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Code Red Worm Propagation
Modeling and Analysis
Zou, Gong, & Towsley
Michael E. Locasto
March 21, 2003
Overview
• Code Red incident data & impact
• epidemiology models
– traditional (biological) infection models
– two-factor worm model
• related work & questions
– (Weaver & Sapphire)
Motivation
• Internet great medium for spreading
malicious code
– Code Red & Co. renew interest in worm studies
• Issues:
– How to explain worm propagation curves?
– What factors affect spreading behavior?
– Can we generate a more accurate model?
Background: Code Red
• Three versions:
– CRv1.1 (bad rng) July 13, 2001
– CRv1.2 July 19, 2001
– CRv2 August, 2001
• 100 threads, 300k victims
• “maliciously crafted URL” (default.ida
vulnerability)
Background: The Stack Smash
• Buffer overflows in C functions
– gets(), etc
– home-grown functions
• code injection & modify return pointer
– both parts are critical: overflow alone does not
allow you to execute code
The Stack Smashing Mechanism
• Insert “junk” (nop),
attack code, and return
value
• this is how many
worms propagate
• SQL “Slammer” fits in
one UDP packet. (376
bytes of assembly
code)
Epidemic Models
• Deterministic vs. Stochastic
– Simple epidemic model (previous paper)
– general epidemic model (Kermack-Mckendrick
add notion of removed hosts)
• good baseline, need to be adjusted to
explain Internet worm data
• any model must be deterministic (b/c of
scale)
Two-Factor Worm Model
• Two major factors affect worm spread:
– dynamic human countermeasures
•
•
•
•
anti-virus software cleaning
patching
firewall updates
disconnect/shutdown
– interference due to aggressive scanning
• Rate of infection (ß) is not constant
Two-Factor Worm Model (con)
• Two important restrictions:
– consider only “continuously activated” worms
– consider worms that propagate w/ort topology
Infection Statistics
Classic Simple Epidemic Model
• Model presented in
previous paper (classic
simple epidemic
model, k=1.8, k=BN)
• a(t) = J(t) / N (fraction
of population infected)
• Wrong! (compare to
last slide)
Simple Epidemic Model Math
• Variables:
• infected hosts (had virus at some point) = J(t)
• population size = N
• infection rate = ß(t)
• dJ(t)/dt = βJ(t)[N - J(t)]
Two-Factor Model Math
• dI(t)/dt = β(t)[N - R(t) - I(t) - Q(t)]I(t) dR(t)/dt
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
S(t) = susceptible hosts
I(t) = infectious hosts
R(t) = removed hosts from I population
Q(t) = removed hosts from S population
J(t) = I(t) + R(t)
C(t) = R(t) + Q(t)
J(t) = I(t) + R(t)
N = population (I+R+Q+S)
Two-Factor Fit
• Take removed hosts
from both S and I
populations into
account
• non-constant infection
rate (decreases)
• fits well with observed
data
Results
• Two-factor worm model
– accurate model without topology constraints
– explains exponential start & end drop off
– identifies 2 critical factors in worm propagation
• Only 60% of CR targets infected
The SQL Slammer (Sapphire)
• Infection stats:
–
–
–
–
90% in 10 minutes
pop doubled every 8.5s
>=75000 infected
1 UDP packet!
Questions
• Sapphire paper:
– http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2003/sapphire/sapphire.html
• “Previous” Code Red paper:
– http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/cdc-usenix-sec02/