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International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000 I. Political Economies and Transformations of Capitalism Social Theory and the Transformation of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century* Gary Herrigel The notion that there is a unitary trajectory associated with capitalist industrialization is identified with many of the great theorizers of economic development in the twentieth century: Schumpeter, Veblen, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Keynes, Rostow, Gerschenkron, Chandler, Galbraith, and Schonfield. Each of these thinkers, while differing amongst themselves on a broad array of issues of theory, shared in common the view that there was an epochally specific social system of capitalism, founded on private property and free markets for labor power. In its early phases, this system operated according to a very specific logic of task- and product-specialization, guided by rational market exchange, that led to increases in the scale of production. This dynamic yielded a process of centralization and concentration in the organizational and property forms governing the social division of labor which, as the system matured, ultimately led to the displacement of market rationality by a rationality of hierarchy and bureaucracy. Naturally, these unitary theorists of capitalism held that different societies would experience this common process in different ways, owing to the contingencies of timing and the greater and lesser tractability of tradition. But that there was one process and that it had a single and determinable directionality was never doubted. Indeed, it was taken to be one of the great discoveries of modern economic science. This unitary view of capitalism and its trajectory of development was also a core part of classical social theory as it emerged in the first fifty years of the twentieth century—in particular in the work of Weber, Polanyi, Parsons, Aron, Bell and the neo-Marxian tradition of critical social theory represented most notably by Horkheimer, Marcuse, Pollock and Neumann. *A review essay of Harry F. Dahms Transformations of Capitalism: Economy. Society, and the State in the Twentieth Century. Main Trends in the World Series. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 405 © 2000 Human Sciences Press. Inc. 406 Herrigel These theorists examined the broader social, political and cultural consequences of capitalism's movement from market to bureaucratic rationality that the unitary political economists described. In particular, they focused on the way in which that development conditioned (and was conditioned by) the organization of social and political power, itself increasingly bureaucratic, in modern societies. Further, their work linked this analysis of bureaucratic organization and control to the development of (increasingly truncated) subjective senses of individual and collective possibility in modern life. As with their counterparts in political economy, these thinkers were sensitive to national difference stemming from contingencies in timing and tradition. But, despite their many substantive and theoretical differences, none disputed that "modern capitalism" [or "industrial society"] was a unitary historical form that profoundly shaped the way that all societies grappled with modernity. The theoretical achievements of the above traditions—which are in part excerpted, collected and summarized in the new reader Transformations of Capitalism: Economy, Society, and the State in the Twentieth Century edited by the social theorist Harry Dahms1 have been formidable. Indeed, as Dahms's extensive introduction notes, they have produced the contemporary disciplines of sociology and political economy and have constructed extremely powerful understandings of contemporary reality in industrial democracies. To the first group of political economists, we owe core paradigms for understanding innovation, combined, uneven and late development, corporate organization in the firm, the joint stock enterprise and state led macroeconomic governance. To the social theorists, we owe a critical appreciation of the affinity between the acquisitiveness, instrumentalism and individuality of capitalist commodity production and the formal, hierarchical and instrumentally rational forms of bureaucratic organization and hierarchical control that historically accompany them in political and social realms. I have no intention in what follows of denying the validity or significance of the theoretical accomplishments of the classic twentieth century traditions that the Dahms volume celebrates. I will, however, argue that they are not as generally helpful or broadly relevant for analyzing and constructing explanations of the developmental experience of industrial societies in the twentieth century as they, or Dahms, maintain. The general and unitary theoretical ambition that defines the tradition results in a selfblinding dynamic in which theorists are unable to recognize the highly particular character and context dependence of what they take to be general developmental dynamics in industrial societies. Indeed, in my view, this unitary tradition's linear and homogenizing conception of capitalist development has led to a profound underestimation of a wide array of perfectly Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 407 viable forms of organization, control, struggle and governance that have been constitutive of the various developmental experiences of industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. The unitary tradition's failure to appreciate alternative forms of organization is a great limitation. At best, it creates a sense of false