Download Reading - "Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and War"

From “The Coming of the Second World War”….by H. G. Gelber First published 1967 by F.W. Cheshire Publishing PTY Ltd, Melbourne Read the following and answer these
questions which will be a focus of
discussion for the next lesson:
1. Name three reasons why the British were
wary of an alliance with Russia.
2. Name three reasons why the Russians
were wary of the Western democracies.
3. What other threat did Russia face, which
made Stalin even more reluctant to enter
into an alliance with Britain & France?
4. For what reasons did Russia finally opt
for an agreement with Germany (Nazi‐
Soviet Non‐aggression Pact) rather than
with Britain & France? 5. By signing the pact with Germany can
Russia be blamed for making it easier for
Germany to invade Poland? 6. How difficult do you think it would be for
Britain & France to help defend Poland?
(you will need to see a map of Europe) Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and War To seek an alliance with the Soviet Union, however, was easier said than done. For Chamberlain, the U.S.S.R. was in every way untrustworthy. The Russians were more concerned with world revolution than with the peaceful settlement of Europe. Not merely Russia's intentions but her political, economic and military power and organization were suspect. The rural collectivization drive at the beginning of the decade, and the crash programme of industrialization, were known to have been accompanied by conflict, repression and large­ scale suffering. During the middle 1930s a series of purges had swept through the upper ranks of the Soviet Communist Party, through industry, the civil service and the army. Life­long bolsheviks and the heads of the armed services had been condemned to death, many of them on obviously preposterous charges of treason. No observer could fail to conclude that the country had been gravely weakened. Equally important, there was no way for Russian help to become effective unless the Russians were allowed to march through Poland and this the Poles would not have. So long as they maintained that view, a British alliance with Poland was alternative and not complementary to an alliance with the Soviet Union. The French, and perhaps the British, too, thought that if one had to choose between Poland and Russia, Poland was the more valuable ally. There was also the uncomfortable suspicion that, just because of the great practical difficulties in the way of Soviet intervention, the Russians might be using the lure of an alliance as a way of involving the British and French in a war with Germany from which Russia could stay aloof. Towards the end of March 1939 Chamberlain wrote to his sister: ­ 1 ­ 'I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with setting everyone else by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated and suspected by many of the smaller states, notably by Poland, Roumania and Finland.' He was by no means alone in his opinion. At the end of May, a Foreign Office memorandum stated that: 'It has to be considered that the actual material assistance to be expected from the Soviet Union is not very great. It is true that the Soviet fleet might contain a proportion of German naval forces in the Baltic and that the Soviet Air Forces might be able to render some assistance. It is, however, unlikely that on land their military effort could be of very much effect, and even in the matter of furnishing munitions and war materials to Poland their assistance would be limited by the fact that the Russian transportation system is in an extremely backward state.' If the British were wary of the Russians, the Russians were equally wary of the Western democracies. Western capitalism was inherently untrustworthy and neither London nor Paris was likely to be sincere in any professions of friendship. Munich had been a clear attempt to turn Hitler eastwards. (There is in fact no evidence that the British leaders were as consistent and logical as this suspicion implies. But it is easy to see why the Russians should have thought so.) Moreover, the Western powers were militarily weak. Stalin would not believe that a stand by Britain, which had practically no army to send to the continent, could be anything other than bluff. It was quite possible that the British and French were dangling the bait of a Soviet­Western alliance so as to embroil the Soviet Union and Germany in war, at the end of
which Britain and France could step in and pick up the pieces. The situation was the more dangerous, from Stalin's point of view, in that he was having serious difficulties with Japan on his Far Eastern frontier. In mid­1939 there were major military clashes. The last thing the Government in Moscow could risk was a two­front war against Germany and Japan. The Russians therefore pursued a double policy: they talked of alliance with the Western powers, but were careful to keep the lines to Berlin open. There were highly publicized offers to the West. In March 1938, for example, the Russians suggested to Britain and France that they form a common front. Stalin probably meant it. Everything else being equal, it would have been sensible to make common cause with the French and British against the one power immediately capable of injuring him: Germany. But Chamberlain replied that Europe must not be divided into rival blocks. What he did not say, but probably meant, was that a block of inadequately armed powers would merely irritate Hitler without stopping him. After Munich, Stalin began to explore his alternatives more carefully. In a major speech just before mid­March, he made it clear that Russia had no intention of going to war for the benefit of the Western powers. At about the same time the Germans began to be interested in an understanding with Russia. A clash with Poland over the issue of the former German territories in western Poland and the formerly German port of Danzig made Soviet neutrality necessary. Hitler therefore began to take Stalin's various hints. Both sides put out feelers towards each other. In the months after Munich, the Russians were thus in effect conducting two parallel sets of talks. Comprehensive security proposals for Eastern Europe were discussed openly with the West. There was another set of talks, more tentative and in secret, with the Germans. The British and French conducted their Moscow negotiations without enthusiasm. They sent comparatively junior officials and refused to engage in the military talks which the Russians thought should be the precondition, not the consequence, of the political discussions. These discussions finally came to nothing. The major reasons, according to the British negotiator, Mr. William (later Lord) Strang, were twofold: '……were the Western Powers to be trusted? Would they not, having got the Soviet Union into war, leave her to bear the German onslaught alone? 'The British Government could not in honour disregard Polish (and Rumanian) susceptibilities. They had tried to find a way to bring the Soviet Union in without doing violence to Poland's interests. The question was: if Soviet troops entered Poland, even in Poland's defence, would they ever quit? This was a question which was never satis­ factorily answered; and upon it the whole operation ultimately broke down.' By the end of July the Germans, on the threshold of war, were pressing the Russians hard for an agreement. The choice for Stalin was now clear. If he made common cause with the British and French, he would gain nothing in Eastern Europe, he would lay himself open to attack by the Germans, possibly to a two­front war against Germany and Japan. He might also be left completely in the lurch. Agreement with Germany, on the other hand, would keep him out of a war between Germany and a Franco­Polish­British alliance. And Hitler might be so mauled as to remove the long­range danger to Russia altogether. Alternatively, Russia would herself have swallowed up large areas of Eastern Europe which, at worst, could be used to blunt a German attack on Russia if and when it eventually came. The balance of advantage must have seemed very clear. ­ 2 ­ In the second half of August the world was astounded when the German Foreign Minister went to Moscow to sign an agreement with Russia. The world Communist movement was thrown into confusion by this pact with the fascist arch­enemy. To the non­Communist world it seemed clear that the last barriers to war had gone. Stalin had sold the pass and betrayed peace. In fact it is not obvious that a failure to reach agreement with the Russians would have prevented Hitler from launching his attack upon Poland. Nor is it clear why Stalin should have considered himself bound to come to an agreement with the West. Nevertheless the belief strengthened anti­ Communism everywhere. Hitler still thought there was a chance of keeping Britain neutral when, on 1st September 1939, German troops stormed across the Polish border. And indeed, the first British reaction was to hesitate. Partly because Mussolini was making offers about mediation; partly because of the need to co­ordinate action with the French, who were also still placing some hopes on the Italians. These hopes came to nothing. A final British ultimatum to the Germans to stop operations against Poland was ignored. On 3rd September Britain, too, went to war.