyed by the summer of 1945, and the Japanese islands were completely cut off from the rest of the
world. The Russian attack of August 8 on Manchuria met little or no resistance.
Discussion Questions
1. How did the battle over the island of Okinawa influence the decision to use the atomic bomb?
2. How would you rank, from most important to least important, the several factors or considerations
involved in the U.S. decision to drop the atomic bomb? Explain.
3. Today, the Japanese often say they have a "nuclear allergy," and the government accordingly has
proclaimed "three nuclear principles," that it will not own or manufacture nuclear weapons and will not
allow them to be brought into Japan.
Introduction
In August 1945 American aircraft dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, killing over 100,000 people and injuring many more. Japan soon sued for peace and World War
II ended. Ever since President Harry S. Truman made the fateful decision to unleash atomic weapons on
Japan, contemporaries and historians have debated the morality, necessity, and consequences of the choice.
Truman said he authorized the use of the atomic bombs on populated areas because that was the only way
to shorten the war and save American lives. Until the 1960s most historians accepted that conclusion. But
recent scholarship, although not denying the argument that American lives would have been spared, has
suggested that other considerations also influenced American leaders: relations with Soviet Russia,
emotional revenge, momentum, and perhaps racism. Scholars today are also debating why several
alternatives to military use of the bomb were not tried.
In early May 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson appointed an Interim Committee, with himself as
chairman, to advise on atomic energy and the uranium bombs the Manhattan Engineering District project
was about to produce. In the committee's meeting of May 31, 1945, the decision was made to keep the
bomb project a secret from the Russians and to use the atomic bomb against Japan. On June 11, 1945, a
group of atomic scientists in Chicago, headed by Jerome Franck, futilely petitioned Stimson for a noncombat demonstration of the bomb in order to improve the chances for postwar international control of
atomic weapons. The recommendations of the Interim Committee and the Franck Committee are reprinted
here.
Report of the Interim Committee on Military Use of the Atomic Bomb, May 1945 (1)
Secretary Stimson explained that the Interim Committee had been appointed by him, with the approval of
the President, to make recommendations on temporary war-time controls, public announcement, legislation
and post-war organization. . . . He expressed the hope that the [four] scientists would feel completely free
to express their views on any phase of the subject.
The Secretary explained that General Marshall shared responsibility with him for making recommendations
to the President on this project with particular reference to its military aspects; therefore, it was considered
highly desirable that General Marshall be present at this meeting to secure at first hand the views of the
scientists.
The Secretary expressed the view, a view shared by General Marshall, that this project should not be
considered simply in terms of military weapons, but as a new relationship of man to the universe. This
discovery might be compared to the discoveries of the Copernican theory and of the laws of gravity, but far
more important than these in its effect on the lives of men. While the advances in the field to date had been
fostered by the needs of war, it was important to realize that the implications of the project went far beyond
the needs of the present war. It must be controlled if possible to make it an assurance of future peace rather
than a menace to civilization.
The Secretary suggested that he hoped to have the following questions discussed during the course of the
meeting:
Future military weapons
Future international competition
Future research
Future controls
Future developments, particularly non-military.
At this point General Marshall discussed at some length the story of charges and counter-charges that have
been typical of our relations with the Russians, pointing out that most of these allegations have proven
unfounded. The seemingly uncooperative attitude of Russia in military matters stemmed from the necessity
of maintaining security. He said that he had accepted this reason for their attitude in his dealings with the
Russians and had acted accordingly. As to the post-war situation and in matters other than purely military,
he felt that he was in no position to express a view. With regard to this field he was inclined to favor the
building up of a combination among like minded powers, thereby forcing Russia to fall in line by the very
force of this coalition. General Marshall was certain that we need have no fear that the Russians, if they had
knowledge of our project, would disclose this information to the Japanese. He raised the question whether
it might be desirable to invite two prominent Russian scientists to witness the test.
