Download United States Foreign Policy - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole

Année Universitaire 2007/2008
Master Science Politique
Mention 3 – Relations Internationales
Spécialité : « Géopolitiques des Relations Internationales »
United States Foreign Policy
(M. Brian WHITE)
Devoir sur table – durée 2 heures
Traiter au choix
1.
2.
US versus Iran
US and Europ : partners or competitors ?
Devoir à rendre par voie électronique au plus tard :
le lundi 10 décembre 2007 au matin. – Délai de rigueur.
[email protected]
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IEP Toulouse - November 2007
United States Foreign Policy
Learning outcomes:
After taking this short course, you should be able:
* to understand the issues and problems posed by the post-Cold War, Post-9/11 context of
contemporary US foreign policy
* to understand how US foreign policy-making works
* to understand two key issue areas: US relations with Europe and the Middle East
Structure of Course: Four sessions
1. The changing historical context of US foreign policy and competing historical traditions and
ideas: liberalism, realpolitik, neoconservatism
2. The foreign policy process. The roles of the presidency, congress and the foreign policy
bureaucracy. Constitutional and institutional issues (small group discussion)
3. The United States and Europe: The new transatlanticism (small group discussion)
4. The United States and the Middle East
Professor Brian White
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United States Foreign Policy
Section 1: Historical Traditions and Ideas
Introduction
The importance of traditions in providing continuity to foreign policy. Tradition as consisting of
historical experience and political ideology.
A. Liberalism and US Politics
Individualism; pluralistic democracy; capitalism; rationality; shared interests/beliefs; cooperation
rather than conflict as norm in domestic and international society.
Liberal values reinforced by historical experience.
B. Impact of Liberalism on US Foreign Policy
1. Primacy of domestic politics
2. The myth of isolationism except in European context - why? ‘New World’ threatened by ‘Old
World’
3. Rejection of power/security politics and a militaristic foreign policy
4. Primacy of ‘low politics’ agenda of commerce (free trade), wealth creation, advocacy of
human rights, liberal democracy, etc.
5. Constitutional impact - written constitution, ‘separation of powers’
C. US ‘Exceptionalism’
1. Term coined by Alexis de Tocqueville - the famous French historian and politician
(Democracy in America). Idea that the American people believe themselves to have been
uniquely blessed in several different ways since establishment of republic at the end of the 18th
century. USA as unique experiment in liberal democracy; unique freedoms that flow from
political institutions; abundant indigenous resources enabling USA to prosper etc
2. Two images: USA as model: model society that others can emulate - ‘shining city on th hill’;
‘beacon of freedom and democracy’ etc. USA as having unique mission whether by divine
sanction or moral obligation to bring democracy, liberty, civilisation - as defined by their
historical experience - to rest of world.
3. Problem: generates antipathy by giving arrogant, overbearing, self-righteous quality to US
foreign policy. Can imply that USA so special, so different that it does not need to be bound by
same legal and moral standards that bind other states.
D. The Cold War Challenge to Liberal Values: Realpolitik
1. Primacy of foreign policy in bipolar conflict. Foreign policy as national security policy.
Conflict rather than cooperation the norm
2. US as superpower, global leader of ‘free world’. Locked into ideological conflict with major
enemy, the Soviet Union. Isolationism not an option anywhere. NATO as ‘entangling alliance’
but necessary. Forced to play power politics game?
3. In Cold War context, military instrument perceived as crucial to national security. Nuclear
weapons and deterrence
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4. “Low politics’ agenda of secondary importance in bipolar military and ideological conflict.
US allies determined by stance on East-West relations rather than by adherence to liberal values
5. Impact of East-West conflict on ‘separation of powers’. The rise of the ‘imperial presidency’
and the weakness of Congress in foreign policy
E. End of Cold War and the Revival of Neo-Liberalism
1. Initial pessimism - academic debate between ‘declinists’ (eg Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall
of the Great Powers, 1987) though soon countered by the ‘revivalists’ (eg Jo Nye, Bound to
Lead, 1990)
2. Optimism. Bush Snr proclaims the possibility of establishing a ‘New World Order’. Bush to
Joint Session of Congress (September 11 (!), 1990):
‘We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment---out of these troubled times [reference
to Gulf crisis]---a new world order can emerge; a new era---freer from the threat of terror (!),
stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace’. NWO should be ‘a
world where nations recognize that they share responsibility for freedom and justice, a world
where the strong respect the rights of the weak’.
