Download What is Consciousness?

WhatisConsciousness?
Anintroduction
Thereissomethingthatitisliketobeconscious.Itisauniqueexperienceandcannotbedescribed
easily.Itisnotpossibletocharacterizeitinanyphysicalterms;infacttodescribeconsciousnessone
requiresadjectiveswhichareonlyrelatedtobeingconscious.Weconstantlyseekwordstosumitup
butendupinacircularstate.Itseemstobeinadifferentcategorycompletelyfromtherestofour
worldorevenouruniverse.Andthisisperhapsthegreatestdifficultyinthephilosophyof
consciousness:howcanweworkouthowsomethingphysicalsuchasourbrainscouldproducesuch
aphenomenon?
Consciousnessisnotthesameasbeingawake,becausewecanhaveconsciousthoughtswhenwe
aredreaming.Also,itdoesnotcorrelatewithmymedicaltrainingaboutconsciousness,inwhichwe
measurelevelsofconsciousnessinsickpatients.
Inmanywaysweareunconsciousofbeingconscious.Weareabitlikefishswimminginwater;itis
theirentireworldandyetitispossibletoimaginethemnotrealizingthatwaterevenexists.Itisso
normaltobeconsciousthatwetendtoignorethefactthatitisanamazingandwonderfulthing.We
takeitforgranteduntilweareaskedtodescribeit.
PrivateAccess
Oneofthedefiningfeaturesofconsciousstatesisthattheyareaprivateworld.Onlyyouare
privilegedtoknowthethoughtsthatyouhave–nooneelsecanhavethem.Itissubjectiveandno
matterhowskilledIamatdescribingmythoughtstoyou,Icannotreallyconveythemproperly.We
alwaysrefertoexamplesofourownthoughtsinordertotrytounderstandthethoughtsofothers.
Infactthereisaninterestingphilosophicalargumentthatyoumightliketoponderanditgoeslike
this:
1/Mentalstatescanonlybeprivatelyaccessed.
2/Nophysicalstatecanbeprivatelyaccessed.
3/Thereforementalstatesarenotphysicalstates.
Actuallythatmightseemobvious,butmanyphilosopherswouldarguethatinfactmentalstatesare
justphysicalandthatitisanillusiontothinkotherwise.Youmightbeaskingyourselfwhythey
wouldsaythis.Itisbecausemanypeoplehaveaworldviewthatsaysthereisnothingmorethanthe
physicalintheuniverse,justmatter,energyandtime.Youmightexpectphilosopherstohaveamore
rigorousmeansofdecidingthis,butaprioriworldviewsdoseemtoheavilyinfluencethedebateon
themind.
Personhood
Consciousnessinvolvesasenseofpersonhood.IknowwhoIamasanindividualperson.Nowthis
mighttaketimetodevelopinchildrenbutthereisnodoubtthataspersonsweareuniquelyaware
ofourindividuality.Thereisacontinuityinmylife;IamthesamepersonthatIwas10yearsago.I
mighthavechangedbutIamthesameuniqueindividual.Westruggletoimaginehowanyphysical
objectormachine,howevercomplex,couldhavethissenseofpersonhood.Itisnotjustthatthereis
thecontinuitybetweenmyselfnowandasIwasyearsago,itismuchmorethanthat.Havingafirst
personknowledgeof“me”issomethingnooneelsecanhaveandwhichhasaphenomenalquality
thatalmostdefiesdescription.Andofcourseweknowthisaboutotherstoo;ourfriendsandfamily
arepersonsintheirownrightwhoareindividualsthatweinstinctivelyfeelarenotphysicalbut
entirelyanduniquely‘them’.WhenIspeakwithorwritetosomeone,IdonotbelieveIam
addressingaphysicalobject.Iamaddressingaperson.
Artificialintelligence(AI)enthusiastswillmaintainthatsomemachinesbehavelikepersonsand
thereforecannotbesaidtobeanydifferent.Butthedifferenceisobvious;machinesare
programmedbyustoappearasiftheyarepersonswhentheyareclearlynot.Whenmycomputer
speakstomeortheSatNavdirectsmetoturnrightatthenextroundabout,Imayliketofantasise
aboutthemachinebeinganactualpersonbutIwouldofcoursebeentirelywrong.AImaydo
wonderfulthingsbutthemostadvancedformsaremerelycopiesofwhatwedo,andnotindividuals
intheirownright.JohnSearleinaclassicpaperhasdismissedthepossibilityofcomputersbecoming
conscious.1
Sensations
Consciousnessinvolvessensations.Forexample,thewayinwhichIexperiencethecolourblue.