Mr. Byrnes expressed a fear that if information were given to the Russians, even in general terms, Stalin
would ask to be brought into the partnership. He felt this to be particularly likely in view of our
commitments and pledges of cooperation with the British. In this connection Dr. Bush pointed out that even
the British do not have any of our blue prints on plants. Mr. Byrnes expressed the view, which was
generally agreed to by all present, that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as
possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every
effort to better our political relations with Russia.
It was pointed out that one atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different from the effect caused
by any Air Corps strike of present dimensions. However, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the visual effect of
an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which
would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to
life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.
After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary
expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any
warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound
psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant the
Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of
workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses.
There was some discussion of the desirability of attempting several strikes at the same time. Dr.
Oppenheimer's judgment was that several strikes would be feasible. General Groves, however, expressed
doubt about this proposal and pointed out the following objections: (1) We would lose the advantage of
gaining additional knowledge concerning the weapon at each successive bombing; (2) such a program
would require a rush job on the part of those assembling the bombs and might, therefore, be ineffective; (3)
the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular Air Force bombing program.
Report of the Franck Committee on the Social and Political Implications of a Demonstration of the
Atomic Bomb (For a Non-Combat Demonstration), June, 1945 (2)
The way in which the nuclear weapons, now secretly developed in this country, will first be revealed to the
world appears of great, perhaps fateful importance.
One possible way--which may particularly appeal to those who consider the nuclear bombs primarily as a
secret weapon developed to help win the present war--is to use it without warning on an appropriately
selected object in Japan. It is doubtful whether the first available bombs, of comparatively low efficiency
and small size, will be sufficient to break the will or ability of Japan to resist, especially given the fact that
the major cities like Tôkyô, Nagoya, Osaka and Kôbe already will largely be reduced to ashes by the
slower process of ordinary aerial bombing. Certain and perhaps important tactical results undoubtedly can
be achieved, but we nevertheless think that the question of the use of the very first available atomic bombs
in the Japanese war should be weighed very carefully, not only by military authority, but by the highest
political leadership of this country. If we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear
warfare as the paramount objective and believe that it can be achieved, this kind of introduction of atomic
weapons to the world may easily destroy all our chances of success. Russia, and even allied countries
which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, will be deeply shocked. It
will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and
suddenly releasing a weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive,
is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement. We
have large accumulations of poison gas, but do not use them, and recent polls have shown that public
opinion in this country would disapprove of such a use even if it would accelerate the winning of the Far
Eastern war. It is true, that some irrational element in mass psychology makes gas poisoning more revolting
than blasting by explosives, even though gas warfare is in no way more "inhuman" than the war of bombs
and bullets. Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that the American public opinion, if it could be enlightened
as to the effect of atomic explosives, would support the first introduction by our own country of such an
indiscriminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian life.
Thus, from the "optimistic" point of view--looking forward to an international agreement on prevention of
nuclear warfare--the military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden use of
atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and
repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world, and perhaps dividing even the public opinion at home.
From this point of view a demonstration of the new weapon may best be made before the eyes of
representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the
achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America would be able to say to the world,
"You see what weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce its use in the future and to join
other nations in working out adequate supervision of the use of this nuclear weapon."
This may sound fantastic, but then in nuclear weapons we have something entirely new in the order of
magnitude of destructive power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage which its possession
gives us, we must use new and imaginative methods. After such a demonstration the weapon could be used
against Japan if a sanction of the United Nations (and of the public opinion at home) could be obtained,
perhaps after a preliminary ultimatum to Japan to surrender or at least to evacuate a certain region as an
alternative to the total destruction of this target.
