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HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SS15 | JONATHAN HOLSLAG
BY JOSEF KIRCHNER
1
INHALT
1. World Apart ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. The origins of diplomacy .............................................................................................................................. 4
1.1.1. The “natural” state of relations between societies .............................................................................. 4
1.1.2. The constitution of the world ............................................................................................................... 6
1.2. Aztec Mexico ................................................................................................................................................ 8
1.3. Italy and the Treaty of Lodi 1454 ................................................................................................................. 8
2. The Budding of Western Primacy ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.1. China........................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2. Japan .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.3. India............................................................................................................................................................ 13
2.4. The Ottomans ............................................................................................................................................. 14
2.5. The Muscovy Empire .................................................................................................................................. 15
2.6. The rise of Europe ...................................................................................................................................... 15
3. The birth of modern diplomacy ........................................................................................................................ 16
3.1. The Habsburg bid for mastery .................................................................................................................... 16
3.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Habsburg Bloc ...................................................................................... 18
3.3. International Comparison .......................................................................................................................... 18
3.3.1. France .................................................................................................................................................. 18
3.3.2. England ................................................................................................................................................ 19
3.3.3. Sweden ................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.3.4. Poland ................................................................................................................................................. 22
3.3.5. Netherlands ......................................................................................................................................... 22
3.3.6. Ottoman Empire .................................................................................................................................. 22
3.4. Birth of the nation state ............................................................................................................................. 22
4. The French dilemma .......................................................................................................................................... 24
4.1. Peace of Westphalia ................................................................................................................................... 24
4.2. the Financial Revolution ............................................................................................................................. 25
4.2.1. From Mercantilism to Liberalism ........................................................................................................ 25
4.3. Geopolitics.................................................................................................................................................. 26
4.4. The rise of France ....................................................................................................................................... 27
4.5. Napoleonic Wars ........................................................................................................................................ 29
5. Europe in the balance ....................................................................................................................................... 31
5.1. The Congress of Vienna .............................................................................................................................. 32
2
5.2. Industrial Revolution and different developements .................................................................................. 33
5.2.1. “Organized capitalism and different economic models ...................................................................... 34
5.2.2. Austria ................................................................................................................................................. 35
5.2.3. France .................................................................................................................................................. 36
5.2.4. Great Britain and the Industrial Revolution ........................................................................................ 36
5.2.5. Russia and the Crimean War ............................................................................................................... 38
5.2.6. The United States and the Civil War ................................................................................................... 39
5.2.7. Prussia and the Wars of German Unification ...................................................................................... 40
5.2.8. Japan ................................................................................................................................................... 41
5.2.9. Italy...................................................................................................................................................... 41
5.3. Alliances and the Drift to War .................................................................................................................... 42
6. From War to War .............................................................................................................................................. 45
6.1. The postwar international Order ............................................................................................................... 45
6.2. In the interwar period ................................................................................................................................ 47
6.2.1. Italy...................................................................................................................................................... 47
6.2.2. Japan ................................................................................................................................................... 48
6.2.3. Germany .............................................................................................................................................. 48
6.2.4. France .................................................................................................................................................. 48
6.2.5. Britain .................................................................................................................................................. 49
6.2.6. Russia .................................................................................................................................................. 49
6.2.7. USA ...................................................................................................................................................... 49
6.3. The world in Depression ............................................................................................................................. 50
6.4. Towards WW2 ............................................................................................................................................ 51
7. The Cold War ..................................................................................................................................................... 53
7.1. The Coming of a Bipolar World .................................................................................................................. 53
7.1.1. The Marshall Plan: Keep the Germans down, keep the Russians out and keep US in ........................ 54
7.1.2. The Economic race .............................................................................................................................. 55
7.2. The Military Race........................................................................................................................................ 56
7.2.1. Chinas balancing act ............................................................................................................................ 59
7.2.2. Japan ................................................................................................................................................... 60
7.2.3. The EEC – Potential and Problems ...................................................................................................... 60
7.2.4. The USSR and its “Contradictions” ...................................................................................................... 61
7.2.5. The US – the problem of number one in relative decline ................................................................... 62
7.3. Towards a multi-polar world? .................................................................................................................... 63
7.4. America’s (brief?) unipolar moment .......................................................................................................... 64
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................................... 66
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1. WORLD APART
INTRODUCTION AND READING
We often identify the 15th century as the start of diplomacy. But diplomacy was practiced many centuries before.
During this session, we will discuss first of all whether it requires state to practice diplomacy. Ragnar Numelin posits
in his Beginnings of Diplomacy that this is not the case. In his introduction and in chapter two (pp. 12-17, 65-79) he
discusses the “natural state” of relations between societies and polities. Q1 I want you first to make an overview of
the positions of the great theorists of international politics and the anthropologists that are presented in this
introduction? Q2 Next, I want you to find all the explicit and implicit explanations put forward by Numelin to make
his case that the “natural state” was not necessarily one of violence and war. Putting it differently: What allowed
some primitive people to live in peace with each other? Q3 In chapter five and six (pp. 147-221) you should identify
the main practices of dispatching envoys and guaranteeing their security. Q4 Lastly (pp. 291-315), you should
summarize for yourself the practice of diplomacy of the Egyptians, the Jews, the Indian Brahmans, the Greek city
state, the Arabs, the Romans, and the Nordic Countries. Specifics: League of Iroquois, Amphictyonic conferences.
Let us now look at one particular case: Pre-Columbian Central America, a region that does not figure very prominent
in most histories of international politics. Read Warwick Bray’s paper (Bray, 1972. pp. 161-185). Q5 Explain the
demographic, geographic, and economic conditions of Mexico before the Spanish Conquest. Imagine yourself the
map of this region! Q6 How does this differ from Numelin’s conditions of peace? Q7 How did that shape the political
outlook and what is referred to as an anarchic pattern of city states? Q8 Why were these states no nation states?
Q9 What was the role of tribute? Q10 Which two multi-state organizations does Warwick discern? Q11 Can we,
according to your opinion speak of real international politics?
In spite of the advancing of diplomacy outside Europe, mainstream Western scholars still insist that the cradle of
modern diplomacy was, like that of many other important things, in Italy. Riccardo Fubini’s (Fubini, pp. 166-199)
paper is not an easy read. It is densely written and loaded with names and dates. Consider it a good exercise. Q12
To begin with, you should draw yourself a map of Italy in the mid-fifteenth century, the city states and the players
on its fringes. Q13 Next, you should draw up a time line of the most important events, alliances and their leaders.
Q14 Now, I want you to reconstruct how Fubini describes the causes of shifts in alliances. Q15 Finally, the following
question: To what extent did this system differ from what we saw in Central America?
1.1. THE ORIGINS OF DIPLOMACY
1.1.1. THE “NATURAL” STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIETIES
For Darwinists war is a “law of nature” (Thomas Hobbes) and therefore necessary, although or because
people(s) want to survive (root to social Darwinism). For Hobbes (1588-1679) war was the only logical premise
to set up a sovereign power – the permanent struggle for power and influence creates a “world at war”:
“War is not merely a political instrument, it is a continuation of political commerce, a
carrying out of the same by different means.” – Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)
Ragnar Numelin points out, that it is not that simple. Early writers trace the origins of diplomacy, the art and
practice of negotiations, to god himself. But despite that sorts of diplomacy existed also in early human
communities – a development from social custom to fixed agreement can be traced, but the “Kulturkreislehre”
emphasised this development in terms of social Darwinism too much.
Despite the assumed axiom, that violent behaviour is absolutely inherent in men, and a lot of early
communities showing warlike character – other communities didn’t. Montesquieu (1689-1755) pointed out,
that not war but peace is the first law of nature.
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“In the beginning there were no great collisions, the struggle for life was carried on
only with the climate and the wild beasts.” – Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842-1904)
A overview shows a rather frequent existence of peaceful primitive peoples, for example in Melonesia,
Polinesia, New Guinea, Ceylon or India. Especially in Oceania war didn’t play a major role in the life of a lot of
peoples. Wars – also in Africa – weren’t generally very bloody and also in more martial societies, especially in
North America, peaceful relations also existed. In some special cases war is not even known or prohibited,
often divided into smaller conflicts or replaced by ceremonies.
The principle of the inviolability of envoys (which was often true for commercial agents too) forced different
peoples and sovereigns to communicate with each other and to adapt a common rule. Special dresses and
language codes were introduced to recognize them, special ceremonials and rituals (drinking, blood and
marriage) and presents (sometimes temporarily wifes) underlined their importance. To make themselves
understandable a gesture language (in Africa also drums) and the “message stick” had general agreement.
The first international treaty can be traced to Egypt and Ramses II (13. Cent. BC), who had trade connections to
a lot of countries as a result of the economic boom around the Nil (compare King Hammurabi’s Code on trade
of 1700 BC).
But some people were also afraid of strangers and had therefore strict rules against foreigners, for example in
Israel before the Exodus (which is preserved in Deuteronomy 7:17-26). The divide of Greece into city states
forced them to a mere humanitarian approach towards strangers and the installation of a lot of foreign
administrations but not yet embassies. Gradually a Greek international law grew up and was prolonged in the
Roman Empire:

Special treaties with the provinces and neighbours  preservation of peace treaties in temples

Development of a special department for foreign affairs

Practice of self-governing colonies: “legates” in the provinces (no ambassadors) and special envoys for
outside the empire

“Ius gentium”: the law of nations, additional to the ius civile, created by mankind

Byzanz: Office of foreign affairs and bureau for the “Barbarians”
Thucydides’ work on the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens (431-404 BC) impresses with his
analysis of the missing balance of power as main reason of the war and the influence of money more than pure
arms strength on warfare. Herodotus already identified the importance of honour and unity when faced
against superior threat.
The institution of envoys was temporary till the Italian city states in the Middle Ages and the first permanent
embassy 1455. Later under Louis XIV the French language became the language of diplomacy. Finally modern
diplomacy custodies were established at the Congress of Vienna.
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1.1.2. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD
500 BC
The Olmecs
The Chavin civilization
The Etruscan Civilization
Carthaginian Empire
The Greek Civilization
The African Bantu
The Persian Empire
The Mauryan Empire
The Qin Empire
0
The Mayan City States
The Moche in the Andes
The Roman Empire
Nubia and Ethiopia
Parthia
The Kushan and the Shatavahana
The Han Empire
6
500
The Mayan City States
The Andean City States
Invasion of the Germanic Tribes
The Eastern Roman Empire
Nubia
The Persian-Sasanian Empire
The Gupta Empire & Southern Kingdoms
The Southern and Northern Dynasties
1000
The Toltec and Mississippian City States
The Andean City States
The Franks
The Holy Roman Empire
England
the Vikings
The Byzantine Empire
Islamic Caliphates and Emirates
Nubia
West African Kingdoms
The Kievan Rus
The Rajput
The Chola Empire
The Chalukyas
The Khmer Empire
Tibet
The Liao Empire
The Song
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1.2. AZTEC MEXICO
The basic political unit in Central Mexico at the time
of the Spanish Conquest were multi-ethical, nonnation
city states.
Besides the political and
economical heart the countryside, in which the Aztecs
had partly widespread colonies, provided the non self
sufficient city with food. This system of sovereign
territory with rural dependences showed big
variations and was unstable in a high degree.
The main cities had more than 10 000 inhabitants,
Tenochtitlan as mayor metropolis nearly 200 000,
and were closely entangled. Especially the Aztex
triple alliance of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan
received tribute from 489 towns which were
relatively small and close together. Because of the
agricultural richness and relatively crowded status of
the main cities the relations between city and
countryside were unequal symbiotic.
1.3. ITALY AND THE TREATY OF LODI 1454
As often in the 15th century Pope Nicholas V. tried to
secure peace and the power of the papacy by
organizing diplomatic encounters between the main
Italien rulers 1451 & 53 to possibly create a league
Venice
Francesco Foscari (1373-1457)
between the great Italian city states.
Milano
Filippo Maria Visconti (1392-1447)
Francesco Sforza (1401-66)
The Great Shisma (1378-1417) led to instability
Florence
Cosimo de Medici („il Vecchio“, 1389–1464)
towards France and Naples/Aragon, another papal fear
Naples
Alfons V. von Aragón (1396-1458)
was the planned subversion of the papal state by an
alliance of Alfonso of Aragon, Filippo Maria Visconti and the Council of Basel in 1435.
To prevent foreign claims on Italian territory, Italian claims on the papal state and therefore to stay an
important power the church wanted to mediate any negotiations while Florence as the least willing power for
such an agreement orientated towards France. The death of the last Visconti 1447 led to succession struggles:

Plans to install a republic, but Venice wanted to see the big power fail

Succession of Francesco Sforza  open struggle between Venice/Naples and Milano/Florence

Peace negotiations moderated by Rome failed
8
Finally the pope and Alfonso of Aragon reached an agreement to enter the league mainly because of security
concerns towards France and the Turks. The pope acted as first head, protector and guarantor but the actual
role remained ambiguous.
The Italian league helped to prevent several crises in the following decades but peace became jeopardized in
the 1460ies. In 1467 Naples, Milan and Florence formed a new league and blackmailed the pope. Venice
therefore created a defence alliance with the duke of Savoy and with the pope. This situation finally led to the
War of Rimini 1469. The next league of 1480 then included all states but Venice.
“Italy will be in the hands of many and not just of one power intent upon gaining a
monarchy over Italy for itself, which would be a very particular shame for the noble
Italians of our time.” - Allesandro Sforza
2. THE BUDDING OF WESTERN PRIMACY
INTRODUCTION AND READING
At the dawn of the four long centuries of European global primacy, the world order consisted of several spheres of
influence. This session focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of non-European powers, their strategic cultures
and the organization of their diplomacy. Your preparatory reading starts with the fist chapter in Paul Kennedy’s Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers (Kennedy 1989, pp. 3-39). Q1Describe the global order at the end of the 16th century.
Q2Give 10 characteristics of the rise of Ming China. Q3Find 10 characteristics of its decline. Q4Identify 10 strengths
of the Ottomans. Q5Give ten causes of vulnerability. Q6Trace 10 important weaknesses of the Mogul Dynasty.
Q7Explain how Japan became a centralized yet isolated power. Q8Why did the Muscovy Empire, for all its
expansion, remain so frail? Q9Explain how geography contributed to Europe’s rise. Q10What was the contribution
of military innovation to Europe’s ascent? Q11How did trade advance Europe’s success compared to other
protagonists? (35’)
Three other book chapters shed a light on Japan, China, and India. The renowned Japan expert Kenneth Pyle offers
interesting insights into the island empire’s strategic thinking (Pyle 2007, pp. 33-66). Q12Try to get an idea of how
was Japan politically organized in the Tokugawa and Meiji period. Q13Which impact did Japan’s geography have on
its foreign politics and what were the domestic roots of Japan’s realist strategic culture? Specifics to look at: shogun,
the Tokugawa Era, security dilemma, mercantilism, Commodore Perry, the Meiji Restoration, Shinto diplomacy, the
flying geese pattern in Asian politics. (35’)
One of the best books on the history of China’s foreign policy is Mark Mancall’s China at the Centre (Mancall 1984,
pp. 1-39). In this excerpt you should be able to learn more about the impact of geography on China’s foreign policy
and how did it contribute to the “Great tradition”. Q14How did China’s political system evolve from a multi-state
setting to a unified empire? Q15What were the objectives of the tributary system, how was it organized, and what
were the differences, if any, with Western diplomacy? Q16How to interpret the role of the emperor and the
“Mandate of Heaven” and how did the emperors look at the utility of armed force in tributary diplomacy? Specifics:
the Yuan Dynasty, Ming Dynasty, Qing Dynasty, Opium War, Century of Humiliation, Confucius, Mencius, the Great
tradition, the tribute system, the Lifan Yuan, Tian Ming, the difference between intermeshing-integration, and
Sinocentrism. (35’)
Stephen Cohen connects India’s past with its contemporary diplomacy (Cohen 2011, pp. 6-36). Q17Here again, it is
interesting to follow his discussion on how the geographical environment and the origins of Indian rulers shape its
strategic destiny. How to interpret the mandala-based concept of foreign policy and how does it compare to
Japanese and Chinese strategic cultures? Q18Why was India so vulnerable to conquest? Q19How did India’s social
system affect political control? Specifics: the Arthashastra, the mandala system, Kautilya, the Mauryan and Mughal
Empires, the Raj, Ashoka the Great, Akbar the Great If this introduction makes you want to learn more about the
development of non-European civilizations, the course Introduction to World History of Prof. Guy Vanthemsche is
strongly recommended.
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2.1. CHINA
Confucius (551-479 BC) as founder of the Chinese morality (personal and governmental)  Confucianism