Thereisa‘blueness’aboutbluethatitnotmerelyregisteringcertainwavelengthsoflight(asa
machinemightdo).ThereisthesmellofsomethingsuchasthecoffeeImadethismorning.Thereis
thesoundofthewindIamhearingaroundthisbuildingIamin.Thereattimesmaybeanitchora
painsomewhereinmybody.Suchexperiencesofsensationsareknownasqualiainphilosophical
language.
IfwegobacktotheexperienceIhaveofseeingthecolourblue,forexample;thereissomething
verydeepgoingon.Idonotmerelyregisterawavelength,Ihaveauniqueexperience.Onceagainit
ishelpfultocontrastthiswithwhathappenswitharobotwhichregistersblue(byanalysing
wavelengthsoflight).Therobotmightevenspeakandsay“wow,thatisawonderfulblue!”.Butthe
robotwillnothavehadanyexperienceofblueatall,merelyregisteringawavelengthand
convertingthedataintospeechviapre-programmedzeroandones.
Wehavetoaskourselvesthereforewhethertheexperience,thequalia,ofseeingacolourisanonmaterialevent.Materialism,(whichhasnothingtodowithshopping),istheviewthatallthatthere
isintheuniverseismatterandenergy.Whatwesensestronglyandmayevenconclude,isthat
consciousexperiencessuchasqualiaarenon-materialevents.Thisisknownas“TheHardProblem”
ofphilosophyofmind,aphrasefromthephilosopherDavidChalmers.2
1
Searle, John. 1983. Can computers Think? From Minds, Brains and Science, pp. 28-41. Harvard
University Press. 2
Chalmers, David. Consciousness and its Place in Nature. From Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of
Mind. Blackwell. 2002 ThereisafamousthoughtexperimentbythephilosopherFrankJacksonknownas‘Mary’sroom’.3
Maryisaneuro-scientistwhoknowsabsolutelyeverythingaboutvision.Infactsheknowsevery
physicalfactabouttheprocessdowntothesub-atomiclevel.Yet,Maryhasbeenbroughtupand
stayedinaroomthatisentirelyblackandwhitewithnocolour,allherlife.Shehasneverseen
colour.Sheofcourseknowsallthatthereisabouttheprocessofcolourvisionbutnever
experiencedit.
Sheisthenbroughtoutofherroomandsheexperiencescolourintheworldaroundher.Thisisa
completelynewexperience.Shehasaddedtoherknowledgeofvisiontheactualphenomenal
experienceofcolourvision.Thisisanewformofknowledge.Wecanstatethesituationasfollows:
1/.Maryknowsallthephysicalfacts
2/Marydoesnotknowallthefacts.
3/Thephysicalfactsdonotexhaustallthefacts.
4/Materialismisthereforefalse.
Materialismisthebeliefthattheonlythingsintheuniversearepurelyphysicalones.Itseems,from
Mary’sexperience,thatsuchabeliefisfalsebecausetheconsciousexperienceofcolourvision
cannotbereducedtosomethingphysical.Philosophersdoargueoverthisendlesslybutmanywould
indeedagreewiththisassessment.
Correlationofpersonandbrain
Thethoughtexperiment‘Mary’sRoom’bringsuptheissueofbrainactivityandconsciousness.For
everythoughtthereissomeactivityofthebrainassociatedorcorrelatedwithit.Wecanseethis
withMRIscans.Thebigquestionisthis:istheneuronalactivityallthereisorisitmerelycorrelated
withconsciousness?
WhenmycarisdrivenfromAtoBitistakingpartinthejourney.Butthatisnotallthereis;itisI
whoamdrivingit.Whatifanythingdrivesthebrain?
Emotions
Consciousnessofcoursealsoinvolvesemotionssuchassadness,fear,anger,hopesandlove.These
aredeeplypersonalandreal.Infactlikeallofconsciousness,itisverydifficulttocategorizesuch
emotionswithanyformofphysicalorderorterminology.
Emotionsare‘about’somethingandtheyhavecontent.This‘aboutness’isknownasintentionality
amongphilosophers.Canthesethoughtsbemerelyphysical?Howcanaphysicalobjectbeabout
something?Whenwelookatphysicalthingsintheuniverseweknowthattheyexistandthey
interactwithotherphysicalthings.Theymayhavecomplexrelationships-thinkoftheweather
systemsforinstance,orthewaymoleculesinteractinthehumanbody.Howeverwecannotsaythat
anyofthesethingsare‘about’anythingotherthanthattheyexistinsuchrelationships.Anemotion,
incontrasthasaboutness–suchasthegriefafterlosingalovedoneortheangertowardsthatbully
atschoolortheloveforthatpersonyouwanttomarry.
