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WhatisConsciousness? Anintroduction Thereissomethingthatitisliketobeconscious.Itisauniqueexperienceandcannotbedescribed easily.Itisnotpossibletocharacterizeitinanyphysicalterms;infacttodescribeconsciousnessone requiresadjectiveswhichareonlyrelatedtobeingconscious.Weconstantlyseekwordstosumitup butendupinacircularstate.Itseemstobeinadifferentcategorycompletelyfromtherestofour worldorevenouruniverse.Andthisisperhapsthegreatestdifficultyinthephilosophyof consciousness:howcanweworkouthowsomethingphysicalsuchasourbrainscouldproducesuch aphenomenon? Consciousnessisnotthesameasbeingawake,becausewecanhaveconsciousthoughtswhenwe aredreaming.Also,itdoesnotcorrelatewithmymedicaltrainingaboutconsciousness,inwhichwe measurelevelsofconsciousnessinsickpatients. Inmanywaysweareunconsciousofbeingconscious.Weareabitlikefishswimminginwater;itis theirentireworldandyetitispossibletoimaginethemnotrealizingthatwaterevenexists.Itisso normaltobeconsciousthatwetendtoignorethefactthatitisanamazingandwonderfulthing.We takeitforgranteduntilweareaskedtodescribeit. PrivateAccess Oneofthedefiningfeaturesofconsciousstatesisthattheyareaprivateworld.Onlyyouare privilegedtoknowthethoughtsthatyouhave–nooneelsecanhavethem.Itissubjectiveandno matterhowskilledIamatdescribingmythoughtstoyou,Icannotreallyconveythemproperly.We alwaysrefertoexamplesofourownthoughtsinordertotrytounderstandthethoughtsofothers. Infactthereisaninterestingphilosophicalargumentthatyoumightliketoponderanditgoeslike this: 1/Mentalstatescanonlybeprivatelyaccessed. 2/Nophysicalstatecanbeprivatelyaccessed. 3/Thereforementalstatesarenotphysicalstates. Actuallythatmightseemobvious,butmanyphilosopherswouldarguethatinfactmentalstatesare justphysicalandthatitisanillusiontothinkotherwise.Youmightbeaskingyourselfwhythey wouldsaythis.Itisbecausemanypeoplehaveaworldviewthatsaysthereisnothingmorethanthe physicalintheuniverse,justmatter,energyandtime.Youmightexpectphilosopherstohaveamore rigorousmeansofdecidingthis,butaprioriworldviewsdoseemtoheavilyinfluencethedebateon themind. Personhood Consciousnessinvolvesasenseofpersonhood.IknowwhoIamasanindividualperson.Nowthis mighttaketimetodevelopinchildrenbutthereisnodoubtthataspersonsweareuniquelyaware ofourindividuality.Thereisacontinuityinmylife;IamthesamepersonthatIwas10yearsago.I mighthavechangedbutIamthesameuniqueindividual.Westruggletoimaginehowanyphysical objectormachine,howevercomplex,couldhavethissenseofpersonhood.Itisnotjustthatthereis thecontinuitybetweenmyselfnowandasIwasyearsago,itismuchmorethanthat.Havingafirst personknowledgeof“me”issomethingnooneelsecanhaveandwhichhasaphenomenalquality thatalmostdefiesdescription.Andofcourseweknowthisaboutotherstoo;ourfriendsandfamily arepersonsintheirownrightwhoareindividualsthatweinstinctivelyfeelarenotphysicalbut entirelyanduniquely‘them’.WhenIspeakwithorwritetosomeone,IdonotbelieveIam addressingaphysicalobject.Iamaddressingaperson. Artificialintelligence(AI)enthusiastswillmaintainthatsomemachinesbehavelikepersonsand thereforecannotbesaidtobeanydifferent.Butthedifferenceisobvious;machinesare programmedbyustoappearasiftheyarepersonswhentheyareclearlynot.Whenmycomputer speakstomeortheSatNavdirectsmetoturnrightatthenextroundabout,Imayliketofantasise aboutthemachinebeinganactualpersonbutIwouldofcoursebeentirelywrong.AImaydo wonderfulthingsbutthemostadvancedformsaremerelycopiesofwhatwedo,andnotindividuals intheirownright.JohnSearleinaclassicpaperhasdismissedthepossibilityofcomputersbecoming conscious.1 Sensations