Strong family loyalty, respect for elders and men  family as basis for a ideal government

Golden Rule as basis

Reformation of Confucianism by Mengzi/Mencius (370-290 BC) state religion
o
Revolution as right under an unfair government
o
Righteousness important in economical context  profit will follow
The first unification can be traced to the Qin-dynasty (221 BC) after periods of warring states. Traditionally the
power centre was in the Delta of the yellow and red river: The big plain land surrounded by Himalaya in the
west and deserts in the south (Gobi) and north allowed easy dominance while the open gate in the northeast
was the only open gate for nomadic peoples. From there also the Yuan and the Qing dynasties came.
The (re-) Creation of a united empire in the Yuan-dynasty (1279-1368) led to economical prosperity, but leaders
weren’t accepted due to discrimination. The Red Turban Rebellion (1351-68) finally overthrew the moguls
government of Yuan dynasty which led to the prospering Ming-dynasty (1368-1644):

begin of Chinese absolutism (including secret services)

urbanisation and growing importance of craftwork and trade

high bureaucracy, monetary system, scientific and art progress  but no competition like in Europe

expansive foreign policy (explorers, big ships) but defensive against Moguls (Great Wall)
The new dynasty learned from the older structure (which often remained) and rose to the strongest power in
the 15th century in terms of population (100-130 Mio in comparison to 50 Mio in Europe), city development,
culture, administration, trade (paper money) and not at least in terms of industrialisation and technology:

felt superior (empire of the middle)  Senicentrism

110 Mio. Inhabitants, large Cities, high developed Confucian bureaucrazy
10

Agricultural reforms and canals

125 000 tons iron per year (more than GB during the Industrial Revolution)

Gunpowder for the army (over 1 Mio soldiers) especially for sea fights

First magnetic compass and large ships  but no big ships allowed from 1436 onwards
o
Opportunity to get to Europe but decision to turn its back on the world
o
Concentration on the frontier towards Mongolia let to the debuilding of the army
o
Concentration on land instead of protoindustry  but not enough output for all inhabitants
o
Attacks of Japanese pirates, appearance of Portuguese vessels
The banning of overseas trade and fishing (while intensification of internal trade) was due to an administrative
conservatism and ideologically dubiousness and led to a steady relative decline – but developments for state
purpose continued. A rebellion with military aid from the Manchurian led to the Qing-dynasty (1644-1911)

Combination of military power of Manchuria and Chinese administration

Sinocentrism with emperor in the centre (Mandate of Heaven - Tianming)  neighbouring (barbaric)
states ranked

Lifanyuan: ministry of foreign affairs, diplomacy with Moghuls, Tibets and border peoples

Economic protectionism: the Opium Wars (1839-42, 1856-60) against GB led to an opening of the
harbours and markets  decline of economy  pressure on the 2000 year old sinocentric world view
 Century of Humiliation (Opium Wars, Sino-Japanese Wars, British Invasion of Tibet): China lost all
its conflicts and interventions from western countries and had to do lots of concessions
The Imperial China tributary system was for over 2000 years the network of trade and foreign relation between
China and its tributaries and the basis for sinocentrism and the leading power of the region.

In the Qing-period foreigners had to send “tribute missions” which acknowledged China’s superiority
 regular tribute by other Asian countries ensured the system

Trade was the most important strategic instrument at the disposal of the emperor to purchase
barbarian loyalty and for keeping the Mongols in a perpetual round of debt.

Mandate of Heaven and Confucianism as basis

Warfare between tributary states was arbitrated by the Chinese emperor

Military conflicts with neighbouring countries in the Ming-dynasty
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2.2. JAPAN
Japan followed till the early modern period the Sinocentrism with gread cultural borrowings from China.
Although importing necessary knowledge Japan always refused to play a fixed role in the Sinocentric world. The
geographical situation led to kinds of isolations and a highly independent development (intensified by threats
by the concept of the Peace of Westphalia). So Japan entered the modern period with a high sense of selfreliance and the willing to maintain its independency.
After a long time of changing leaders the early modern history began with the Tokugawa Shogunate 1600 in the
Capital in Edo (Tokyo, “Edo period”) – but the emperor in Kyoto was still the legitimate ruler:

Political concentration but 250 local lords (Daimyo)

Elaborate social structure: Samurai – farmer – craftsmen - merchants

Military leaders with concentrated power over religion, economy and politics
Buddhism was introduced as only state religion 1615 while Christianity became forbidden. This led to an
isolation (1639: end of foreign trade) in terms of Thirty Years War (“sakoku”), but trade with the protestant
Netherlands was restricted allowed. The rising efficiency in agriculture and continuing high taxes led to an
economic growth:

Urbanisation: Edo with more than 1 Mio. Inhabitants in the mid of the 18th century

A lot of credits (esp. to the Samurai) made traders rich

Despite the isolation acquisition of western knowledge did occur

Little importance of the letter  slow distribution of knowledge  slow economic growth
The “security dilemma” (John Herz) led on the one hand to a unity against continental threats, on the other
hand to a non-ideological compelling between feudal states in the relatively anarchy due to the low influence
of governmental power in the federation and so to a competitive structure comparable with Europe and
persisting improvement because of the fear to fall back in comparison with the others. So knowledge became
the basis of development and learning from each other important. This was a preparation for the later opening
and following international comparison.
Quests for an opening were rejected in the 19th century. But in 1853 Matthew Perry landed with four warships
in the bay of Yokohama which was regarded as an act of imperialism but which led also to the Convention of
Konagawa and diplomatic relations between the US and Japan.
Manufacturies allowed a fast industrialisation after the opening but 1868 rebellions against the shogun and the
foreign traders from the US and Europe and therefore the end of the Edo-period. The Meji-restauration
implemented a new government and a new restrictive social structure:

Imperialisms, Industrialisation, Colonialisation

Tenno as formal leader in a constitutional monarchy but a lot of power for oligarchs (Samurai)

Shinto as national cult and ideological instrument of the Tonno
 instrumentalized for nationalistic and colonialistic purpose after WW1
12
After the success over China 1895 should Japan get the leading economic power in East Asia. Described with
the picture of the flying goes pattern Japan will then be followed by the so-called Tigerstates (South Corea,
Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapur)
2.3. INDIA
After times of reorganisations and religious visions the first Indian empire developed right after Alexander the
Great in 321 BC: Tolerance and prosperity were the main terms of the Maurya empire which became biggest in
the 3rd century BC and devided 185 BC.

Arthashastra: Indian manual on statescraft and political organisation of the 4 th century
o
Influensive till today on rational thought and social organisation
o
Written by Chanakya, chief advisor to the first Maurya rulers

Desire for empire remained but locked the intensity of the Mauryas

Mauryas not a conquering system but international contact because of their culture

Mandala: basic system of foreign policy circle of states: neighbouring enemies and allies behind

Six types of foreign policy: agreements with peace pledges, offensive operations, threats, neutrality,
subordination, duplicity/balancing
Islamic influence from the 8th century onwards established the Moghul period (1526-1857). The rise of the
Moghuls 1526 led to major changes in the political integration of India.:

Adopted Bureaucratic system introduced by the Mauryans by Akbar the Great in the 16th century
o

Religious tolerancy: Hindu and Muslims living together  domestic stability
o

Veneration of the emperor-ruler: cult of the monarchy under Akhbar (1556-1605)
But the caste system throttled initiative
Economically prospering: manufacturing, credit system
o
But little improvement of communication
o
Industrially weak
o
Weak tax system
The Moghul empire based on consolidation not conquest, military
played a very little role. Because the political center was in the north
threats were seen in the north and the west while paying less
attention to the sea (no naval force!). This led to a rising influence by
the British East India Company from the second half of the 18th century onwards and the development of a civil
and administrative structure (Raj).
After the rebellion 1857 and the following colonial structure the Britains were divided by the idea of India
becoming a nation. While state interventions were necessary for the economic development the independence
is important for nationalistic tensions. Finally India became a fixed element of the British global strategy with
central importance.
13
The caste structure influenced the policy ever but the Britains were successful in combining it with military
selection which shaped the ideology. Due to the impossible social mobility innovation is tendecially low.
Diversity can be seen as strength but it has to be managed. Due to the fact that the cast system also includes
measuring others and being measured by them a great sensitivity led to a tendency to overestimate nuances
and the searching for disadvantages in the complex system.
India had different identities during history: It was well known in medieval times for the spices , the philosophy
and diversity, but during the Raj it first got object of plunder before becoming the “jewel of the crown” and
after WW2 one component of the imperial strategy of Britain before becoming independent.
Nahru, the first prime minister from 1947-64, had the vision of the global power India: The high but poor
population led to a strong but weak equipped army, but the reputation of India is high in the region, in Russia
and later in Europe which led to the enforcement of the Non-Aligned-Movement.
2.4. THE OTTOMANS
In the European middle ages the Ottoman Empire was ahead in terms of science (math, medicine), industry
(guns, cannons), trade (control of important trade routes), bureaucracy and art – high time was under
Suleyman I. (1520-66) with a high diversification but tolerance and knowledge transfer. But the biggest danger
arose from the military (Janissaries) and also their navy (Battle of Mohacs 1526, Siege of Vienna 1529):

Strategical overextension: troups all over the Mediterranea and Asia, rising powers at its borders

Split in the muslim world between Sunni and upheaving Shi’ite

Hardening of official attitudes towards all forms of free thought (end of tolerance)

Economic crisis (credits) led to inflation in the mid of the 16th century  Janissaries against court

After 1566: “thirteen incompetent sultans in a row”
The time after the sea battle of Lepanto 1571 (one of the biggest in history), where a Mediterranean alliance
under the lead of Spain won surprisingly against the Ottomans, shows a decline of power. Conservativism in
the core led to a weaker army with no new weaponry, an unbalanced trade (needed imports but forbidden
exports) and plagues as well as famines (no new medical and agricultural techniques) and to a fast decrease in
power in comparison with rising powers in India, Persia, Russia and the Medeterranea.
14
2.5. THE MUSCOVY EMPIRE
Despite a relative backwardness in terms of technology, economics and communication grew Russia in the 15 th
and 16th century. Borrowings from Europe helped defeating rising powers (Sweden, Ottomans, Poland) but
despite that contacts with the west remained little.
After Iwan III (the great, 1462-1505) battles with Lithuania-Poland led to the establishing of “the ruler of all
Rus” under the great duchy of Moscow. Under Iwan IV (the terrible, 1547-80), the first Tsar, Russia expanded to
the west and east but tensions with Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Ottomans and Tartars remained.
The high land mass without natural borders but with extreme climates and poor communication as well as the
domestic structure (serfdom, bureaucracy) in the feudal and absolutistic system let the country remain
technologically backward.
2.6. THE RISE OF EUROPE
Although the knowledge of the own weaknesses (little population, difficult climates, …) was there, It was quite
obvious that the continent of Europe should take over power from other regions. Although there was little
knowledge about other Empires in the world (and a lot of false information) and although there was no uniting
spirit but dividing tensions between the main powers in Europe, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 should be
the starting point of a new world order.
Europe was always fragmented what can be explained by the geographical and climatical differences.
Occasional concentrations of authority (like under Charlemagne or Rome) were temporarily patchworks. The
growth of the marked and trading system let to a relative rising of power from the 15 th century onwards for
whicht the variety of economic and military centres of power was fundamental:

Impedus of constant improvement of military and trading techniques
o
Several centres for every good were in constant struggle with each other
o
“gunpowder revolution” led to smaller but safer arms (esp. cannons on ships)

Development from knights to the longbow (14th century), the crossbow (15th) and
the pikemen and musketeers (16th)


Cannons from the 16th century onwards led to earth works and star forts (17th)
Predictability of economic conditions: credits, bankers, trading unions
o
Taxing system led to a broad acceptance and social integration of bankers and dealers
o
New accesses (imperialism, colonialism) and products boosted the existing development
o
Explosion of knowledge spreaded by printing  each of the rival forces had access to new
technologies and so no single power ever possessed the decisive age
15
3. THE BIRTH OF MODERN DIPLOMACY
INTRODUCTION AND READING
This session offers a bird’s view on European diplomatic history between 1519 and 1815. Paul Kennedy will pilot us
through this turbulent period during which Habsburg primacy became eclipsed by the rise of France and, later on,
witnessed London to establish its global leadership. Important across this session is to interpret the evolving forms
of aggrandizement, the impact of domestic political organization on diplomacy, the impact of colonies, finance, and
revolutions in military technology on the European balance of power. In the first chapter of The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers Kennedy describes the rise of Habsburg (Kennedy 1989, pp. 39-94). Q1Reconstruct in broad lines the
evolution of the European order between 1519 and 1648. Q2How did the Habsburgs piece their empire together?
Q3What were their strengths and weaknesses? Q4Who were the main challengers and what were their strengths,
weaknesses and ambitions? Q5What were the main playgrounds of great power politics? Q6What drove the shifts
in the balance of power? Q6How did diplomacy involved and what was the significance of the Peace of Westphalia?
Other specifics: the Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years War, Wars of the Roses, the Revolt of the Netherlands, the
Armada, the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of the Pyrenees, bullion, debasement.
You should also read a few chapters of Nicollo Machiavelli. Machiavelli made his career as advisor to the Medici in
Milan. His instructions to Renaissance princes remained very influential in de centuries afterwards. One of is most
renowned works is The Prince (Machiavelli 1532/1998, chapters 1-3). In this book you can reconstruct the strategic
landscape around Italy – especially the relation between intermediary powers and great powers. Q7Which two
forms of territorial aggrandizement does he describe? Q8Machiavelli describes posits that clever diplomacy requires
princes to consider both the domestic and external context: how? Q9He also pays a great deal of attention to
human nature or, what is now called, political psychology: in which way? Q10How does the author describe the
importance of alliances and which mistakes did Louis XII make in this regard? Q11How can princes overstretch their
capabilities? We will also discuss two chapters from his Leviathan (Hobbes 1651/1996, chapters 17 and 19). Q12
How does he describe the driving force of social behaviour – between man and states? Q13 What are the main
diplomatic concerns of a commonwealth? Q What impedes men and states to cooperate? Q14 How is a
commonwealth’s power described and what causes its demise? Q15 Hobbes prescribes sovereigns to constantly
guard their power: why?
3.1. THE HABSBURG BID FOR MASTERY
In the struggle between many by cultural and religious aspects divided states the Habsburg created a
widespread dynasty with active marriage policy – with the addition of luck Karl V (1516/8/9-58) could reign
over a dominant empire („Plus Ultra“ - Über alles bisherige hinaus“) after Maximilian I (1486/93/1508) because
their enemies believed in the domination of Habsburg.