It must be stressed that if one takes a pessimistic point of view and discounts the possibilities of an
effective international control of nuclear weapons, then the advisability of an early use of nuclear bombs
against Japan becomes even more doubtful--quite independently of any humanitarian considerations. If no
international agreement is concluded immediately after the first demonstration, this will mean a flying start
of an unlimited armaments race. If this race is inevitable, we have all reason to delay its beginning as long
as possible in order to increase our head start still further. . . . The benefit to the nation, and the saving of
American lives in the future, achieved by renouncing an early demonstration of nuclear bombs and letting
the other nations come into the race only reluctantly, on the basis of guess work and without definite
knowledge that the "thing does work," may far outweigh the advantages to be gained by the immediate use
of the first and comparatively inefficient bombs in the war against Japan. At the least, pros and cons of this
use must be carefully weighed by the supreme political and military leader ship of the country, and the
decision should not be left to considerations, merely, of military tactics.
One may point out that scientists themselves have initiated the development of this "secret weapon" and it
is therefore strange that they should be reluctant to try it out on the enemy as soon as it is available. The
answer to this question was given above--the compelling reason for creating this weapon with such speed
was our fear that Germany had the technical skill necessary to develop such a weapon without any moral
restraints regarding its use.
Another argument which could be quoted in favor of using atomic bombs as soon as they are available is
that so much taxpayers money has been invested in those projects that the Congress and the American
public will require a return for their money. The above-mentioned attitude of the American public opinion
in the question of the use of poison gas against Japan shows that one can expect, it to understand that a
weapon can sometimes be made ready only for use in extreme emergency; and as soon as the potentialities
of nuclear weapons will be revealed to the American people, one can be certain that it will support all
attempts to make the use of such weapons impossible.
(1) and (2) From Major Problems in American Foreign Policy by Thomas G. Paterson. Copyright c 1978 by
D.C. Heath and Company. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
The Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945 (3)
Proclamation Defining the Terms for the Japanese Surrender July 26, 1945
(1) WE--THE PRESIDENT of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic
of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen,
have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many
times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon
Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to
prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the
world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on
Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste
to the lands, the industry, and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our
military power backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese
armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed
militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of
annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no
delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and
misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace,
security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power
is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the
achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the
islands of Honshû, Hokkaidô, Kyûshû, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their
homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well
as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the
exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end,
access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual participation in world
trade relations shall be permitted.
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have
been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the
Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese
armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The
alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
(3) This and other documents such as the Japanese surrender offer and the Imperial rescripts can be found
in the appendices of Robert J. C. Buton Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1954.)
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The Yalta Conference
See Also : Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by
Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United
States of America Command; February 11, 1945
February, 1945
Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta)
Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo
Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:
PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE
The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place
from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:
I. WORLD ORGANIZATION
It was decided:
1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be
summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of
America.
2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:
(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1
March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight
Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the
21st
Century
2000 -
delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to
admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White
Russia.
3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the
Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at
the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.
4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in
the United Nations conference should be as follows:
"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the
Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the
Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the
Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945,
or soon thereafter , at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a charter
for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a
basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international
organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks
conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section
C of Chapter VI:
C. Voting
"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members.
"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided
that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph
1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
"In the event that the Government of -------- desires in advance of the conference to
present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States
of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating
Governments."
Territorial trusteeship:
It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security
Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of
territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial
trusteeship will only apply to
(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war;
(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United
Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for
subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be place
under trusteeship.
[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]
II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE
The following declaration has been approved:
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other
in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They
jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in
liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated
from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of
Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must
be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges
of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a
principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government
under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those
peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the
three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former
Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,
(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic
elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment
through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities
or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under
consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated
state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately
consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in
this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our
pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation
with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security,
freedom and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional
Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure
suggested.
[End first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]
III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended
to read as follows:
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such
authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as
they deem requisite for future peace and security."
The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a
committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This
body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.
IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be
allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its
extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French
Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become
a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
V. REPARATION
The following protocol has been approved:
Protocol
On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on
the Question of the German Reparations in Kind
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the
course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries
which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have
organized victory over the enemy.
2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:
(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of
organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of
Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships,
rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other
enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the
purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.
(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
(c) Use of German labor.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of
reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will
consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from
the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of
it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American
delegations agreed as follows:
"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for
discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in
accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and
that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation
question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be
mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation
commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.
VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the
subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of
the conference.
[Begin second section published Feb. 13, 1945.]
VII. POLAND
The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red
Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more
broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The
Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from
Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity.
"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in
the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other
Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization
of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the
basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi
parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.
"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in
conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic
relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations
with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by
whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow
the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of
Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north
and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of
the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."
VIII. YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:
(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new
government formed on the basis of the agreement.
(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:
(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to
include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by
collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament
and
(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation
(AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this
statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.
IX. ITALO-YOGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER
Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and
Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.
X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the
desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a
state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state.
Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that
this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American
Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov
agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following
subjects:
(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.
XII. IRAN
Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was
agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.
[Begin third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]
XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES
The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation
between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably
about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held
in London.
[End third section published Feb. 13, 1945.]
XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in
London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government
would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments.
The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.
The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the
Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945.
E. R. Stettinius Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden
AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN
The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America
and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered
and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on
the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be
preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904
shall be restored, viz.:
(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be
returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent
interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port
Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide
an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint SovietChinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet
Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and
railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The
President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal
Stalin.
The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union
shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National
Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in
order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China
from the Japanese yoke.
Joseph Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill
February 11, 1945.
Source:
A Decade of American Foriegn Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49
Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
By the Staff of the Committe and the Department of State.
Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1950
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2000 -
World War II: Japanese Home Front--Ketsugo (April
1945)
The Emperor and the
Japanese military were
determined to resist.
Emperor Hirohito approced
the strategy of Ketsugo
(January 1945). This was
part of the overall strategy of
bleeding the Americans to
force a negotiated peace.
Ketsugo meant self defense,
As a national defense policy
it meant preparing civilans to
fight an American invasion.
Figure 1.--Here we see Japanese school girls being
trained in self defense. Note the sharpened bamboo
It was a refinement of
poles. And Japanese Army officers are observing the
Japan's Shosango victory
demonstration. Beginning in the 1930s, the Japanese
plan which envisioned
military began play an increading role in the schools.
defending the home islands
to the last man. The plan
was to prepare the Japanese people psychologically to fight the Americans and die
defending their homeland. There was to be no surrender, even civilians were not to
surrender. Some Japanese sources claim that Japan was defeated and ready to
surrender. Such claims are starkly disproved by what happened to civilians on
Okinawa. The military there actively prevented civilians from surrendering and
incouraged civilians to kill themselves. Ketsugo went a step further. It involved
training civilians to actively resist an American invasion. The plan included training
children, boys as well as girls, to fight with improvised weapons. The military began
implementing the strategy of Ketsugo (April 1945). Soldiers were assigned to
schools to train even primary-level children in the use of weapons like bamboo
spears. I am not sure how widespread this effort was and how intensive the training.
I have noted Japanese adults describing such traing they received in schools.
Japanese officials warned that the Americans would kill men who surrendered
instantly and rape women. There was no evidence forthis belief other than this was
how the Imperial Japanese Army behaved in well-publicized Chinese incidents. Not
only were Japanese soldiers not to surrender, but neither would civilians. Others
Japanese sources have reported their was no serious training in their schools. A
peace faction led by Foreign Minister Togo complained that Ketsugo would destroy
the nation. General Anami retorted. "Those who can not fulfill their resonsibilities to
the Emperor should commit hari-kiri. " He was intent that the entire nation should
resist the Americans to the death.
School Drill
Drill was a very common part of European and American education in the 129th
and early-20th century. This primarily consisted of marching and learming marching
moves. It waa adopted primarily because it taught discipline. It was mote common
for boys than girls. Japan after the Meiji Resoration established a national
educational systen for the first time and used European models for their new system.