Consciousnessinvolvessensations.Forexample,thewayinwhichIexperiencethecolourblue. Thereisa‘blueness’aboutbluethatitnotmerelyregisteringcertainwavelengthsoflight(asa machinemightdo).ThereisthesmellofsomethingsuchasthecoffeeImadethismorning.Thereis thesoundofthewindIamhearingaroundthisbuildingIamin.Thereattimesmaybeanitchora painsomewhereinmybody.Suchexperiencesofsensationsareknownasqualiainphilosophical language. IfwegobacktotheexperienceIhaveofseeingthecolourblue,forexample;thereissomething verydeepgoingon.Idonotmerelyregisterawavelength,Ihaveauniqueexperience.Onceagainit ishelpfultocontrastthiswithwhathappenswitharobotwhichregistersblue(byanalysing wavelengthsoflight).Therobotmightevenspeakandsay“wow,thatisawonderfulblue!”.Butthe robotwillnothavehadanyexperienceofblueatall,merelyregisteringawavelengthand convertingthedataintospeechviapre-programmedzeroandones. Wehavetoaskourselvesthereforewhethertheexperience,thequalia,ofseeingacolourisanonmaterialevent.Materialism,(whichhasnothingtodowithshopping),istheviewthatallthatthere isintheuniverseismatterandenergy.Whatwesensestronglyandmayevenconclude,isthat consciousexperiencessuchasqualiaarenon-materialevents.Thisisknownas“TheHardProblem” ofphilosophyofmind,aphrasefromthephilosopherDavidChalmers.2 1 Searle, John. 1983. Can computers Think? From Minds, Brains and Science, pp. 28-41. Harvard University Press. 2 Chalmers, David. Consciousness and its Place in Nature. From Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 2002 ThereisafamousthoughtexperimentbythephilosopherFrankJacksonknownas‘Mary’sroom’.3 Maryisaneuro-scientistwhoknowsabsolutelyeverythingaboutvision.Infactsheknowsevery physicalfactabouttheprocessdowntothesub-atomiclevel.Yet,Maryhasbeenbroughtupand stayedinaroomthatisentirelyblackandwhitewithnocolour,allherlife.Shehasneverseen colour.Sheofcourseknowsallthatthereisabouttheprocessofcolourvisionbutnever experiencedit. Sheisthenbroughtoutofherroomandsheexperiencescolourintheworldaroundher.Thisisa completelynewexperience.Shehasaddedtoherknowledgeofvisiontheactualphenomenal experienceofcolourvision.Thisisanewformofknowledge.Wecanstatethesituationasfollows: 1/.Maryknowsallthephysicalfacts 2/Marydoesnotknowallthefacts. 3/Thephysicalfactsdonotexhaustallthefacts. 4/Materialismisthereforefalse. Materialismisthebeliefthattheonlythingsintheuniversearepurelyphysicalones.Itseems,from Mary’sexperience,thatsuchabeliefisfalsebecausetheconsciousexperienceofcolourvision cannotbereducedtosomethingphysical.Philosophersdoargueoverthisendlesslybutmanywould indeedagreewiththisassessment. Correlationofpersonandbrain Thethoughtexperiment‘Mary’sRoom’bringsuptheissueofbrainactivityandconsciousness.For everythoughtthereissomeactivityofthebrainassociatedorcorrelatedwithit.Wecanseethis withMRIscans.Thebigquestionisthis:istheneuronalactivityallthereisorisitmerelycorrelated withconsciousness? WhenmycarisdrivenfromAtoBitistakingpartinthejourney.Butthatisnotallthereis;itisI whoamdrivingit.Whatifanythingdrivesthebrain? Emotions Consciousnessofcoursealsoinvolvesemotionssuchassadness,fear,anger,hopesandlove.These aredeeplypersonalandreal.Infactlikeallofconsciousness,itisverydifficulttocategorizesuch emotionswithanyformofphysicalorderorterminology. Emotionsare‘about’somethingandtheyhavecontent.This‘aboutness’isknownasintentionality amongphilosophers.Canthesethoughtsbemerelyphysical?Howcanaphysicalobjectbeabout something?Whenwelookatphysicalthingsintheuniverseweknowthattheyexistandthey interactwithotherphysicalthings.Theymayhavecomplexrelationships-thinkoftheweather systemsforinstance,orthewaymoleculesinteractinthehumanbody.Howeverwecannotsaythat anyofthesethingsare‘about’anythingotherthanthattheyexistinsuchrelationships.Anemotion, incontrasthasaboutness–suchasthegriefafterlosingalovedoneortheangertowardsthatbully atschoolortheloveforthatpersonyouwanttomarry. Emotionsarealsosurelydistinctfromphysicaleventsinthattheyhaveclearandnon-physical attributeswhenwefeelthem.Thisislikethediscussionwehadaboutqualia;thereissomethingitis liketohaveanemotionsuchasjoy.Joyisuniquelypersonalanditishardtoseehowitcouldbe reducedtosomethingphysical. 