Marriage of Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy  Netherlands

Philipp (der Schöne), Maximilians son, with Joana (die Wahnsinnige) of Castilia and Aragon
 Spain, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia and colonies

Ferdinand I., brother of Karl, married Anna of Bohemia and Hungary Bohemia, Hungary
16
The title of the elected Holy Roman Emperor was not very important, but Germany was eager to have it while
France saw itself encircled and tried to weaken Austria in every possible way for the next 200 years. In the
same time the Austrian king nearly always was elected as the leader of the HRR. Besides continuing struggles
with the Ottomans the Reformation should get the major issue of Karl in the 1540ies: After successes in the
beginning French troops then supported the Protestants in 1552 which led to the Peace of Augsburg 1555, the
abdication of Karl and the beginning decline, starting with the dividing of the monarchy (two-headed eagle).
A revolt of the Dutch against the policy of Philipp II of Spain from 1568 onwards turned into an international
struggle and finally led to the Establishing of the United Provinces 1581. The following Eighty Years War ended
with the acknowledgement at the Peace of Westphalia 1648. The existence of the United Provinces of the
Netherlands aside with GB and Spain shows that hegemony is not possible in Europe.
Political-religious antagonisms between the European powers were finally settled after the revolt of the
protestant estates of Bohemia against Ferdinand II in the Thirty Years War.

rapid accumulation of imperial power for Germany  provoked Sweden and France

the interlinked structure of the battle made withdrawals difficult

the sudden full acceptance of the Netherlands by Spain was the beginning of peace negotiations
17
3.2. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE HABSBURG BLOC
“This agglomeration which was called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman
Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.” – Voltaire
The Peace of Westphalia 1648 brought balance in the HRR but limitation upon imperial authority while the war
between France and Spain continued till the Treaty of the Pyrenees 1659. Altogether in both, the 80- and the
30 Years war overstretch was the main problem of the Habsburg Empire, because as enormous as the financial
and military recourses of the Austro-Spanish empire was, it was never sufficient to meet requirements:

main incomes: Castile, Italian States, Netherlands, America, leading financial and mercantile houses

good military divisions: army of Flanders, fleets of Italy and Spain, Spanish infantry
o
rising military costs due to greater importance of the infantry all over Europe  high amount
of fresh loans on worse terms  bankrupsy of Spain 1557 (France in the same year)

the enormous Habsburg Empire was related to a lot of enemies and battlefields without regeneration
o
Spain turned from one struggle into sometimes three other
o
Policy of defence
o
Consolidation of power in the dynastic lands  basis for a long-term power state
The war in the Netherlands was considered as strategically important (domino effect) while tactically
complicated (no sea access due to France) but no sufficient funds could be raised. The different lands weren’t
as united as one might believe and weren’t willing to support a war far from home. Castile therefore became
the “milk cow” with rising taxes and therefore emigrations (especially of traders). The selling of monopolies
and privileges as well as deficit financing and a temporary bankruptcy of the Spanish king secured the financial
households but reduced in a vicious circle the credit rating for the future.
The economic mismanagement can be traced to a risen influence of the emperor on the marked which is
mostly the first sign for his decline. Debasement was followed by extremely high inflation followed by
deflation, which brought financial instability, worked against with the installation of golden bullions. Higher
taxes from the mainly agricultural lands and from the free states in the HRR led to uprisings which culminated
in the Thirty Years War.
3.3. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
3.3.1. FRANCE
France replaced Spain as the main military power but although financial measures in the 16 th century tried to
cover the rising costs of the military revolution, France had (after the exhausting struggle against Spain after
the Peace of Westphalia) to declare bankruptcy in the same year as the Habsburgs (1557).
The main interests were in Italy, Burgundy and the Netherlands:
18

Louis XII (1498-1515), grandchildren of Karl V., invaded Italy
and
had
Scotland
an
alliance
against
with
England
(compare: mandala)

Francois I (1515-1547), grandgrand-children of Karl V., had the
first alliance of an European
power
with
the
Ottomans
against Spain

Henri II (1547-1559) attacked
again Italy, the Netherlands,
started the Huguenot wars and
had an alliance with the HRR

Henri IV (1589-1610) increased
the
struggles
Netherlands
religiously
with
and
freedom
the
granted
to
the
Huguenots

Louis XIII (1610-1643) fought the Netherlands in the Eighty Years War, Germany in the Thirty Years
War
The first state minister and advisor of Louis XIII, Richelieu, tried to get France a major power without difficult
struggles – the peaceful rise (“We must create huge companies, force the merchants to participate and accord
privileges.”) can be considered as result of the claustrophobics (encirclement fears). This led to the support of
merchants in order to lead the markets in a form of state capitalism and to mercantilism (Colbert). For Duc de
Sully infrastructure had to be considered as basis for economic evolution. To fight the Habsburg in a proxy war
he gave financial aid to several German states, the Netherlands Sweden, Denmark and Portugal. The expensive
proxy war was financed by a higher taxation, but the fiscal overburdening was always eminent.
3.3.2. ENGLAND
England had less inhabitants, less income and less soldiers as any other power, concentrated on defensive
structures and had to hire troops from Germany if needed, because of their own backwardness. After the Wars
of the Roses in the second half of the 15th century between York and Lancaster, Henry VII united with the
Marriage with Elisabeth of York both houses to the Tudor dynasty – but first under Henry VIII a standing army
was established and needed at a French and a Scottish invasion. After the divorce from Catherina of Aragon (no
male successor) he established the Anglican church – after the reign of Mary and Elisabeth the Tudor dynasty
ended.
19
Wars in the second half of the 16th century put England near bankruptcy but new incomes from the colonies
and the efficient market laid a solid economic foundation. From the 1650ies onwards the modernized army
played a main role in the Spanish war and the European balance of power, but 1659 followed another
bankruptcy.

Union of England and Scotland 1603

Republic of Oliver Cromwell: defeating the royal army with his professional New Model Army 1645

Glorious revolution 1688: King-in-parliament, Bill of Rights

Francis Bacon: balance of power check your neighbours
20
3.3.3. SWEDEN
Germany tried to get more influence in the north but Sweden wanted to have the coast of Pommerania for
trade issues. This also brought difficulties with Poland and Russia. But Sweden had the best and very active
army during the Thirty Years War.
But in the later 16th century the prospects for Sweden looked poor: no access to Western Europe, continuing
struggles with Russia, underdeveloped industry and much unuseful land. But investments from mercantilists
(iron and copper mills) and internal reformations (tax, administrations, education) as well as military
improvements let Sweden check the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years War. “Contributions” of esp. German states
financed the 100 000 men strong army under Gustav-Adolph, which was considered as best in the world, but
maintaining the power in the new gained lands was far more difficult. After 1648 Sweden remained a local
power under great influence of the “real” European powers with a peak of domestic developments (Bank of
Sweden, overseas colonies – Gulf of Guinea, New Sweden) under Charles XI.
21
3.3.4. POLAND
The most conflicts were traditionally with Russia (6 conflicts 1492-1632) while connections to Europe remained
little although the economically importance (iron and copper resources) and political improvements (early
parliament, free cities) should have been very interesting. 1569 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was
established under the terms of fragmentation and democratisation. Following wars with Sweden and the
Ottomans as well as expansion tensions towards Russia in the first half of the 17 th century were not successful.
3.3.5. NETHERLANDS
The conflict with Spain tested the Dutch recourses but not as much as those of Spain. In the 17th century the
Netherlands could rise, based on a well developed industry and military as well as the growing overseas
activities which led to the growing role of Amsterdam as centre of international finance.
3.3.6. OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Besides claims on Polish (1620 & 1670) and Hungarian territory (battle of Mohacs 1526), the main interests
were still in the Balkans which made the Ottoman Empire to the biggest fighter of the Habsburg for centuries
(Sieges of Vienna 1525, 1683). This weakened the struggles with Spain and Naples and led to alliances with
Elisabeth I. and France.
3.4. BIRTH OF THE NATION STATE
After 1450 centralisation, taxation, bureaucracy and rising communication led to the “birth of the nationstate”. Governmental spending rose in a period of wars which led to difficulties in all countries. The balance
between material base and military power led to a “damned close” victory of the anti-Habsburg forces.
Money became the basis of power and the enforcement of trade and colonies which therefore led to
interdependences and entanglements. A smart statecraft now tries to minimize expensive wars which led to
the rise of France. But also smart management of the economy and a smart taxation are necessary and show
the high relevance of public opinion in the Thirty and Eighty Years War. Printings like pamphlets, newsletter
and propaganda will lead to more upheavals and also the enlightenment.
In his major work “Il principe” Niccolo Machiavelli distinguishes two forms of governmental rule, the republic
(Free State) and the principal (dictatorship) and considered hereditary princedoms as easier to rule while new
state rulers need to establish themselves. The normal form is the “mixed princedom” with new parts and older,
which already belong to the prince. Because he needs also the support of the lower people he need to make
22
more or less changes to the common system, depending on the cultural distance of the prince to the
princedom.
Machiavelli advises to get rid of the old ruling family but not to change rules and taxes. In difficult cases the
prince has also to set his residency in the new princedom and should act as a protector of the region or install
colonies. As a negative example he puts the intervention of Louis VII of France on the side of Lombardy against
Venetia: After his success a big power got bigger while a weak power got smaller, which can be considered as
failure of the politics of Venetia.
Hobbes in his Leviathan distinguishes three types of state systems: monarchies, aristocracies and democracies
– there is no difference in power but in how to produce peace. In all cases the dividing of power leads to war.
But the basis is the power of the sovereign over all people but himself. This agreement of men is artificial: The
common power directs the actions to a common benefit in a lasting agreement.
Men, so Hobbes, are continuously in competition of Honour and Dignity, driven by envy and hatred. The joy
consists in comparing but distractions arise from those who consider themselves wiser and for a better ruler. In
conferring all individual power and interests to an person or an assembly every state can reach a “CommonWealth”. The individual freedom then is the basis for the leader, the collective fear his strength. Other realists
like Riechelieu or Duke of Sully focussed on territory, balance of power, leagues and self-preservation of the
state by treaties or other means while Optimists and Idealists like Erasmus focussed on world peacy by
negotiation and concentration on god and the church as unifying element.
The Peace of Westphalia then led to an important stability and peace period in Europe like the Peace of
Westphalia (“Cuius region, eius religio.”) a century earlier. The state system was transited by the Habsburgs
“Universalmonarchie” from the medieval “Republica Christiana”, overseen by the pope, to the Italian
diplomatic system – their decline then led to the renaissance of diplomacy with a greater institutionalisation,
focus on trade and balance of power and proxy wars. First permanent embassies and ministries of foreign
affairs were installed – the influence of diplomats on politics rose all together.
23
4. THE FRENCH DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION AND READING
Between p. 94 and 179, Kennedy accounts the power shift from Vienna to Versailles – and further on to London.
Q1What were the main changes that Kennedy discerned during this period? Q2How did the financial and industrial
revolution affect the European balance of power? Explain the evolution of the power, the ambitions, and the
foreign policy of Q3France, Q4England/the United Kingdom, Q5 the Habsburg Empire, Q6Russia, Q7Prussia, and the
Q8United States. Specifics: the South Seas Bubble, the War of Austrian Succession, the American Revolutionary
War, the Seven Years War, the War of Spanish Succession, the Nine Years War, and the Glorious Revolution.
4.1. PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
“If one believes France, it only wants to retain territory under the appearance of holding
passes, so it can help its friends in Germany; when one considers in the cold light of the
day, however, it aims at the expansion of its kingdom and of Catholicism, and finally even
to obtain imperial dignity.” – Johann Rudolf Wettstein (Swiss diplomat)
The Peace of Westphalia at the neutralized “les villes des cochons”, Münster and Osnabrück, is often
considered as “the first modern peace conference”, which is not entirely true, because other earlier
negotiations showed a comparable degree of organisation (e.g. the peace treaty at the end of the 100 Years
War), but mass-diplomacy (in French) by plenipotentiaries, fully state representatives, and the check by
newspapers and pamphlets showed the direction of modern negotiations.

Habsburg wanted to remain its status-quo

Spain wanted to keep its claim over the Netherlands

France thought about a peaceful rise, wanted Alsace and Lorraine, more influence in the Netherlands
and Spain, and more rights to German estates

Sweden wanted Pomerania and the religious freedoms to German estates

The Netherlands wanted their independence to be confirmed, religious freedom and trade freedom
Spain approached the Netherlands first to weaken the position of France, who then dropped Lorraine in the
Spanish-Dutch breakthrough in the Peace of Münster; other breakthroughs between Sweden and Austria in the
Treaty of Osnabrück and between Austria and France in the Treaty of Münster. France and Spain failed to find a
treaty – the war continued till the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.
These results meant a shift towards the nation-state which showed that the reasons for the war were not only
religious but mainly geopolitics. Often this is seen as the end of empires and the beginning of sovereignty, but
both developments cannot be sharply marked. After 1660 a mulitpolar power system with “national interests”
rather than transnational, religious ambitions tended to a five-power-system with the balance of power
controlled by London and St. Petersburg. Power was now “national power”: More than the improvements in
military technology and strategic brought the changes in organisation significance.

France managed through several small wars in the 18th century to become a leading role

Habsburg managed to stabilize but was only a marginal first-class power

Prussia stabilized and was highly organized in military and agriculture  rising Power
24

The United Provinces tended to overstretch esp. with clashes with GB

England rose to the main colonial power independence of the USA in 1776

Russia gained influence over Poland

Sweden and the Ottoman Empire were on a steady decline
4.2. THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION
The steady increase in European commerce especially by replacing seasoned fairs by permanent markets which
were better predictable and stronger regulated led to a structure of banking and credit houses – the financing
of wars boosted this development. Because of the close connection to the government Amsterdam became a
leading role and could invest in other stock markets which led to a growing international credit network.

Balance of payment/investments/trade became more and more important

Professionalization (experts) and growing communication (newsletters)

Joint-investment, speculation in derivates (Tulip mania 1637, South Sea Bubble 1720)

Rentier states (GB and the Netherlands): High economic dependence on foreign money and
investments, concentrated on a few cities  little profit for the rest of the country
A system of high taxes in peace times and a focus on public credits in combination with structural reforms
(creation of the Bank of England 1694, regulation of the national debt) stabilized the British financial system
and made it important for foreign investors. The domestic credits were the main factor in the national
household compared with France:

French system was always “managed” by a hierarchical system  “cuts” of every step in the line

Raising money in wartime was a difficult and long process

Same national debt as Britain in the 1780ies but twice as high interest payments
In the 18th century the financial element always determined the fate of nations in the wars. Although
Amsterdam was the economic centre, the United Provinces declined as well as Prussia and Habsburg. Another
important factor was the rising Industrial Revolution starting in GB with protectionism and imperialism and the
development from mercantilism to liberalism with strong state intervention.
4.2.1. FROM MERCANTILISM TO LIBERALISM
Institutionalizing of state interventions marks the shift from trade capitalism to industrial capitalism, in a
territorial state the public economy (different spheres: guilds, church…) becomes synonymous with the state
economy and goes along with the deconstructing of smaller regulations to one homogenous economical rule.
In the 16th and 17th century the amount of gold is still the indicator of economical prosperity and gold imports
go along with manufacturing exports – trade balance is now the key to a stable economy.
25
At the end of the 18th century centralistic planning was not any more suitable to reach new economic growth
which lead to more and more elements of a new liberal market economy (“Universalkommerz”, “Zollunion”) –
state intervention now focussed on migration, education and demographic politics as well as on agricultural
growth as basis for a long term economic growth. Finance, monetary and currency politics differ from each
other – financial autonomy and monetary sovereignty were the new indicators of strength and dominance.
More financial needs of the state (principal governance) leaded to a more elaborate tax system with direct
(income, land) and indirect (consumption, tariffs) payments – the new state budget based on credits and
(growing) debts. While the tasks of the financial policy differ (military, bureaucracy, economic intervention),
the different earnings unite in the centralized power of the emperor – this will lead to a modern state budget.
The metal monetary system is still the basis, but the rising savings in the rising prosperity put a brake on the
development. New “privileged” Feds and their paper money covered the new needs for money – but still there
are several different currencies and monetary systems, national currencies were developed in connection with
the nationalism of the 19th century.
4.3. GEOPOLITICS
The United Provinces, prospering in the 17th century, struggled from decreasing commerce due to the rising of
the French and British market and mercantilism as well as sinking incomes from colonies and had to increase
the army because of threatening by Louis XIV from the late 1660ies onwards. This led to widespread debt
reputations and losing in the overseas trade (restricted areas through the canal). Financial expertise and
reliance upon surplus capital were simply no longer enough.
Because of the decentralized, ethnical diverse and economically backward condition the Habsburg Empire
became a marginal first-class-power with a continuing struggle between the influence of the Ottoman Empire
(1663-1791), Russia, Prussia and France (War of Spanish Succession 1702-13).
Prussia benefited from the decreasing Sweden, the weak Poland, the inactive Austria and the mostly allied
France and filled the “power vacuum” in North Europe but couldn’t withstand diplomatic pressure after the
Seven Years War (1756-63) by Russia and France. Besides the fiscal stability based on strong trade and industry
as well as the acquisition of Silesia, the efficient Junker-officered army, modelled by Friedrich Willhelm (171340) and Friedrich der Große (1740-86), added a power sphere. But the small population always tended towards
overstretch.
After the Peace of Rijsvijk 1697 (Nine Years War, but going back on the Treaty of Nijnmegen 1678), the Act of
Union with Scotland 1707 and the victory in the Seven Years War on side of Prussia against all other European
powers, Britain saw itself besides a rising and independent United States, who became the sixth industrial
power due to an industrialisation from the mid of the 18 th century onwards. Although agriculture remained the
fundament, the British rising in the 18th century was mainly because of their geopolitical situation which
26
allowed them to concentrate on naval power and defence strategies than on continental borders like France or
Prussia, which had to rise on this basis.
Sweden failed its attack on Russia 1709 after gaining Poland and Saxony and became a secondary power
therefore. After defeating Sweden Russia became a bigger power especially as threats for the Habsburg and
the Ottoman Empire who itself was difficult to conquer. Although they caught up in military affairs during the
18th century, the country remained poor and underdeveloped, especially in terms of trade, logistics and naval
development.
4.4. THE RISE OF FRANCE
Under Louis XIV (1643–1715)
diplomatic success was followed
by an circling between mighty
powers allied together without
strategical
concentration
(“falling between stools”). The
Ancient Regime remained the
biggest power by size, population
and wealth, secondary in military
size after Russia and strong in
agriculture
and
entrepreneurship, but was not
efficiently organized (hierarchical
tax system) to become a “superpower” and was therefore stabilizing the plurality of power in Europe.
The geopolitical orientation was towards all borders (Spain, GB, low countries, Italy) based on the encirclement
fears – France never enjoyed the luck of strategical concentration. It was successful in the war against the
Netherlands till the Peace of Nijmegen 1678/9 (which was enforced by mercantilists from Amsterdam) and had
to round off its northern borders and claimed itself “the arbiter of Europe” in a universal monarchy – but after
the uprising of the Hugenots 1685 and the invasion of Germany 1688 France stood alone:

Treaty of Rijswijk 1697 ended the Nine Years War  resettling the political plurality in Europe

Occupation of the Southern Netherlands and possible succession of the Spanish throne by Louis XIV
provoked the other powers  War of Spanish Succession 1701-13
o
After the Treaty of the Pyrenees the mountains should be a natural buffer
o
Treaty of Utrecht and Rastatt  the great beneficiary was GB (was the only sea power now)
o
Dynasty and territorial claims of France have been checked
27
o
Independence of the United Provinces, Southern Netherlands and Milan to Habsburg
Cardinal Mazarin, successor of Richelieu as state minister (1642-61), was successful in international politics but
weak in domestic politics (upheaval of Le Fronde 1648) - Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1665-83) established the
mercantilism as new economic principle with fair trade, standardisation and more indirect taxation – but alone
40% of the new manufactures were for the building of Versailles. Also Colonies like the French East India
Company played a major role. The role of commerce will be extended under Cardinal de Fleury (1719-43) and
his balance of budget and infrastructural and economical expansions, and later the introduction of loans
instead of taxes by Louis XVI as a result of the inefficient financial system (expensive wars and Versailles) – but
latest by the 19th century France missed the Industrial Revolution.
French attacks towards Austrian possessions (Lorraine,
Milan) 1733 were successful because GB under the
isolationist Walpole kept out of international affairs. The
influence of France in the east rose with the peace
negotiations to end the Austro-Russian war against the
Ottomans 1735-9.
The succession by Maria Theresia and the attack on
Silesia by Friedrich der Große in 1740/1 showed the
difficult situation on the continent in the War of Austrian
Succession: GB relieved Austria in many ways and defended the Netherlands on a high price – geography and
finance altogether brought France and GB to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (status quo ante).
Reinforcement between GB and France was a threat to Austria, Prussia and Russia and led to new alliances –
the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756:

France, Austria and Russia seemed successful only in the first period against Prussia and England

Anglo-Prussian alliance was superior in leadership, financial power and military/naval expertise
o
Combination of the popular “maritime strategy” with a “continental” one
o
Sufficient financial resources to survive  bankruptcy of Austria 1760
o
Return to pre-war-status 1762/3  beneficiary was again Britain (influence in the colonies)
Despite the economic benefits of the vast global empire, Britain struggled with economic problems – a period
of introspection followed, interrupted by the fighting in America. France and Russia also tried to expand with
colonies, but France then slided into the Revolution as a result of the bad financial situation and the therefore
risen taxes.
28
Main wars of the 17th and 18th century in Europe
duration
name
peace treaty
main aggressor(s)
main combatant(s)
1568-1648
Eighty Years War
Peace of Westphalia
Netherlands
Spain
1618-48
Thirty Years War
Peace of Westphalia
1635-59
Spanish-French War
Peace of Pyrenees
France
Spain
1672-8
French-Dutch War
Treaty of Nijmwegen
France
Netherlands
1688-97
Nine Years War
Treaty of Rijswijk
France
1701-14
War of Spanish Succession
Treaty of
Utrecht and Rastatt
France
1740-8
War of Austrian Succession
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
France, Prussia
Spain, Bavaria
1756-63
Seven Years War
Peace of Paris
England, Prussia
France/Sweden/Austria/Spain
Austria, HRR, Spain,
England, Netherlands
Austria, HRR, England
Netherlands
Austria, England,
Netherlands
Austria, HRR, France,
Russia, Sweden
4.5. NAPOLEONIC WARS
The powers on the continent struggled with recovery from the Seven Years War and domestic problems as
Britain was forced into a war in America 1776-83 it could not win – mainly because of support problems of the
lasting fight and the decentralized society. So support from other European powers will lead to isolation politics
since the war.
As the eastern powers wanted to protect themselves from another big fight, territorial gains could only be
reached by diplomatics like in the (last cabinet) “War” of Bavarian Succession or the curving up of Poland. With
the decline of the Ottoman Empire came the rise of Katharina II as new power in the east. In GB Pitt’s (the
younger) diplomacy, the booming overseas-trade and the beginning Industrial Revolution, based on a growing
agriculture, restored the state’s finances (fiscal reforms).
Financial problems arose in trying to check the French imperial visions after the French Revolution and the
military improvements of the First Republic: The fighting of the opponents showed a lack of strategy, the one
of GB was inefficient and expensive (“british warfare”: colonial operations, maritime blockage). While the
exhausted continental powers admitted the French primacy, fights between GB and France continued, but the
two main powers couldn’t defeat each other on sea or land only:

Seven wars between GB and France 1789-1815
o
First (1793-5) and second (1799-1802) coalition: no strategic clarety, failed cooperative
o
1802: Peace of Amiens  neutralized colonies, no economical treaty between France & GB

Allies against Napoleon (3rd coalition) were defeated early (Ulm and Austerlitz, 1805)

Economical pressures on GB: no marked in continental Europe for their products
o
Smuggling, new markets overseas and the rising Industrial Revolution saved the economy
o
Protection led the French industry emerge from the war in a less competitive state
29

Plunder and taxes in the defeated countries financed the French war
o
Small-town commerce and small-scaled industry was not competitive
o
Limited domestic reforms, price control and export regulations  backward economy could
no longer finance the war, loans from other countries were out of reach

Great losses (esp. Aspern and Wagram, 1809) let the French manpower stocks erode
o
Russia and Austria still had big “armies in being”
o
Biggest losses in the Russian campaign 1812
o
Battle of Nations, Leipzig 1813
Napoleons final campaign 1815 strengthened Britain and ensured the enemies in a policy against France in the
coming decades. Being the dominant power in world politics after Napoleon the principle of equilibrium which
Pitt and Castlereagh held so high was on which applied to European territorial arrangements but not to the
colonial and commercial spheres in which GB got superdominant.
30
5. EUROPE IN THE BALANCE
INTRODUCTION AND READING
This session discusses the evolution of European power politics between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the
outbreak of World War I. Why did the European powers end up in the bloody trenches? Why were fears about
French aggrandizement replaced by deep-seated suspicion of Germany? After all, the Congress of Vienna seemed to
usher a long period of relative stability, diplomatic exchanges became more intensive and institutionalized, trade
boomed, and both conservative and liberal schools of international politics emphasized the need for prevent the
wrangling for influence from turning hostile. By way of preparation, you are expected to read chapter four of The
Rise and Fall of Great Powers (Kennedy 1989, pp. 184-248). Important here is to identify the main players, their
strengths and weaknesses. Important is also that you understand the dynamics that made the balance of power
shift, especially in regard to the Great Britain, Prussia, France, and the United States. Do pay attention to the
influence of domestic politics – the role of parliaments and new leaders – affected foreign policies. We are also
interested in the main playgrounds of power politics: how did the weakness of the Turkish Empire and the
fragmentation of southern Europe elicit interference? This will lead us again to Kennedy’s book (Kennedy 1989, pp.
249-354). Very important here is to interpret what the author describes as the crisis of the middle powers. You
should also pay attention to the rise of Germany, Japan, and the United States, and how their foreign policies
changed since the late 19th century. What caused Great Britain to slide into a confidence crisis? It is also key to
analyse how the Near East continued to be an incubator of instability, and how the playground of European power
politics shifted to Africa and the East. Lastly, you should understand the causes, triggers, and evolution of World
War I.
Additional reading. Nicely complementing with this chapter is Henry Kissinger’s analysis of the European Concert
(Kissinger 1994, pp. 78-102). You should reconstruct how the European powers sought to maintain stability via a
system of conferences as well as the differences in terms of their interests and political ideologies. Also notice how
Kissinger portrays the personal role of great negotiators like the Prince von Metternich and Talleyrand. Alfred
Mahan, Bernhard von Bulow, John Hobson, and Norman Angell are three writers that I suggest you to read in
combination with the previous texts. Alfred Mahan (Mahan, 1890) was a leading naval strategist who had a strong
influence on the latter President Roosevelt and, as some argue, even con contemporary naval thinking in India and
China. What are his arguments to plea for a larger American Navy? What is his position towards international law?
How is he tabling the idea of some sort of maritime sphere of influence? In a speech before the Reichstag,
Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow makes his case for a Greater Germany (von Bülow 1899). How does he make his
case and how does he anticipate this Greater Germany to emerge? John Hobson, an English historical economist
and source of inspiration of Lenin, traces expansionism and imperialism back to financial and economic dynamics
(Hobson 1902, chapter 4.1). Which two options does he distinguish for countries that struggle with overcapacity?
Try to come up with your own opinion about how the industrial revolution might have contributed to expansionism
and war. While the English businessman-turned-politician Norman Angell develops his critique of power politics into
a much different direction, he too has reasons to scorn the pursuit of expansionism (Angell, 1910). Try to find his
main accusations in a short excerpt from the Great Illusion.
31
5.1. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
The Congress of Vienna 1814/5 secured the peace in Europe till the Crimean War 1854 – it was therefore the
longest European peace period since ever before, afterwards only beaten by the period between 1945 and 89.
The key issue was to consolidate (but not unify) central Europe, meaning Germany. The Idea of selfdetermination of nations was not yet born, so ethnic homogeneity was no concern. But the very high
specialisation and scientific evidences for claiming certain territories made it a highly comprehensive summit.
The quest for the moral high ground as a general motivation puts noble values above imperial claims – so the
Congress of Vienna can be seen as the starting point of the “European Concert System”, frequent summits to
maintain the balance of power and restore conservative values.
Austria was keen on the historic leadership they lost with the failed hegemony after the Thirty Years War –
balance of power was therefore only interesting if Austria benefits from a new order based on it. On the other
hand, the German Confederation was too strong to be attacked but too decentralized for own attacks. The
balance of power was finally secured in the Quadrupel Alliance (GB, D, A, RUS) against France and the
additional Holy Alliance (without GB) on wish of the Tsar on a religious, conservative unity.
While Austria, France and Great Britain wanted to stabilize the status quo ante on different reasons, Prussia
and Russia were actively expansionist. The restoration of France (Bourbons), the share of the Rhineland
(freedom of navigation on the Rhine) and the destruction of Poland between Prussia and Russia were the main
agendas. But Prussia also got Saxony and Danzig, Russia Finland. Also the Low Countries and Luxembourg were
recreated and the German Confederation as well as the Swiss neutrality established.
Metternich (1773-1859) and his “extraordinary
diplomatic skills” secured the position of Austria
for another 100 years. While Wilson one century
Prince of Metternich
Talleyrand
later will consider democracies as peacekeeping
and reasonable, for Metternich they were
unpredictable
in
remembering
the
Tsar Alexander I.
French
Revolution. Here the difference of developments
and the implementation of the international
Lord Castlereagh
behaviour of a state by its defining domestic
institutions can be seen: While the US is created
“The tongue is untied, the heart opens and the
need to make oneself understood often takes over
from the rules of cold and severe calculation.”
“I spent the day carving Europe up like a cheese.”
“I put the law first and interests second”
“A new new order. The principal powers in Europe
should bind themselves mutually to protect and
support each other.”
“I would rather have war than give up what
occupy.”
“The advantage of this mode of proceeding is that
you treat the plenipotentiaries as a body, with
early and becoming respect. You keep the powers
by concert and management in your own has, but
without openly assuming authority to their
exclusion.”
Prince of Hardenberg
to set men free and therefore institutionalized
democratic
values,
Europe
has
grown
institutions – and for Metternich laws and rights
therefore existed in the nature of things.
So Metternich conceived the main threats (D,
RUS) that the advantages of revolution are less
32
important than their danger in concern of least manageable
domestic upheavals. “Wise and measured policy” was for him
the only way Austria could survive, due to the geopolitical
situation, which allowed to attack Austria from all sides (in
contrary: GB, F, RUS). He was calm and conservative and found
it “more important to eliminate the claims of others than to
press on your own.”
France should be hedged in a balance of power and he defined
Russia as a long-term threat and made steps towards the Tsar
and tried to temper him by involving him into consultations and
highlightening the common interests of domestic stability
(secured by the Holy Alliance). Therefore Metternich had to
show a double play towards GB with the stabilising Quadruple
Alliance.
Castlereagh (1769-1822) saw in an European forum the main
stabilizing aspect, which differs from the historic position of Great Britain: Tradition let them have no fear and
the security to find allies in the last moment. Like Wilson a century later he considered active participation in
the peace project necessary – in difference he could not shape the foreign policy as Wilson did later.
Talleyrand (1754-1838) can be considered as the most flexible negotiator, minister of foreign affairs in six
French regimes, managing to restore France without big territorial losses and successful in installing buffer
states (Netherlands, German Confederation, Piedmont). Napoleon III (1808-1873) then saw an opportunity to
end the isolation of France by destroying the Holy Alliance: He weakened Russia by getting the status of
protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire which led to an open fight between Russia and the
Ottomans, which were backed by France and Great Britain. Austria first declared neutrality but feared the rising
power of Russia in the Slavic region. Uneasy alliances finally let to the collapse at WW1.
5.2. INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND DIFFERENT DEVELOPEMENTS
Even when certain trades and regions on the continent had flourished during the Napoleonic wars, they caused
population losses, changed barriers, higher taxes and the loss of overseas markets and raw materials and
determined the stagnating economical growth, especially in comparison with the always growing Great Britain.
There was no money, demand and enthusiasm to “modernize” mostly agricultural regions so till the mid of
the century traditional production, transport and products remained. Efforts were taken to save the status quo
and avoid risky diplomacy and military actions – domestic upheavals were the major threat and actions in the
first half of the century.
33
5.2.1. “ORGANIZED CAPITALISM AND DIFFERENT ECONOMIC MODELS
Different developments in the 19th century had influences on the economic and monetary system:

Change of the “traditional” social order: industrialisation, migration, urbanisation

From agricultural seasons to new business cycles

Nationalisation and Internationalisation of the economy, economic politics and theories
On the basis of the 18th century two models were shaped, the continental economic model with its orientation
on budget stability and centralized interventionism and the Anglo-Saxon liberalized model (Adam Smith) with
the dominance of the market and the role of the state reduced to (or focussed on) security and infrastructure.
With a stricter regulation of the working class in Great Britain from 1834 onwards poverty and migration grew.
The political idea was to secure the working class on a low living standard for the industry and therefore
economic growth – miserably living conditions then also led to risings of the workers classes and later Marxism.
From the 1830ies onwards the “Anti-Corn-Law Association” focussed on limiting the tariffs on agricultural
import – free trade was seen as a win-win situation for different state economies with different products. The
abolition of the Corn Laws 1846 led to a higher purchasing power of the importing nations, to whom now more
industrial products could be sold – wages rose and the economical leading position of GB could so be ensured.
On the continent the industrial take-off was in the mid of the 19th century (textile industry, mining,
engineering) with international private industries, subsidized by the state in important sectors (esp. railway).
Free trade was only realized in complex multilateral treaties, national economic systems and protectionist
tendencies were still very powerful (“organized capitalism”), but new interest groups (agricultural, industrial
and trade chambers) and cooperatives rose. In reaction to the political formation of the workers class a state
social policy (insurances, education) grew.
New industrial zones (often on the ground of old fortifications) established a complex speculation system in
wide parts of the population (“Gründerzeit”) – huge sells 1873 were followed by share falls on the stock
markets, liquiditation problems followed and caused a crisis of the banking system and so to a total financial
crisis with export problems for overcapacities and therefore the breakdown of many companies (comparable to
1929). This is enforced by the rising amount of paper money, but the new national currencies were also based
on the gold-standard – the basis for a control over the exchange rates.
This financial crisis was followed by an rising state interventionism and protectionism as well as more
infrastructural privileges to the state (water, gas and electricity supply, medical care, public transport) – the
“industrial imperial colonialism” tried to expand the economies while higher tariffs should protect the
economy. Additional the influence of the banks on the politics and the system rose due to a reduction of share
holders financing and a rising credit financing – and the rising public spending changed the public finance
system with higher and more taxes but also new money transfers.
34
5.2.2. AUSTRIA
Metternich and Schwarzenberg were the leading figures in preserving the status quo, while other powers were
constantly less willing to aid Austria. The county feared internal upheavals (esp. in Poland) and was busy as a
five-sided checkmate, controlling France, Italy, Prussia and Russia by always appealing to the Holy Alliance