Triumphalist tone given some intellectual backing by Francis Fukuyama’s article ‘The End of
History’ (National Interest, 1989).
Elements of NWO - effective UN; US ‘engagement’; multilateralism; spread of free market
economics and pluralistic democracy; opposition to totalitarianism; support for human rights.
1991 Gulf War as model of NWO in action.
3. Bush/Clinton foreign economic diplomacy.
1993-95 - agreements reached to free up trade in different regional contexts, position the US
economy more effectively and enable it to penetrate a range of global markets:
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) Signed by Bush, eventually ratified by Clinton
1993. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005?
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Seattle 1993. Agreement to create free trade in
region by 2020
GATT Clinton makes significant compromises to conclude Uruguay Round of tariff
reductions - December 1993
May 1994, decision finally taken to de-link human rights and trade with China
4. Foreign Policy as Extension of Domestic Politics
New domestic mood evident as early as 1992. Clinton victory (‘It’s the economy, stupid’!)
follows his recognition that costly, high profile foreign policy no longer justifiable in post-Cold
War environment. Return to traditional liberal idea of primacy of domestic politics. Certainly in
first Clinton administration, foreign policy dominated by economic rather than military security.
US public opinion strongly supportive eg 1994 survey shows that protecting jobs the most
popular foreign policy concern (stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the US comes second problem of illegal immigration also come high on the list).
F. Reassertion of Realpolitik
By mid 1990s, serious challenges to liberal agenda:
1. Republican victories in 1994 mid-term elections - commitment to protectionism
2. Peso crisis in Mexico 1995 - massive US bail-out
3. US economy in good health. Space created for re-emergence of military-security issues eg
November 1995 Dayton Accords on Bosnia
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4. ‘assertive multilateralism’ (Secretary of State Madeline Albright) lasts only until Somalia
intervention 1993 (18 US soldiers killed). May 1994 Clinton issues Presidential Directive 25
which places major constraints on US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. Direct
linkage to US interests.
Other realpolitik issues - eg re-engagement with NATO, commitment to expand alliance to
include former Warsaw Pact states
5. 9/11 places national security firmly centre stage - though focus of threat perception radically
shifts to East Asia and Middle East
G. Post 9/11 and Neo-Conservatism
1. By mid1990s, new group emerges in Washington critical of liberal response to end of cold
war. Argue that liberal NWO simply too weak and did not effectively secure US interests in
dangerous, new post-cold war world. Group includes Paul Wolfovitz, Richard Perle, Robert
Kagan, Irving Kristol.
2. Neo-conservative ideas legitimised by 9/11
3. Bush Doctrine centred around idea of ‘pre-emption’ - first articulated in National Security
Strategy (September 2002)
‘Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the US can no longer rely solely on a reactive
posture as we have done in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of
today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries
choice of weapons do not permit this option -----as was demonstrated by the losses on September
11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be
exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction ----To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts ---- the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively’. Two implications drawn:
a. US will intervene militarily if it has grounds for believing its national security at risk if it
doesn’t act in advance of an attack
b. US will act with or without support of support of allies/UN. Pre-emption associated with
unilateralism
4. What is neo-conservatism? Strategy of ‘primacy’ - meaning:
a. maintaining US political and military predominance while pre-empting any challenges
b. achieving an ‘Americanised’ international order characterised by an expanding zone of
market-orientated libral democracies. Iraq is (was??) central to this vision in the Middle East.
Questions for discussion:
What are the differences/similarities between neo-conservatism, liberalism and realism?
What do developments in Iraq and elsewhere since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 tell us about
neo-conservatism?
Is neoconservatism in decline? What is the evidence from contemporary US foreign policy?
Section 2: The Making of US Foreign Policy
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Having reviewed the changing historical context of foreign policy, we move on to suggest that
historical context interacts with policy process. The key assumption here is that foreign policy, to
a greater or lesser extent, is conditioned by the nature of the foreign policy-making process. In
the United States, the presidency and congress are key actors and institutions in foreign policymaking. They are supported in principle at least by an extensive foreign policy bureaucracy.
