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APD and Rational Choice OxfordHandbooksOnline APDandRationalChoice JefferyA.Jenkins TheOxfordHandbookofAmericanPoliticalDevelopment(Forthcoming) EditedbyRobertLieberman,SuzanneMettler,andRichardValelly OnlinePublicationDate: Sep 2014 Subject: PoliticalScience,U.S.Politics,PoliticalInstitutions DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697915.013.18 AbstractandKeywords RationalchoiceandAmericanpoliticaldevelopment(APD)bothemergedasresponsesto(perceived)limitations withthedominantbehavioraltradition.Whiletheircritiqueswerebasedonverydifferentresearchtraditions, similaritieswerealsopresent;inparticular,bothrationalchoiceandAPDapproachesfocusedontheimportanceof institutionsforstudyingpoliticaloutcomes.Overtime,rationalchoiceandAPDresearchhasconvergedtoa significantdegree,asscholarsinbothtraditionshaveincreasinglybeenexposedtodifferenttheoreticaland methodologicalperspectivesandthusbecomeconsumersofeachother’swork.Thischapterdocumentshowand whyrationalchoiceresearchhasmovedinanAPDdirection. Keywords:rationalchoice,historicalinstitutionalism,anti-behavioralism,equilibriuminstitutions,structures,rules,procedures,processes,defining Americanpoliticaldevelopment,methodologicalpluralism Itwasnotsolongagothat“rationalchoice(RC)”and“Americanpoliticaldevelopment(APD)”werealmostwholly separateresearchenterprisesinpoliticalscience.Interestingly,bothemergedasreactionstothedominant “behavioralparadigm”ofthemid-twentiethcentury.BothRCandAPDscholarsbelievedthatbehavioralresearch, whichgrewoutofthesociologicalandsocial-psychologicaltraditionsandassumedthatindividualsresponded reactivelytolargerforcesandpressuresaroundthem(andthusassumedthatpoliticaloutcomesweretheresultof socialroles,psychologicalcues,and/orgroup-basednorms),leftoutkeyingredientsthatwereimportantfor understandingthepoliticalworld.RCscholarsinthe1960sand1970sfocusedonindividualagencyasthemissing ingredientandrecastpoliticalactorsasproactive(orpurposive)agents,withdistinctpreferences,beliefsabout thepoliticalworld,andtheabilitytoactonthosepreferencesandbeliefstowardsomechosengoal(s).Bythelate 1970s,RCscholarsidentifiedanothermissingcomponentinbehavioralresearch—thelackofaroleforinstitutions intheproductionofpoliticaloutcomes.Thefocusoninstitutions(formal/informalstructuresandprocesses)would cometoplayaprivilegedroleinRCscholarshipand,inshortorder,transformthefield(Aldrich1994;Shepsle 1989).APDscholarsofthe1980sand1990s,ontheotherhand,focusedonadifferentsetof(perceived) limitationsinbehavioralresearch.Thefirstwasthelackofattentionpaidtohistory,andthewaysinwhichthe historicalpoliticalcontextorhistoricalpowerrelationshipsinsocietyaffectedoutcomes(andwereshapedby outcomes).Thesecond,whichwasrelated,wastheabsenceofanyreferenceto(orawarenessof)the“state”; APDscholarsbelievedthatpolicyprocessesandoutputswereinextricablylinkedtothemacro-political-economic environmentandtheconstellationofpoliticalandeconomicforcesinsociety(thatdevelopedandevolvedinan historicalway).Inthisway,APDscholarsalsopointedtoinstitutionsascrucialforafullerunderstandingofpolitics (Evans,Reuschemeyer,andSkocpol1985;OrrenandSkowronek2004). WhileRCandAPDscholarshadthesamebehavioralfoil,andseemedtoshareanaffinityforinstitutions,theydid notregularlyengageoneanother.Muchofthiswaslikelyduetomethodologicaldifferences(seeSwiftandBrady 1994).Rationalchoicescholarshipdescendedfromoperationsresearchandeconomics;researchwasdeductive innature,oftenemployingformal(mathematical)models,andhypotheseswerederivedandtestedwithlarge-N Page 1 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice datasetsusingadvancedstatisticaltechniques.APDscholarship,bycontrast,descendedfromhistory,sociology, anddemocratictheory;researchwasinductiveinnature,oftenemployingqualitativetechniqueslikethick descriptionandprocesstracinginanarrative-based,non-hypothesis-testingformat.Ineffect,RCandAPD scholarsspokedifferentlanguages.Andsincebothwerethenewkidsontheblock,andrelativeadolescentsas intellectualtraditions,theydidnotalwaysplaywellwiththoseunlikethem.Overtime,RCscholars,thelargerofthe twogroups,soughttoviewithbehavioralistsfordisciplinaryhegemony.Andwhiletheysucceededinvarious colonizationefforts,theycouldnotfullyvanquishtheirbehavioralfoes;today,RCandbehavioralscholars maintainaroughequalityinthehallsofresearchuniversitiesintheUnitedStates.APDscholars,whileconsiderably smallerinnumber,havegrownsteadilyovertime;moreover,manyAPDscholars(especiallythosefromthefirst generation)haveembracedtheiroutsiderpositionandhappilyviewedtheAPDenterpriseasanintellectual “insurgency”(seeBensel2003). Whileprideofintellectualtraditionisstillstrongtoday,andtensionsbetweenthecampsstillexist,1communication betweenRCandAPDscholarshasimprovedconsiderably.Someofthisisduetogenerationalreplacement,as youngerscholarsareoftenexposedtobothtypesofworkintheirgraduateschoolcurricula(whilealsoreceiving broadmethodologicaltraining).Someisalsoprobablyduetotopscholarsinbothtraditionspayinghomageto researchendeavorsintheothercamp(see,e.g.,OrrenandSkowronek2002;SwiftandBrady1994).Finally,and relatedtothepriortwopoints,theintellectual“culturewars,”forallintentsandpurposes,areover.The “pathologies”ofrationalchoicehavebeenairedanddisputed(GreenandShapiro1994;Friedman1996),the Perestroikamovementhascomeand(largely)gone(seeMonroe2005forthelastsetoforganizedthoughts),and aperiodofrelativecalmhasensued.Doeseveryoneagreethattherightlevelof“methodologicalpluralism”has beenachieved?Probablynot.Butthefeverishdaysofintellectualbattlesseemtobehindus(atleastfornow).In myview,andthisispurelyimpressionistic,thereseemstobemoretolerancetodaythanadecadeortwoago. Partofthattolerance,Ibelieve,hascomefromawillingnesstolearnacrossboundaries,whichhasfostereda healthyrespectforthosewithalternativeideasandapproaches.Acaseinpoint,inmyownexperience,hasbeen theCongressandHistoryConference(CHC),thebrainchildofIraKatznelson.Nowadecadeold,theCHCbrings togethercongressionalscholarsfromtherationalchoice,APD,andhistoricaltraditions.Ihavehadthepleasureof attendingeachCHC,andtheopportunitytolearnfromscholarslikeKatznelson,RichardBensel,RickValelly,and ElizabethSandershashelpedshapethewaythatIapproachresearchquestions.Inshort,engagementand