necessity in the interpretive orientation of the theorist. At worst, it shackles the transformative imagination in social theory.2 ALTERNATIVE NON-UNITARY TRADITIONS The first point to be made is that the unitary tradition represented in the Dahms volume has always been only one voice among many competing ones in the collective effort to comprehend the industrial transformations of society in the modern age. Even as it was emerging in the nineteenth century (in the writings of Marxian and classical economists and Darwinian social theorists), the unitary conception of capitalism's trajectory was opposed by (among others): catholic corporatist thinkers who believed in a fragmented social order of organic and customary communities of vocation and belief;3 pragmatic conservatives in the Burkean tradition who believed in the piecemeal, uneven, locally reflective and gradual nature of social evolution;4 nationalist economists such as Friedrich List who denied that there was a common logic in industrialization and insisted on (nationally empowering) local economic peculiarity;5 and, finally, anarchist and mutualist writers, such as Proudhon and Kropotkin who believed that the centralizing and concentrating vision of the Marxian and classical economists sat poorly with the numerous and demonstrable ways in which human beings flourished and created in decentralized, local and smaller scale productive environments.6 In the twentieth century, especially on the left, opposition to the unitary view of capitalism has been found in the experimentalist inclinations of pragmatic philosophers and social critics such as John Dewey, who believed in the radically historically specific, contingent, provisional and imminently revisable character of organization and practice in modern life.7 Opposition also came from pluralist writers who viewed tendencies toward centralization and bureaucracy as one form of modern control and governance among many alternatives, including, not least, the extremely strong and attractive experiments in modern societies in group and associational governance.8 Though this debate has never been settled entirely in favor of one side or the other, in recent decades the unitary traditions have come under very significant attack—empirically, theoretically and politically—from a broad array of practical and academic locations. The catalyst for the critiques has 408 Herrigel been the massive transformations in the organization of industrial production, in corporate organization and in state finance and services that have been occurring in industrial societies all over the world. These transformations are awkwardly explained by the unitary traditions, not only because different companies, regions and national governments are responding to similar pressures in very different institutional, political and strategic ways. The unitary narratives are also being rendered problematic, theoretically, because their core explanatory mechanisms are being falsified in practice.9 For example, industrial production in a broad array of manufacturing industries is being spread out away from a central firm location and distributed across a wide array of independent property holders in the social division of labor.10 In other words, instead of the unitary logic of concentration and centralization of capital, we see increasingly—in many different ways!!— spatial decentralization in production and a decoupling of the development of the division of labor from property. This picture is then further complicated when one views the organization of work within production in such contexts. Here the unitary strategy of separating conception from execution is in many factories being abandoned for forms of organization— multifunctional teams, simultaneous engineering—that self-consciously seek to reintegrate conception and execution in the interest of flexibility and manufacturing quality." These attacks in the empirical world by real agents on bureaucratic control and hierarchy, finally, are not confined to business enterprise. State bureaucracies are also being leveled through efforts to make organizational decision making more efficient, to unburden responsibility from centers of authority and to enhance the flexibility of organizations by locating decision making authority closer to the origin of the problem (i.e., by reintegrating policy conception and execution).12 Moreover, in the same process of debureaucratization, functional specialization and the division of authority between government and citizens is frequently being replaced by multifunctional community and government groups in which decisional authority is shared by the disparate members of the group and decision making capacity is exercised through discussion among the members of the group.13 Here again, instead of unitary instrumentalism, hierarchical control and atomization, regulatory governments are in this way introducing practical reflection and explicit ideas of mutual dependence into policy making. By pointing to these examples (and there are many others), contemporary critics of the unitary tradition in economic history,14 economic sociology,15 economic geography,16 evolutionary economics,17 political science,18 and social theory19 have not, for the most part, intended to suggest that the unitary conception of capitalism's trajectory is utterly wrong or indeed, being replaced by an alternative one. Everyone admits some historical Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 409 significance, under the proper conditions, for the forms of organization and control identified by the unitary tradition. Moreover those critics writing on the contemporary period acknowledge that it is still possible, in partial agreement with the