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Paper: Bailey et a1
Paper
The behaviour of full-scale steel-framed
buildings subjected to compartment fires
C. G . Bailey, BEng, PhD
Building Research Establishment
T. Lennon, BEng
Building Research Establishment
D. B. Moore, BTech, PhD, CEng, MIStructE
Building Research Establishment
Synopsis
During 1995 and 1996, a major fire test programme was
conducted on a full-scaleeight-storey steel-jiramedbuilding.
The principle aim of these tests was to investigate the actual
behaviour of a steel-jiramed buildingsubjected to aseries of
compartment (1ocalised)fires. This paper presents the results
from two of these tests, which were conducted by the Building
Research Establishment. The results from the tests showed that
existingfire Codes are not addressing the correct building
behaviour during afire and, as a consequence, are extremely
conservative. In addition, the fire tests on the full-scale frame
showed that the actual global and local structural behaviour of
buildings is different,and typically far better; than that shownin
standard small-scale fire tests. The paper discusses in detail the
behaviour of the building observed during thefire tests,and
preliminary conclusions are presented.
Introduction
When heated, steel will lose both strength and stiffness. For life safety and
property protection, the use of steel within buildings will obviously need to
be designed to withstand the effects of a fire. This design must ensure no
additional threat, caused by possible collapse of the steel structure, to either
escaping occupants or fire fighters. In addition, no disproportionate damage
should occur to the building during a fire. The level of fire resistance that a
structure requires is specified in terms of time inthe Building Regulations'.
It isdependent on the function and height of the building and, in some cases,
whether sprinklers are used. In addition, maximum fire compartment sizes
are specified, where thecompartment boundaries are designed to contain the
fire. In multistorey buildingsthis will typicallycreate an areaof structure that
is being heated by the fire, withthe structure surrounding this area remaining much cooler and thus retaining its strength and stiffness.
The most common and
traditional design method of ensuring strength and
stability to steel-framed buildings during a fireis to cover all exposed steel
areas with a protective material. Typical types of protection material consist of boards, sprays, and intumescent paints, with the choice of material
depending on cost, appearance, and durability. Specification of material
thickness for a known fire resistance, time and steel section size can be
obtained from individual manufacturers or from (what is commonlytermed)
the 'Yellow Book''. The required thickness is based on the principle of
ensuring that the steel remains below 550°C for thespecified fire resistance
period. This assumes that steel members fully stressed in accordance with
BS 44933 or BS 5950 Part 1' will lose their design safety margin when they
reach a temperature of approximately 550°C.
Although, the philosophy of specifying protection thickness is adequate,
it is extremely conservative. This is result
a
of the assumption that the member is uniformly heated, together with a disregard for both actual applied
load levels during the fire and true material behaviour at elevated temperatures. To address this issue, research was conducted into the actual behaviour of isolated bare steel beams and columns, resulting in the first ever fire
design Code, BS 5950: Part S".This treats the occurrence of fire asan accidental limit state, with its own associated load and material partial
safety factors. Similar principles were adopted in the development of EC3: Part 1.26
(which covers steel structures)and E C 4 Part 1.2' (which covers composite structures).Although similar, the Eurocodes are more comprehensiveand
cover a much wider range of structural configurations.
The Structural Engineer
Volume 77/NO 8
20 April 1999
The development of the design Codes provides a more solid scientific
foundation for the provision of fire resistance to steel-framed structures.
However, the design Codes were mainly developed from standard fire tests
on isolated columns and beams. In these tests, columns are 3.0m high and
beams are 4.5m long, and the failure criteria are governed largelyby the size
of the furnace. There is general agreementasthat standard tests ignore significant structural behaviour by disregarding the interaction between members. This was shown in 1990 when a fire developed in a partly completed
14-storey office block on the Broadgate development in London'". secLarge
tions of the steel frame were totally exposed at the time
of the fire.