The physical educational (PE) program as designed by the new Ministry of
Education (MoE) at first involved light gymnastics, but over time, drill and evebtually
overt military training became part of the phyical education system. The first PE
program designed by the MoE was light gymnastics (1878). The primary purpose of
the PE program was to promote health. The Moe made PE a required subject and
adopted military gymnastics (1886). The MoE reorganized the PE and adopted
military drill (early 20th century). The MoE gradually turned to military personnel for
PE instructors. During the Taisho era (1912-26) about 50 percent of school PE
teachers were military personnel. Schools began assigning military officers
secondary and teriiary schools to teach military drill. This included both marching
and military exercises. The military began to see school PE as preparing students for
subsequent military training. [Okuma] At the end of World War II this was extended
to preparing children to participate in resisting an anticipated American invasion-Ketsugo.
Approval
The Emperor and the Japanese military were determined to resist. Emperor
Hirohito approved the strategy of Ketsugo (January 20, 1945).
Strategy
This was part of the overall strategy of bleeding the Americans to force a
negotiated peace. Ketsugo meant self defense, As a national defense policy it meant
preparing civilans to fight an American invasion. It was a refinement of Japan's
Shosango victory plan which envisioned defending the home islands to the last man.
The plan was to prepare the Japanese people psychologically to fight the Americans
and die defending their homeland. There was to be no surrender, even civilians were
not to surrender.
Denials
Some Japanese sources claim that Japan was defeated and ready to surrender.
This tends to comne from those who want to pasint Japan as a victim of World War
II. Such claims are starkly disproved by what happened to civilians on Okinawa. The
military there actively prevented civilians from surrendering and incouraged civilians
to kill themselves.
Civilian Role
Ketsugo went a step further. It involved training civilians to actively resist an
American invasion. The plan included training children, boys as well as girls, to fight
with improvised weapons. The military began implementing the strategy of Ketsugo
(April 1945). Soldiers were assigned to schools to train even primary-level children in
the use of weapons like bamboo spears. Boys were trained to strap on satchel
charges and chasrge a tank, roll under it and set off the charge. I am not sure how
widespread this effort was and how intensive the training. I have noted Japanese
adults describing such traing they received in schools. Not only were Japanese
soldiers not to surrender, but neither would civilians. Others Japanese sources have
reported their was no serious training in their schools.
Propaganda
Japanese officials warned that the Americans would kill men who surrendered
instantly and rape women. There was no evidence forthis belief other than this was
how the Imperial Japanese Army behaved in well-publicized Chinese incidents.
Peace Faction
A peace faction led by Foreign Minister Togo complained that Ketsugo would
destroy the nation. General Anami retorted. "Those who can not fulfill their
resonsibilities to the Emperor should commit hari-kiri." He was intent that the entire
nation should resist the Americans to the death.
OPERATION KETSU-GO
The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly.
- Japanese slogan in the summer of
1945.
Japan was finished as a warmaking nation, in spite of its four million men still
under arms. But...Japan was not going to quit. Despite the fact that she was
militarily finished, Japan's leaders were going to fight right on. To not lose "face"
was more important than hundreds and hundreds of thousands of lives. And the
people concurred, in silence, without protest. To continue was no longer a
question of Japanese military thinking, it was an aspect of Japanese culture and
psychology.
- James Jones, WWII
Background: While Japan no longer had a realistic prospect of winning the war, Japan's
leaders believed they could make the cost of conquering Japan too high for the Allies to
accept, leading to some sort of armistice rather than total defeat. The Japanese plan for
defeating the invasion was called OPERATION KETSUGŌ (決号作戦, Ketsugō;
"Operation Codename Decision"). The Japanese had secretly constructed an
underground headquarters which could be used in the event of Allied invasion to shelter
the Emperor and Imperial General staff, and began preparing for the American invasion.
Japanese Homeland Defense Strategy
The strategy for Ketsu-Go was outlined in an 8 April 1945 Army Directive. It stated that
the Imperial Army would endeavor to crush the Americans while the invasion force was
still at sea. They planned to deliver a decisive blow against the American naval force by
initially destroying as many carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack forces of the
Air Force and Navy. When the amphibious force approached within range of the
homeland airbases, the entire air combat strength would be employed in continual night
and day assaults against these ships. In conducting the air operations, the emphasis would
be on the disruption of the American landing plans. The principal targets were to be the
troop and equipment transports. Those American forces which succeeded in landing
would be swiftly attacked by the Imperial Army in order to seek the decisive victory. The
principal objective of the land operation was the destruction of the American landing
force on the beach.