later essays in Dahms's volume (e.g., by Bluestone and Harrison, Zysman and Cohen, Kolko, Stallings and Streeck et al.) to find examples in the world that seemingly correspond to the unitary expectations: hierarchy, bureaucracy, and Taylorism still exist and are being reproduced in all advanced industrial societies. The criticisms, however, are not about suggesting an alternative trajectory or an alternative holistic conception of capitalism. Rather, they are about moving away from the idea that there needs to be a unitary trajectory at all and developing a theoretical language that makes it possible to account for what appears to be enduring developmental, and organizational heterogeneity in industrial societies, polities and economies. Seen in this light, it is striking that Dahms has chosen to celebrate the unitary position in a volume that is supposed to chronicle voices on the transformation of capitalism in the twentieth century. No critics of the unitary conception are included and, to the extent that their arguments are addressed (largely in passing in the editor's introduction and epilog), it is only to dismiss them as superficial interpretations of economic change that miss "deeper," "underlying" "dominant" and "more fundamental" features of capitalist continuity and development. This is an odd move, given the very profound tension between the developmental expectations generated by the explanatory mechanisms in the unitary view and the variety of observed forms of "non-unitary" organization and control unearthed by the alternative critical tradition. How can this one sided representational strategy be explained? I think it comes from the self blinding logic of the unitary conception of capitalism itself: When confronted with empirical evidence that is in tension with the trajectory of organization and control predicted by the coherence of the unitary notion of capitalism, the impulse is to make that evidence into something exogenous to fundamental process e.g., intractable tradition or organizational forms that have to do with the lack of synchrony in the unfolding of the deeper unitary logic. I will elaborate on this point below, but before doing so it is important to turn to the more detailed picture of twentieth century capitalism that the unitary Dahms volume presents. THE UNITARY VIEW OF CAPITALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Dahms's portrait of twentieth century capitalism has two framing large claims. The first is that the twentieth century saw the triumph of bureau- 410 Herrigel cracy, in the form of the corporation and the welfare state, in capitalist society. By this he means that the principles of hierarchical organization and control replaced the market as the dominant mode of governance for capitalism and that they pervade contemporary political and industrial experience: "Focusing on structural shifts in advanced political economies, this volume brings to light the fundamental trends that operate "below" the surface of economic activity, conveying the central importance of organization and control . . . [T]hese trends constitute crucial aspects of economic decision-making processes in bureaucratic capitalism" (page 7). In the twentieth century, control is hierarchical and organization bureaucratic for Dahms. The second claim is that the United States is the historical embodiment or realization of bureaucratic capitalism as a pure type. "Since the late nineteenth century," Dahms writes, "the United States may well have been the most capitalistic society" (page 9). The trends toward pervasive bureaucratization in the economy and the polity "manifested themselves more distinctly and clearly" in the U.S. than elsewhere (page 9). Using these two framing arguments, Dahms arranges his unitary theorists to construct the following narrative about the emergence and evolution of twentieth century bureaucratic capitalism. Guided by a pervasive capitalist instrumental rationality and calculation, hierarchical and bureaucratic principles in the form of the industrial corporation (Chandler) triumphed completely over all traditionalist non-capitalist/non-bureaucratic opposition in the early twentieth century United States economy. These hierarchical and bureaucratic principles were extended and consolidated through the spread of joint stock enterprise and the increasing separation of ownership and control (Veblen, Berle & Means). The absolute hegemony of these principles of control and organization in the broader society as a whole was consolidated at mid century with the growth of the bureaucratic welfare state, military industrial complex and American dominated international monetary and trade apparatus of the post war Golden Age (Keynes, Schumpeter, Polanyi, Kindleberger, Adams, Galbraith, Aron, Jordan). For the Europeans and Japanese during this period, Dahms writes, "the concept as well as the reality of capitalism [was] tempered to a greater extent than in the United States by political, social and cultural factors and preconceived notions that imposed limits on the importance of the economy and its role in the society" (page 9). According to Dahms, the dominance of hierarchical control and bureaucratic organization became even stronger and more pervasive (and more reactionary) in the United States with the deep crisis of the 1970s and eighties. This capitalist crisis was accompanied by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (Block), and initiated the decimation of the organized labor movement (Bluestone & Harrison, Kolko), and attacks on the Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 411 welfare state (Offe, Bensman & Vidich). Out of the crisis, bureaucratic capitalism in the U.S. emerged in the 1990s even stronger