Investigation following the fire allowed a back-analysis of the structure to
BS 5950: Part 8. This highlighted that the Codes, although conservative,
were not addressing the true behaviour, since thebuilding was notacting as
a seriesof individual members. The nature of a localised fire, at Broadgate,
caused a zone of heated structure to expand against the surrounding cold
structure. Owing to the relative greater strength and stiffness of the surrounding cold structure, additional axial forces were induced into the heated structural zone. Considering the global structural behaviour, this caused
larger displacements in the horizontal and vertical members owing tothe P6 effect. In addition, local buckling occurred in the proximity of the connections, within the fire-affected zone. However, no signs of collapse were
Fig I . Eight-storey steel-jramed test building
15
Paper: Bailey et al
9
9000
9000
2
9000
2
9000
6000
@-I9000
@f.
6000
Indicatestestsconductedby
I,_
BRE
Indicates tests conducted byBritish Steel
Fig 2. Plan showing locatiorl ofjire tests
evident. This indicates that there was
a redistribution of load away from the
fire-affected areas, witha large inherent reserveof strength within the structure that is not considered by the present design Codes.
The main conclusion from the Broadgate
fire was the obvious lack of engineering knowledge about the behaviour of the whole structure when subjected to a fire. Therefore, although there is confidence that insulating
exposed steel or using design Codes ;c conservative, the factor of safety is
unknown. If, at present, this factor of S :‘’?ty, whenapplied to overall collapse,
is unrealistically high, it may be reduced whilst maintaining adequate levels
of safety. The saving in cost could then be used to install additional active
fire safety measures such as sprinklers. This will result in an overall safer
environment againstfire, which can be created more economically compared
with using present design methods.
To achieve this, we must fully understand
the actual overall structural behaviour
of the buildingin a fire. Realistically,
this knowledge can be obtained only
by conducting fire tests on a full-scale
building. The construction of the eight-storey steel-framed test-building”
by
the Building Research Establishment (BRE) at its Cardington Laboratory
provided a unique opportunity to conduct thesetests.
The test building
design the underlying philosophy
was to obtaina structure thatused the minimum amount of material, was simple to manufacture, and at all stagesof
construction and erection reflected normal building practice, rather
than specialist research procedures. The imposed load was achieved using sandbags,
+
each weighing 1 1 kN. This resulted in an overall applied load (dead
imposed) of 5.48kN/m2/floor.
The fire tests
A European collaborative programme
of firetests was undertaken on the test
structure. The programme was coordinated jointly by BRE and British
& Steel
Steel. Financialsupportwasprovided
by theEuropeanCoal
Community and the Department
of the Environment, Transport & the
in the programme,i.e. the Steel
Regions. Other organisations were involved
Construction Institute, TNO Building & Construction Research, Centre
Technique Industrial de la Construction Metallique. and the University of
Sheffield. In addition to the structural experimental programme,
a large
risk and hazard assessment study dealing with the development of the natural fire safety concept’’for steel-framed buildings is currently underway.
A total of six major fire tests”, which were designed to be complementary, were conducted: fourtests by British Steel and twoby BRE. These are
summarised in Table2, with the locationof the tests (on plan) shownin Fig
2. The aims of the tests were to:
The steel-framed test-building was designed and constructedto resemble a
typical modern city-centre eight-storey office development (Fig
l). On plan,
the building covers an areaof 2 1m X 45m (Fig 2), with an overall height of
- observe, under test conditions, the behaviour of the complete building
33m. There are five equally spaced bays along the length of the building.
when subjected to localised
fires (it was important to consider localised
Across the width there are three bays spaced 6m, 9m and 6m. Placed cenfires owing to the regulatory requirement
of separating multistorey
trally on the footprint of the building is a 9mx 2.5m lift core with two 4.5
buildings into fire compartments)
x 4.5m stairwells placed at each end. The sizes of the main steel members
- damage the structure in
an attempt to find the limit
of its inherent
used in the frame are shown in Table 1. The structure was designed as a
strength in a fire, which will enable the present design factor of safety
braced frame with lateral restraint provided
by cross-bracing around the
to be quantified
three vertical access shafts.The beams were designed as simply supported,
acting compositely (via shear studs) with the supported floorslab. The composite floorslab was 130mm deep and consisted
of a steel trapezoidal deck,
TABLE 2 - Summary cfthr,fire tests
with lightweight concrete and anticrack mesh. Throughout the structural
Organisation
Floor Location
Test
conducting
area
(tloor
Description
No.