communicationwithAPDscholarshasbroadenedmyintellectualperspectiveandmademeabetterscholar. IwillhavemoretosayabouttheshrinkinggapbetweenRCandAPDscholarshiplaterinthischapter.Myprimary focusinthefollowingsectionswillbetodetailtheinroadsthatRCscholarshavemadeintothestudyofAPD,which Iwillinitiallydefineasthe“inquiryintotemporalaspectsofgovernance”(OrrenandSkowronek2002,722).Two decadesago,therewasalmostnoRCresearchwithAPDovertones.Nowthereisaconsiderableamount,andthe trajectoryofRC-basedAPDworkisquitepositive.Partofthisgrowth,asInoteabove,isduetotheblurringof boundaries,thanksinparttobettercommunicationandactiveengagement.Butforsuchcommunicationand engagementtotakeplace,aninitialfoundationofRC-basedAPDresearchhadtoemerge.Onceacredible commitmenttoelementsoftheAPDagenda(sensitivitytohistoricalcontext,respectfortheoretical/methodological conceptsliketimingandsequence,etc.)wasmade,thebasisforcommongroundwascreated,andaseriousand fruitfuldialoguecouldthenbegin. IndescribinghowRCscholarshipmovedinanAPDdirection,IwillmostlydiscussexamplesfromtheCongressand partiesliteratures,simplybecausethisiswhereRC-basedAPDworkhashaditsgreatestpurchase.2 Butbefore doingso,apreliminarystepisnecessary;specifically,tounderstandtheRCmovetowardAPD,wemustfirst understandtheevolutionofRCasafield. RationalChoiceandthe“Discovery”ofInstitutions Inthissection,IprovideashortoverviewoftheevolutionoftheRCfield.AstheRCliteratureismorethanahalfcenturyold,mycoveragewillbeobviously(perhapsembarrassingly)brief.3 Butmymaingoalhereisnotto provideacomprehensiveintellectualhistory,burrathertolayouthow(some)RCscholarsgravitatedtowardAPD. Theanswerwillbethroughthe(re)discoveryofinstitutions. Asmentionedpreviously,RChaditsoriginsintheeconomicsandoperationsresearchliteratures.TheRC Page 2 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. 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Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice approachwasinmanywaysthepolaroppositeoftheprevailingbehavioralapproachofthetime.Whileboth approachestooktheindividualasthebaseunitofanalysis(ortheoreticalbuildingblock),theRCapproach replacedbehavioralism’s“passiveman,”nudgedbyhissurroundingstowardsomeoutcome,with“activeman,” whopossessedwell-definedpreferencesandbeliefsabouttheworldaroundhim,andselectedstrategiesthat maximizedhislikelihoodofachievinghisgoals(most-preferredoutcomes).4 Regardingpreferences,RCtheory assumedthatanindividualwasself-interestedandpurposive(andsometimesa“maximizer”);“self-interest”did notnecessarilymean“selfish,”however,asanindividualcouldgreatlyvaluebenefitsthataccruedtothose beyondhim(i.e.,socialbenefits).Moreimportantwasthatbasicself-interestinagivenstudybeclearlyidentified— incongressionalstudies,forexample,acommonRCassumptionhasbeenthatamemberofCongressseeksto maximizehischanceofreelection(Mayhew1974). RCtheorydifferedfrombehavioralisminanotherimportantway:itwasdeductiveratherthaninductive.RCtheory wasbuiltabstractly,usingpremisesandassumptions,andhypotheseswerederivedfromthetheory(andoften tested).Atheoreticaloutcomewassaidtobeanequilibriumifitwasstable,whichtypicallymeantthatnodecisive coalition—oftenasimplemajorityinmostdecisionsettings—preferredadifferentoutcome.WhilemuchRC scholarshipovertheyearshasbeeninformal(i.e.,logic-based),thedeductivenatureoftheRCenterpriseledto variousformal(mathematical)representations.Decision-andgame-theoreticmodelsbecamepopular,whilethe spatialmodelofdecisionmaking—where,initssimplestform,actors(voters,legislators)andalternatives (candidates,policies)arearrayedfromlefttorightalongaline—emergedasthe“workhorse”modelinRCstudies. EarlyRCscholarsfocusedconsiderableattentiononthedynamicsofdemocraticdecisionmaking.Atissuewasan earlyaxiomaticresultbyArrow(1951)thatsuggestedthatnodemocraticvotingmethod(nomethodofaggregating preferences)was“fair”—thatindividualrationalitydidnotnecessarilyleadtogrouprationality.5Inresponse,Black (1948,1958)andDowns(1957)showedthatifthenumberofdecisionmakerswereodd,decisionmakers’ preferenceswerewellordered(“singlepeaked”),anddecisionsweremadealongonedimensionofchoice,then themedianvoter’smost-preferredpolicy(his“idealpoint”)wasanequilibriumoutcomeinamajority-rulesetting—it wasa“Condorcetwinner,”inthatitcouldbeatanyotheralternativeinpair-wisevoting.Themedianvoterresult would,intime,transcendacademiaandbecomepartofthepubliclexicon,aspoliticiansandjournalistswould discusshowimportantitwasforpoliticalcandidatesto“movetothecenter”or“capturethoseinthemiddle”in advanceofanelection. Bythe1960sand1970s,formaltheoristsworkingondemocraticdecisionmaking(i.e.,socialchoicetheorists) soughttomovebeyondthesingle-dimensionalworldofBlackandDowns.Thebeliefwasthatdemocraticpolitics couldnottypicallybereducedtoonedimensionofpolicychoice,andthatdecision-makingmodels—toberealistic —neededtoincorporateadditional(higher)dimensions.Whenaseconddimensionwasadded,themedianvoter resulteffectivelyvanished.Exceptunderveryrarecircumstances(Plott1967),outcomesintwodimensions exhibitednostability—noequilibriumexisted,asanymajority-preferredoutcomewassusceptibletobeing overriddenbyanewmajority(composedof,inpart,losersfromthepriorround).Moreover,asMcKelvey(1976) showed,anyoutcomeinthechoicespacecouldpotentiallybereached.Thepossibilityof“chaos”inmajority-rule decisionmakingwasreal,asconditionsthatallowedforinstability,agendamanipulation,andcyclingwere pervasive. Theproblemwiththesocialchoicetheorists’workwassummedupinthetitleofapaperbyTullock(1981):“why somuchstability?”Incomparingtheacademicresultstorealworldvotingbodies,Tullocksawadisjuncture: legislatureswereabletopasspoliciesintolaw,andoncepassed,thoselawswerequitestable.Noneofthe proceduraldysfunctionalityandendlesscyclingthatMcKelvey’stheoremwarnedaboutwasapparent.Something seemedtobemissingfromthesocialchoicetheorists’work. Shepsle(1979)providedananswer:theworkofPlott,McKelvey,andothershadabstractedawaytoomuchofthe realworld’scomplexity.Intheirstripped-downmodels,wherepoliticalactorsweredeciding(voting)inalargely structure-freeenvironment,thelackofanequilibriuminpreferencesalonewasindeedtheresult.Buttherealworld hadstructure.Therealworldhadinstitutions.Withthisinmind,Shepsledevelopedamodelofalegislaturewitha committeesystem,basedlooselyontheUSHouseofRepresentatives.Thekeyfeaturesrevolvedaroundrulesof jurisdictionandagendacontrol—ifindividualpolicies(orindividualpartsofcomplexpolicies)wereassignedto individualcommitteesandonlythoseamendmentsgermanetothepolicydimensioninquestionwereallowed,then anequilibriumcouldbegenerated.Institutions(acommitteesystemwithjurisdictionalarrangementsand Page 3 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. 