with the global growth of the massively controlling and bureaucratic multinational (Gilpin), supported by the huge unchecked power of finance capital (Fligstein, Helleiner). Despite the neo-liberal ideology that accompanied the reaction against the welfare state and the labor movement, bureaucracy was actually expanding (not retreating) in the state realm as well, as states increasingly sought to circumvent the market and foster innovation and technological development in their economies (Zysman and Cohen). Naturally, owing to differences in tradition and timing of the crisis, major capitalist powers manifested the dominance of bureaucracy in their economies and polities in different ways (Stallings & Streeck). Dahms freely acknowledges that the authors he has assembled to construct this narrative do not all agree on theoretical first principles or in all of the details of the transformation of capitalism in the twentieth century (although he does not acknowledge that they all adhere to the unitary notion of capitalism). He believes, legitimately, that despite this pluralism, it is nonetheless "possible to arrive at an intelligible narrative of the transformations of capitalism in the twentieth century" with this assemblage of thinkers (page 24). This, in turn, gives him hope that it will one day be possible to arrive at a grand and massive theoretical synthesis that will enable us to grasp contemporary capitalism as a unitary whole. He writes: "This collection ought to be understood as an attempt to prepare the kind of comprehensive perspective without which we cannot hope to address effectively any issues pertaining to capitalism in general. . . This is, after all, the promise of modern times: that we can move beyond the narrow definitions of 'reality' (whether political, economic, ideological, religious, or theoretical), to arrive at a better sense of the whole by means of unimpeded intellectual and practical exchange" (page 26). Dahms believes that moving toward the construction of a general, holistic conception of unitary capitalism will make it more likely for societies to be able to solve the problems that such a capitalism generates. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE From my point of view, which is frankly sympathetic to the opponents of the unitary conception, this is both a highly flawed portrait of twentieth century capitalism and a chimerical theoretical hope. The alternative nonunitary tradition objects to both of the core framing themes of Dahms' twentieth century: It does not construct the United States as the embodiment of a pure capitalist type, nor does it view hierarchical bureaucracy Herrigel 412 as the dominant form of organization and control in the century. Further, the alternative tradition takes the ambition to achieve unity and wholeness as an obstacle to the invention of solutions to problems generated in contemporary historical contexts rather than as a necessary step toward such solutions. The character of the alternative position can best be grasped by looking first at core theoretical differences between the alternative theorists and the unitary theorists. Once these have been specified, it will also be possible to show how the alternative tradition reconceives the activity of social criticism and facilitates practical problem solving capacity. Finally, it will be possible to show how the problem of the development of industrial societies in the twentieth century can be framed very differently. DIFFERENCES IN THEORY The core difference in theory, from which all others follow, between the unitary conceptions of capitalism and contemporary critics concerns the way in which each tradition understands the historical specificity of the processes and institutions being observed. For the unitary tradition, history has a linear directionality in which the human condition either becomes better and better or in which tensions between forms of human potential and given possibilities become increasingly acute.20 The line of unitary history is marked by an ordered and hierarchical sequence of epochs of fundamentally different but internally unitary and systematically integrated forms of social, economic and political order (agrarian empires, feudalism, capitalism, etc.), each of which themselves contain linearly arranged substages of development (competitive capitalism, bureaucratic or corporate capitalism, globalization, etc.). Historical specificity within this tradition, then, involves placing ideas, events, processes and institutions within this elaborate linear and hierarchical structure. Naturally, social reality is extremely heterogeneous, but the normative hierarchy and the ideal types (and sub-types) of historical systems make it possible to separate progressive from reactionary (or backward or irrelevant) phenomenon at any point in time. In unitary theory, moreover, the causal analytic and the normative dimensions of theory depend on and reinforce one another: Without a line of progressive development, and a systematically interconnected matrix of ideal typical relations and processes that produce it, the specific normative ends of the theory would have no general, transhistorical authority. They would just be one normative position among many in a given present. On the other side, without the authority of a norm of progress, the analytical procedures of unitary theory would have no grounds for separating so Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 413 decisively progressive from reactionary or backward dimensions of heterogeneous reality—especially if the "backward" elements tended to reproduce themselves over time. This very modern union of universal norms with rational analytic concepts is notably resistant