Download Synopsis: The Fall of the Third Reich

Synopsis: The Fall of the Third Reich
Question: Was it really the work of the Allies, or of Nazi Germany itself that caused its own demise?
Thesis:
The Third Reich, because of flawed foreign policy, resistance within Nazi-occupied Europe, and dire
tactical blunders, was the architect of its own defeat in World War Two.
Counter-Arguments:
1. Allied numerical superiority in arms and resources overwhelmed the Germans.
2. The Allies won the war due to the efficiency of their Intelligence unit at cracking codes.
3. The Allies won through sheer superiority of their air force over the Luftwaffe.
Argument 1: Germany’s unfavourable system of allies and bad diplomatic systems weakened the Third Reich.
There is little evidence of cooperation among the Tripartite powers.
 Among the Tripartite powers, “There were no institutions comparable to the British-American Combined Chiefs of
Staff and the other joint boards and committees… [nor was there] evidence to suggest that either Axis partner had
any interest in such coordination.”1
 “In the political field, there was very little willingness to work together… On the contrary, both Hitler and Mussolini
far preferred to direct the respective war efforts of their countries entirely independent of each other.” 2
Germany’s ally, Italy, out of sheer spite, deceived Hitler, with severe consequences on Germany.

“Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find
out from the newspapers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be re-established.”3
o Because Hitler had failed to tell Mussolini of his plans to occupy Romania, Italy, angered, invaded Greece in
retaliation to Germany’s deception. Result: Mussolini was beaten back by Greek and Allied forces. 4
 Mussolini’s miscalculation meant that British troops were positioned in Crete. This threatened Germany’s oilfields
in Romania, so Hitler had no choice but to redirect his troops and step in to recover the problem.
 “Hitler’s steady success in building up a diplomatic empire in South-eastern Europe was halted by Mussolini.” 5 
ironically, it was not the Allies that hampered Germany’s success, but Germany’s own ally, Italy.
America was isolationist at the time. Germany’s decision to declare war on the United States needlessly drew the world’s
largest economy & greatest industrial power into the war.
 The United States’ declaration of war on Japan did not apply to Germany. Germany was not obligated to aid Japan
either, because their alliance promised military aid only if attacked. Since Japan was the aggressor, Germany did not
need to involve itself in the conflict. 6
 “[Hitler’s] primary goal was still to persuade Japan to attack Britain in East Asia and thus indirectly to deter
America from intervention in Europe.”7  so why draw attention back to the European front by declaring war?
 Germany that stretched itself thin by taking on multiple enemies at once. With ongoing struggles in the West, in the
East, in Africa, and now with the United States, the Third Reich made it so that it was impossible to win.
Argument 2: The Resistance within Nazi-occupied Europe crippled Germany, making it more vulnerable to
Allied attack.
Sabotage within the Third Reich meant that Nazi Germany in addition to the fighting the war, it also had to fight
crippling Resistance armies within its own borders.
 Nazi Germany fought underground armies from twelve different European countries throughout the war. Forces
like the Albanian, Polish, Belgian, French, and most notably the Yugoslavs, waged continuous damaging guerrilla
campaigns against Nazi occupation from 1940 to the end of the war.8
The success of the Allied deception on D-Day was largely owed to the French Resistance.
 “Before June 1944, the French resistance had become an effective army operating inside France.”9  consistently
sabotaged bridges, communications, transport, power stations, and supplies.
 August 1943: “Railway saboteurs set dynamite sticks under tracks in several busy sectors: Marseille, Saint-Amour,
and Mâcon. They succeeded in blowing up ten long trains, including ammunition cars and troop transport cars,
inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans… not a day went by without some sabotage of German transports.” 10
1
Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 744.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 747.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. (London: Bison Books Ltd.,1960.) 815.
4
Alex Hook, Defining Moments: World War II. (United Kingdom: Grange Books, 2005) 38.
5
Norman Rich. Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1992) 195
6
Great Blunders of WW II. Volume 1, The German blunder at Dunkirk Hitler's declaration of war on the U.S. Videocassette. History Channel. World War II, 2000. 52 min.
7
Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler in History. (London: University Press of New England, 1984.) 66-67.
8
“European Resistance Movements of World War II”. UK MSN Encarta. 2007. 14 Dec. 2007. <http://uk.encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=1481570724>
9
“Resistance Movement”. Hutchinson Encyclopedia. 2004. 4 Oct. 2007. <http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/resistance+movement>
10
David Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1980) 319
2
3