TABLE l -Main steel sizes used in the test frunze
the test
level)
(m’)
Location Steel section size
1
24 One level
beam7British St
305 x 165 x 40 UB (Grade S275)
9.0m secondary beam
2
Slice across the building British53Steel level 4
610 x 229 x 101 UB (Grade S 2 7 3
356 x 17 l x 5 l UB (Grade S355)
3
4
9.0m perimeter beam
Upper internal columns 254
356 x 17 1 x 5 1 UB (Grade S 3 5 3
S
Lower internal columns
305 x 305 x 137 UC (Grade S 3 5 3
9.0m primary beam
6.0m primary beam
16
x 254 x 89 UC (Grade S 3 5 3
6
I
1
I
BRE
BritishSteel
I
~
76
Corner compartment British Steel
level 2
Corner compartment BRE S4
level 3
Large
compartment
Large compartment with
office furniture
The Structural Engineer
I
1
340
136
Volume 77/No 8
I
1
level 3
level 2
20 April 1999
Paper: Bailey et a1
- obtain
quality test data to validate,or develop further, computer models which will allow different structural andfire scenarios to be investigated, together with different sizeof fire compartment
- develop design guidance based on actual structural behaviour
1200 ,
1
Removal of
:
:
first
plane 4,
i
Presented in this paper
is adescription of the two compartmenttests carried
out by BRE, with preliminary conclusions.
-Maximum
BRE test 1 (corner compartment)
A 9.0m x 6.0m compartment was constructedin the corner of the building
(Fig 3), between the second and third floors.
The internal compartment
walls were constructed using steel stud partitions with fire-resistant board
and a deflection allowance of 1Smm. These were placed centrally on gridline E and slightly offset from gridline 3 (Fig 3). A full-height blockwork
wall on gridline F and a 1 .Om-high dado wall and double glazing on gridline 4 completed the compartment. Allsteel beams and beam-to-beam connectionswere left exposed,togetherwiththeundersideofthesteel
0
20
40
60
80
100
120 160140
trapezoidal deck. All columns were
fire protected up to the undersideof the
Time (mins)
floorslab. This was required to ensure that the compartment
fire caused
only localised damage, which will allow the rest
of the building to be used
Fig 4. Maximum and uveruge utmosphere temperutures in corner
after the fire. This is an extremely important factor from the insurer's point
compartment fire test
of view. A previous test" conducted by British Steel, where parts of the
columns were unprotected, caused disproportionate damage to the structure,
by the columns reducing in lengthby 200mm.
The compartment was totally enclosed, with all windows and doors
artito
closed. No additional ventilation was provided and no attempt made
ficially seal the compartment. In addition to investigating the exposed
steel
frame and composite floor, the behaviour
of the glazing system on the
development of the fire was also of interest. The glazing comprised a 9mwide x 3m-high, 12-pane aluminium grid. Each pane consisted of 6: 12:6
double-glazed sealed units 1.5m X 1.5m. To achieve the temperatures required to test the structure, the fire was designed on the basis of the glass
cracking in the early stages of
fire development and thus providing the
maximum ventilation possible. The behaviour of the test showed that this
assumption was incorrect, orat best an over-simplification.
A total of 12 timber cribs were used to give
a fire load of 40kg/m2. This
represents the 90% fractile value
for amodern office buiIdingl4. This means
that 90% of all the office buildings surveyed had a fire load (total combustible material) less than 40kg/m2.The compartment area, together with
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1
160
Time (mins)
One metre high dado wall
-and glazing to underside of floor above
Q
Fig 5. Muximum vertical displucement in corner compartmentfire test
9000
0
rl
5mm deflection
allowance
5mm deflection
allowance
Section A - A
Section B - B
Fig 3. Fire compartment layout of BRE corner test
The Structural Engineer
Volume 77INo 8
20 April 1999
the surrounding structure in the proximityof the compartment, was extensively instrumented. This included thermocouples, displacement transducers, clinometers, and strain gauges, together with
a laser system to measure
thermal curvature of the full-height blockwork wall on gridlineF.