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Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice amendmentrestrictions)couldinducestabilityandthushelplegislatorsachievetheirgoals.Shepslecalledthis structure-inducedequilibrium(SIE)incontrasttothepreference-inducedequilibrium(PIE)ofthelargelyinstitutionfreesocialchoiceresearch.6 Later,otherRCscholarsturnedtoadifferentinstitution—politicalparties—asthe structuralsolutiontovariouslegislativechoiceproblems(CoxandMcCubbins1993;Aldrich1995).ThisRCtrendof studyingpreferencechoicewithinaparticularinstitutionalcontext—wheretheinstitutionsconstrainandshapethe goalsandstrategiesofpoliticalactors—becameknownasthe“newinstitutionalism.” This“discovery”ofinstitutionsbyShepsleandotherswas,ofcourse,littlemorethanarediscovery.Inthelate nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,an“oldinstitutionalism”wascentraltothepoliticalsciencediscipline. Predicatedonconstitutionallawandconstitutionalhistory,this“legal-formalanalysis,”practicedbysuch luminariesasWoodrowWilsonandJamesBryce,survivedthroughtheearly1950s,whenbehavioralismtookroot andreduceditspredecessortomarginalstatus.Thisoldinstitutionalismhadmuchincommonwithcontemporary APD,as“state-based”structuralformsplayedamajorroleinitsintellectualagenda.Oldinstitutionalworkwas generallyexpository,however,asscholarswerecontentmostlytodescribeinstitutionsindetailandnotpursue deepertheoreticalorempiricaltreatments(seePeters1996;Rhodes2006).7 Thus,thankstoShepsle’spioneeringefforts,institutionscametobeviewedasasolutiontocollectiveandsocial choiceproblemsinstylizeddecision-makingbodies.Butweretheythesolutiontosimilarproblemsinrealworld legislatures?Thatis,wereinstitutionschosenbypoliticalactorstohelpthemtoachievetheirgoals?ForShepsle (1986,1989),then,thequestionbecame:howwereinstitutionsselectedand,onceselected,howwerethey maintained?Hecalledthisthesearchforequilibriuminstitutions.Inthisendeavor,Shepsleandotherswerenot servedbymoremathematicalequationsonablackboard;rather,theyneededtofindempiricalevidence.A detailedsearchthroughhistorywasneededtodetermineifintellectualconjecturehadabasisinreality,thatis, whetherthereweregroundsforbelievingthatpoliticalactorsinthepastpurposivelyturnedtoinstitutionstosolve problemsofdemocraticdecisionmaking. InstitutionalChoice:Structures DeterminingtheoriginsofinstitutionsthusbecameRCscholars’entréeintoAPD.Theironlyotheralternative,given thedirectionthattheirworkhadtakenthem,wastoresorttofunctionalism,i.e.,(a)majority-ruledecisionmaking wasunstableinmorethanonedimension,(b)institutionswereshowntobeasolutiontothisproblem,and(c)thus institutionsemerged.Andthat,ofcourse,wasnotanintellectuallysatisfyingalternative. Inthissection,IdiscussoneformthatRC-basedinstitutional-choiceresearchtook:structuralchoice.Indeed,the firstmajorAPDforaysmadebyRCscholarsfocusedonthestructuralmakeupofCongress,specificallythe emergenceofstandingcommitteesandinstitutionalpoliticalparties.Otherquestionsofinstitutionalchoice,likethe selectionofrulesandprocedures,willbediscussedinthefollowingsection. GammandShepsle(1989)werethefirststudytoexploretheequilibriuminstitutionsideaempirically.Not surprisingly,giventhestructuralcomponentofShepsle’searlierinstitutional-equilibriumwork,thefocusinGamm andShepsle(1989)wastheemergenceofastandingcommitteesysteminCongress.Whiletheywereunableto finda“smokinggun”(intheformofaletter,diaryentry,etc.)intheirhistoricalsearch,GammandShepsleargued thataRCaccount,revolvingprimarilyaroundthemachinationsofHouseSpeakerHenryClay,providedaplausible explanationforthesuddenshiftfromselect-committeegovernmenttostanding-committeegovernmentintheyears between1810and1825.Severalyearslater,Jenkins(1998)presentedasimilarstory,butwithmorespecific hypothesesandcriticaltests. Inshort,theGamm–Shepsle–Jenkins(GSJ)accountrestedonchangingexternalfactorsthatdroveentrepreneurial innovation.ClaybecameSpeakeratatimewhenwarwithBritainwasintheair;hetookadvantageofideological homogeneitywithinhisRepublicanPartytoestablishastablepolicyagenda,whichheusedtomaintaincontrolof thespeakership.WhenthewarendedandtheFirstPartySystemcollapsed,however,Claywasunabletoconstruct anewpolicyagendatoholdhiscoalitiontogether;withouttheFederalistsasaviablefoil,theRepublicanslost cohesionandstartedtofocusonregionalissues.Thisparochialismledtovoting(decisionmaking)instabilitythat, ineffect,mirroredthemultidimensionalchaosofthesocialchoicetheorists’world.Tosolvethisproblem,Clay reorganizedtheHouse’sinternalstructurebyjettisoningtheexistingselectcommitteesystemandcreatinga systemwherebystandingcommittees,withstrongjurisdictionalcontrolsandpropertyrightsofassignment,would Page 4 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice handlethechamber’sbusiness.Withthisshifttostandingcommittees,Clayineffectcreatedelectorallyvaluable “turf”intheHouse,whichgavemembers“quasi-permanentinfluenceonthoseissuesthatmostconcernedthem” (AldrichandShepsle2000,36).Clayparceledoutinfluenceinthiswaytohelphimachievehisgoals:maintaining controlofthespeakershipinanunstableenvironment,which(amongotherthings)kepthimintherunningforthe presidencyin1824.While,again,GSJuncoverednosmoking-gunvalidation,Jenkins(1998)didfindindirect empiricalsupport(usingdataonbillreferrals,committeeassignments,andspeakershipvotes)forallthemain elementsofthisRCaccount. UnderlyingtheGSJaccountwasanassumptionthatnationalpoliticswasstablebeforethecollapseoftheFirst PartySystem.Aldrich(1995)enteredheretomakeacaseforthisassumption;hearguedthatinstitutionalpolitical parties(i.e.,partiesinCongress)werecreatedtosolvecoordinationandcollectivechoiceproblemsthathampered decisionmakingintheearlyCongresses.Specifically,AldrichcontendedthattheFederalists,ledbyAlexander