The Resistance also destroyed a complex of thirty-eight cable lines, severing almost all German army
communications from French units to the headquarters in Berlin. 11  with vital forms of communication disabled
before the invasion, it was highly difficult for the Third Reich to have anticipated the attack.
America’s most important spy, Fritz Kolbe, was not American. He was a German silently opposing the Nazi regime.
 “The ideal spy had perhaps just been unearthed in Berlin: No one could be more useful than a well-informed
German official, close to the centre of power and decision making, and inclined to transmit his knowledge on a
regular basis… a German agent working at the German Foreign Ministry.” 12
 Important contributions  exposed German spies, explained the German method of “one-time pad” coding, He also
gave details of Germany’s new secret V-1 & V-2 rocket programs and engine manufacture site of the Messerschmitt
Me 262 jet fighter, revealed German expectations of the site of the D-Day landings.13
There were also countless assassination attempts that came dangerously close to succeeding. These were orchestrated by
some of Hitler’s officials. How would he be able to win the war if his own officers actively seek his destruction, and
can’t be trusted? 14
Argument 3: Critical tactical errors and misguided military decisions allowed the Allies to gain the upper-hand
in World War Two, ultimately costing Germany the war.
Germany missed the perfect opportunity to destroy over 400 000 Allied troops and to crush Britain and Dunkirk.
 Germany’s initial Western offensive was overwhelmingly successful. The only way to save Britain from military
disaster was to evacuate at the French port of Dunkirk. 15 German troops were much closer to Dunkirk than the
Allies, and could have easily annihilated 400 000 Allied troops by taking the port.
 Hitler mysteriously ordered the divisions to halt, allowing Britain the time to evacuate 338 000 soldiers.16 A British
defeat at Dunkirk would have been catastrophic for the Allies. Had Nazi Germany removed Britain as an opponent,
any threats from Allied numbers, intelligence, or air force would have been eradicated.
Hitler delayed Operation Barbarossa (the plan to invade Russia) for the sake of taking revenge on Yugoslavia’s revolt
against Prince Paul. This put the operation dangerously close to the Russian winter.
 Hitler saw the rebellion as a great insult, and decided Yugoslavia “must be regarded as an enemy and beaten down
as soon as possible.”17  revenge was worth more than avoiding the risk of fighting during the Russian winter?
Failing to learn from the example set by Napoleon slightly more than a century earlier, the Nazis were severely crippled
by the extreme weather, which both handicapped Germany in the area of supplies and the soldiers’ morale.
 Germany’s goal was to seize one million square miles from the Soviet Union. Up until this point, the entire Western
campaign had been fought only on 50 000 square miles. 18 With the date of attack set back to June 22, completing
the operation before winter was unrealistic.
 “Win or lose, the Army and the Luftwaffe were bound to be standing guard in Russia throughout the winter of
1941/42 and would need clothing warmer than summer uniforms in 30° of frost, even if engaged only in garrison
duties.”19  Even the error of assuming the campaign would be won before winter did not justify not providing
winter clothing and vehicle protection against extreme weather. In that sense, German’s problem was self-induced.
Germany antagonized potentially friendly sympathetic Russian subjects, resulting in more needless enemies.
 “The people … would have joined in a crusade in collaboration with the Germans in order to win their independence
from the oppressive Russians. Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, White Russians, Ukrainians, and many thousands of
Poles, who welcomed the Germans as liberators, would have helped if only Hitler and the Nazi party have not been
wedded to racial doctrines which placed the Jewish and Slavic peoples into the category of vermin, to be
antagonized by brutal treatment, and later by extermination policies.”20
Germany’s bad decisions destroyed its 6th army during the Battle of Stalingrad.
 Germany further weakened its army by dividing its forces between Stalingrad & the Caucasus before the attack. 21
 When faced with defeat, Hitler refused to retreat, opting instead to resupply his troops with the Luftwaffe.
o “Paulus radioed that they would need a minimum of 750 tons of supplies a day flown in.” 22 Realistically,
only 350 tons could be delivered.
 German casualties: 740 000; 110 000 taken as prisoners of war, with only 6000 ever returning to Germany. 23
11
David Schoenbrun, Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1980) 319
Lucas Delattre, A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich. (Paris: Éditions Denoël, 2005) 4
Lucas Delattre, A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich. (Paris: Éditions Denoël, 2005) 100, 134, 140
14
Ronald Lewin, Hitler’s Mistakes. (London: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1984) 28
15
Bevin Alexander, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000) 31.
16
“Dunkirk: Rescued From Defeat”. BBC News. 10 Dec. 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2000/dunkirk_remembered/default.stm>.
17
Alex Hook, Defining Moments: World War II. (United Kingdom: Grange Books, 2005) 48.
18
Bevin Alexander, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000) 83.
19
Macksey, Kenneth. Military Errors of World War Two. (Great Britain: Arms & Armour Press Ltd., 1987) 66.
20
Macksey, Kenneth. Military Errors of World War Two. (Great Britain: Arms & Armour Press Ltd., 1987) 63.
21
Bevin Alexander, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000) 145.
22
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. (London: Bison Books Ltd.,1994) 206.
23
Barry, Bill. "Stopped Cold at Stalingrad." World War II 21.9 (2007): 32.
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