The Presidency and Congress
A The Constitutional Context
Despite ‘separation of powers’ doctrine, foreign policy powers appear to have been concentrated
on congress rather than the president. Raises analytical questions about the growth of presidential
power and authority, and the apparent decline of congressional power, particularly in the Cold
War period. Impact of end of Cold War on the balance of executive-legislative powers.
1. Key Presidential Powers:
a. to receive ambassadors - head of state as well as head of government
b. to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. Key Congressional Powers:
a. to declare war
b. broad powers over legislation with respect to appropriation of funds - ‘purse-strings’ powers
3. Shared Powers. These include:
a. treaty-making/ratification
b. confirmation of presidential appointments
B The Presidency - ‘Imperial’ or ‘imperilled’?
1. The Presidential power thesis
A. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency. (1973) Leads school which argues for highly
centralised, elite conception of power based around the White House. Informal powers augment
constitutional role of president. Presidency as somehow ‘above’ domestic politics
a.
b.
c.
d.
national leader
power of initiative
powers of patronage
institutionalisation of presidency
2. The constrained presidency
R. Neustadt, Presidential Power (1980). Leads school which suggests that presidency immersed
in domestic politics. Offers pluralist conception of power.
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‘presidential power is the power to persuade’ (Neustadt). ‘Powers’ as potential power or
resources in bargaining.
Is George W. Bush junior an ‘imperial’ or an ‘imperilled’ president’?
Conclusion: Presidential power as variable rather than constant factor in US foreign policymaking: presidential style/personality; domestic context; international context; nature of issue;
situational factors, etc.
C Congress and Foreign Policy
1. Strengths of Congressional role:
a. constitutional right to be centrally involved in foreign policy-making - co-equal partner. NB
attempt to reassert constitutional rights in foreign policy since 1970s - response to ‘imperial
presidency’
b. Oversight role - monitoring expenditure and administration - General Accounting Office
(GAO).
Congressional committee system - used to investigate executive
c. Post-Cold War context. Emergence of ‘intermestic’ agenda - foreign economic policy.
Highlights importance of ‘purse-strings’ powers and congressional links to domestic pressure
groups and public opinion. But impact of 9/11?
2. Weaknesses of Congressional role:
a. Cold War context. Congress weak and ineffective
b. Institutional reforms of 1970s. Extent to which decentralisation of Congress has weakened
rather than strengthened its impact on foreign policy.
c. Neutralisation of constitutional powers.
d. Reassertion of ‘war-making’ powers? War Powers Act (1973) but serious problems in
application. Limited impact only on presidential behaviour.
Conclusions
Like presidential power, congressional power not a constant - several variables. But, at best,
Congress can only constrain rather than initiate foreign policy. Nevertheless, particularly given
the higher salience of domestic politics since the end of the Cold war, Congress has to be
carefully managed by the executive.
The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy
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1. Although the President and Congress often set the agenda for foreign policy -making, the dayto-day conduct and administration of U.S. foreign policy are vested in the massive federal
bureaucracy. The U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy can be pictured as having four issue
“complexes”: diplomatic, security, economic affairs, and intelligence. Each of these issue areas
has actors and agencies that are not always in agreement or on the same page. Overall, the U.S.
foreign policy bureaucracy is highly fragmented and decentralized.
2. Studying the foreign policy bureaucracy is key to understanding the foreign policy process.
The structures and agencies in the federal system outlast members of Congress and presidents,
who have limited time, resources, and capacities that prevent them from engaging in day-to-day
and even long-term foreign policy issues. Bureaucrats are vested with the resources, budgets, and
expertise to implement policies. Each of the four complexes, however, faces challenges and
constraints on its mission that arise from cultural and institutional factors.
3. The diplomatic complex encompasses the interactions between U.S. agencies and actors and
foreign countries, governments, and citizens. These interactions can occur between officials of
government or through more informal means of communication aimed directly at the foreign
citizenry, often referred to as public diplomacy. The main U.S. institution in the diplomatic
complex is the Department of State, the oldest executive agency in the U.S. government. The
State Department, headed by the secretary of state, is vested with advising and guiding the
president on diplomatic affairs as well as providing citizens with information and access to
foreign countries. These missions are often hampered by foreign and domestic disdain for
diplomacy as well as the presidential and congressional priorities of security and intelligence
budgets.