The surpression of national tendencies provoked Britain and Russia

Unwillingness to join the German “Zollverein” or “greater Germany”-ideologies disappointed many
German states who then looked for Prussia as leader

Repeated use of military in northern Italy provoked France
The diversity of the Habsburg Empire in times of Nationalisation was seen as its major weakness

Great differences (average income, industrialisation) between more developed areas in the west and
the major agricultural parts

Growing nationality problem, army as only unifying institution
o
Heterogenic army with a lot disadvantages  armed strength behind all other powers
o
Army weapons out of date and too few  no funds
o
Keeping the empire together was difficult for the diplomats
o
Complicated relations with most of its neighbours: many foes, difficult war-preparation

Difficulties in raising taxes and underdeveloped economic base  lack of funding

French wars had left the Empire financially exhausted (heavy public debt)
Besides this disadvantages Austria controlled many influential families in Germany and showed a careful rule
over the divided Empire. In addition, while every other power had problems with the multinational state, they
were always willing to cooperate on certain issues and especially in wars.
In the middle of the 19th century the flank-powers concentrated on recovering from the Crimean War as well as
domestic and economic politics while Prussia was struggling because of the succession of Friedrich Wilhelm IV
(1840-61) by Wilhelm I (1861-88) and Austria had to juggle with several other problems. France could emerge
as an artificial leader of the European concert, strengthened by its successful intervention on the side of the
Piedmont against Habsburg, which wasn’t caused by the military strength of France but by the weakness of
Habsburg.
Austria grew in terms of population and held about 4,5% of the worlds manufacturing output at the end of the
19th century but was by far the weakest of the European powers in terms of Industrialisation but tried to act
like a main power with the resources of a weak and therefore needed German assistance in every war,
especially against Serbia.
35
5.2.3. FRANCE
The position of France after 1815 was much better than those of Austria or Prussia in terms of capital (higher
national income), population (higher and more heterogenic) and military (esp. navy), but it was limited by the
other powers in order to prevent it from regaining strength. Cooperations were possible at certain times but
France had no equal economic partner and no access to overseas. Therefore the vast sums of the active
colonial policy were not well spent. Even when Industrialisation started in the second half of the 19th century
other powers grew faster, so the path to national prosperity led over concentration on high-class goods rather
than mass products.
The new revisionism of Napoleon III against the treaty of Vienna showed interests in the Mediterranean and
the Rhineland, but France became more and more torn between its interests in different conflicts all over
Europe which led to an often ambivalent and hesitating policy but made France to a controlling factor in many
struggles and saved its position as an important ally for the other powers in order to prevent the balance of
power.
The main foe was seen in Germany while struggles over colonies with Britain and an unpredictable Italy added
a geopolitical, naval and military problem. While the economy was declining and the military weak (no artillery)
the country was financially prospering and could invest in whole Europe, which manifested in an important
alliance with Britain.
5.2.4. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Steady (and after the 1840ies: spectacular) growth of an integrated global economy:

Transcontinental trading and financial network centred in Europe (mainly GB)

Improvement in transport, communication, knowledge-transfer, manufacturing output


o
1760-1830: 30% of the worlds manufacturing output by GB
o
1860: 1/3 of world merchants under British flag
o
London stock exchange is often seen as key for the economic success
Ideas of free trade and international harmony after the “great war” for GB important
o
Less open wars: Franko-Austrian war1859, Crimean War 1854, American civil war
o
Wars of conquest against less developed peoples intensified
Technical change and industrial development had little and slow influence on military and warfare
o
Focus on speed victories than on long-term mobilisation
o
Governmental bureaucracies made it easier to get money from funds but the influence on
warfare was little  concentration on existing military

Massive increase in productivity  substitute inanimate for animate sources of power
o
Always higher economical growth than the massive population growth
o
Rising agricultural output was important to feed the workers
o
World manufacturing output 1750: Europe ¼, Asia ¾  1900: Europe 2/3, US ¼, Asia 1/10
36

Larger rise of population in Asia reduced their per capita income

Land controlled by Europe: 1800: 1/3  1878: 2/3  1914: 85%

“firepower-gap”: no resistance was successful, resources mainly in western power
Great Britain achieved a remarkable degree of global pre-eminence by 1815, thanks to naval mastery, financial
credit, commercial expertise and alliance diplomacy. The Industrial Revolution enhanced this already strong
mercantilist power and transferred it gradually (not revolutionally) into a different form of power.
Britain was unchallenged in industrial production and energy consumption but only leading in GNP per capita,
not in absolute terms. Additional the “modernisation” of the laissez-faire economy was not paralleled by
improvements in the army, which stagnated in the post-1815 decades.

War was seen as last resort, diplomacy and peace were regarded as cheaper and therefore better for
the development public against interventions  limited military expenditures


o
Diplomacy was seen as central to solve international problems
o
Permanent juggling act: permanent interest, no permanent allies (“splendid isolation”)
Influence could not be measured by the traditional criteria of military hegemony
o
Domestic stability by consolidation of the parliamentarian democracy
o
Naval realm: still control over the sea  navy always bigger than the 3-4 next ones together
o
Expanding colonial empire: British interests encountered no others for a long time
Permanent capital from the 17th century on: investments (partly overseas)  upward spiral
o
Overseas-investments always returned  no balance-of-payments-crisis
o
Additional money from the international trading and banking network centred in Britain
o
Complementary between visible trade flows and investments guaranteed internationally
growing prosperity in a stable import/export-system and world harmony

Repeated financial injections and infrastructure (developing of an industry) in
foreign countries had the danger of future rivality

Big dependence on international trade and finance as a result of the overcapacities
of the Industrialisation had the danger of collapsing in times of war
 concentrating on uniting the world and avoiding wars
The “splendid isolation” of Great Britain allowed them to get the biggest power in the 19 th century without the
need of allies. The self-confidence allowes GB to pick the quarrels on the continent in which they intervene
with temporarily allies – so the status of the protector of the balance of power got a fixed principle. The British
foreign policy, mostly architected by Palmerston, grew out of open debates with the public opinion playing a
major role which led to an extraordinary unity in times of war.
37
5.2.5. RUSSIA AND THE CRIMEAN WAR
Russia could prevent its status as a fearable gendarme of Europe
under Nicholas I (1825-55), which army overshadowed the
continental powers but also made not evident till the Crimean
War that the industry was unproductive and underdeveloped.
Total GNP figures were constantly high because of the big (and
rising) population, but in terms of GNP per capita Russia lost
ground to all other powers:

Import of iron to start the process of industrialisation

Export of primary materials to higher developed countries

General lack of capital, low consumer demand, big influence of the state, geopolitical situation

Remaining military strength: expansion in the Caucasus (1828/9), suppression of the Hungarian
rebellion (1848/9)
But the campaign in the Crimea 1853-6 showed the backwardness of the army and the whole system:

Troops could not be concentrated, were overaged or untrained, very few reservists

Navy, cavalry and infantry had old weapons and ships – new ones could not be produced

No coherent grand strategy in the incapable leadership

Logistical weakness: no railways south of Moscow, not enough fodder for the many horses
 disproportional small outcomes for a very high effort

The British blockade cut off the exports  heavy borrowings to finance the war  near bankrupsy
France on the other side was as a “hybrid power” way ahead of Russia and even Britain in military terms and
could recover from the Napoleon heritage – but the high war costs evaporated early enthusiasm, which led to
an orientation towards peace negotiations. Britain’s army could not compete with France due to the laissezfaire policy (small army, low degree of governmental influence, free press) and tried to compensade the lacks
with high amount of moneys to the armed forces. The resulting unrest in the “unmilitarized” British public led
to negotiations and moved Britain in the the edge (intensified by domestic reforms and the Indian Mutiny
1857.
Russia under Alexander II (1855-81) now focussed on industrialisation, modernisation of infrastructure
(railway) and bigger enterprises but was still far behind the other continental powers and lost in this war all its
reputation but gained the feeling of vulnerability (side effect: sell of Alaska 1867).
Russia was growing in terms of population and industrialisation, but a high amount of its firms was in foreign
hands, the uneducation and poverty rates were high and at the end of the 19 th century it had the largest debts
in the world. The inefficient agriculture in comparison with the rising population as well as the rising military
costs created low living standards and therefore the permanent fear of social upheavals.
38
5.2.6. THE UNITED STATES AND THE CIVIL WAR
Geographical similarities of the US with Russia (size, open frontiers, resources, growing population) go aside
with important differences (higher average standard of living – but big internal differences, higher average
income, higher productivity). The only threat comes from Britain, but the two countries were economically tied
together and prospering (with benefits for both sides), so that a war was unlogical.
Therefore most of the time the armed forces were kept at a minimum to secure the economic growth before
transforming it quickly into the biggest military nation followed again by demilitarisation 1865. The victory of
the north in the first real industrialized “total war” was mainly because of the weakness of the south:

Great difference in population: only half the amount of soldiers

Dependence on agriculture: lower recruitment capabilities

No weapon manufacturies, no railway, no income after the export of cotton stopped
o
No military support from Europe, loanings didn’t work out
o
Imports of weapons from Europe too slow and less
In such a desperate situation the only “strategy” for the South was to hope to blunt the northern willpower so
that they accept the South. But after heavy losses surrender was the only chance left.
After the reconstruction, Industrialisation could go on in the strategically secure and now united country
(“Gilded age”). With massive British investments and an agricultural revolution the competition with Europe
grew, still on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 (non-intervention: “America for the Americans.”), but
now Panamericanism (“Weltpolitik”) and colonialism was more offensive:

Building of the Suez Canal 1878: interventions for economic interests  annexation of Hawaii

Own colonies: Cuba (1898), Philippines, Puerto Rico (1899)

Open door policy with China 1899 to strengthen its position in East Asia

Policy of the Big Stick under Roosevelt (1901-9): interventions as an international police
Alfred Mahan, leading naval strategist with influence on Roosevelt, wanted in 1890 to increase the influence of
the US in the Pacific by transferring the passive navy, orientated on defence, into an active one. A rising power
cannot stand to the Monroe doctrine. The combination of economic policy with military strength should lead to
a better fortification of the harbours with coast-defence ships and the closure of the area 3000 miles from the
coast for foreign ships while the own economic influence (fishing) should be extended with help from the navy
– which would then lead to confrontations with big naval powers like Canada and Great Britain.
The US seemed to have every advantage of the other powers without its disadvantages: A rising
industrialisation and low transport costs created a big domestic market and the highest incomes per capita (in
comparison to low foreign trade). Foreign products were kept out by higher tariffs while the US switched from
an exporter of raw materials (esp. cotton) to the biggest manufacturer, from protectionism to free trade. The
39
growing navy (1% of GNP to defence) created a feeling of security, but the underdeveloped financial structure
(foreign trade in Sterling) led to a first crisis in 1907.
5.2.7. PRUSSIA AND THE WARS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
Prussia dealt with the acquisition of the Rhineland and the split of the state in a “liberal” western and a
“feudal” eastern part and the connected fear of domestic upheavals. This was visible in the dealing with the
“German question” about the unification of the German states and the leading role. After the creation of the
Zollverein 1833 (indication to use industrial power to gain political power), at the 1850 agreement of Olmütz,
Prussia agreed to demobilize its army and to abandon its own schemes for unification and so to lead the
German states. A diplomatic humiliation was preferable to a risky war with the Habsburg Empire:

Upheaval of Schleswig-Holstein  Austria didn’t want to intervene

Support of Austria by several German states and Russia
 German Confederation as a buffer between Prussia and Austria

Strengths: education system, administration, army (esp. tactics)
 couldn’t be utilized until the domestic problems were solved and the industry developed
Prussia was the smallest of the European powers till the 1860ies, but industrialisation and an infrastructure
boom went along with the demobilisation of the army (no intervention in the Crimea) and led to a quick
infrastructure boom under the new Chancellor Bismarck (1862-90). The compulsury Volksschule for decades
now showed effects in engineering and research (Krupp, Siemens - telegraph, Bayer - Aspirin, BASF - gaslamp).
By 1870 the GNP was bigger than those of France, but a depression in the 1870ies led to beginning
protectionism and imperialism.
The Prussian “military revolution” of the 1860ies brought the shift in the German power balance (Königgrätz
1866) and showed the military developments of the Industrial Revolution:

Breechloaders, railway, communication technologies  large industrial firms (e.g. Krupp)

Short-service system  larger front-line army

General staff studied mistakes

High education level in the society
After the success against France 1870 Prussia should lead the continent with a growing importance of
diplomacy under Bismarck in terms of regulate rising powers to avoid clashes.

Habsburgs compromise 1867 might provoke a Russian intervention

Italian unification 1970: papal state without protection of France
 shift towards Germany  “Triple Alliance” 1882

Post-Crimean War military reforms in Russia weren’t successful

France was in dependence of Prussia and isolated in Europe

US and Japan weren’t yet considered as “part of the system”
40
The quick victory of Prussia over France should get the status of a model for modern warfare everyone liked to
achieve – the “military revolution” should be the key to achieve it. In general the status of industrialisation
marked the power of a state now: The power system of 1815 was dissolving with Britain and the US getting
more influence on continental Europe, Italy as new power in the concert and Russia and Austria loosing
influence. The shaken power balance and the combination of engineering, military strength and autocracy (if it
existsts, this could be the German “Sonderweg”) threatened several states simultaneously, Wilhelm II (18881918) intensified this with an uncareful diplomacy, especially towards Russia and Britain.
5.2.8. JAPAN
In a more and more globalized world the pressure upon the isolated Japan rose in the 19 th century, but quests
for opening were rejected till the landing of Matthew Perry with four American warships, which was regarded
as an act of imperialism, and the following opening to international trade. The Urbanisation, the established
trading system and the manufacturies with western knowledge, raw materials and money allowed a fast
industrialisation after the opening, but 1868 rebellions against foreign traders ended the Edo period.
After the Meji-restauration Industrialisation was combined with a high consciousness about the own cultural
uniqueness and fear of getting colonialized to Imperialism (Nippon chauvinism) and Militarism/Colonialism.
Therefore the security dilemma in East Asia ended in open wars with Corea (1876) and China (1894/5), backed
by Western Powers, especially GB. But the military strength is based on high loans which then nearly led to
bankruptcy 1905.
After the success over China 1895 Japan should get the leading economic power in East Asia due to the
geopolitical isolation. Described with the picture of the flying goes pattern Japan will then be followed by the
so-called Tigerstates (South Corea, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapur). But the so enforced Nationalism also led the
instrumentalizing of the Shinto cult and expansionism after WW1 and therefore growing tensions with the US.
5.2.9. ITALY
Italy saw a growth of population and military
strength but its industrialisation status was
relatively low, agricultural backwardness and
illiteracy relatively high, which led to high
emigration rates to the US and a shift to
industrialisation/heavy industry in the north,
but with relatively low output.
41
5.3. ALLIANCES AND THE DRIFT TO WAR
The shift from an isolated France to an isolated Prussia is the main change in 19th century balance of power.
Roots of the Nationalism, which arose after the defeat of France, can be traced to the 18 th century and will lead
to growing tensions with Great Britain and Japan on colonial issues. The lack of colonies also led to an
orientation towards the east.
In the 19th century public opinion arose as well as pacifism (1848: Brussels Peace conference with disarment
proposal by Napoleon III, Paris 49, London 51, the Hague 1899/1907, Brussels 13) and economic realism
(Bismarck 1888: “Germany is a saturated power”). But due to the fact that several power spheres didn’t show
clear leaders and quick changes often shook the power balance, alliance diplomacy became very central for
the European powers (not for the US and Japan) in foresight of a rising conflict:

Increasing colonial politics and rising influence of the navy

Fears of GB from several powers led to an end of the Anglo-French rivalry  united by the suspicion
against Germany