3 Jackson,Frank.‘EpiphenomenalQualia’.PhilosophicalQuaterly.(1982)32:127-136 Beliefs Beliefsareanessentialpartofourconsciouslivesandalsohavethissenseof‘aboutness’.IfIbelieve thatTolstoyisabetterwriterthanDickens,thenIammorelikelytoreadhisnovels.Thisbeliefmay perhapsbejustifiedbymegivingexamplesofbothwritersandanalysingthem.Butintheendmy beliefthatTolstoyisbetteratwritingisasubjectivethingthatisnotreducibletofactsorindeed anythingphysical.Abeliefstandsonitsownsomehow.Howcoulditbereducibletoneurones signallingoneanother–evenifsuchneuronalactivityiscorrelatedstronglywithhavingthebelief? Canaphysicaleventoreventsinmybraincanhavebeliefs? Wealsohavethequestionofwhetherabeliefcanaffectthebraininordertodosomething(suchas bringmyumbrella).Ifabeliefisnotphysicalthenhowcanitaffectsomethingphysicalsuchasthe brain? Thisis‘the’crunchquestioninphilosophyofmind;cananon-physicalthingsuchasaconscious beliefhaveanyeffectonaphysicalobjectsuchasthebrain? Free-will Asindividualswehaveastrongsensethatwehavechoiceandcanfreelydecidetododifferent things.Assuchwebelieve,rightlyornot,thatwehaveadegreeofautonomy.Wehaveasensethat wecanchoosetobuyacertainarticleortogouptosomeonetospeaktothem,forexample.We awardpeoplewhochoosetodobravethingsinwar,andgivethemmedals,becausewefeelthey couldhavechosentodootherwise.Wepunishpeoplewhodobadthingsbecausewebelievethey couldhavechosenanothercourse. Thebigquestioniswhetherapurelyphysicalobjectsuchasthebrain,howevercomplex,couldhave free-will.Thereasonthisiscontroversialisthatanypurelyphysicalsystemissubjecttothelawsof physicsandcannotdootherwisethanwhatitdoes.Externalphysicalconditionsmayaffectthe outcome,butthereisnofreedomthatwecanseewithinsuchapurelyphysicalstate.Andquantum randomnessattheatomicleveldoesnothelptoexplainfree-will,becausebeingrandommeansa lackofanyautonomyorrealchoice. Ifwereallydohaveautonomytochoose,thenthisisamassiveargumentforthenon-material natureofthemind. Morality Whilenotstrictlypartofphilosophyofmind,moralandethicalthoughtsarecentraltoourvery nature.Allofus,apartfromveryfewexceptions,willarguestrenuouslyforourmoralvalues.These arefirmlyheldpositionsonsuchthingsasfairness,equality,benevolence,justiceandhumanrights (forexample).Wemightdifferonthedetailsbutwewillagreeonthebasicmoralpositions.Mostof uswouldagreethatitissimplywrongtocheatinexamsortocommitmurder.Wetakesuchviews forgranted,andwegenerallyholdthemasabsolutes.Theyarepartofourconsciousnessbutthese areviewsabouttheworldandotherswhichwefeelareoutsideofus.Theydonotdependonour particularstateofmind;murderiswrong–whetheryouorIthinksoornot. Wheredosuchvaluescomefrom?Thematerialistwillattempttoinvokesuchthingsassocial Darwinism(itisgoodfortheextendedkinandthusgenesurvival).Bydoingsotheydemotesuch moralitytomeresurvivaltactics,ratherthantoanythinguniversal. Andsoifyouthinkmurderiswrongperse,youarealreadyshowingastrongleaningtowards somethingimmaterialanduniversalinthewaywethink.Wheredosuchuniversalvaluescome from? Monismanddualism Itisworthdefiningsomephilosophicalwordsthatrepeatedlycropup. Monismistheviewthatthemindisentirelyonesubstance.