Emotionsarealsosurelydistinctfromphysicaleventsinthattheyhaveclearandnon-physical
attributeswhenwefeelthem.Thisislikethediscussionwehadaboutqualia;thereissomethingitis
liketohaveanemotionsuchasjoy.Joyisuniquelypersonalanditishardtoseehowitcouldbe
reducedtosomethingphysical.
3
Jackson,Frank.‘EpiphenomenalQualia’.PhilosophicalQuaterly.(1982)32:127-136
Beliefs
Beliefsareanessentialpartofourconsciouslivesandalsohavethissenseof‘aboutness’.IfIbelieve
thatTolstoyisabetterwriterthanDickens,thenIammorelikelytoreadhisnovels.Thisbeliefmay
perhapsbejustifiedbymegivingexamplesofbothwritersandanalysingthem.Butintheendmy
beliefthatTolstoyisbetteratwritingisasubjectivethingthatisnotreducibletofactsorindeed
anythingphysical.Abeliefstandsonitsownsomehow.Howcoulditbereducibletoneurones
signallingoneanother–evenifsuchneuronalactivityiscorrelatedstronglywithhavingthebelief?
Canaphysicaleventoreventsinmybraincanhavebeliefs?
Wealsohavethequestionofwhetherabeliefcanaffectthebraininordertodosomething(suchas
bringmyumbrella).Ifabeliefisnotphysicalthenhowcanitaffectsomethingphysicalsuchasthe
brain?
Thisis‘the’crunchquestioninphilosophyofmind;cananon-physicalthingsuchasaconscious
beliefhaveanyeffectonaphysicalobjectsuchasthebrain?
Free-will
Asindividualswehaveastrongsensethatwehavechoiceandcanfreelydecidetododifferent
things.Assuchwebelieve,rightlyornot,thatwehaveadegreeofautonomy.Wehaveasensethat
wecanchoosetobuyacertainarticleortogouptosomeonetospeaktothem,forexample.We
awardpeoplewhochoosetodobravethingsinwar,andgivethemmedals,becausewefeelthey
couldhavechosentodootherwise.Wepunishpeoplewhodobadthingsbecausewebelievethey
couldhavechosenanothercourse.
Thebigquestioniswhetherapurelyphysicalobjectsuchasthebrain,howevercomplex,couldhave
free-will.Thereasonthisiscontroversialisthatanypurelyphysicalsystemissubjecttothelawsof
physicsandcannotdootherwisethanwhatitdoes.Externalphysicalconditionsmayaffectthe
outcome,butthereisnofreedomthatwecanseewithinsuchapurelyphysicalstate.Andquantum
randomnessattheatomicleveldoesnothelptoexplainfree-will,becausebeingrandommeansa
lackofanyautonomyorrealchoice.
Ifwereallydohaveautonomytochoose,thenthisisamassiveargumentforthenon-material
natureofthemind.
Morality
Whilenotstrictlypartofphilosophyofmind,moralandethicalthoughtsarecentraltoourvery
nature.Allofus,apartfromveryfewexceptions,willarguestrenuouslyforourmoralvalues.These
arefirmlyheldpositionsonsuchthingsasfairness,equality,benevolence,justiceandhumanrights
(forexample).Wemightdifferonthedetailsbutwewillagreeonthebasicmoralpositions.Mostof
uswouldagreethatitissimplywrongtocheatinexamsortocommitmurder.Wetakesuchviews
forgranted,andwegenerallyholdthemasabsolutes.Theyarepartofourconsciousnessbutthese
areviewsabouttheworldandotherswhichwefeelareoutsideofus.Theydonotdependonour
particularstateofmind;murderiswrong–whetheryouorIthinksoornot.
Wheredosuchvaluescomefrom?Thematerialistwillattempttoinvokesuchthingsassocial
Darwinism(itisgoodfortheextendedkinandthusgenesurvival).Bydoingsotheydemotesuch
moralitytomeresurvivaltactics,ratherthantoanythinguniversal.
Andsoifyouthinkmurderiswrongperse,youarealreadyshowingastrongleaningtowards
somethingimmaterialanduniversalinthewaywethink.Wheredosuchuniversalvaluescome
from?