4. The security complex receives most of the attention and resources of the U.S. foreign-policy
bureaucracy. The Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Council (NSC) are the
two agencies with the most foreign policy resources and responsibilities. The trend, however, has
been to centralize many of the security issues and actors inside the White House. The national
security adviser has played an increasingly active role in planning foreign-policy strategies and
dealing with security issues. The NSC is often critiqued because of its ad hoc and secretive role.
The DoD continues to be the largest organization in both funding and employees; it is extremely
fragmented and decentralized as it includes the army, navy, air force, and dozens of agencies.
The newly formed Department of Homeland Security now faces problems similar to those of the
DoD.
5. The intelligence and economic complexes are less recognized but no less important. The main
component of the intelligence complex is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is an
independent agency. The other fourteen agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community
operate within other departments, such as the DoD, or within branches of the armed services.
Each agency has its own agenda and budget, and the agencies have not tended to share their
intelligence; this problem was exemplified by the September 11 attacks. The economic complex
generally involves the broad mission of coordinating trade and currency markets. The National
Economic Council and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative are the main agencies that
advise the president and coordinate economic matters with other policy actors.
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Each of these complexes faces similar difficulties, which include coordinating resources,
agendas, and interests. The increased centralization of resources and staff in the White House
have often made cabinet and executive branch bureaucrats less relevant in the policy process.
Yet the largest problem for each of the four complexes is the massive size, scope, and selfinterest of U.S. foreign policy institutions.
6. Which institution plays the ‘lead ‘role in foreign policy-making ? Traditionally the State
Department but problems there (widened agenda of [intermestic’] issues; poor performance;
small bureaucracy compared to others) means today lead role frequently taken by other
departments/agencies eg Treasury - international financial crises; Environmental Agency environmental negotiations like Kyoto; Justice and FBI lead on terrorism investigations abroad;
Commerce - exports; Agriculture - external agricultural interests; US Trade Representative leads
on trade negotiations like Uruquay and Doha. Difficult for State to dominate a foreign policy
agenda that includes issues as diverse (and a specialised) as international crime, drugs, military
assistance, climate change, terrorism and infectious diseases.
Questions for discussion on policy process:
1. What are the powers of the President in the making of US foreign policy?
2. What are the limits on presidential power?
3. What are the powers of Congress in the making of US foreign policy?
4. What are the limits on congressional power ?
5. What positive role does the bureaucracy play in foreign policy-making?
6. What negative role does the bureacracy play in foreign policy-making? What is bureaucratic
politics?
Section 3: The United States and Europe: The New Transatlanticism
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To characterise and illustrate the changing nature of US-European relations over the postwar
period. Central theme: problems in transatlantic relations are not new. Unclear at the beginning
of the 21st century whether USA and Europe are allies/partners, competitors/rivals or both.
A. The Establishment of the Atlantic Alliance
Postwar relationship established in late 1940s/early 1950s on three bases:
1. Common perceptions of a Soviet threat
2. Dependence of Western Europe on US in military, economic and political terms
3. Willingness and ability of the US to support Western Europe - Marshall Plan (June 1947);
NATO (April 1949)
B. Challenges to Bases of Alliance
As early as the 1960s, these underpinning bases began to erode:
1. Differential perceptions of the Soviet threat after Cuban crisis. As early as 1967, enquiry
launched into the future role of NATO (Harmel Report)
2. Recovery of Western Europe produces new political assertiveness (de Gaulle) and questioning
of US hegemony in the alliance
3. US becomes much more ambivalent about underwriting the security of Western Europe.
Truman Doctrine (1947) replaced by Nixon Doctrine (1970)
Changing nature of the relationship illustrated by:
1960s - nuclear strategy debate. ‘Massive retaliation’ versus ‘flexible response’
1970s - ‘Year of Europe’ fiasco illustrates growing mistrust
1980s - series of military-security crises: eg attitudes to ‘new’ Cold War; US missiles in Europe
(Cruise, Pershing); Siberian gas pipeline (1982); US bombing of Libya (1986)
1990s - trade disputes eg Burton-Helms Act seeks extra-territorial powers to impose sanctions on
firms trading with Cuba,Libya or Iraq; Uruquay Round of GATT 1986-93. Military - Balkans;
NATO expansion versus European defence identity
C. End of the Cold War
Removal of Soviet threat in 1981 poses major questions for the alliance:
1. What is the rationale for the atlantic alliance once its rationale is removed?
2. What happens to NATO ? What happens to the US defence (nuclear) guarantee to Western
Europe?