‘Substance’inthesediscussionsdoes notrefertoonlyphysicalthingsbutcanrefertononphysicalthings(suchasthepossiblenonphysicalmind). Dualismistheviewthatthemindisdistinctfromthebrainorbodyandisnotreducibletocertain formsofneuronalbrainactivity.Ittendstocomeintwoforms: Propertydualismholdsthatthoughdistinctfromthebrain,consciousnessisentirelyaproductof physicalbrainactivity.Thetermusedisoften‘supervenience’.Themindissupervenientonthe brain,andisinthissenseimmaterial,butisentirelyaproductofthephysicalneuronsandcannot existindependentofthem. Substancedualism,whichistheviewthatwasheldbythephilosopherDescartes4,saysthatthe mindisdistinctandisadifferent‘substance’fromthebrain.Itisanon-physicalsubstance.It interactswiththebrainandiscloselylinkedtothebrainbutcanexistwithoutbrainactivity.The interactionsithaswiththebrainarebothways;thebraincanactonthemindandthemindonthe brain. Substancedualismholdsthatthereisinfactsomethingwemightcallasoulineachofus.Thesoulis theactualpersonandisautonomousinthatthesoulhasfree-willandisnotdependentonthe physicalbrainfordecisions. Aswegetdeeperintothestudyofconsciousnesswerealizefairlyquicklythatitissomethingto wonderatandappreciate.. __________________________________________________________________________________ DISCUSSIONTRIGGERPOINTS SEEENDOFNEXTPAPER 4 Descartes, René. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 1985 Mind-theGap. Anoutlineofthemainphilosophicalpositionsheldaboutthemind Themindisacuriousthing.Whatisit?Justaproductoftheelectrochemicalcircuitryofthebrain? Thematerialistwillsaysoandmanyaneuroscientist,withMRIscannerathand,willshowussome lit-upareasofourbrainscorrespondingtoparticularthoughts.Isthatitthen?Isthatconscious thought? Well–itisclearlynotassimpleasthat.Thisarticleisarapidtourofthemainphilosophical positionsconcerningthemindoverthepastfewcenturies.Asamereintroductionitmaywhet appetitestoreadtheoriginalworksofsomefineminds. LetusstartwithDescartes(1596-1650).Inhis‘Meditations’1hecametothestrongdualist conclusionthatthemindisdistinctfromthebody(whichincludesthebrain).Greekphilosophers heldsimilardualistviews.Asa‘thinkingthing’Descartesconcludedthateverythingphysicalis ‘extended’–inotherwordsthebodyandallelsethatismaterialhasdimensions;somethingthe mindlacks.Healsoconcludedthatthemindwasindivisible,whereasallmaterialthingsare divisible.Thesethoughtsmadehimcertainthatthemindisnotmaterial;evenifintimatelylinked toand‘intermingledwith’thebrain.Hisphilosophyofmindremainspowerfulandmanyofthe twistsandturnsofmodernphilosophyarebasedontheideathathemustbewrong;howcoulda non-materialmindhavecausaleffectonthematerialbody?Hisclaimthatthemindisindivisibleis supported,interestingly,bycertainformsofneuro-surgery.2WhentheCorpusCallosum(the bundleofnervefibresconnectingthetwobrainhemispheres)issevered,thehemispheresare isolatedfromoneanotherandyetthishasnoeffectontheintegrityofanysuchpatient’s personalityorcontinuityasoneperson. Leibniz(1646-1716)feltmuchthesameasDescartesandremarkedthatifonewastogointoa pieceofmachinery,suchasanenormousmill,wecouldnotthereinfindanyevidenceforthought –helikenedthistousenteringintothebrainandlookingamongstthe‘machinery’for thoughts.3Wewouldnotfindthem.Whichatleastmakesussitupandaskourselves–whereis consciousnesswithinaphysicalsystem? Withtheadvanceofan‘enlightened’materialisminthe20thcenturytherewasavoguewithinthe logicalpositivistschoolofphilosophyforabehaviouristapproachtothemind.4Thiswasan attempttomakescientificandmeasurableanystatementwemighthaveaboutthoughts. Essentially,accordingtothisview,(nowconsideredfalsebymost),wecanonlymeasureandknow