Ketsu-Go operation was designed as an all-out joint defense effort to be conducted by the
entire strengths of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The basic plan for the operation called
for the Navy to defend the coasts by attacking the invasion fleets with its combined
surface, submarine, and air forces. The Air General Army would cooperate closely with
the Navy in locating the American transports and destroying them at sea. Should the
invasion force succeed in making a landing, the Area Army concerned would assume
command of all naval ground forces in its area and would exercise operational control of
air forces in support of ground operations.
If the battle at the beach showed no prospect of a successful ending, then the battle would
inevitably shift to inland warfare; hence, interior resistance would be planned. Guard
units and Civilian Defense Corps personnel, with elements of field forces acting as a
nucleus, would be employed as interior resistance troops. Their mission would be to
attrite the Americans through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disturbance of
supply areas, and blockading of supplies when enemy landing forces advanced inland. It
is interesting to note that the Japanese normally exercised little inter-service coordination
throughout the war. Now when the homeland was threatened, the Japanese finally
stressed inter-service coordination and unity of command.
Operational preparations for Ketsu-Go were conducted in three phases. The first phase,
during which defensive preparations and troop unit organization was completed,
continued through July 1945. The second phase began in August and was intended to
continue through September, during which training was to be conducted and all defenses
improved. The third phase would see the completion of troop training and deployment, as
well as the construction of all defense positions, would be completed during October.
[The second and third phases were never completed because of the end of the war. Thus,
if implemented, X-Day would have occurred just as Japanese defense plans had been
completed. By July, Japanese officers were assessing that the invasion would occur in
October or November 1945 due to the summer typhoon season.]
The intent of Ketsu-Go was to inflict tremendous casualties on the American forces,
thereby undermining the American people's will to continue the fight for Japan's
unconditional surrender. This intent is clear in a boastful comment made by an Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) army staff officer in July 1945:
We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize
every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash
one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will
also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special
weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to
sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties
upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America
will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with
comparatively advantageous conditions.
In the summer of 1945 Japanese strategists identified the will of the American people as
the US strategic center of gravity and a critical vulnerability as the infliction of high
casualties.
Defense of Kyushu
The Japanese were extremely accurate as to predicting the location of the American
landing zones. The Sixteenth Area Army would be utilized as an assault group to be
rushed to the area of the main American effort. Their mission would be to annihilate the
American forces as soon after the initial landings as possible. The defensive plan called
for a major counterattack to be delivered within two weeks of the initial American
landings. As stated by a Japanese officer, the object of the defense was "to frustrate the
enemy's landing plans with a counterattack like an electric shock, and at the proper
moment to annihilate the enemy by close-range fire, by throwing hand grenades, and by
hand-to-hand combat."
The defense positions in Kyushu were built in accordance with the precepts laid down in
The Three Basic Principles on How to Fight Americans, which had been developed as a
result of lessons learned in south Pacific combat. In brief, these principles were:
- Positions should be constructed beyond effective range of enemy naval
bombardment.
- Cave type positions should be constructed for protection against air raids and
naval bombardment.
- Inaccessible high ground should be selected as protection against flame
throwing tanks.
Air operations against American landings on Kyushu were to be the responsibility of the
5th Naval Air Fleet and 6th Air Army, both under the control of the Air General Army.
Planes were to be released in waves of 300-400, at the rate of one wave per hour, against
the invasion fleet. Sufficient fuel had been stored for this use, but only about 8,000 pilots
were available. Although the pilots were poorly trained and no match against experienced
American pilots, they were capable enough to carry out suicide attacks against ships. At
the end of the war, Japan had approximately 12,725 planes. The Army had 5,651 and the
Navy had 7,074 aircraft of all types. While many of these were not considered combat
planes, almost all were converted into kamikaze planes. The Japanese were planning to
train enough pilots to use all of the aircraft that were capable of flying.