3. Will the US withdraw from Europe and over what timescale?
D. Recent Problem Issues:
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Iraq war and terrorism
1. While the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 created a wave of sympathy with the
US in Europe, plus immediately stepped up and still ongoing levels of co-operation on antiterrorism, the run-up to the Iraq war in the winter of 2002-2003 destroyed much of the goodwill
and put major strains on the partnership.
2. The conflict also gave rise to tension within the EU among the countries supporting or
opposing the Iraq war. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld successfully managed to play on
the differences between the two blocs in the EU by talking about ‘new’ and ‘old Europe’. France
and Germany were singled out as the ‘baddies’ by Washington, whilst the UK (in the shape of
Prime Minister Tony Blair and his close relationship with President Bush), alongside Italy,
Spain, Denmark and Poland, gave strong support to the US position.
China arms embargo
1. The EU's plan to lift the 15 year long arms embargo against China in 2005 was a divisive issue
between the US and EU. Lead by major arms exporting countries, UK, France and Italy, the EU
argued that a reinforced code of conduct on on arms sales would be enough to secure the
concerns of US and its allies such as Taiwan.
2. The EU, however, chose to put the lifting of the embargo on hold after pressure from the US
administration. The issue died down after President Bush's visit on 21-22 February 2005 and
mainly after the Chinese government in March 2005 adopted a law that would allow use of
military force if Taiwan ventures down the road of independence. This made it politically
unsustainable for the EU to go ahead with a lifting the ban.
3. On a visit to China in July 2005 Commission President Barroso cited concerns over China's
human right record as the reason why the ban was upheld
Trade
1. On trade policy the EU and the US share the overall common goal of promoting trade
liberalisation through the WTO as most recently defined under the Doha agenda
2. Disputes over GMOs, the use of growth hormones in meat production, and more generally the
EU’s application of the precautionary principle, have grabbed media attention in an otherwise
largely harmonious relationship.
3. The two partners, however, have major recurring disputes over trade subsidies. These are
centered around subsidies given to the agricultural sector in both blocs, but issues such as
subsidies given to the Aerospace industry (Boeing-Airbus) also provoked renewed tension. In
May 2005 this lead to the US and the EU taking the issue to the WTO.
Conclusion:
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USA and Europe will continue to share common interests. But assumption of a continuing
special bond misunderstands fundamental changes in the relationship since World War Two
which have exposed differences of historical experiences, geography, perspective, approach and
priorities. Partners on some issues but competitors on others.
Questions for discussion on transatlantic relationship:
1. What are the differences between the American and the European approach to terrorism?
2. Are there serious cultural differences between the United States and Europe?
3. What are the differences between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economic model and the European social
model?
4. Is the defence of Western Europe better provided by NATO or a European defence force?
5. Are the United States and Europe partners, competitors or something else?
6. How powerful is the United States today? Is it an imperialistic state? Does it threaten
European interests?
Section 4: The United States and the Middle East? United States and European Perspectives
This section locates the Iraq crisis in the broader context of different diplomatic perspectives on
the Middle East over the postwar period. The lecture focuses initially on US policy to provide an
historical overview. European perspectives are then identified as an overlay with a view to
highlighting similarities and differences
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A The Regional Context
1. Geo-political significance - meeting point of three continents; oil factor
2. Overlapping conflicts and fluctuating rivalries; intra-Arab; Arab-Israeli;
Iran-Iraq etc. Endemic instability in region
B Cold War Context
Mid-1950s: US involvement following 1. import of Soviet arms into region triggers region as
cold war theatre 2. declining influence of traditional colonial powers, Britain and France - NB
Suez crisis 1956
US Objectives:
1. contain Soviet expansionism 2. safeguard oil supplies 3. develop cooperative relations with
Arab states 4. protect Israel. Problem: constructing a policy that would achieve all four
objectives. By 1970s, primacy of Soviet containment challenged by priority of resolving ArabIsraeli dispute. Different policy phases:
1950s - alliances with conservative Arab regimes to contain Soviet influence
1960s - policy tilts towards Israel. By mid 60s, US had replaced France as major supplier of
arms to Israel
1970s - after 1973 war, towards a more ‘even-handed’ policy. Attempts to resolve Arab-Israeli
dispute reinforced by 1. 1973-74 oil crisis 2. Rabat Declaration from Arab League - no ArabIsraeli peace without resolving Palestinian claim to self-determination. Carter and ‘peace
process’. October 1978- Camp David summit with Sadat/Begin. November 1979 - Israel-Egypt
Peace Treaty.