themindthroughobservationofaperson’sbehaviour.Indeedsuchbehaviourwasconsideredto bealltherewastothemind.Apainthereforecouldbesimplyacombinationofscreaming,wincing andwithdrawing.Whatthebehaviouristsleftouthoweverwastheveryessenceofthought,which isaninternalprocessthatisexperienced. TypeIdentitytheoryisaviewthathasheldswaywithmanyphilosophersofmind.Thisholdsthat anexperiencesuchasapainsimplyisthefiringofcertainnervefibres(suchasCfibres).5Inother wordsthepainisidenticaltothenervefibresfiring.Thisisnowconsideredunlikelybymost, particularlysincetheworkofKripke,(1940-)6,whoarguesconvincinglythatitisverylikelythat suchathingaspaincouldoccurwithoutthoseexactCfibresfiring(suchasinanalienwhodoes nothaveCfibres).Likewise,hearguesconvincinglythatitismorethanlikelythatsuchabrain eventasCfibresfiringcouldoccurwithoutanypain. ThephilosophicalviewknownasFunctionalismhasprevailedinsomequarters.7Thisholdsthata mentalstateisafunctionalstateofthewholeorganism.Inotherwordsitissomethingthatoccurs whencertaininternalstates,withtheircausalrelationships,occuralongwiththeinputsand outputsthattheorganismexperiences.Thisrathermechanisticviewhashoweverbeenmoreor lessabandoned,particularlysinceNedBlock(1942-)illustrated(inhisfamous‘Chinesethought experiment’)howonecouldreproducetheexactfunctionalstateswithoutanythoughtoccurring.8 Davidson(1917-2003)isknownforhisAnomolousMonism.9Theproblemhetriedtotacklewas this: 1/Themindiscausal,inotherwordsthoughtscancausethingstohappenintheworld.Hegives theexampleofasubmarinecommanderdecidingtofireatorpedo. 2/Causalityintheuniverseimplieslawsthatmustexisttoaccountforonethingcausinganother. 3/Themindhoweverisnotboundbylawbutisfree. Nowclearlytheseobservationsareincompatible.WhatDavidsontriedtodowastofreethemind fromthebrutephysicalstateofbrainevents.Heproposedthatthemindis‘supervenient’;thatis producedbyphysicalbraineventsbutnotthesameasthem.Thissupervenientmindistherefore somehowfreefromphysicallaws.Kimhoweverhasconvincedmostthatthiscannotwork;ifthe brainstate,whichisphysical,producesthought,thenthethoughtisinseparablylinkedtothe physicalandcouldnotbefree.10 Eliminativismisanextremematerialistview.Itschiefproponent,PaulChurchland(1942-), maintainsthatneurosciencewilleliminateallpsychologicalconceptsaswecometounderstand theprecisescienceofthebrain.11Assuchthereisnosuchthingasthemind–simplyneurological events.Thisreductionistaccountofthoughtleavesonecoldhowever.Howcanlovebereducedto nerveactionpotentials?Howcouldabelief(thateliminativismistrue,forinstance)bemerelythe firingofneurons?Indeed,couldsuchabeliefbeeithertrueorfalse? Epiphenomenalismisadualistpositioninthatitholdsthemindtobenon-physicalanddistinct fromthebrain.12However,thoughthemindisproducedbythebrain(andiscausallyinfluencedby it),themindhasnocausaleffectonthephysicalbrainorbody.Assuchthisviewpreservesthe ideathatonlyphysicalthingscanactonthephysical.ContrastthiswithDescartes’dualismwhich demandsthatthereiscausalinteractionbetweenmentalandphysical−mentalthingsbothcause andarecausedbyphysicalthings.AsIhavesaid,muchofsubsequentphilosophy,including epiphenomenalism,isanefforttoavoidDescartes’ideathatanon-physicalmindcouldhave causaleffectonthephysical.However,epiphenomenalismleavesthemindinanunsatisfactory limbo–inertandunabletocauseanything.Thisdefiesourcommonexperience. DavidChalmers(1966-)callsconsciousnessthe‘hardproblem’ofphilosophyofmind.13Chalmers particularlyconcentrateson‘qualia’;thesubjectivequalitiesofconsciousexperience(suchaswhat youexperiencewhenyousmellarose,seethecolourredorenjoyagoodwine).Qualiaseem