Hamilton,recognizedthattheyhadamajorityofsupportforthe“GreatPrinciple”oftheday—howstrongthe Federalgovernmentshouldbe—butwereunabletotranslatethatsupportintopolicyoutcomes.Thiswasbecause theRepublicans,ledbyThomasJeffersonandJamesMadison,wereabletoinjectregional(orsecondary) dimensionsintodebatesandvotes;this,ineffect,madethechoicespacemultidimensional,whichtheRepublicans usedtotheiradvantageinstymieingtheFederalists.AccordingtoAldrich,Hamiltonrecognizedtheproblemearly on,andsetaboutcreatinginformalstructures(caucuses,floorleaders,andwhipsystems)thatwouldconvince FederaliststofocusontheGreatPrincipledimensionandignoreattemptstoaddcomplexitytovotedecisions.Very quickly,Hamiltonsawhisgoalachieved,astheFederalistsbeganwinningmoreoften. ForAldrich,Hamiltondidnot“create”partiessomuchashedid“intuit”them.Revolutionaryleadersunderstood (orcametounderstand)theimportanceofinstitutions.Itwasclear,forexample,thattheweakinstitutionsinherent intheConfederalsystemledtoitsdemise;asJillsonandWilson(1994)documented,colonialrepresentativeswere unwillingtocedemuchauthorityinthecreationoftheContinentalCongress,andthisledtoweakinstitutional structuresthatcouldnoteffectivelycoordinatesharedinterestsorhelpovercomecollectivechoiceproblems.Asa result,theFoundersbuiltmuchstrongerinstitutionsintothenewFederalsystem.However,withregardto Congress,nomechanismwasincludedtoaggregatepreferencesinthefaceofpotentialinstability.Asaresult,a newextralegalinstitutionwasdeveloped,astheseparateinformalstructuresdevisedbyHamiltonwouldformthe coreofaninstitutionalpoliticalparty.8 TheRepublicansquicklycopiedthesefeatures,inresponsetothe Federalists’newfoundlegislativesuccess,andaninstitutionalpartysystemwasborn.Aldrichfoundsupportforthis storybylookingatkeyvotesassociatedwithFederalistfiscalandforeignpolicyissues—overtime,betweenthe FirstandThirdCongresses,partywasresponsibleforstructuringmoreindividualvotechoicesandreducingthe influenceofnon-GreatPrincipledimensions. Aldrich(1995)alsodocumentedtheemergenceofmasspoliticalparties;heretheentrepreneurwasMartinVan Buren,whosoughttocreateanewparty(andpartysystem)builtaroundAndrewJacksonandbasedon Jeffersonianprinciplesratherthanpersonalallegiancetoelites.VanBuren’sgoalwastomaximizepartymembers’ likelihoodofretainingoffice.HistacticsincludedbuildinganationalpartyorganizationaroundJackson,bylinking numerousstateandlocalpartyorganizations,andusingthatnationalorganizationtomobilizetheelectorate behindcandidatesontheJacksonticket.Electionandre-electionmeantasteadystreamofpolicyandpolitical spoils.OrganizationandmobilizationwerethusthecollectiveactionproblemsthatVanBurensolvedthroughthe constructionofamassparty.AldrichuncoveredevidencetosupportthisRCstorybylookingatparty organizationalandturnoutdatainavarietyofways. JenkinsandStewart(2013)alsoplacedVanBureninanentrepreneurialroleadecadeafterhissuccessfulcreation oftheJacksonianParty.Inthiscase,VanBurencametorecognizethatHouseofficerpositions—principallythe Speaker,butalsothePrinterandClerk—controlledresourcesthatcouldbeusedinpursuitofpolicyandpatronage; ifsecuredconsistently,thesepositionscouldprovidesubstantialbenefitsforthemajorityparty.Theproblemwas thatofficerelectionsexhibitedthesametypeofinstabilitythatplaguedvotingintheearlyFederalCongresses;in thelate1830s,forexample,dissidentmajority-partymemberssometimesvotedwiththeminorityforideological reasons,whichonseveraloccasionsresultedinthemajoritypartylosingtheofficerelection.Asaresult,Van Buren,nowpresident,pushedfortheadoptionofapublicballot(asthesecretballothadgovernedHouseofficer electionstothatpoint)andthecreationofalegislativepartycaucus,basedonaninstitutionthatheused effectivelyinNewYorkaspartoftheAlbanyRegency.Withthepublicballotinplace,9 thepartycaucuswouldbe thevenueforintra-partycoordinationonofficerelections.Theexpectationwasthatdecisionsmadeincaucus Page 5 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). 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Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice wouldbehonoredbyallpartymembersonthefloor.Thiswasenforcedbyasystemofcarrotsandsticks:“losers” incaucuswerecompensatedwithvariousbenefits(policy,committeeassignments),whilethethreatofbeing expelledfromtheparty—forrefusingtotoethelineonthefloor—wasrepeatedlyunderscored.Aftersomeinitial successes,theVanBureniteswereunabletomakethepartycaucusoperateeffectively,asslaverybecametoo strongaregionalpressureforthepartybondtowithstand.Theseedwasplanted,however.AsJenkinsandStewart showed,onceslaverywasnolongeranissue,beginningduringtheCivilWar,theRepublicansandthenlaterthe Democratsusedthepartycaucustoeffectivelystructureofficernominationsandfloorelections.Bythelate nineteenthcentury,thebindingpartycaucusonorganizationalmattershadfullydevelopedintoanequilibrium institution. InstitutionalChoice:Rules,Procedures,andProcesses AsRCresearchonstructuralemergenceanddevelopmenttookoff,aparallelRCliteratureoninstitutionalchoice dealingwithrules,procedures,andprocessesalsocommenced.ThisliteraturewasdominatedbyRCscholarswho begantakingthehistoricaldevelopmentofCongressseriously.AnassortmentofsuchRCstudieshasappeared sincethelate1980s;Ifocusbelowonsomeofthemostimportantones. AroundthesametimethatGamm/ShepslewerefocusingonstandingcommitteeemergenceinCongress,Stewart (1988;1989)soughttoapplyaRCframeworktothestudyofbudgetreformpoliticsinCongressbetween1865and 1921.UnlikeGamm/Shepsle,though,whofocusedoncommitteedevelopmentasanempiricalanaloguetothe formalliteratureoninstitutions,StewartfollowedMayhew(1974)inapplyingabasicRCassumptionofre-electionseekingbehavioronthepartofmembersofCongresstoanearliertimeperiod.Indoingso,Stewartwasawarethat applyingaRCframeworktothehistoricalstudyofCongresswas“boundtobecontroversial”(1989,9).Thus,apart fromhisanalysisofchangesintheHouse’sappropriationsprocess,Stewartalsomadeanimportantcontributionin explicatingwhyanassumptionofgoal-directedbehaviorwastenableinearliercongressionalperiods. Substantively,inasetofempiricalcaseanalyses,Stewartshowedthatmomentsoffragmentationand centralizationintheHousebudgetprocessfollowedfromtheinteractionbetweenthedecisioncontextand members’spendingpreferences.Whentheeconomywasflushandtheexistingcommitteesystemoverworked, legislatorswithahighdemandforparticularisticpolicy(asawaytomeetconstituents’interests)sought