Monismanddualism
Itisworthdefiningsomephilosophicalwordsthatrepeatedlycropup.
Monismistheviewthatthemindisentirelyonesubstance.‘Substance’inthesediscussionsdoes
notrefertoonlyphysicalthingsbutcanrefertononphysicalthings(suchasthepossiblenonphysicalmind).
Dualismistheviewthatthemindisdistinctfromthebrainorbodyandisnotreducibletocertain
formsofneuronalbrainactivity.Ittendstocomeintwoforms:
Propertydualismholdsthatthoughdistinctfromthebrain,consciousnessisentirelyaproductof
physicalbrainactivity.Thetermusedisoften‘supervenience’.Themindissupervenientonthe
brain,andisinthissenseimmaterial,butisentirelyaproductofthephysicalneuronsandcannot
existindependentofthem.
Substancedualism,whichistheviewthatwasheldbythephilosopherDescartes4,saysthatthe
mindisdistinctandisadifferent‘substance’fromthebrain.Itisanon-physicalsubstance.It
interactswiththebrainandiscloselylinkedtothebrainbutcanexistwithoutbrainactivity.The
interactionsithaswiththebrainarebothways;thebraincanactonthemindandthemindonthe
brain.
Substancedualismholdsthatthereisinfactsomethingwemightcallasoulineachofus.Thesoulis
theactualpersonandisautonomousinthatthesoulhasfree-willandisnotdependentonthe
physicalbrainfordecisions.
Aswegetdeeperintothestudyofconsciousnesswerealizefairlyquicklythatitissomethingto
wonderatandappreciate..
__________________________________________________________________________________
DISCUSSIONTRIGGERPOINTS
SEEENDOFNEXTPAPER
4
Descartes, René. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 1985
Mind-theGap.
Anoutlineofthemainphilosophicalpositionsheldaboutthemind
Themindisacuriousthing.Whatisit?Justaproductoftheelectrochemicalcircuitryofthebrain?
Thematerialistwillsaysoandmanyaneuroscientist,withMRIscannerathand,willshowussome
lit-upareasofourbrainscorrespondingtoparticularthoughts.Isthatitthen?Isthatconscious
thought?
Well–itisclearlynotassimpleasthat.Thisarticleisarapidtourofthemainphilosophical
positionsconcerningthemindoverthepastfewcenturies.Asamereintroductionitmaywhet
appetitestoreadtheoriginalworksofsomefineminds.
LetusstartwithDescartes(1596-1650).Inhis‘Meditations’1hecametothestrongdualist
conclusionthatthemindisdistinctfromthebody(whichincludesthebrain).Greekphilosophers
heldsimilardualistviews.Asa‘thinkingthing’Descartesconcludedthateverythingphysicalis
‘extended’–inotherwordsthebodyandallelsethatismaterialhasdimensions;somethingthe
mindlacks.Healsoconcludedthatthemindwasindivisible,whereasallmaterialthingsare
divisible.Thesethoughtsmadehimcertainthatthemindisnotmaterial;evenifintimatelylinked
toand‘intermingledwith’thebrain.Hisphilosophyofmindremainspowerfulandmanyofthe
twistsandturnsofmodernphilosophyarebasedontheideathathemustbewrong;howcoulda
non-materialmindhavecausaleffectonthematerialbody?Hisclaimthatthemindisindivisibleis
supported,interestingly,bycertainformsofneuro-surgery.2WhentheCorpusCallosum(the
bundleofnervefibresconnectingthetwobrainhemispheres)issevered,thehemispheresare
isolatedfromoneanotherandyetthishasnoeffectontheintegrityofanysuchpatient’s
personalityorcontinuityasoneperson.
Leibniz(1646-1716)feltmuchthesameasDescartesandremarkedthatifonewastogointoa
pieceofmachinery,suchasanenormousmill,wecouldnotthereinfindanyevidenceforthought
–helikenedthistousenteringintothebrainandlookingamongstthe‘machinery’for
thoughts.3Wewouldnotfindthem.Whichatleastmakesussitupandaskourselves–whereis
consciousnesswithinaphysicalsystem?
Withtheadvanceofan‘enlightened’materialisminthe20thcenturytherewasavoguewithinthe
logicalpositivistschoolofphilosophyforabehaviouristapproachtothemind.4Thiswasan
attempttomakescientificandmeasurableanystatementwemighthaveaboutthoughts.