In 1905 the chances of a German success were big but the Kaiser chose diplomacy

International conflicts returned rivalries to Europe (e.g. Marocco-crisis 1907/11)
42
The “Eastern Question” will get central in the early 20th century: Rising Balkan states (esp. Serbia) couldn’t be
controlled by the other powers. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand speed seemed to be the key to
success but new weaponry destroyed early war plans of quick offences. The alliance system then provoked a
long war in which the financial prosperity will get important.
Germany saw its opportunity to open a second front to the west with the “Schlieffenplan”, the same strategy
as successful in 1871. The counter-offensive of France led to a hard fight with new technology on the neutral
Belgium, which then provoked Great Britain. The entrance of Britain to the war was essential because Russia
and France had difficulties in connecting their strategies and were on a personally low level after disastrous
campaigns (esp. Verdun). Italy’s and Turkish intervention 1915 were not as essential as often mentioned while
the US and Japan were on the sideline and first directly affected with the British intervention.
The geopolitical isolation, rising transport costs and infrastructural problems, but of course also the Februar
Revolution 1917, the civil war and the assassination of the Tsar, led to the collapse of Russia – Italy and Austria
should follow. The high discipline but little equipment in the army led to 3,6 Mio dead and 2,1 Mio prisoners.
The Treaty of Brest-Litowsk (similar to the Molotow-Ribbentrop-Abkommen in WW2) between Germany and
Russia 1918 eased the western front (spring offensives, Hundred Days Offensive). France on the other side was
during the whole war dependent on deliveries of raw material and nutrition, especially from overseas, from
fresh loans to finance it and from military assistance – this was the big advantage compared to Russia.
43
It took 1-2 years until one million troops stood ready in France and also the industrial military production was
not ready for a long war but should rise to two billion (80% of the total governmental expenditures) producing
120 000 machine guns and 32 000 aircrafts in 1918. After heavy losses at the western front (Ypres,
Paeschendaele 1917) the dependency upon the US rose (borrowings, weapon supply, but first no direct action
following the Monroe doctrine).
The same process took place on German side after the Battles of Verdun and at the Somme with the
Hindenburg program 1916, the total concentration of the economy on war. The German military-industrial
might was based on the exploitation of conquest and on the edge of victory 1917, but the strategical neglect of
agriculture by taking away men, horses and food turned the coin as well as the “Zimmermann telegram” 1917
and the unrestricted U-boat campaign against merchants and therefore the US-intervention. Those army
strength was weaker in 1917 than any other by 1914 which led to a “lag time” before bringing the economic
potential into military effectiveness. of
WWI
44
6. FROM WAR TO WAR
INTRODUCTION AND READING
In merely four decades the world witnessed the two bloodiest episodes of War. This session interprets the causes of
the Second World War and its consequences for the strategic landscape. Particular attention will be paid to the
failure of international cooperation, the reluctance of the United States to lead, Japanese and German revisionism,
as well as the impact of economic turmoil on international politics. Paul Kennedy’s analysis will serve as
introduction (Kennedy 1989, pp. 355-459). Likewise to the previous sessions, you should be able to identify the
main players and playgrounds of international politics. Clarify for yourself the importance of unsettled business
from World War I, France’s search for security and why the world order was much more fragile than in the
nineteenth century? Very important is to apprehend the making and impact of the economic crisis and the failure of
a long series of conferences on economic and military affairs. Regarding the latter, it would be useful even to draw
up a list of the major events from the Paris Peace Conference to the Geneva World Disarmament Conference.
The additional reading materials focus on three important questions. First, there is an extract from Kindleberger’s
classic on the economic crisis (Kindleberger 1973, pp. 291-308). One of America’s most influential historical
economists, Charles P. Kindleberger traces back the origins of the economic crisis of the 1930s. In this chapter
Kindleberger expresses his reservations about the classic liberal supposition that international markets can be
stabilized on the balance of payments. “Symmetry is not the way of the world,” he states. Important here is to
interpret the reasons of his scepticism and the so-called fallacy of the composition. Second, you should understand
why international markets were rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume
responsibility. Pay also attention to the domestic reasons of Washington’s reluctance to take the lead.
Second, there are two works on the alleged American isolationism. In his lively written essay, Princeton professor
Albert Weinberg lucidly summarizes the main features of America’s isolationism – a feature that also runs
prominently through the chapter of Paul Kennedy and Charles Kindleberger (Weinberg 1940, pp. 539-547). Relevant
in this article are the assumptions that underpin isolationism (p. 542) and the main principles (p. 543 and onwards).
The most interesting part, however, is how Weinberg describes the gradual morphing of isolationism into a more
pragmatic synthesis with new needs and opportunities abroad, a synthesis that can prove to be a new way of
“commanding its [America’s] own fortunes”. In his important treatise, William Appleman Williams argues that the
idea of a synthesis between “the fidelity to ideals and the urge to power” might not cover reality and proposes four
broad policy perspectives (Williams 1954, pp. 1-20). The author refers to some sort of international corporatism, but
also signals that this pragmatic line was challenged by German and Japanese revisionism
Third, there are two articles that present interesting insights into the machinery of conferences. Robert Binkley
gives a colourful account of how the great powers were at loggerheads over the organization of the Paris Peace
Conference (Binkley 1931, pp. 509-547). Cursory reading suffices for this article, but try to grasp from this article
how the protagonists sought to demine sensitive matters in committees and how within these committees smaller
members hardly had a say. At least as revealing is David Carlton’s discussion of the 1927 Naval Disarmament
Conference (Carlton 1968, pp. 573-598). Remark the bickering and distrust between London and Washington. Also
pay attention to the role of the British delegation, caught between different interest groups.
6.1. THE POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER
“Eventually, the United States became the larder, arsenal, and bank of the Allies and
acquired a direct interest in Allied victory that was to bemuse the postwar apostles of
economic determinism for a long time.” – Barbara Tuchman
“By next June, or earlier, the president of the American Republic would be in a
position to dictate his terms to us.” – Keynes, 1916
“We can bring the Allies to our way of thinking, because they will be financially in our
hands.” – Wilson, 1917
45
As Western Europe was economically and military exhausted as well as destroyed in big parts and suffered
under heavy losses (casualties, flu) the edge powers USA and Russia started a stunning rise based on new
export-orientated economies. This was also the start of decolonialisation and the so-called Washington-ParisSystem for peace (Paris Peace Conferences, Washington Naval Treaties 1921-2):
On the Paris Peace Conferences important issues were discussed between the big powers in Councils of Four
(US, F, GB, I) or Five (incl. RU) and only special interests in bigger Councils. The peace treaty was presented to
the smaller powers one day before to the enemies and “Powers with special interests” could appear but had no
influence on the negotiations – therefore the hearings of smaller powers produced a lot of paperwork but little
decisions. The right to speak was seen by the leaders of the conference as a concession ant not as a
contribution towards territorial claims. So the critics about great power dictation were the same as 1815:
“No Belgian sat on the Belgian Commission, no Pole on any of the three Polish
Commissions, and when it was necessary to draft conventions to apply to the New
States, no representative of any of the New States had a place on the commission.” –
Binkley
Also the interests haven’t changed much: Great Britain wanted Germany out of the seas to sustain the power
of the Commonwealth and therefore also France as a buffer, France itself wanted buffer states to repress
Germany while the Anglo-American power should be repressed. While revisionist Japan wanted their
enlargement recognized and later racial equality, the US was interested in independence and selfdetermination of the successors of the
Habsburg
empire
as
well
as
the
dismantling (Wilsons 14 points) and the
creation of the League of Nations. In five
treaties the territorial borders were fixed
and alliances between Germany and
Austria forbidden.
Versailles
SaintGermain
Trianon
Neuilly
Sévres
Germany
Austria



heavy losses and reparations
15 years allied occupation of the Rhineland
Limitation on military development



Dividing the empire, curtailing Austria
Prohibition of union with Germany
Hungary curtailed  minorities in other states
Hungary
Bulgaria

Osman Empire
Black Sea access for Greece
curtailed, foundation of Turkey 1920
60 million dead (esp. Russian Revolution, influenza and other war-caused reasons) and an industry lower than
before (agriculture 1/3 lower) added many problems to the states, but the technological warfare had also
advantages in the industrial production. No European country could follow the US to the gold standard of 1919.
High debts, financial instability and political rivalry made the US the greatest creditor nation – the quick
internationalisation of the financial crisis 1928/9, followed by the installation of the gold and silver bloc, shows
the high entanglement. Also as a reason to the crisis the mood of the public turned towards autarky, which
expresses the rising influence of the public opinion upon politics since the 19th century.
International contacts came into a global network of trade while Lenin and Wilson wanted to transfer the old
colonial order into a “new diplomacy” with self determination. The difficulty of several successor states for
46
trade and diplomacy and the close economical connection let fears of a new rising Germany controlling Central
Europe arise. The League of Nations became an important factor in international relations but causes
confusion about using the “old” or the “new” diplomacy and over the status and goals of the league as a
watchdog or as a conciliator.
The US but also Japan can be seen as the biggest victor of WW1, strengthened by loans to Great Britain and
France, which then had to buy in the US to be challengeable. To Wilson this dependence was clear, a reshaping
and determination of the new world order with the US as hegemony power was wanted. Self-sufficient
because auf own economic resources exports and military rose – the US took over the role of GB in maritime
and financial terms (“roaring 20ies”). But also the role as a world police with interventions in Europe was
typical for Wilson (and in general the American way, to maintain power after a victory).
Although alliances became popular from the 18th century onwards, Washington and Jefferson set the “doctrine
of non-entanglement” which should allow the total “freedom of action” – the US can only save the world when
it first saves itself. It was successful because of America’s self-sufficiency and superiority, so after WW1 the
“disentanglement” of Wilson tried to remove all historical alliances for world peace. “Non-intervention” (to
avoid counter-intervention) and “Self-Determination” should get the basic principles of the EuropeanAmerican relationship, but these principles were undergoing by speaking “en famillie” to reach diplomatic
intervention by threatening.
The American retreat into some sort of isolationism after Wilson (Harding 21-23, Coolidge 23-29, Hoover 2933) led the balance of power remain partly in Europe. France was searching for security against future German
resurgence and was therefore maintaining a very large army and keen to keep the occupation of the Rhineland
as a buffer. As Germany didn’t pay its war debt France could so invade the Ruhr region in 1923.
6.2. IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
6.2.1. ITALY
Italy’s rising under Mussolini was due to its military strength and therefore its claim to control the
Mediterranean till the border of the alps. But Italy remained a underdeveloped country in terms of illiteracy,
unemployment rates and life standard, which was mainly caused by the high state control of the agriculture
(important for fascism to be independent from nutrition imports)

Amount of saving for entrepreneurial investments was low  high costs to maintain the rural life

High dependence of raw material imports for industrialisation (controlled by GB)

Out-of-date military equipment and the extended Abyssinian campaign with great expenditures and
heavy losses weakened the army in front of another great war

No strategy or leaders who could communicate it  Britain considered, that the entrance of Italy into
the war on side of Germany would hurt the middle powers more than they can gain from it
47
6.2.2. JAPAN
To Japan WW1 was a big boost in industrialisation which led (in combination with brave soldiers influenced by
the bushido spirit) to a very strong army and navy. Debts were liquidated during the war, but afterwards the
economic crisis hit the country hard:

Primitive banking system, great inflation, “rice riots” 1919

High borrowing in the 1930ies to finance the army (70% of total governmental expenditure)

The invasion of China 1937 caused a large deficit spending while the interests in Asia collided with the
US, which led to the expensive war to maintain economic security
6.2.3. GERMANY
Germany managed to recover quickly because a lot of the industry was intact and could be restarted with fresh
loans (Dawes Plan) – its status did improve through the 1920ies due to general prosperity (“Goldene 20er”)and
Stresemanns diplomacy but the country was still political “half-free” and endemic violent, entangled between
the radical left communism and the radical anti-Jew right, when the financial crisis 1929-33 devastated the
precarious economy and the much-disliked liberal Weimar democracy. But Germany should be able to pay
back the war debts to France so that France can buy products in the US to stabilize the system and guarantee
new investments in Germany – but first the Dawes Plan of 1924 and later the Young Plan (with reduced debts)
of 1929 were not accepted by Germany.

The economic potential remained  rise of weapon production towards war tremendously

“revisionism” and “nationalism” are not new but instrumentalized (e.g. against the Young Plan)

Infrastructure measures sank the high unemployment rate caused by a bad economic situation
 quasi-Keynesianism  economic consequences on long term were enorm

Rich only in coal the Reich was dependent upon imports of raw material (iron, oil, rubber,…)
 only chance in a short war  Hitlers plans were different

Building of an army of the “greatest possible strength” right after 1933  plunder required
6.2.4. FRANCE
France and Britain shared the same post-war economy (unable to recover), the politics (liberal-capitalists) and
the diplomacy in handling the “German problem”. Raimund Poincarré (president 1913-20, premier 22-29)
managed to stabilize the economy while certain products (iron, cars, electronics) were booming. France
considered itself as main victim but seemed to be stronger at the 1930ies because it was less affected by the
crash due to large gold holdings and the early gold standard for the Franc.

Maintaining the gold standard 1933 started a slow decline (collapse of foreign trade)

Low efficiency in agriculture, stagnating heavy-industry
 effected weapon production: France had the best navy in 1937 but worst army and aircraft

Lacks in leadership: no combined warfare, communication problems, defence strategies,…
48

High dependence on raw material imports  financial and military support needed
6.2.5. BRITAIN
Britain’s traditional role of a superpower was challenged (India, Africa) and was forced by the economic crisis
and the high expenditures to keep the empire together to cut down military spending in the 1930ies and was
therefore overtaken by Germany in every concern.

Diplomacy of appeasement was necessary for security

Difficulties to find allies: US and USSR isolated, Italy neutral, Japan changed sides

Weak military started improving not earlier as in 1938

Internal knowledge about the weakness  hoping for a long war
6.2.6. RUSSIA
While declining the manufacturing output in a struggling Russian society (war and revolution, 78% in the
agriculture) the switch from farming to industry should be managed by the collectivizing of the agriculture
(high control on prices and wages) in the “command economy”:

Decline in production  famine 1933  recovering with tractors and scientists (high costs)

Private consumption only 50% of GNP  25% for industrial investments

Fast rising industrial output  reorientation towards armament 1937

State terror created a shortage of workers and prohibited innovation

Russia was ahead in weapon production but had not enough educated and trained soldiers
Lenin was eager to find synergies with Europe with a new world (and economic) order and was therefore
against isolationism – this changed and hardened with Stalin in the 1930ies.
6.2.7. USA
America benefitted most from WW1 and took over the role of Britain as global naval and economic leader but
decided not to play a global military role and decreased the army (while having still efficient navy and air
forces). The high sensitivity towards the global trade order is an effect of domestic problems of an
underutilized economy with little absolute output and high unemployment – even the New Deal did not
stimulate enough, but lastly the rearmament program of 1940.
There is an ambivalence of many observers to determine Isolationism as well as Interventionism and/or
Expansionism, which correlates with the fact that the US in the interbellum never were isolated or did pursue a
foreign policy of isolationism, as William Appleman Williams determines. Therefore the only principles of the
foreign policy in the 20ies were the extension of American influence, power and authority.
After the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 the five naval powers (US, UK, J, FR, I) decided to restrict their
naval weaponery on a certain ratio. Coolidge expected a relatively easy extension of this treaty 1927 but Italy
49
and France refused to come to the conference in Geneva while Japan and the UK saw their only military power
in the navy and didn’t want to restrict it therefore. Discussions about measuring the number of ships and/or
the tonnage showed the big suspicions of all powers against each other.
Wilson is often portrayed as the one decision maker trying to gain influence “for the greater good” but failed
because of delegating to some who didn’t agree totally with that. Besides the external problems in
international power politics, especially with Great Britain about the leading role in the Anglo-Saxon federation,
internal problems to establish a concert of decision between government and private economy, made it
impossible to reach the goals of the American corporatism (securing order, social peace and stability).
6.3. THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION
By cutting the free market and establishing interventionistic plans and regulations, state, military, industry and
finance became more and more entangled. The change from the war economy, concentrated on military
production, to peace economy was not fully successful.
Due to foreign loans (esp. to Austria) in the 1920ies Britain was not able to take a world leading role in finance
and economics while the US wasn’t keen either and France was a destabilizing factor (Charles Kindleberger:
"Britain could not, and the United States would not, act in the capacity of a world leader."). Benefits from
Britain and France getting reparations, which could lead to a long-term leadership of the US, were hard to
persuade the voter. Additional the economic summits of the League failed. The US changed from the biggest
debtor to the greatest creditor.
Rising costs of every state for rehabilitation had to be financed over downrating the own currency (hided
inflation) and loans, especially from the US. This short-term spending was used for long-term investments, but
Germany was not able or eager to pay its war debts fully to France and Britain (Dowes and Young Plan), who
therefore could not pay their own debts to the US – or only with new loans from overseas. The high
dependence on money from America was showed as this cash flow broke down as a reaction to the crash of
the investment bubble, based on the new markets in Europe, in the States. Due to overproduction (too fast
expansion) the US became too much dependent on the exports to Europe which then led to a quick deflation in
the US-economy and as a reaction to the lack of money spent in Europe to inflation there.
Asymmetries of the trade are balanced by (domestic or abroad) investments. A cut down on both, imports and
loaning led to the crisis of the Stock markets in the US 1929. Competitive devaluation (lower the currency to
be financially attractive) led to instability of the global money system and the creation of monetary blocs
(Dollar & Sterling).
“I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustment,
but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment.” - Roosevelt
50
With the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (tremendous rise of tariffs) every nation was keen on protection of
the imports. Restrictions of imports cut down the exports to more than 2/3 at the peak of the crisis and led to
the total breakdown of world trade – every nation lost (fallacy of composition).
In comparison to the austerity-policy of Hoover, Roosevelt (from 1933 onwards) tried the active anti-cyclic
investments (deficit spending) together with institutional and social reforms. This “New Deal” bases on the
theory of John M. Keynes (Keynesianism) and tried to end the high unemployment rate (big infrastructural
projects) and back up the agriculture as basis of the economy. More money in the economical cash flow (e.g.
rising income of the farmer) should end the deflation. But the missing coordination between the different
measures and the early ending of it let the “New Deal” not as successful as it could have been, but a new rise of
unemployment in the late 30ies was deforced by the newly rising war economy.
On the international sphere the end of the gold standard caused heavy exchange rate fluctuations, “splitted
rates” (partly intervention) and a drifting apart of “strong” and “weak” currencies: The British Pound lost its
status of a reserve currency against the Dollar (Dollar-Sterling-Bloc) while the currencies of the middle powers
were quick deflated. Trade deficits led to the fact that a lot of countries hold money from Great Britain and
secured so the stability with these international investments although the country’s economy was in deficit.
6.4. TOWARDS WW2
The rising of extremism, nationalism and (German and Japan) expansionism can be seen as one political result
of the finance crisis. The economic strengths and needs of Germany were bigger than the sources and export
markets (no colonies). Like France around 1800, expansionism and imperialism can so be seen as an escape
from an economically not strong country and the debt crisis.
51
With the isolated US and the weakened Europe no power
wanted to check the Germans which led to the failed
“appeasement-policy” in the 30ies. After Stresemann managed
to drive Germany out of its isolation with Peace Treaties with
Russia (Rapallo 1922) and France (Locarno 1925), while
disarming conferences failed, the occupation of the Rhineland
1936 by Hitler ended the peaceful relations in Europe – this
signed also the end of the Geneva World Disarmament
Conference 1932-7.
“The limits of foreign policy” were shown at the aggression of
Japan towards China (Second Sino.Japanese War 1937) and the
creation of the Manchukuo, a regime in Manchuria 1932-45:
The League had no power to intervene but the military strength
of its members who showed different strategies:

GB saw in Germany the long-term foe and in Japan the short-term and was therefore divided

After the join of Russia to the League 1935 and its security pacts with Paris and Prague, Germany was
surrendered – but the power against it was little, especially France was desperate

Forced appeasements by Chamberlain from 1937 onwards – not yet willing to fight
 shocked by the Molotow-Ribbentrop-act about Poland
The Polish campaign showed the national strategy, the great operational doctrine, combined warfare, tactical
air power and decentralized offensive warfare, but did not show economic lacks of raw material yet –
altogether strengthened Germany.

Italy’s unsuccessful campaign showed how overrated it was

The big advantage of the Wehrmacht in shock campaigns was undermined in the attack on Russia 41

Trade embargos on Japan helped ending their fights  allied concentration on Europe
Although the economic power of the Reich and the vast advantages in battlefield, overstretching and
overestimating of the own capacities combined with smaller and bigger mistakes due to the lack of a “grand
strategy” and the “polycratic chaos” changed fate. With continuing time of the war the allied military
production overwhelmed those of Germany in total outputs and in technique. The dropping of the atomic
bombs not only symbolized the end of the war but marked also the beginning of a new order.
52
7. THE COLD WAR
INTRODUCTION AND READING
The preparation of this class starts with the reading of two diplomatic cables, one sent by George Kennan in
February 1946, the other dispatched by Nikolai Novikov in September of that year (Kennan 1946 and Novokov
1946). A comparison of these documents gives remarkable insights into the logic of the Cold War. Try to analyse the
range of arguments that the two diplomats put forward to portray the other side as the aggressor or expansionist.
What is the importance of ideology and domestic politics in their argumentation? Which areas are considered the
most important theatres if rivalry? What are the main recommendations to the leadership? While there is probably
no better introduction to the Cold War period than these two dispatches, Paul Kennedy offers a good overview of
the course of the main events between Yalta and the faltering of the Berlin Wall (Kennedy 1989, pp. 459-692). What
I expect you to grasp is how Kennedy posits that the height of bipolarism already embodied the origins of
multipolarism, given the success of Western Europe, countries like Japan, and the emancipation of the Third World.
Second, you should be able to identify the main changes in strategies – containment, rollback, etc. – as well as to
reconstruct how the Cold War manifested itself in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Another important matter is, of
course, the arms race. How did the super powers try to walk the tightrope between deterrence and reassurance?
What was the significance of arms control? Fourth, you should look at the importance of multilateral organizations
in the pursuit of influence. How did the two juggernauts build international institutions around their interests?
Obviously, the two superpowers had the world as their playground – “This has become a very small planet,” as Dean
Rusk put it – and there were dramatic developments in armament. Yet, it is important here to clarify for yourself
how much the drivers of the Cold War and the patterns of balancing were different from European great power
politics in previous centuries. Had ideology a more decisive role? Did nuclear weapons lead to more self-restraint?
Were leaders better able to prevent tensions from escalating into military confrontations?
7.1. THE COMING OF A BIPOLAR WORLD
POST-WAR CONFERENCES (SELECTION)
1941

no territorial gains were to be sought by the US or the UK

territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of the peoples
concerned  right to self-determination
Atlantic Charta
1943
Cairo
Teheran
1944
Dumbarton Oaks
Bretton Woods
Yalta
1945
Potsdam

lower trade barriers, global economic cooperation, freedom of the seas

disarmament of aggressor nations, and a post-war common disarmament

Meetings of Churchill and Roosevelt with Chiang (Cairo) and Stalin (Teheran)

Support of Yugoslav partisans, new fronts in Europe and Japan

Settings for the UN and postwar peace (Dumbarton Oaks)

Creation of the World Bank and the postwar financial order (Bretton Woods)

Final war plans, post-war (Eastern) Europe settings, occupation zones (Yalta)

restoration of original governments in invaded countries

final settings of the policy towards Germany  split (Potsdam)
After WW2 the balance of power was bipolar with economically and military leading US (only financial winner
of the war) eager to export their system to the world to benefit from the economic rehabilitation. Russia was a
military giant after the war (territorial enlargement – new satellite states) and used this force to control the
huge amount of new satellite states and maintain security – at the same time the focus on producer goods
(heavy industry, coal, electricity) led to an unbalanced economy and an unefficiant agriculture.
53
“[Stalin] will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.” – Roosevelt, 1943
“Russians look like Americans, dress like Americans, think like Americans.” – Life
Magazine, 1943
“The real problem is Russia, but I can’t get the Americans to see it.” – Churchill
Compromises of the US with Russia to win the war together created a power vacuum not only in parts but
whole Europe, which enforced the division of the continent: Poland was quickly under Russian military control,
but the influence of the US was rising. Germany, Italy, Japan and the devastated France had a very low
industrial output after the war and were highly dependent on US-aids (“economic satellites”)

Military overstretch of the from beginning till end fighting Britains

While the US GNP has surged 50% during the war those of Europe fall 25%

The possession of nuclear weapons changed the power landscape, diplomacy and warfare tactics

Growing rate of ideology
The quick transformation of Europe in a western and an eastern part can be traced to the reactions to the
Marshall Plan: By forcing especially Poland and the CSSR not to ask for financial helps and installing of the
COMECON, an instrument mostly not for helping but milking the satellites, the economic development of the
following decades is set and the premature word of the “iron curtain” by Churchill 1946 came into reality two
years later.
7.1.1. THE MARSHALL PLAN: KEEP THE GERMANS DOWN, KEEP THE RUSSIANS OUT AND KEEP US IN
One main problem of the American economy was distinguished early: The overcapacity after the war as result
of the rising economy but shrinking consumer power in the destroyed countries. To secure the needed exports
to Europe and to stabilize the therefore needed currency positions, the system of “Bretton Woods” was
established 1944:

Dollar with gold standard as reserve and leading currency (back-up with gold)

Fixed exchange rates to other currencies  national reforms

Interventionism: cooperative central banks, International Monetary Fund, Worldbank

unlimited access to foreign markets as basis for the American economic hegemony
The whole system is dependent on the important countries with a trade surplus (UK, D, J, China) which allowed
cheap imports for the US to satisfy their external demands and high purchasing power. On the other hand the
weakened countries got military support by the supreme position of the US, which supported their currency.
The higher exports resulting from that trade surplus led to reinvestments in the US (bonds, obligations) to
create the necessary reserve assets – slowly over the decades China replaced Germany as main adopting
country with a high amount of bonds. This raised fears that China could drop the Dollar, which would have
54
severe consequences for the US economy and the dependent countries. Another question arose: Is the payback of the bonds by a shrinking economy even possible?
The system of Bretton Woods is the basis for the creation of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
and ERP (European Recovery Program, 1948-52) to strategically reinforce Europe’s economy, especially against
the rising expansion of the USSR (Containment policy). With the monetary base (ERP-Fonds), provided by the
ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) and based on different economic plans for every nation, a strong
market could be the basis for future self-sufficient economic development, with the cooperation the long term
benefits for the US (in- and export) can be at least as
Road to institutions
Committee of European Economic
(Counterpart-System).
1947 CAAC
Cooperation
1947 GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1948 ERP
European Recovery Program
The economic cooperation was institutionalized in the 1948 ECA
Economic Cooperation Administration
West European Union
OEEC
(Organisation
of
European
Economic 1948 WEU
Organisation of European Economic
Cooperation) 1948 to coordinate the ERP and build up 1948 OEEC
Cooperation (ECA&CAAC)
COMECON
1949
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
the EPU (European Payments Union) 1950, an
1949 NATO
North Atlantic Trade Organisation
agreement on the liberalized free convertibility of 1950 EPU
European Payments Union
1951
ECSC
European Coal and Steel Community
currencies and therefore strengthened the also mostly
1957 EEC
European Economic Community
liberalized trade. This was followed by the ECSC 1960 EFTA
European Free Trade Association
(European Coal and Steel Community) 1951 and the development of a supranational market on important
high as for the devastated European economies
industrial and military goods.
On the general goal of the welfare state with social security, “mixed economies” in West Europe distinguished
with partly economical planning (“Planification”) and neocorporatistic elements (social partnership). “Full
employment in a free society” (Lord Beveridge) became the main issue and so work income became the main
basis of the social and economic system while the Keynesianism was not fully accepted. The European
Integration (EEC, EFTA) under the system of Bretton Woods stabilized the trade balances under dependence of
the US.
7.1.2. THE ECONOMIC RACE
In the US exports were displaced by imports in the 1960ies due to newer technologies and the concentration
on service. The export of capital goods (machines, techniques, know-how) to Europe pushed the economical
rise and lowered the future need of capital goods. But the dependence got even stronger as the US needed the
reinvestments to get its dept (Vietnam War) financed.
Till the 1970ies the economic race between West and East Europe was quite equal. Transformed into different
specific centralized planned economies, the satellite states saw a strong growth in the 1950ies without the
dependence on individual consumption, which resulted in a lower living standard but low prices and a general
welfare system. Failure in planning (no full employment) went along with lacks of modernisation, which led to
55
liberalisations (profit, bonus-malus-system) in the higher developed countries (DDR, CSSR, Poland, Hungary) in
the 1960ies - theories of a “Third Way” with the combination of capitalistic and socialistic elements rose.
Anti-dumping measured were taken at the 6th meeting of the GATT 1967 (“Kennedy Round”) with lowering the
market price of goods you have a surplus. At the “Tokyo Round” 1971 non-tariff-barriers were installed with
rules and standards for prohibition and protectionism.
With the end of the Bretton Woods system and the Dollar as reserve currency 1971 (surprising announcement
also known as “Nixon Shock”) the unstopped rise of the European economy changed towards a “stagflation”
with unsecure conditions, which led to the end of state interventionism and the change from Keynesianism to
monetarism and a liberalisation of the markets. So the first stock market crisis after the war 1987 hadn’t big
effects due to quick and coordinated reactions of the central banking system. Despite the unstable markets the
US got more attractive but got hit by financial crisis in Asia 1994 and 97 and the Dotcom-Bubble 1999 – too
much invested money always creates bubbles.
To secure the American economic hegemony several efforts were taken on different aspects:

1986: NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Association) between US, Canada & Mexico

1990: Washington Concensus to secure trade esp. with South America

1994: Enlargement of TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) to
software concerns

1998: ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) as international organisation
under US rule to secure the hegemony in the internet
Parallel strategically lacks show in the centralized economies as result of the concentration of the growth on
heavy industry and neglecting the agriculture and consumer goods – the original system between the USSR
(raw materials) and its satellites (final products) works no more due to the rising need of energy and raw
materials for weaponry and the following exploitation of the satellites. A rising living standard was seen as
important to maintain the domestic stability, but the needed trade with Western Europe was impossible due to
the dependence upon Russia. Economic liberalisation, as intended in the “Perestroika”, is only possible with
the process of democratisation.
7.2. THE MILITARY RACE
“USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be
no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American
workers: "In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two
centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend
toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward
capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of
capitalism and of communism in entire world." […]
56
To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and
Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of
intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with
itself and with Russia. […]
It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond
Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises
mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.
[…]
At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense
of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on
vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. […, F]or Russian rulers have
invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its
psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of
Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct
contact between Western world and their own […]. And they have learned to seek security only
in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and
compromises with it. […]
All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It
should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive
program. For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of
how to deal with Russia. […]”
In February 1946, American diplomat George F. Kennan sent his “long telegram” displaying the Soviet Union as
bad in domestic as well as foreign policy and giving advices for future diplomacy and mainly founding the
Containment policy. Another secret telegram in September 1946 from Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Nowikov
showed the change from the Monroe Doctrine in Americas foreign policy to the Truman Doctrine without
concerning internal affairs. While the Truman Doctrine marked the end of military cooperation between the
remaining superpowers (which was necessary to win the war) and the beginning of the Cold War, the two
diplomatic cables show the inconcrete doubt and fears of them towards each other.
Mainly the “German question” (restore or weaken it, so that it never will become a threat to the bigger powers
again) and the fear of a new quick invasion of Russia in the western countries when time was ready (and the
USSR tried to make time ready) led to the creation of the NATO (and the SEATO in the pacific area 1954)
without concrete military plans but it should be a sign of a stand-together.
As a reaction to the plans of the USSR of splitting Iran to get new (communist) states 1946 Harry S. Truman
recognized the importance of the oil of Iran for the western economy and that a switch could change the
balance of power tremendously and threatened Russia with a nuclear strike (Truman Doctrine).
Another fear was the growing influence of Russia in Asia and therefore the global dimension of the Cold War
which led to significant changes in American foreign policy, especially concerning China, India, Korea and Iran.
This manifests itself in the arms race mainly between the two main powers:

Russian explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949 brake the American monopoly  invention and
production of new weapons while knowing that they cannot be used in normal warfare
57
o
Russia was technologically backward in the beginning (submarines, rockets) but eager to
close up and willing to compensate with the amount of weapons
o
Second strike capacity (e.g. submarines hiding in the deep sea)
o
Ratio of the Cold War: The more the better to threaten the other not to use it
 nuclear power disciplined the powers more than treaties

The missing contact between the US and the USSR provided a lot of false information