fragmentation,tobetterincreasespendingandexpandpolicyoutputs.Thiswasthecaseinthe1870sand1880s, whentheAppropriationsCommitteewasstrippedofmostofitsspendingjurisdictions.Whentheeconomywas stagnantanddeficitsexisted,legislatorswithalowdemandforparticularisticpolicysoughtcentralization,tobetter controlspendingandlimitpolicyoutputs.ThiswasthecaserightafterWorldWarI,whentheBudgetand AccountingActwasconsideredandeventuallypassed.Increatinga“marriage”ofRCtheoryanddetailed historicalanalysis,Stewartsetastandardforthestudyofinstitutionalchoice(andchange)inCongress. Binder(1996)shiftedthefocusawayfromprocessbyexaminingproceduralchoiceinCongressfrom1789through 1823.BuildingoffthepurposiveapproachofGamm/Shepsle,sheoutlinedhowamajoritypartythatwasunableto secureitspreferencesdirectlymightseektochangetherules—inthiscase,byrestrictingminorityrights—to achieveitsgoals.Inlookingatvotesonthepreviousquestionmotion(whichallowedamajoritytocutoffdebate)in theHouse,Binderfoundthatpartisanship,andnot“increasedworkload”(whichwastiedtoanoldersociological literature),wasasignificantdeterminant—specifically,thepreviousquestionmotionwasalteredwhenpartieswere homogeneousandpolarizedfromoneanother.Binder(1997)expandedthislineofreasoning,bothintermsof articulatingwhenminorityrightsgenerallyshouldbesuppressed(whenmajoritypartystrengthwashighanda short-termadvantagecouldbeachieved)andacrossalongerswathofcongressionalhistory(200years). Moreover,shearguedthatinheritedruleswerealsoimportanttoconsiderasacontextualfactorinstudying institutionalchange;forexample,thestrongminorityrightsintheSenateresultedfromparticulardecisions(likethe eliminationofthepreviousquestionrule)madeearlyinthatchamber’shistory. Dion(1997)coveredsimilargroundasBinder,bylookingatminorityrightsrestrictionsfromthe1830sthroughthe 1890s.Usingnewlycollecteddata,Diontestedformallyderivedhypotheses—inboththetraditionalstatistical sense,aswellasthroughdetailedcasestudies—andfoundthatcohesivemajoritiesweremorelikelytoprovoke obstructionfromtheminority,andaccordingly,cohesivemajoritieswerethenmorelikelytopushforprocedural changetolimittheminority’srighttoobstruct.WhereDiondifferedfromBinderwasonhowthesizeofthemajority Page 6 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice correlatedwithproceduralrestrictions;forBinder,largermajoritiessoughttorestrictminorityrights,whileforDionit wassmallermajorities.Binder’sfinding(usingalongertimeseries)waspurelyempirical,whileDion’sempirical findingwasconsistentwithformally-derivedhypotheses.BeyondhiscarefulformalandempiricalRCanalyses, DionactivelyreachedouttotheAPDcommunity,statingthathe“[tried]hardtotakethehistoricalsideofthe enterpriseasseriouslyastheformalside”(xii–xiii). Adler(2002)tackledtheissueofinstitutionalchoiceinadifferentwaybylookingatfailedchanges.Indoingso,he exploredadifferentelementoftheequilibriuminstitutionsquestion:whyinstitutionsmaintainthemselves(inthe faceofreformefforts)overtime.Specifically,AdlerinvestigatedwhythebasicstructureoftheHousecommittee systemremainedlargelyintactsinceWorldWarIIdespitesignificantattemptsatreforminthe1940s,1970s,and 1990s.Adler’sthesis,likeStewart’s,revolvedaroundtheelectoralconnection;hearguedthatsincereelectionseekingmembersofCongresshadlearnedhowtoservetheneedsoftheirconstituentsthroughthecommittee system,theywereunwillingtosupportanyeffortstoshakeupthecurrentarrangement.Usingavarietyof socioeconomicandfinancialdata,Adlershowedthatdistributivebenefitsandcommitteemembershipwereindeed linked.Andusingcasestudies,heshowedthatmembersofCongresswereriskaversewhenitcametoreform, willingtoacceptasuboptimalstatusquosystemratherthanincurthecostsoflearninganew,potentiallybetter system(withonlytwoyearsbetweenelectioncycles).Adlerthusarguedthatuncertainty(andthepotentialcosts therein)ledtoinstitutionalstasis. CoxandMcCubbins(2005)investigatedtheemergenceoftheReedRulesintheearly-1890sHouse.Atissuewas thechamber’soutdatedsystemofproceduralrights,whichtheminorityusedeffectivelyinthe1870sand1880sto thwartthelegislativemomentumofthemajority.CoxandMcCubbinsreferredtothisperiodasa“dualveto system,”asboththemajorityandminoritypartiesostensiblypossessedagendavetoes,andmajoritygainsoften cameonlywithminorityconcessions.ThomasReed,afterbecomingHouseSpeaker,reformedthesystemby remakingtherules—minorityrightswererestrictedandmajorityrightswereenhanced.Thisdestroyedthe prevailingdualvetosystem,andthemajoritypartywasquicklytransformedfromaprocedurallightweightintoa proceduralheavyweight.AndasCoxandMcCubbinsshowedinatime-seriesanalysis,themajorityparty’sability tocontroltheagendainanegativeway,bypreventinglegislativechangethatamajorityofitsmemberswouldfind distasteful,spikedwithReed’sinnovationsandhasremainedstrong(regardlessofotherproceduralchangesmade overtheyears)throughthepresentday. WawroandSchickler(2006)revisitedtheearlierproceduraldebate,byexploringthelawmakingenvironmentinthe Senateacrosstime.AtissuewashowtheSenatewasabletolegislateinthenineteenthandearlytwentieth centurieswhentherewasnoruleinplacetocutoffdebate.Theyarguedthatlawmakingduringthistimewasakin toagame-theoretic“warofattrition,”wherebyminoritiesandmajoritieswouldconveyinformationand“preference intensity”duringdebate.Exceptinraresituations,majorities(evennarrowones)wouldeventuallyworktheirwill becausethethreatthatamajoritycouldchangetherules—directlyinaformalwayorindirectlythroughprecedent —andweakenordestroyminorityrightswasveryreal.EventuallythegrowingsizeoftheSenateanditsincreasing workloadmadecontinuedoperationundertheexistinginformalsystemtoocostly,andaformalruletoinvoke cloture(shutoffdebate)wasadoptedin1917.Tosupporttheirargument,WawroandSchickleruseda combinationofspatialmodels,quantitativetechniques,andqualitativecasestudies.AndinarguingthatSenate ruleswereineffectgovernedbymajoritychoice,theytookaprovocativestance,opposingBinder(1997)and otherswhoemphasizedpathdependenceandinheritedrulesthatenabledSenateminoritiestopreventrules changespreferredbymajorities. MovingtheGoalPosts?RedefiningAPD RecallthatIhadinitiallyadoptedOrrenandSkowronek’s(2002,722)definitionofAPDasthe“inquiryintotemporal