After ignition the developmentof the fire was influenced by the lack of
oxygen within the compartment, owing to the glazing remaining
intact. Fig
4 shows the maximum and average recorded atmosphere temperature within the compartment. It can be seen
that, after an initial temperature rise, the
fire died down and continued to smoulder. This continued until the
fire
brigade intervened to vent the compartment
by removal of a single paneof
glazing, at 56 min into thetest. This resulted ina small increase in temperature, followed by a decrease. Flashover did not occur until
a second pane,
at a lower level, was removed(at 66 min). This initiateda sharp rise in temperature that continued as the
fire spread throughout the compartment (Fig
4). The maximum recorded atmosphere temperature in the centre
of the
compartment was 105 1°C after 102 min. The maximum steel temperature
of 903°C was recorded after1 14 min.To put this temperature into context,
the presentfire design Codes suggest that the beam will
'fail' at 680°C. The
displacement at the centre of the compartment reached a maximum of
269mm (Fig 5). Measurements taken the day after thetest showed that the
slab had recovered toa residual displacement of I60mm.
The unprotected edge beam (gridline4)was observed during thetest to
be completely engulfed infire (Fig 6). However, the beam reached a maximum temperature of only 680"C, with a corresponding maximum displacement of 52mm. This displacement was very small and attributed to the
windposts above thefire compartment that were included in thetest building. These windposts, although not incorporated directly into the design
of
the frame, acted in tension, providing considerable support to the weakening edge beam.
The unprotected steel beams above the compartment walls on gridlines
17
Paper: Bailey et a1
Fig 6. Developingjre in corner compartment test
Fig 8. Distortionally buckled beam (compartment has been removed)
9000
Double glazing
(middle 113 left open)
$
1
Fig 7. Stud partition compartment wall following thejre
E and 3 had nominal vertical displacement, resulting in the stud partition
walls retaining their integrity during the fire. Fig 7 shows the stud partition
intact following the fire. The beam ongridline 3 buckled distortionally during the test (Fig
8). This was attributed to thebeam being heated on
one side,
together with restraint preventing thermal expansion, provided by the surrounding structure (including the stair wellkorearea). Although the beam
on gridline E was also heated from one side only, it had nominal restraint
to thermal expansion and therefore did not buckle.
Overall, the damage to the structure was extremely localised, which will
allow remedial works to be carried out quickly and with little disruption to
the rest of the building. Allconnections remained intact during both the heating and cooling phases of the fire.
Although the columns within the compartment were protected, strain
gauges indicated that additional moments were induced into the columns.
The values of these moments were in the range of 20-30% of the ultimate
moment capacity of the columns. The structural behaviour involved in
developing this increase in moment is not yetfully understood. One possible explanation is that the columns, owing to their location, had a thermal
18
9000
0
*
W
I
15mm deflection
allowance
I1
Section A
-A
Fig 9. Fire compartment layout ofBRE large compartment fire test
gradient through their cross-section. Restraint to this thermal gradient from
the continuation of the column aboveand below the fire compartment could,
in part, account for these induced moments. Additionally, the
thermal expansion of the adjacent heated beams could have laterally displaced the
columns, thus inducing restraining moments. This lateral movement would
have also increased the column moment due to the
P-6 effect. This presents
some feasible explanations of the possible structural behaviour that may
have resulted inthe high induced column moments measured
during the test.
Further work, involving computer simulations, is under way to try to identify the predominant cause of these additional column moments.
The Structural Engineer Volume 77/NO 8
20
April 1999
Paper: Bailey et al
BRE test 2 (large compartment test)
A compartment was constructed between the second and third floors,
extending over the full width of the building, between gridline A and 0.5m
from gridline C (Fig 9). The total floor area of the compartment was 340m2.