Naval operations against the invasion fleet would be conducted in two phases. The first
phase would consist of attriting the American fleet as it approached the home islands.
The remaining 38 Japanese fleet submarines would attempt to attrite as many transports
as possible. They were to serve as launch platforms for manned suicide torpedoes called
"Kaitens". Although the Kaitens had not proved too successful in operations on the open
ocean, the Japanese hoped that they would be effective in the restricted waters around the
home islands. The five-man midget submarines, known as "Koryu," would also be
employed with either two torpedoes or an explosive charge for use in a suicide role. The
Navy planned to have 540 Koryu in service by the time of the invasion. A more advanced
midget submarine, the "Kairyu," was a two man craft armed with either two torpedoes or
an explosive charge. Approximately 740 Kairyu were planned by the fall of 1945.
As the invasion fleet reached the landing areas, the second phase would commence. The
19 surviving Japanese destroyers would attempt to attack the American transports at the
invasion beaches. Suicide attack boats, called "Shinyo," carrying 550 pounds of
explosives in their bows, would strike from hiding places along the shore. Closer to
shore, there would be three rows of divers, or “Fukuryu” arrayed so that they were about
60 feet apart. Underwater lairs for the Fukuryu were to be made of reinforced concrete
with steel doors. As many as 18 divers could be stationed in each underwater "foxhole."
Clad in a diving suit and breathing from oxygen tanks, a Fukuryu carried an explosive
charge, which was mounted on a stick with a contact fuse. He was to swim up to landing
craft and detonate the charge. The Navy had hoped for 4,000 men to be trained and
equipped for this suicide force by October.
Ground operations against the American landings called for the ground forces to quickly
determine the area of the invasion and concentrate in this area as many troops as possible
before the invasion began.
Medium and heavy artillery were to cover the landing craft approaches, the beaches, and
plains areas surrounding the beaches.
Commanders were told to be ready to swiftly divert the necessary troops and military
supplies to other sectors at any time. The ground forces were to be concentrated in
planned operational areas. Movement of ground forces would be primarily at night by
foot, and the movement of war supplies would be by rail or water as the situation
permitted. Troop movements were to be executed even under American air attacks.
Coastal and Inland Defenses / Fortifications
The Japanese had extensive experience with how the Americans conducted amphibious
assaults in the Pacific. In late 1944, the Japanese also sent a team of officers to debrief
the Germans on their defenses at Normandy and how the Allies assaulted to gain a
foothold in Europe. From these experiences the Japanese coastal defenses on Kyushu
were divided into three zones.
1. Beach Positions - These positions were to be used mainly in beach fighting and for
firing against landing craft. They were to be heavily fortified and concealed for protection
against naval gunfire. Coastal fortifications were constructed in cave type shelters to
withstand intense bombings and bombardments, especially from naval gunfire. They
were to have the ability to conduct close range actions and withstand attacks from flamethrowers, explosives, and gas. Their purpose was to defeat any landing attempt.
2. Foreground Zone - If the beach positions could not prevent a landing, then the attack
was to be delayed in this zone with localized counterattacks and raids. Obstacles, hidden
positions, timed land mines, and assault tunnels utilizing natural terrain features were
prepared to slow the attack and to fight within the enemy lines to limit the effectiveness
of naval gunfire and close air support.
3. Main Zone of Resistance - This zone was the area where the main resistance was to be
established. Battalions and larger units would occupy key terrain positions which were
independent of each other. These installations were constructed as underground fortresses
capable of coping with close range actions in which flame-throwers, explosives, and gas
would be used. This resistance zone was intended to stop the American advance and set
up the major counterattack that was to decisively defeat the attack. The Japanese paid
special attention to camouflage of their positions even during construction. Defensive
positions were to be concealed from air, land, and sea observation. Within all three zones,
dummy positions were constructed for deception. Cave installations were to be heavily
reinforced and capable of withstanding a direct hit by naval gunfire. Pillboxes, assault
positions, sniper positions, and obstacles were to be organized for close quarter combat
and mutually supporting. Each position was to store water, ammunition, fuel, antitank
weapons, food, salt, vitamin pills, and medical supplies.