Essentially,accordingtothisview,(nowconsideredfalsebymost),wecanonlymeasureandknow
themindthroughobservationofaperson’sbehaviour.Indeedsuchbehaviourwasconsideredto
bealltherewastothemind.Apainthereforecouldbesimplyacombinationofscreaming,wincing
andwithdrawing.Whatthebehaviouristsleftouthoweverwastheveryessenceofthought,which
isaninternalprocessthatisexperienced.
TypeIdentitytheoryisaviewthathasheldswaywithmanyphilosophersofmind.Thisholdsthat
anexperiencesuchasapainsimplyisthefiringofcertainnervefibres(suchasCfibres).5Inother
wordsthepainisidenticaltothenervefibresfiring.Thisisnowconsideredunlikelybymost,
particularlysincetheworkofKripke,(1940-)6,whoarguesconvincinglythatitisverylikelythat
suchathingaspaincouldoccurwithoutthoseexactCfibresfiring(suchasinanalienwhodoes
nothaveCfibres).Likewise,hearguesconvincinglythatitismorethanlikelythatsuchabrain
eventasCfibresfiringcouldoccurwithoutanypain.
ThephilosophicalviewknownasFunctionalismhasprevailedinsomequarters.7Thisholdsthata
mentalstateisafunctionalstateofthewholeorganism.Inotherwordsitissomethingthatoccurs
whencertaininternalstates,withtheircausalrelationships,occuralongwiththeinputsand
outputsthattheorganismexperiences.Thisrathermechanisticviewhashoweverbeenmoreor
lessabandoned,particularlysinceNedBlock(1942-)illustrated(inhisfamous‘Chinesethought
experiment’)howonecouldreproducetheexactfunctionalstateswithoutanythoughtoccurring.8
Davidson(1917-2003)isknownforhisAnomolousMonism.9Theproblemhetriedtotacklewas
this:
1/Themindiscausal,inotherwordsthoughtscancausethingstohappenintheworld.Hegives
theexampleofasubmarinecommanderdecidingtofireatorpedo.
2/Causalityintheuniverseimplieslawsthatmustexisttoaccountforonethingcausinganother.
3/Themindhoweverisnotboundbylawbutisfree.
Nowclearlytheseobservationsareincompatible.WhatDavidsontriedtodowastofreethemind
fromthebrutephysicalstateofbrainevents.Heproposedthatthemindis‘supervenient’;thatis
producedbyphysicalbraineventsbutnotthesameasthem.Thissupervenientmindistherefore
somehowfreefromphysicallaws.Kimhoweverhasconvincedmostthatthiscannotwork;ifthe
brainstate,whichisphysical,producesthought,thenthethoughtisinseparablylinkedtothe
physicalandcouldnotbefree.10
Eliminativismisanextremematerialistview.Itschiefproponent,PaulChurchland(1942-),
maintainsthatneurosciencewilleliminateallpsychologicalconceptsaswecometounderstand
theprecisescienceofthebrain.11Assuchthereisnosuchthingasthemind–simplyneurological
events.Thisreductionistaccountofthoughtleavesonecoldhowever.Howcanlovebereducedto
nerveactionpotentials?Howcouldabelief(thateliminativismistrue,forinstance)bemerelythe
firingofneurons?Indeed,couldsuchabeliefbeeithertrueorfalse?
Epiphenomenalismisadualistpositioninthatitholdsthemindtobenon-physicalanddistinct
fromthebrain.12However,thoughthemindisproducedbythebrain(andiscausallyinfluencedby
it),themindhasnocausaleffectonthephysicalbrainorbody.Assuchthisviewpreservesthe
ideathatonlyphysicalthingscanactonthephysical.ContrastthiswithDescartes’dualismwhich
demandsthatthereiscausalinteractionbetweenmentalandphysical−mentalthingsbothcause
andarecausedbyphysicalthings.AsIhavesaid,muchofsubsequentphilosophy,including
epiphenomenalism,isanefforttoavoidDescartes’ideathatanon-physicalmindcouldhave
causaleffectonthephysical.However,epiphenomenalismleavesthemindinanunsatisfactory
limbo–inertandunabletocauseanything.Thisdefiesourcommonexperience.
DavidChalmers(1966-)callsconsciousnessthe‘hardproblem’ofphilosophyofmind.13Chalmers
particularlyconcentrateson‘qualia’;thesubjectivequalitiesofconsciousexperience(suchaswhat
youexperiencewhenyousmellarose,seethecolourredorenjoyagoodwine).Qualiaseem
irreducibletomereneurologicalevents.Theyaredistinctpersonalexperiencesthataredifferent
toanythingelse.Arobotthatsensescolourwouldnothavequalia–merelytheregistrationof
certainwavelengthsoflight.