The same fire load as the previous test (40kg/m2) was placed in the compartment in the form of 42 wooden cribs. The compartment was formed by
constructing a fire-resistant stud partition wall across the width of the building, and also around the vertical access shafts. Double glazing was installed
on two sides of the building on gridlines 1 and 4. Unlike the previous test,
it was decided to leave the middle third of the glazing open on both sides
of the building. This was to allowsufficient ventilation for the fire to develOP.
All steel beams, including edge beams, were left unprotected. Beam-tobeam connections were also exposed, together with the underside of thesteel
trapezoidal deck of the composite floor. The columns were once again protected up to the underside of the floor, to limit the structural damage to the
compartment area.
In a manner similar to the previous test the ventilation conditions governed the development and severity of the fire. Rapidignition resulted in the
windows breakingduring the early part ofthe test. This resulted in a fire scenario where the maximum temperature reached wasfairly low, butthe duration at which the maximum
temperature occurred was much longer (Fig 10).
This is fairly
a
severe scenario forthe behaviour of the composite floor, due
to the heat transfer through the concrete to the mesh reinforcement.This will
reduce the strength of the reinforcement, which is the main component of
resistance in these types of floor. Obviously, a fire with higher temperatures
which remains constant for a long duration will be even more severe. The
800.
fire produced a maximum atmosphere temperature of 763°C and a maximum steel temperature of 691 This
"C.resulted in a maximum displacement
of 557mm, which was measured halfway between gridlines 2 to 3 and B to
C. This recovered to a residual displacement of 48 1mm, once the structure
had cooled.
Fig 1 1 shows the deformed structure in the latter stages of the fire. No
signs of possible collapse are evident,and overall the structure performed
very well. However, there was some interesting localised behaviour that
merits further discussion. Most internal beams showed signs of local buckling in the lower flange, and part of the web, in the proximity of the connections (Fig 12). It wasfelt that this was caused by the restraint to thermal
Fig 12. Typical localbuckling of beams in the proximity ojthe connections
700
a
600
Y
F
/-.
500
Shear capacity of connection
maintained by unfractured
side of plate
a,
400
L
2
g 300
U)
z
200
Tensile force induced
during cooling
100
0
-0
20
40
60
80
l00
Time (mins)
l20
140
1fio
\
Typical fraiure in end-plate
occuring during cooling
Fig IO. Maximum and average atmosphere temperaturesin large comart
mentjre test
Fig 13. Typical fractureof endplate during cooling
Fig 11. Large compartment test withdevelopedjre
Fig 14. Damage to stud partition compartment wall following thejire
TheStructural Engineer
Volume 77/No 8
20 April 1999
19
Paper: Bailey et a1
f
-F
1-
Tension
zone
A
Fig 15. Possible structuralmechanism in the composite floor (tensile
membrane action)
we reached the limit of the inherent strength of the frame, which was one
of the major aims. Is it possible that the temperatures could have reached
higher values?This is a question that needs
to be answered by possible computer modelling..
Undoubtedly, the major contribution to the survival ofthe frame was the
composite floor. This performed extremely well during all the tests, reinforcing the results from previous small-scale tests, which have shown that
this type of floor has a good inherent
fire resistance. During each test,
as the
beams increased in temperature and lost a large proportion of their loadcarrying capacity, the composite
slab supported the applied load over
the fire
compartment area. In the first instance this was achieved by utilising the
slab’s full moment capacity,
as the supporting steel beams lost their strength.
As the temperatures continued to rise and the supporting beams had nominal strength, the slab utilised its tensile membrane action through its mesh
reinforcement. In the case where there is no horizontal restraint (i.e.slab at
an edge of a building), a compressive membrane
ring will form around the
area of slab which is in tensile membrane action, as shown in Fig 15.
Research work has begun to look at the contribution of tensile membrane
action of the slabl6. It is hoped that this work will allow a fuller understanding of the mechanism and define
the span (orsize of fire compartment)
limits.