Reductions of Russia in the mid-50ies by Khrushchev to release funds for consumer goods

o
Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 to imitate nuclear tests (US, UK, USSR)
o
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1969 to 79 with several treaties
Chinas build-up reflects its growing strength – but it remained a bipolar world
The Korean War 1950-3 between the two from the occupation zones emerged Korean states showed the new
Rollback strategy (“massive retaliation”) after the Containment policy brought not the expected success in
East Europe: In pushing back the communist expansion by nuclear threatening the US wanted to check the
Russians early and stop ambitions towards Japan and other parts of Eurasia. The USSR sent the Chinese, who
were just emerged as peoples republic in 1949, with 100 000 volunteer soldiers in to do the dirty work. The war
in which none of the superpowers wanted to use its nuclear weapons ended in a proxy and trench warfare,
truce was signed 1953 but no peace treaty till today. The war later influenced the China-Taiwan conflict in the
1950ies.
After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev
1933-45 Franklyn D. Roosevelt
threw away the paranoid caution and
1945-53 Harry S. Truman
1953-61 Dwight D. Eisenhower
1961-63 John F. Kennedy
1963-69 Lyndon B. Johnson
1969-74 Richard Nixon
1974-77 Gerald Ford
1977-81 Jimmy Carter
1981-89 Ronald Reagon
started (as the US did alone in the years
before) making allies and partners of the
“Warshow Pact” (1955) by providing
“friendship treaties” – Krushchev wanted
the USSR to be loved and admired, not
1927-52 Stalin
1953-64 Nikita Chruschtchow
1964-82 Leonid Iljitsch Breschnew
1982-84 Juri Andropow
1984-85 Konstantin Tschernenko
1985-91 Michail Gorbatschow
hated. This short period ended with the
military interventions at the upheaval in the DDR 1953 and Hungary 1956 and the following military and
political expansionism (Cuba missile crisis 1962) and Isolationism (Berlin Wall 1961).
Johnson and Breshniew both followed the domino thesis and therefore wanted to hold every country. But after
the Cuba missile crisis a period of de-escalation with a limitation of the nuclear arms race started, mainly
influenced by Henry Kissinger (security advisor 1969-73, secretary of state 1973-77, Nobel peace price 1973).
He found inspiration in the 19th century concert of powers and argued economically for a rational approach to
minimize military spending.
Latin America was first out of containment and rollback policy with the Rio treaty of 1947 and the creation of a
economically and military stand-together (TIAR) in an US-centric world. The CIA-support of the upheaval in
Cuba 1961 against Castro in the Bay of Pigs gave Cuba a reason to orientate towards the USSR (Cuba Missile
58
Crisis 1962) and showed the new US hybrid wars against communist influence by destabilising unfavourable
governments and sending weapon support to favourably possible new governments. (Guatemala 1954,
Dominican Republic 1965, Bolivia 1971, Chile 1973). The Invasion of Panama 1989 was the last chapter of
military conflicts between American states.
After the Suez Crisis it became obvious that control over the Levant was critical for the US. To check the USSRbacked Syria the 1958 intervention in the Libanon crisis was necessary as well as the support of Israel, who
could take over control of the region (Golan highs, West Bank, Sinai) in the 6-Days-War 1967 with US weapons.
While endless negotiations in the UN brought no result the revenge Jom-Kippur-War of 1973 by aligned Arabic
nations brought no direct winner but a both-sided acceptance while tensions remained.
After the contacts with Russia went down to a minimum under Jimmy Carter the 80ies with Reagon and the
Afghanistan crisis (Soviet intervention 1979) brought new crisis years with a rise in military spending (“Star
Wars Program”) new rollback-operations in several countries (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada,…)
and a new missile crisis in Europe. Surprisingly Gorbatschow presented 1986 his reform program (Perestroika
and Glasnost) to a (esp. nuclear) demobilisation – a first meeting at the Geneva Summit (1985) started a new
diplomacy between the two states.
Besides the East-West-Conflict a lot of states started regularly meetings of the “non-aligned-states” and forced
the UN to concentrate not only on European and Cold War issues but also on international politics and
especially decolonialisation.
7.2.1. CHINAS BALANCING ACT
In military concerns the USSR and the US were leading in every sphere, way ahead of China or European
powers. Although economically and politically backwards (cultural Revolution) China emerged in the 1960ies
to a considerable military power which led to an embarrassing split of the two communist powers in terms of
ideology and provided Russia a second main enemy, especially in Third World issues in Asia: Pakistan-India
conflict (1947-9, 65, 71), North Vietnam’s expansion tensions with the support of Russia, negotiations of China
with the Nato.
China was slowly rising, but hat to struggle with its demographic growth, industrial backwardness, clashes with
Russia and almost any other neighbour and the emphasise of agriculture on the Cultural Revolution. This led to
an embarrassing shift of alliance from Russia to the US in the 1970ies after the Sino-Indian War 1962, the US
intervention in Vietnam 1965 and the Sino-Russian War 1969.
As the weakest and poorest of the powers after WW2, China showed a fast self-improvement, especially in
military reorganisation, new weaponry and nuclear technology – but technological lacks and lower financial
spending hemmed the emerging as a superpower. With a rising economy of 12% and a rising agriculture of 8%
the farmer based agriculture now turns into a weakness: labour-intense rice farming and growing meat
consumption are problems for the rising population and led China became a net-importer of nutrition by 1980.
59
Acquiring foreign technology but avoiding any dependence (even on agricultural imports) led to the production
of low-cost goods in high amounts which allowed the import of high-end technology. Having achieved a
military equilibrium in Central Asia, China could now concentrate on economical development and can better
negotiate with Russia and Japan. The rising economy also has power-political implications which will lead to a
rising military role of China.
7.2.2. JAPAN
At the San Francisco Treaty of 1952 the occupation of Japan ended as well as formally the war in East Asia.
With a strong alliance the US wanted to maintain its economic status in the region (parallel ANZUS treaty with
NZ and AUS) while Japan was prohibited from building offensive military and forced to hand over all nuclear
material to the US in order that they should not be able any more to produce nuclear weapons on their own.
The further goal of a UN-membership was in the first years after the treaty vetoed by the USSR because auf the
close entanglement with the US.
In the two decades after the end of occupation 1952, Japan rose to the second biggest industrial power with a
GNP of 10% of the world, leading in some aspects (cars, cameras) and moving on to high-technology products.
The enormous economic growth in the decades after 1945 looked delicate and vulnerable to Japan itself, which
wanted to be a “omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy”. Therefore import restrictions (not of raw material) and
a low Yen (for an increasing export) followed – in the nowadays “open” global market, Japan could become a
global economic giant without territorial disadvantages or global responsabilities In order to support the
economy, Japan spends very little in military development and uses its peaceful diplomacy to maintain its
status – helped by the US, especially concerning the high oil imports. Problems can arise when this union fails
or China and/or Russia take aggressive actions in the region.
High expenses in non-military research and development led Japan rise to the leading power in advanced
scientific economy (hard- and software, robots,…) with the highest amount of qualified workers and ingenieurs.
On the one hand cheaper labour conditions in neighbouring Asian countries forced Japan to increase in
manufacturing quality, on the other hand the US and the EEC tend to protectionism in these spheres to avoid
negative trade balance. This and the rising age of Japanese people (higher costs in the social system) led to a
lower growth.
7.2.3. THE EEC – POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS
Despite regional disparities, Europe saw (besides Japan) the biggest economic growth in general, the EEC world
be leading in economics –but was immature politically and militarily.

“Italian miracle” with fast rising economy and high aids – but still the smallest European power

GB was ahead after the war and then declining (still expensive colonies and military)
o
GB maintained high military expenditures and a high amount of military research and
development  tries to maintain its status as a big power with less money than the others
60

German “Wirtschaftswunder”: second in export rates, „multiplier effect“ by big (car) producers
o
High sensitivity of the other powers in terms of a German rise

“Morgenthau-Plan” 1944 (US finance minister) to transform Germany into an
agricultural state with restrict from military assets and alliances


Roosevelt emphasised the military rollback
o
has to deal with its split and the different developments
o
Economic weight did not turn into political or military might
France was economically stagnating, still underdeveloped and mainly agricultural and highly
dependent on (oil) imports
o
France decided to rise as a nuclear power without getting rid of the other military
technologies  higher costs and a more difficult political landscape
At the Potsdam Conference 1945 the border question between Germany and Poland was managed and the
basis for the later split of the German states created (elections 1947, Berlin blockade 1948). The western
countries criticised the blunt interference of countries like Poland, Bulgaria or Romania in the conference of the
allied powers. Additional to that conflict with Russia the control of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea by the
US to rollback Russia was another point of aggression as well as the military support in the Greek civil war
1946-9 against the communists (without support of Russia). The act of the smaller power to ask the bigger to
intervene in an domestic conflict can be compared to the situation of the Italian city states in the 15th century
after the death of the last Visconti in Milan.
The security guarantees of 1947 from the US to Greece and Turkey with mediation of France and Great Britain
finalised the split of the continent, on institutional level the creation of the NATO 1949 and the ECSC 1951 to
pacify the Rhineland and unite Europe in peace while strengthening the economy by establishing an long term
export market marked the beginning of the European Integration.
The Suez crisis of 1956 should become a symbol for the rise of an economically united Europe which was
finalized by the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the EEC 1957: While France and Great Britain, for which the
Suez Canal was the main connection to big parts of its Commonwealth, wanted to interfere after the
nationalisation of the Canal by the Egyptian president Nasser, the US threatened with cuttings of the economic
and financial help and called back the European Powers to avoid a war.
The Cold War period also shows the transformation of Europe from a main global player to a playground by the
new super powers. The last escalation was the strategic missile defence unity of the US and the EU in the
Reagan era with the “Star Wars Program” (aka “Strategic Defence Initiative”).
The European states combined had a very high economical potential, leading in nearly all economic terms while
growing slower than China or Japan. But the biggest problem for success is the steady disunity in several
concerns, while a united military and economic policy could maintain the status of Europe.
7.2.4. THE USSR AND ITS “CONTRADICTIONS”
61
In order to have the same amount of weapons and manpower in the military race with the US and to bloc the
new second threat China, insecure feelings of Moscow led to a higher arms production with more investments
and therefore to a higher insecurity worldwide based on the rising scepticism after WW2. In order not to get in
a position of military inferiority a high percentage of research and development as well as industry altogether
went to the military which had the effect that the low productivity in the agriculture changes Russia’s position
from an exporter to an importer.

Food prices are kept low with subsidies to prevent social unrest

Poor transport, storage and distribution conditions destroyed a lot nutrition

Bad climate situation with a lot of cold winter

Highly influential “centralized bureaucracy”
 change would be like admitting the failure of the (communist) system
The inefficiency of the industry led to rising costs for energy which is harder and harder to get and could
therefore no more be exported while imports remained high – so money for investments wasn’t there and
espionage was the only way to import foreign technologies. In addition a decreasing male population
(alcoholism, lacks in medical care, 25 Mio. casualties in WW2) led to more women in the industry.
7.2.5. THE US – THE PROBLEM OF NUMBER ONE IN RELATIVE DECLINE
Multilateralism leaded to a big package of rules and regulations as the outcome of several US-led organisations,
developed during the Cold War to manifest the US-lead (NATO, OAS, OEEC, ANZUS, ECSC, SEATO, CENTO – WB,
IMF, ITO, GATT, TRIPS, …) – on the other hand Russia tried to copy it with less influence but some independent
organisations arose (Arab League, OAU, EEC, G77, ASEAN, Andean Community, SAARC). An international
regime therefore follows a framework of rules: Indivisibility, non-discrimination and diffuse reciprocity.
Also the UN is often seen as US-instrument for and by cooperation. But Multilateralism is only meaningful if all
participate – therefore the US was against the UN because Russia and China were too. The American “Freedom
of Action-Dilemma” leaded to a burden-share cooperation model in pseudo-multilateralism: The strong do,
what they want, the weak have to adopt their policy.
The absolute power of the US is much larger than that of the USSR but the decline is relatively faster, due to
global imperial overstretch. But the liberal economic system is more flexible for changing surroundings

Interests in the Near East and South-East Asia, migration from Mexico

EEC and Japan as partners and economic rivals

More than 500 000 soldiers all over the world
A rising Europe caused a steady decline of US-industry and agriculture – additional with the unwell of the
government to raise taxes the US changed from the world’s biggest creditor to its biggest debtor in a few years.
Rising national debt led to the move from manufacturing to service sector without cutting down the defencebased industry. But the steady high amounts of money and development for military causes (1/2 of the world’s
62
fleet) let no money free for civil expenditures and were part of the economic decline, which is masked by the
military power and “Americanisation” of the world, but it has to shrink to a more “natural” amount of power.
7.3. TOWARDS A MULTI-POLAR WORLD?
For the US a unified Europe was the best bloc towards Russia even if that meant that supported states would
rise as new competitors – but the competition with Russia was more important. While China was busy with its
Cultural Revolution the US intervened in a new rising communist power – but the Vietnam War should get the
fist main US-loss and destroy all efforts and international reputations as well as national self-consciousness:

Economic and military superiority will not always be translated in military effectiveness

Imitated conflict: government refuses to mobilize the reserves or put the economy to war status
o
Fear of its international and domestic reputation: no use of mass-destruction weaponry, no
heave casualties wanted
o

Importance not to provoke the two communist powers to join the war
Decline in moral and willpower
While America was fighting the USSR could close up in military terms and China, Japan and Europe in economic.
This led to the recognition of the Limitations of American power by Kissinger as foreign affairs minister and
main negotiator of the peace with Vietnam. The new concert between the US, USSR, Europe, Japan and China
also needed a new US-diplomacy, while negotiations between China and Japan ended the cold war in Asia.
The extravagant rise of world manufacturing output and trade was on the one hand based on the quick
reconciliation of Europe after the wars and the success of capitalism, but on the other hand also on the
developments in the Third World. Their share on world manufacturing output on a whole rose, but the
differences between more developed and trading states and the very poor ones, shaken by natural (climate) or
political (dictatorship, wars) problems, were getting bigger.
Russia was still economically backward and dependent on agricultural imports and the fast developments of
the liberalized satellites. But also the US was growing too little in comparison and therefore fastly declining in
terms of their share of the world manufacturing output (due to military expenditures which led to the
important lead of Russia). The overall trend was towards a multi-polar world with several economic centres
and the declining of the share on world industry and economics of the traditional powers after WW2.
Despite changing power-balances over the centuries the principles of the states as sovereign and the always
changing amount of influence remained, but economic power must not always transfer into military power.
Besides that, the world as a whole is getting richer, Third World countries are develoloping – but the growth
after 1945 is unequal:

Growth of southeast Asia was broad-based and therefore lasting
63

Rising military costs as another principle, also in the Third World
 arms race on land, sea, air and the outer space

Tensions between nations searching for strategically power (military-political interventionism) and for
economic security (laissez-faire policy)  every great power needs security, investments and growth
over several years to be stable
7.4. AMERICA’S (BRIEF?) UNIPOLAR MOMENT
INTRODUCTION AND READING
As the Cold War wound to an end, the United States emerged as the sole superpower. But its clout was instantly put
to the test by various new security threats, financial instability, and sclerosis at home. Several of these challenges
can be traced back to the Cold War period, but they now came to haunt the superpower more pugnaciously. In
Charles Krauthammer’s essay (Krauthammer 1990, pp. 23-33) you should be able to reconstruct the author’s
assessment of America’s security environment, as well as to identify the domestic weaknesses that he sees ahead.
Compare this assessment with what Kennedy writes about the American unipolar moment and especially to which
extent he expects players like China, Japan, and the Europe to challenge America. In a 1999 treatise, Samuel
Huntington speaks of a uni-multipolar order and argues that America is widely perceived as a rogue power. Why is
this so and how to the other pretenders cope with US primacy? (Huntington 1999, pp. 35-49).
As the only decisive player an any conflict the US emerged as the only power in the 1990ies - as long as Europe
isn’t (militarily) unified and the economic power of Japan does not translate into geopolitical power. Foreign
entanglement is a burden but a necessesity to keep the economy alive (oil!). But the relative decline of the
economy is also not only “imperial overstretch” but has domestic reasons:

low tax policy for decades  creating an economy on debts

low saving rates, stagnant productivity, poor education system, rising demands
Weapons of mass destruction are not the only threat but the most devious who put the world closer together
and forced the unipolar power to police it to maintain the balance of power. On the other hand the unilateral
pull was shown from the UN-charta onwards with the neglect to adopt several international treaties (UNESCO
1985, Kyoto 1997, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 2001) and the intervention in several countries over the decades.
Additional after the Presidential Decision Directive 25 of 1992, no US troops will fight under UN command.
While the US often acts as the one and only hegemon, the other major powers work towards a multipolar
system fearing the hegemon. So in the uni-multipolar system every actor wants to change the current system.
With the lack of the domestic political base, the US needs partners for international (military) actions and
therefore pretends to act for the “greater good” to maintain its unipolar status and stop smaller countries in
rising – unilaterism is put into the clothes of pseudo-multilaterism in military fights. This leads to the acting as
spokesman of the “internatonal community” while standing alone without support, seen as a threat and rogue
power in many countries and without acceptance as a world’s policemen (which was the better alternative in
the former bipolar system).
A formal anti-America coalition has not yet been established because most major powers want to benefit of
the US in terms of trade and military coalitions and the interest of regional major powers and secondary
regional powers differ too much. On economical (fracking, digital markets) and military (cyber war, soft power)
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terms the primacy is mainly challenged by the rising China – but nobody knows what to expect from the Asian
giant in the future.
“A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. By
2025 a single ‘international community’ composed of nation-states will no longer
exist. Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the
game while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken.
Rather than emulating Western models of political and economic development, more
countries may be attracted to China’s alternative development model.” - NIC Global
Trends 2025 (2008)
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