Whataboutcomputersandartificialintelligence?Canwenotenvisagethemhaving
consciousness?Actuallytheanswerappearstobeaclear“No!”JohnSearle(1932-),inhismost
famouspaper‘Cancomputersthink?’14showsusthatnomatterhowadvancedacomputeris,the
informationitholdsandprocessesisderived(fromus)andisbasedondigitalsymbolswhich
cannotinvolvetheconsciousnessweexperience.
Thereisthenthequestionoffree-will.Thisisaseriouschallengetothematerialistwhoofcourse
hastoagreetothemindbeingentirelydependantonthephysicsofthebrainanditsenvironment.
Assuchitcannotbefreebecauseeverybraineventisdeterminedbypriorphysicalstates.
Quantumrandomnessdoesnothelphereeither,becausethereisnoautonomyorfree-willin
completerandomness.15Manyphilosophershavethereforeconcludedthatourthoughtsare
entirelydeterminedandourfreedom(andindeedallresponsibility)isillusory.Anyonewho
upholdsfree-willis,likeitornot,defendingadualist,non-materialmind.
Thematerialistparadigm,whichdemandstheabandonmentofanysortofCartesiandualism,is
basedonapriorassumptionthatonlythephysicalcanactonthephysical.Itisanunproven
worldviewandonewhichisseriouslythreatenedbywhatwenowknowabouttheuniverse;its
finetuningandtheevidenceforafirst,necessarilyimmaterial,cause.
Themindisstillverymuchanenigma.Arewemachinesandnothingmore?Orarewewillingto
accept,withDescartes,thatthemindissomethingquitedifferent?Howweseethehumanrace
andourselvesaspersonscriticallydependsonthesequestions.
AntonyLatham
DISCUSSIONTRIGGERPOINTS
1. Whatreactiondoyouhavetoanyaspectoftheinformationgivenineitherpaper?
2. Whatrelevancedoyoufindthereisinthismaterialtothe‘Godquestion’?
3. Doyouthinkthatholdingtheviewthatthesoulisentirelyseparatefromphysicalaspects
ofthebodyshouldbefundamentallyimportantinatheisticworldview?
1
Descartes,René.1641.MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.CambridgeUniversityPress.1985
2
BogenIE:Physiologicalconsequencesofcompleteorpartialcommissuralsection,inApuzzoMLJ
(ed):SurgeryoftheThirdVentricle,2nded.Baltimore,Md:Williams&Wilkins,1997
3
Monadology17.InLeibnizSelections,ed.PhilipWeiner(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1951),
p.536.
4
Carnap,Rudolph.1932.PsychologyinPhysicalLanguage.OriginallypublishedinErkenntnis,
3:107-42,1932/33.Behaviourismisepitomisedinthisclassicpaper.
5
PlaceU.T.Isconsciousnessabrainprocess?BritishJournalofPsychology47:44-50,1956.
6
KripkeS.A.1980.NamingandNecessity,pp.144-55.HarvardUniversityPress.
7
Putnam,Hilary.1973.TheNatureofMentalStates.Originally“PsychologicalPredicates”,inArt,
MindandReligionpp.37-48.Univ.OfPittsburghPress.AclassicpapersupportingFunctionalism.
8
Block,Ned.TroubleswithfunctionalismInC.W.Savage,ed.,PerceptionandCognition(University
ofMinnesotaPress,1978).
9
Davidson,Donald.1970InL.Foster&J.Swanson,eds.,ExperienceandTheory,pp.79-101.
HumanitiesPress.
10
Kim,Jaegwon.FromMindinaPhysicalWorld(MITPress,1998),pp.29-47
11
Churchland,Paul.EliminativeMaterialismandthePropositionalAttitudes.FromJournalof
Philosophy78:67-90,1981
12
Jackson,Frank.EpiphenomenalQualia.PhilosophicalQuarterly32:127-136,1982
13
Chalmers,David.ConsciousnessanditsPlaceinNature.FromBlackwellGuidetothePhilosophy
ofMind.Blackwell.2002
14
Searle,John.1983.CancomputersThink?FromMinds,BrainsandScience,pp.28-41.Harvard
UniversityPress.
15
SeeSwinburne,Richard.1986.TheEvolutionoftheSoul.OxfordUniversityPress.P.239–246.
Forhelpfuldiscussionaboutquantumeffectsonfreewill.