1980s - US attention switches to Gulf. Carter Doctrine - Persian Gulf crucial to US security.
Why? 1. revolution in Iran 1979. 2. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 3. Iraq hostage crisis. 4. IranIraq war - initial support for Iraq but growing tensions by end of 1980s.
First Gulf war 1991 - impact. 1. refocuses attention away from end of Cold War in Europe back
to ever unstable ME. 2. Saddam’s skilful use of Palestinian issue as justification for invasion of
Kuwait forces US to return to issue after war (Madrid process) 3. war reinforces concerns about
Israel as key strategic asset in region - kept out of conflict. Growing US concern about Israel
since invasion of Lebanon in early 1980s
C Post Cold War context
US objectives: 1. Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) 2. oil -safeguarding supplies 3. ‘dual
containment’ of Iran and Iraq 4. growing concerns about ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ 5. problem
of proliferation of WMD 6. managing relationship with Israel. Post 9/11 - add 7. terrorism and 8.
democratisation of Middle East to the mix
D. European Perspective
1967 - Six day War initiates EEC focus on ME. Establishes critical perspective on Israel and
broadly supportive of Palestinians
1970s - European dependence upon ME oil highlighted by price rises. Euro-Arab Dialogue
(includes PLO) established as one of first substantive foci of European Political Cooperation.
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1977 EEC calls for a ‘homeland’ for Palestinians (predates Carter) and for multilateral
negotiations involving representatives of the Palestinian people
1980 - Venice Declaration establishes EEC as major player in MEPP. Refuses to endorse
Carter’s ‘piece by pieces’ approach. Favours a comprehensive settlement based on UNSC
Resolutions 242/238. Venice calls for: 1. recognition of Palestinian rights to self-determination
2. association of Palestinian people and specifically PLO with peace negotiations (US only
agrees to talk to PLO in late 1980s after it rejects terrorism and recognises right of Israel to exist)
3. final settlement guaranteed by UNSC. NB EEC diplomacy helps to legitimise the Palestinian
cause and provides an important precedent for the US to begin to negotiate directly with the
Palestinians after 1988
1990s - (for detailed data/analysis of impact of EC/EU on ME in the 1990s, see R.Ginsberg, The
European Union in World Politics, chap 5). Major impact of EU on Israel and Palestinian
Authority but less direct impact on MEPP (US much more important) during this decade.
However, alternative EU track directed towards peace and stability in the wider Mediterranean
basin region initiated by the ‘Barcelona Process’ from 1995 offers boost to economic growth and
development thus helping security in region
E. More Recent Developments
Both US and EU involved in multilateral ‘Quartet’ group (US, EU, UN, Russia) seeking restart
of final settlement talks. By end of 2002, group had agreed a ‘road map’ for a settlement
culminating in the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005 (NB recognition of Palestinian
statehood claim a major Bush concession). But progress to date slowed by Iraq crisis and then
the 2004 US presidential election. Different US/EU priorities became evident in context of Iraq:
USA - determined to resolve Iraq issue before dealing with MEPP. End of February 2003, Bush
argues that removal of Saddam would open up the possibility of a Palestinian state but refused to
specify timetable. Sharon government in Israel strongly supports Bush line
EU - strongly supported either the absolute priority of restarting MEPP or believed (Britain,
Spain) that Iraq and MEPP should be parallel processes. Post Iraq and post Arafat - strong
Blair/EU pressure on Bush to act. But few signs of movement on MEPP in second Bush
administration
2006 - conflict between Lebanon/Hizbullah and Israel. US response and impact. Further sets
back Middle East peace process?
Finally, two simple assumptions to be questioned:
1. US supports Israel and EU supports the Palestinian/Arab cause, Historically, the US has
moved a long way towards a more even handed policy in the region despite the current rather
uncritical support for Sharon. The EU has a strong economic relationship with Israel as well as
the PA which gives the EU - if united - considerable political leverage across the region
2. The US can and should ‘deliver’ Israel to the negotiating table and the EU can and should
‘deliver’ the PA to the negotiating table. This dramatically understates the difficulties of outside
powers controlling the complexities of domestic and regional Middle East politics.
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