irreducibletomereneurologicalevents.Theyaredistinctpersonalexperiencesthataredifferent toanythingelse.Arobotthatsensescolourwouldnothavequalia–merelytheregistrationof certainwavelengthsoflight. Whataboutcomputersandartificialintelligence?Canwenotenvisagethemhaving consciousness?Actuallytheanswerappearstobeaclear“No!”JohnSearle(1932-),inhismost famouspaper‘Cancomputersthink?’14showsusthatnomatterhowadvancedacomputeris,the informationitholdsandprocessesisderived(fromus)andisbasedondigitalsymbolswhich cannotinvolvetheconsciousnessweexperience. Thereisthenthequestionoffree-will.Thisisaseriouschallengetothematerialistwhoofcourse hastoagreetothemindbeingentirelydependantonthephysicsofthebrainanditsenvironment. Assuchitcannotbefreebecauseeverybraineventisdeterminedbypriorphysicalstates. Quantumrandomnessdoesnothelphereeither,becausethereisnoautonomyorfree-willin completerandomness.15Manyphilosophershavethereforeconcludedthatourthoughtsare entirelydeterminedandourfreedom(andindeedallresponsibility)isillusory.Anyonewho upholdsfree-willis,likeitornot,defendingadualist,non-materialmind. Thematerialistparadigm,whichdemandstheabandonmentofanysortofCartesiandualism,is basedonapriorassumptionthatonlythephysicalcanactonthephysical.Itisanunproven worldviewandonewhichisseriouslythreatenedbywhatwenowknowabouttheuniverse;its finetuningandtheevidenceforafirst,necessarilyimmaterial,cause. Themindisstillverymuchanenigma.Arewemachinesandnothingmore?Orarewewillingto accept,withDescartes,thatthemindissomethingquitedifferent?Howweseethehumanrace andourselvesaspersonscriticallydependsonthesequestions. AntonyLatham DISCUSSIONTRIGGERPOINTS 1. Whatreactiondoyouhavetoanyaspectoftheinformationgivenineitherpaper? 2. Whatrelevancedoyoufindthereisinthismaterialtothe‘Godquestion’? 3. Doyouthinkthatholdingtheviewthatthesoulisentirelyseparatefromphysicalaspects ofthebodyshouldbefundamentallyimportantinatheisticworldview? 1 Descartes,René.1641.MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.CambridgeUniversityPress.1985 2 BogenIE:Physiologicalconsequencesofcompleteorpartialcommissuralsection,inApuzzoMLJ (ed):SurgeryoftheThirdVentricle,2nded.Baltimore,Md:Williams&Wilkins,1997 3 Monadology17.InLeibnizSelections,ed.PhilipWeiner(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1951), p.536. 4 Carnap,Rudolph.1932.PsychologyinPhysicalLanguage.OriginallypublishedinErkenntnis, 3:107-42,1932/33.Behaviourismisepitomisedinthisclassicpaper. 5 PlaceU.T.Isconsciousnessabrainprocess?BritishJournalofPsychology47:44-50,1956. 6 KripkeS.A.1980.NamingandNecessity,pp.144-55.HarvardUniversityPress. 7 Putnam,Hilary.1973.TheNatureofMentalStates.Originally“PsychologicalPredicates”,inArt, MindandReligionpp.37-48.Univ.OfPittsburghPress.AclassicpapersupportingFunctionalism. 8 Block,Ned.TroubleswithfunctionalismInC.W.Savage,ed.,PerceptionandCognition(University ofMinnesotaPress,1978). 9 Davidson,Donald.1970InL.Foster&J.Swanson,eds.,ExperienceandTheory,pp.79-101. HumanitiesPress. 10 Kim,Jaegwon.FromMindinaPhysicalWorld(MITPress,1998),pp.29-47 11 Churchland,Paul.EliminativeMaterialismandthePropositionalAttitudes.FromJournalof Philosophy78:67-90,1981 12 Jackson,Frank.EpiphenomenalQualia.PhilosophicalQuarterly32:127-136,1982 13 Chalmers,David.ConsciousnessanditsPlaceinNature.FromBlackwellGuidetothePhilosophy ofMind.Blackwell.2002 14 Searle,John.1983.CancomputersThink?FromMinds,BrainsandScience,pp.28-41.Harvard UniversityPress. 15 SeeSwinburne,Richard.1986.TheEvolutionoftheSoul.OxfordUniversityPress.P.239–246. Forhelpfuldiscussionaboutquantumeffectsonfreewill.