Inland fortifications were also constructed to provide cover and concealment for heavy
equipment such as tanks, motor vehicles and artillery as well as bomb proof storage of
ammunition and fuel. As on many islands throughout the Pacific, these storage shelters
were impervious to American air and naval bombardment.
The defensive plan called for the use of the Civilian Volunteer Corps, a mobilization not
of volunteers but of all boys and men 15 to 60 and all girls and women 17 to 40, except
for those exempted as unfit. They were trained with hand grenades, swords, sickles,
knives, fire hooks, and bamboo spears. These civilians, led by regular forces, were to
make extensive use of night infiltration patrols armed with light weapons and
demolitions. Also, the Japanese had not prepared, and did not intend to prepare, any plan
for the evacuation of civilians or for the declaration of open cities. The southern third of
Kyushu had a population of 2,400,000 within the 3,500 square miles included in the
Prefectures of Kagoshima and Miyazaki. The defensive plan was to actively defend the
few selected beach areas at the beach, and then to mass reserves for an all-out
counterattack if the invasion forces succeeded in winning a beachhead.
The Japanese were determined to fight the final and decisive battle on Kyushu. At
whatever the cost, Japanese military leaders were planning to repel any U.S. landing
attempt. The defense of the Japanese home islands centered on two primary operations:
the Army's fanatical defense of the beaches, and the employment of Kamikaze planes and
suicide boats against transports. The Japanese plans for suicide attacks were much more
extensive than anything the U.S. had yet experienced in the war. The Japanese special
suicide forces were seen as a "Divine Wind" which was to save their nation just as the
"Divine Wind" had driven the Mongol hordes back in the thirteenth century.
Citation:
"OPERATION KETSU-GO." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 09 Dec. 2010.
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap4.htm>.
BY BILL DIETRICH
Seattle Times staff reporter
Historians are still divided over whether it was necessary to drop the atomic
bomb on Japan to end World War II. Here is a summary of arguments on both sides:
Why the bomb was needed or justified:





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The Japanese had demonstrated near-fanatical resistance, fighting to almost the
last man on Pacific islands, committing mass suicide on Saipan and unleashing
kamikaze attacks at Okinawa. Fire bombing had killed 100,000 in Tokyo with no
discernible political effect. Only the atomic bomb could jolt Japan's leadership to
surrender.
With only two bombs ready (and a third on the way by late August 1945) it was
too risky to "waste" one in a demonstration over an unpopulated area.
An invasion of Japan would have caused casualties on both sides that could easily
have exceeded the toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The two targeted cities would have been firebombed anyway.
Immediate use of the bomb convinced the world of its horror and prevented future
use when nuclear stockpiles were far larger.
The bomb's use impressed the Soviet Union and halted the war quickly enough
that the USSR did not demand joint occupation of Japan.
Why the bomb was not needed, or unjustified:



Japan was ready to call it quits anyway. More than 60 of its cities had been
destroyed by conventional bombing, the home islands were being blockaded by
the American Navy, and the Soviet Union entered the war by attacking Japanese
troops in Manchuria.
American refusal to modify its "unconditional surrender" demand to allow the
Japanese to keep their emperor needlessly prolonged Japan's resistance.
A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's
leaders to quit without killing many people.
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


Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for word to
filter out of its devastation before bombing Nagasaki.
The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.
The two cities were of limited military value. Civilians outnumbered troops in
Hiroshima five or six to one.
Japanese lives were sacrificed simply for power politics between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union.
Conventional firebombing would have caused as much significant damage
without making the U.S. the first nation to use nuclear weapons.
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