aspectsofgovernance.”Thisdefinitionhadaninclusivequality,andallowedforafairlyseamlessdiscoveryofRCbasedworkwithanAPDflavor.Morerecently,OrrenandSkowronek(2004)proposedamoreexclusivedefinition ofAPD.Thiswasdueinparttotheirdesiretoestablish(orperhapsbetterclarify)APDasauniqueintellectual enterpriseandsubfield.InrespondingtovariouscritiquesofAPD,OrrenandSkowronek(2004,121)notedthat“in APDresearchtoday,thereismoreatstakethanpoliticalchangeinthepastandstrategicinteractionsinhistorical context.”10 Assuch,theyshiftedgearsandredefinedpoliticaldevelopmentas Page 7 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice adurableshiftingoverningauthority.By‘governingauthority’wemeantheexerciseofcontrolover personsorthingsthatisdesignatedandenforceablebythestate.By‘shift’wehaveinmindachangein thelocusordirectionofcontrol,resultinginanewdistributionofauthorityamongpersonsororganizations withinthepolityatlargeorbetweenthemandtheircounterpartsoutside. (OrrenandSkowronek2004,123,emphasisadded) Somemightcontendthatthisshiftisakinto“movingthegoalposts.”Basedonthisnarrowerdefinition,for example,manyoftheRCstudiesofintra-institutionalchangethatIdescribedearlierwouldprobablynotbe recognizedas“APDresearch.”Indeed,RCworkisnotnaturallysuitedtothe“sweepingimpact”thatseems necessaryunderOrrenandSkowronek’snewdefinition—becauseRCresearchisoftentheoreticallytiedtoformal conceptslike“equilibrium”andempiricallytiedtoestablishingclearcausalrelationships,itsscope(orframe)is oftenlimited(ormodestlydrawn).Thatsaid,andapartfromotherconcernsrelatingtothenarrowingofthe definition,mygoalinthissectionistoasksimply:doesRCworkthatsatisfiesthismoreexclusiveAPDdefinition exist?Theansweris“yes,”andIprovidetwoexamplesbelow. Thefirstexampleisasubstantiveone,anddealswithhowtheRepublicanswereabletoprotectthepoliciesthey enactedduringtheCivilWarandReconstructionastheDemocratsreemergedasamajorplayeronthenational stageinthe1870s.StewartandWeingast(1992)couchedtheiranalysisinthegrowinginstitutionalliteratureofthe time,butemphasizedtheroleofelectoralinstitutions(ratherthanlegislativeinstitutionsoftheSIErevolution). TheyarguedthattheRepublicans,beginningintheCivilWarera,used“statehoodpolitics”—ortheprocessof bringingnewstatesintotheUnion—inastrategic(partisan)waytoincreasetheirshareofcongressional representation.This“artificialrepresentation”inCongressallowedtheRepublicanstocountertheDemocrats’ growinginfluenceinthenation(whichwasalsopartiallyartificialduetoeffortstodisenfranchiseAfricanAmericans intheSouth).Engstrom(2006)extendedtheStewart/WeingastargumentbydetailinghowRepublicans’strategic decisionsatthestatelevel—notablygerrymanderingeffortsintheredistrictingprocess—weredesignedtoprovide apartisanbiasandincreasetheGOP’srepresentationinthelate-nineteenth-centuryHouse.Finally,Jenkins(2007) describedhowtheRepublicansinthelate-nineteenth-centuryHouseused“disputed”elections(basedonalleged votingirregularities)tostrategicallyflipDemocraticseatsintoRepublicanseats,therebyincreasingtheirworking majorityinthechamber.Thesecontested(disputed)electioncasesalsoservedasan“equalizer”tocombatthe Democrats’useoffraud,corruption,andviolenceinSouthernelectionsandhelpedtheRepublicansmaintaina footholdintheformerConfederacy. ThesecondexampleisrelatedtoCongress’simpactonotherfacetsofthestate.Inparticular,aliteraturehas emergedtoinvestigatehowandwhyCongresshashelpedtodeveloptheExecutivebranchovertime.Thepathof suchdevelopmenthasoftenbeentiedtomembers’goals.Forexample,JohnsonandLibecap(1994)arguedthat membersofCongressfirstpassedcivilservicereform(viathePendletonActof1883)asastrategicinitiativeto facilitatetheirre-electionefforts—withskilledpoliticiansinthecivilservice,membersofCongresscouldbetter managetheirremainingpoliticalappointeesandensurethattheneedsoftheirconstituentsweremet.Theriault (2003)builtonJohnsonandLibecapbyrecastingtheroleoftheelectoralconnection;hefoundthatcivil-service reformwasdrivenasmuchbydirectpublicpressure(followingPresidentGarfield’sassassinationbyadisgruntled bureaucraticofficeseeker)asbythestrategicmachinationsofmembersofCongress.KernellandMcDonald (1999)alsoweavedanelectoralconnectionstoryindiscussingthetransformationoftheU.S.PostOfficefrom patronagetoserviceinthelatenineteenthcentury—fourthclasspostofficesweredismantledandreplacedwith “ruralfreedelivery”asawayformemberstomeettheneedsoftheirconstituentsandcurryelectoralfavor. GailmardandPatty(2013),ontheotherhand,focusedonmembers’policygoalstoexplainwhyCongresshas delegatedsubstantialauthoritytotheExecutivebranchovertime(andcreated“theinstitutionalpresidency”). Becausethepresidentandfederalbureaucratspossessinformationaladvantages,Congresshashadanincentive toensurethatExecutivebranchofficialsacquireexpertisesothat“good”publicpolicies(consistentwith Congress’spreferences)areproduced. WhatDoestheFutureHold? RegardlessofhowAPDisdefined,RCscholarswillalmostcertainlycontinuetakinghistoryseriously—bothin generalandasamethodologicalconcept.Thus,thesortsofworkthatIhavediscussedoninstitutionalchoicewill Page 8 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice onlyincreaseinnumber.AndthecontinuedeffortsofRCscholarstoproduceworkthatmightspeakto“adurable shiftingoverningauthority”willonlyincreaseaswell.RC-basedAPDwork,inwhateverform,isheretostay. Butthelargerandmoreimportantpoint,inmymind,isthatthegapbetweenRCscholarshipandtraditionalAPD scholarshipisshrinking.AsInotedpreviously,whereasscholarsofinstitutionsagenerationortwoagomighthave sortedprettyseamlesslyintoRCorAPDcamps,todaythestoryisdifferent.Studentsnowreceivebroadtraining almostasamatterofcourse,andareexposedtoarangeoftheoreticalandmethodologicalperspectives. This“narrowingofthegap”betweenRCandtraditionalAPDcanbeillustratedintwoways.First,whilethischapter hasdocumentedthemovementofRCinanAPDdirection,thereversehasalsobeentrue.SomeofthebestAPD workinrecentyears,whilefirmlyensconcedinhistorical-institutionalistorhistorical-interpretivisttraditions,has alsoembracedsomeRCtenetsaswell.Forexample,theacceptanceofindividualagency,orpurposiveactionon thepartofpoliticalactors,isprettystandardnow—andcanbefoundinJames’s(2000)workonpresidentsandthe politicsofregulatorychoice,Schickler’s(2001)workontheinstitutionaldevelopmentofCongress,Carpenter’s (2001)workonbureaucraticautonomy,OrrenandSkowronek’s(2004)foundationalAPDwork,Valelly’s(2004) workonblackenfranchisementacrosstime,Galvin’s(2009)workonpresidentsandnationalparties,andCrowe’s (2012)workonthedevelopmentofthefederaljudiciary. Second,RCandtraditionalAPDscholarsareoftenworkingonthesamequestions,andincreasinglyengageeach otherintheirresearch.Forexample,justasRCscholarslikeGamm/Shepsle,Aldrich,andJenkins/Stewarthave focusedon“politicalentrepreneurship”tohelpexplaininstitutionaldevelopmentovertime,sotoohavetraditional APDscholarslikeSheingate(2003),Strahan(2007),andCrowe(2007),whohaveexploredthetopicindepth. Indeed,itisfairtosaythatAPDscholarsarefurtheralongthanRCscholarsinthedevelopmentofatheoryof politicalentrepreneurship.Inaddition,justasShepsle/Weingast,Engstrom,andJenkinshavefocusedtheirefforts onaparticularshiftinpostbellumgoverningauthority,sotoohaveAPDscholarslikeJamesandLawson(1999)and Gillman(2000),whohaveexaminedtheRepublicans’strategicdeploymentofFederalelectionofficialsanddeputy marshalsandstrategicexpansionandstaffingofthefederalcourtsystem,respectively,inthelatenineteenth century.TheJames/LawsonandGillmananalysesnicelycomplementtheRCanalysesandhelpprovideafuller viewoftheGOP’sstrategicinitiativesinthedecadesafterCivilWarandReconstruction. Insum,thefutureforRC-basedAPDworkisbright.However,Ialsobelievethatwearenotfarawayfromdropping theadjectivesthatadornoursubstantiveinterests.Thatis,whilewemaycurrentlyemploylabelslike“rationalchoiceinstitutionalists,”“historicalinstitutionalists,”and“institutionally-focusedAPDscholars,”Ienvisionatime whenwesimplycallourselves“institutionalists.”11And,asinstitutionalists,thefactthatwepossesshistorical sensibilitieswillbeassumed. Inplanningthischapter,IbenefittedfromconversationswithDanGalvinandEricSchickler.IalsothankRob LiebermanandRickValellyforfeedbackonanearlierversionofthechapter. References Adler,E.S.2002.WhyCongressionalReformsFail:ReelectionandtheHouseCommitteeSystem.Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress. Aldrich,J.1994.‘RationalchoicetheoryandthestudyofAmericanpolitics,’inL.C.DoddandC.Jillson,eds.,The DynamicsofAmericanPolitics:Approaches&Interpretations.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,208–233. Aldrich,J.H.1995.WhyParties?:TheOriginandTransformationofPoliticalPartiesinAmerica.Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress. Aldrich,J.H.,andShepsle,K.A.2000.‘Explaininginstitutionalchange:soaking,poking,andmodelingintheU.S. congress,’inW.T.Bianco,ed.,CongressonDisplay,CongressatWork.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress, 23–46. Arrow,K.J.1951.SocialChoiceandIndividualValues.NewYork:Wiley. Bensel,R.2003.‘TheTensionbetweenAmericanPoliticalDevelopmentasaResearchCommunityandasa Page 9 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice DisciplinarySubfield.’StudiesinAmericanPoliticalDevelopment17,103–106. Binder,S.A.1996.‘PartisanshipandProceduralChoice:InstitutionalChangeintheEarlyCongress,1789-1823.’ JournalofPolitics57,1093–1118. Binder,S.A.1997.MinorityRights,MajorityRule:PartisanshipandtheDevelopmentofCongress.NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress. Black,D.1948.‘OntheRationaleofGroupDecision-making.’JournalofPoliticalEconomy56,23–34. Black,D.1958.TheTheoryofCommitteesandElections.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Cameron,C.M.2005.‘Endogenouspreferencesaboutcourts:Atheoryofjudicialstatebuildinginthenineteenth century,’inI.KatznelsonandB.R.Weingast,eds.,PreferencesandSituations:PointsofIntersectionBetween HistoricalandRationalChoiceInstitutionalism.NewYork:RussellSageFoundation,185–215. Carpenter,D.2001.TheForgingofBureaucraticAutonomy:Reputations,Networks,andPolicyInnovationsin ExecutiveAgencies,1862-1928.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Cox,G.W.,andMcCubbins,M.D.1993.LegislativeLeviathan:PartyGovernmentintheHouse.Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress. Cox,G.W.,andMcCubbins,M.D.2005.SettingtheAgenda:ResponsiblePartyGovernmentintheU.S.Houseof Representatives.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Crowe,J.2007.‘TheForgingofJudicialAutonomy:PoliticalEntrepreneurshipandtheReformsofWilliamHoward Taft.’JournalofPolitics69,73–87. Crowe,J.2012.BuildingtheJudiciary:Law,Courts,andthePoliticsofInstitutionalDevelopment.Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress. Dion,D.1997.TurningtheLegislativeThumbscrew:MinorityRightsandProceduralChangeinCongress.Ann Arbor:UniversityofMichiganPress. Downs,A.1957.AnEconomicTheoryofDemocracy.NewYork:HarperandRow. Engstrom,E.J.2006.‘StackingtheStates,StackingtheHouse:ThePartisanConsequencesofCongressional Redistrictinginthe19thCentury.’AmericanPoliticalScienceReview100,419–427. Evans,P.B.,Reuschemeyer,D.,andSkocpol,T.(eds).1985.BringingtheStateBackIn.NewYork:Cambridge UniversityPress. Friedman,J.1996.(ed.)TheRationalChoiceControversy:EconomicModelsofPoliticsReconsidered.NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress. 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Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice UniversityPress. James,S.C.2000.Presidents,Parties,andtheState:APartySystemPerspectiveonDemocraticRegulatory Choice,1884-1936.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. James,S.C.,andLawson,B.L.1999.‘ThePoliticalEconomyofVotingRightsEnforcementinAmerica’sGildedAge: ElectoralCollegeCompetition,PartisanCommitment,andtheFederalElectionLaw.’AmericanPoliticalScience Review93,115–131. Jenkins,J.A.1998.‘PropertyRightsandStandingCommitteeDominanceintheNineteenth-CenturyHouse.’ LegislativeStudiesQuarterly23,493–519. Jenkins,J.A.1999.‘WhyNoParties?:InvestigatingtheDisappearanceofDemocrat-WhigDivisionsinthe Confederacy.’StudiesinAmericanPoliticalDevelopment13,279–287. Jenkins,J.A.2007.‘Thefirst“SouthernStrategy”:TheRepublicanPartyandcontestedelectioncasesinthelate19thcenturyHouse,’inD.W.BradyandM.D.McCubbins,eds.,Party,Process,andPoliticalChangeinCongress, Volume2:FurtherNewPerspectivesontheHistoryofCongress.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,78–90. Jenkins,J.A.,andStewartC.,III.2013.FightingfortheSpeakership:TheHouseandtheRiseofPartyGovernment. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Jillson,C.,andWilson,R.K.1994.CongressionalDynamics:Structure,Coordination,andChoiceintheFirst AmericanCongress,1774-1789.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress. Johnson,R.N.,andLibecap,G.D.1994.TheFederalCivilServiceSystemandtheProblemofBureaucracy:The EconomicsandPoliticsofInstitutionalChange.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Katznelson,I.,andWeingast,B.R.2005.‘Intersectionsbetweenhistoricalandrationalchoiceinstitutionalism,’inI. KatznelsonandB.R.Weingast,eds.,PreferencesandSituations:PointsofIntersectionBetweenHistoricaland RationalChoiceInstitutionalism.NewYork:RussellSageFoundation,1–24. Kernell,S.,andMcDonald,M.P.1999.‘CongressandAmerica’sPoliticalDevelopment:TheTransformationofthe PostOfficeforPatronagetoService.’AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience43,792–811. Mayhew,D.R.1974.Congress:TheElectoralConnection.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress. McKelvey,R.E.1976.‘IntransitivitiesinMultidimensionalVotingModelsandSomeImplicationsforAgendaControl.’ JournalofEconomicTheory12,472–482. Moe,T.M.1985.‘Thepoliticizedpresidency,’inJ.E.ChubbandP.E.Peterson,eds.,TheNewDirectionin AmericanPolitics.Washington:Brookings,235–271. Monroe,K.R.2005.Perestroika!TheRaucousRebellioninPoliticalScience.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress. Ordeshook,P.C.1990.‘Theemergingdisciplineofpoliticaleconomy,’inJ.E.AltandK.A.Shepsle,eds., PerspectivesonPoliticalEconomy.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,9–30. Orren,K.,andSkowronek,S.2002.‘ThestudyofAmericanpoliticaldevelopment,’inKatznelsonandH.V.Milner, eds.,PoliticalScience:TheStateoftheDiscipline.NewYork:W.W.Norton,722–754. Orren,K.,andSkowronek,S.2004.TheSearchforAmericanPoliticalDevelopment.NewYork:Cambridge UniversityPress. Peters,B.G.1996.‘Politicalinstitutions,oldandnew,’inR.E.GoodinandH.Klingemann,eds.,ANewHandbookof PoliticalScience.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,205–220. Plott,C.1967.‘ANotionofEquilibriumandItsPossibilityUnderMajorityRule.’AmericanEconomicReview57,146– 160. Rhodes,R.A.W.2006.‘Oldinstitutionalisms,’inR.A.W.Rhodes,S.A.Binder,andB.A.Rockman,eds.,The Page 11 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). 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Stewart,C.,III,andWeingast,B.R.1992.‘StackingtheSenate,ChangingtheNation:RepublicanRottenBoroughs, StatehoodPolitics,andAmericanPoliticalDevelopment.’StudiesinAmericanPoliticalDevelopment6,223–271. Swift,E.K.andBrady,D.W.1994.‘Commonground:historyandtheoriesofAmericanpolitics,’inL.C.DoddandC. Jillson,eds.,TheDynamicsofAmericanPolitics:Approaches&Interpretations.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,83– 104. Theriault,S.M.2003.‘Patronage,thePendletonAct,andthePowerofthePeople.’JournalofPolitics65,50–68. Tullock,G.1981.‘WhySoMuchStability?’PublicChoice37,189–205. Valelly,R.M.2004.TheTwoReconstructions:TheStruggleforBlackEnfranchisement.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. Wawro,G.J.,andSchickler,E.2006.Filibuster:ObstructionandLawmkingintheU.S.Senate.Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress. Notes: (1)Onesuchtensionisinthewaypoliticalactors’preferenceshavebeentreatedbyRCandAPDscholars.APD scholarshavecriticizedsomeRCscholarsfortreatingpoliticalactors’preferencesasgiven(orimputed)rather thanashistoricallysituatedandconstructed;likewise,RCscholarshavecriticizedsomeAPDscholarsfor downplayingtheroleofpoliticalactors’preferencesinfavorof(outsized)attentiontomacro-leveltracingofhistory Page 12 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014 APD and Rational Choice andprocess.KatznelsonandWeingast(2005,6)acknowledgethistensionbutalsocontendthatthe aforementionedcriticismsare“outofdate,”asscholarsinbothtraditionshaveincreasinglyconvergedthankstoa greaterfocusoninstitutions. (2 )RC-basedAPDworkinotherfieldsclearlyexists,suchasMoe’s(1985)workonthedevelopmentofthe institutionalpresidency,Harvey’s(1998)workonthedevelopmentoforganized/electoralinterests,andCameron’s (2005)workonjudicialstatebuilding. (3 )ShortoverviewscanbefoundinRiker(1990),Ordeshook(1990),andAldrich(1994).Foradetailed,accessible primeronRCtheory,completewithsubstantiveapplications,seeShepsle(2010). (4 )Shepsle(1989)referstotheseindividualsas“sociologicalman”and“economicman.” (5)ThisisobviouslyaverysimpledescriptionofArrow’sTheorem. (6 )SeealsoShepsleandWeingast(1981). (7 )ForaRCtakeonthe“oldinstitutionalism,”anditsrelationtothe“newinstitutionalism,”seeAldrichandShepsle (2000). (8 )InadifferentRCtreatment,Jenkins(1999)lookedattheflipsideofpartyemergence:partydestruction. Specifically,heexaminedwhyDemocrat–Whigdivisions,whichhadformedthebasisoftheSecondPartySystem andexistedatthestate-levelintheSouththrough1860-61,vanishedintheConfederacy.Lookingatroll-callvotes intheConfederateConstitutionalConvention,JenkinsfoundthatDemocrats—whocomprisedamajorityof conventiondelegates—votedtoprohibittwooftheWhigs’majorissues:protectivetariffsandfederalfundingfor internalimprovements.Thiseliminatedtheseissuesfromthelegislativeagenda,andthuserasedthesourceof Democrat–Whigdivisions.Asaresult,theConfederacybeganitsexistencewithoutparties,anditdidnotsurvive longenoughforanewpartysystemtoemergearoundsomedifferentsetofissues. (9 )Thepublicballotsolvedthe“hiddenshirking”problembyallowingleaderstoidentifypartisanrecalcitrantsand (potentially)punishthem.Theproblemwasthatconstituentscouldalsonowobserveindividualvotesinofficer elections.Consequently,aspressurewasbuildingoverslavery,Housemembersoftenfoundthemselvescaught betweenpartyandregion. (10 )Onthesegeneralpoints,seealsoSkowronek(2003). (11)Whilequiteoptimisticabout“pointsofintersectionandoverlap”betweenhistoricalandRCinstitutionalists, KatznelsonandWeingast(2005,20–1)arelesssanguineaboutthefullconvergenceoftheinstitutional approaches:“Thereislittledangerthatcommunicationandcollaborationwillproducemethodologicaluniformity.” JefferyA.Jenkins JefferyA.JenkinsisassociateprofessorofpoliticsattheUniversityofVirginia. Page 13 of 13 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. 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