In addition to investigating tensile membrane action, detailed computer
models are being developedlvalidated. Fig 16 shows the prediction of the
BRE corner compartment fire test, using a finiteelement computer model.
Full comparisons between the model and test results have been presented
in detail elsewhere”.Once the models have beenfully developed, different
fire and structural scenarios can be investigated, which will enable design
guides to be produced.
Conclusions
0
Fig 16. Computer simulation(at maximum temperature) of the cornerfire test
expansion and the negativemoment caused by the rotational restraint from
the surthe connection. The restraint to thermal expansion was provided by
rounding cold structure, together with differential heating through
the compartment. The connections also showed signs of being subjected to high
tensile forces. In the partial depth endplates
the plate had fractured down
one
side (Fig 13) and, in one instance, the web had fractured. In the finplates
(beam-to-beam connections) the bolts had sheared.The high tensile forces
were induced during the cooling phase of the fire.This was caused by the
steel beam, which has restraint against thermal expansion, cooling down
from a plastic state. This behaviour has also been shown analytically and
presented in detail elsewhere”.
The stud partition wall parallel to gridline C had 15mm deflection
allowance. The deflection ofthe slab was greater thanthis value and caused
integrity failure of the compartment wall (Fig 14). In a fire failure of the
compartment walls must be avoided and therefore
the wall must be designed
to accommodate the deflection ofthe structure or placed on gridlines (under
beam positions) wherethe deflection will be less, as shown from the previous test.
Similar to the previous test, the strain gauges on the protected columns
indicated high induced moments during the test. As explained previously,
the exact structural behaviour thatcauses these column moments is not yet
fully understood. Further work is currently being conductedto investigate
the behaviour of the tested protected columns.
From the observations of the two tests presented in this paper, the following conclusions are drawn.
( I ) No collapse was evident, even though the unprotected beams reached
temperatures over 900°C (temperatures over 1100°C were reached in the
British Steel tests).
(2) Existing fire design Codes
are too conservative, predicting structural collapse at 680°C.
(3) Only localised damage occurred, provided thatcolumns were protected
over their full length.
(4) Non-loadbearing compartment walls placed on the gridlines (i.e. under
steel beams) performed well.
( 5 ) Non-loadbearing walls placed off the
gridlines showed signs of integrity failure owingto the deflection of the structure. Walls will have to be spec
ified with an adequate deflection allowanceor placed on gridlines.
(6) The behaviour of the structure was differentand better than that shown
in standard fire tests.
(7) Local buckling typically occurred in
the heated steel beams in the proximity of the connections. Therefore, conservatively,
the connections should
be assumed to be pinned in afire design.
(8) The behaviour of theconnections during cooling needs to be addressed.
This may result in the need to specify more ductile connections to ensure
shear capacity following a fire.
(9) Thecomposite slab was extremely beneficial
to the survivalof the frame.
It was felt that this was due to the tensile membrane capacity of the slab,
which requires further investigation.
It must be emphasised that
the above conclusions apply only to buildings
of the same form as the test building.Computer models are being developed
to investigate different structural layouts, member sizes, compartment sizes,
etc., together with different fire scenarios. Once this investigation is complete, comprehensive design guidancecan be produced.
It is envisaged that most, if not all,steel beams could be left unprotected. The saving from not using passive fire resistance in terms of material c
and time required to fidapply the protection could be used to provide active
fire measures (such as sprinklers). This will inevitably create overall safer
buildings.
Acknowledgements
Discussion and utilisation of the test results
These two tests, together withthe four British Steel tests, have shown comprehensively thatthe existing design Codes are conservativeby calculating
structural collapse when the beam steel temperature reaches 680°C. The
maximum steel temperature in the BRE tests was 903”C, and in the British
Steel tests” the maximum steel temperature was above 1100°C. There was
no sign of collapse in any ofthe tests. This raises the question of whether
20
Financial support for the work presented in this paper was provided by
the
Department ofthe Environment, Transport& the Regions. This is gratefully acknowledged.
References
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Paper: Bailey et al
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The Structural Engineer
Volume 77/No 8
20 April 1999
21