to empirical disconfirmation, not least because inconvenient pieces of data can be dismissed as superficial or out of step with the "underlying" forces of development. To an outsider, who does not accept the unitary theory's coupling of universal norm and systematic theory, this resistance to evidence appears as a kind of blindness. Their normative confidence blinds them both to the possibility of alternative trajectories and to the particularity of their own analytical and normative claims.21 The alternative tradition, on the other hand, denies that history has any inherent directionality or trajectory at all. Human potential is taken to be effectively limitless, and as a consequence indescribable as a whole. Without a conception of the whole, however, it is not possible to construct a general normative ordering of progress with transhistorical validity, as the unitary tradition does. For the contemporary alternative tradition, all norms and practical understandings of individual and collective possibility are local and historically specific.22 This difference from the unitary tradition has consequences in three areas: 1.) for the way in which this alternative tradition conceives of social, political and economic order and the role of choice and action in the way that an order changes; 2.) for the way it relates the past to the present; and 3.) for the understanding it has for the critical role of social theory. Each of these areas further distinguish the alternative tradition of social theory from the unitary. Social, Economic, and Political Order and the Role of Choice: Because it rejects the notion of a transhistorical normative anchor by which local constellations of human potential can be ordered (as progressive or backward etc.) the alternative tradition also rejects the analytical strategy of constructing an overarching, abstract, interconnected model of social, economic and political order—such as "bureaucratic capitalism." Instead, this non-unitary tradition approaches the analysis of a given moment of heterogeneous social life with the expectation that it will have order and not be chaotic, but that it will also be full of multiple possibilities for individual and collective' enhancement as well as multiple forms of constraint. Transformation and liberation is continually occurring within the various particular realms of a given social order while being blocked or constrained in others. Any particular historical social order will likely be 414 Herrigel governed by multiple principles of order, contain an array of organizational forms and be subject to numerous and competing forms of control. Moreover, in most cases, the governing, organizing and controlling principles and their relation to one another will be either contested, ambiguous or both. Conceiving of the social order in this way tends to cede structure less causal or shaping power and give strategic agency, deliberation and creativity more importance in the process of social transformation than is typical of the unitary tradition. Contestation and ambiguity in the realms of control and organization creates the possibility for agents to reshape the context in which their interactions are ordered. This possibility for effective agency is enhanced by the absence of a privileged global position from which all of the possibilities and constraints can be identified: local players will see possibilities and constraints that are not apparent to others, creating congenital uncertainty in systems and the possibility for unforeseeable occurrences. Struggle, conflict and deliberation among different perspectives and locations, as well as surprise, play crucial roles in the construction of organizational forms and governance mechanisms that come to constitute a given social economic and political order. Different theorists in the alternative tradition describe this non-unitary conception of social, economic and political order in different ways. Geoffrey Hodgson, for example, has suggested that non-unitary evolutionary theories are governed by what he calls the "impurity principle," by which he means that "there must always be a coexistent plurality of modes of production, so that the social formation as a whole has the requisite structural variety to cope with change."23 Hodgson and the evolutionary economists, however, place less emphasis on creative agency than other theorists within the alternative tradition. Jonathan Zeitlin, for example, denies that there really are coherent modes of production that interpenetrate, in reality. Instead, he suggests that reflexive agents draw distinctions, in thought, between modes of production—in his parlance, epochs—that facilitate the creation of hybrid forms of organization in practice. In his view the The interpenetration of strategies and practices within industries and national economies at any one time resulting from actors' efforts to hedge their organizational and technological bets about future changes in the environment casts inevitable doubt on the possibility of drawing sharp distinctions between epochs or periods such as the "age of Fordism" or the "era of flexibility." From this vantage point, it seems more useful to distinguish historical epochs according to changing orientations towards the ideas of political and economic regarded as normal or paradigmatic than to divide history into periods where social life was in fact thoroughly organized according to one or another master principle. This notion of changing orientations towards paradigmatic or normal ideas faithfully conveys both a sense of changing constraints on historical actors and that of continuing scope for localized strategic choice insofar as ideas of normality tend to magnify and thus to increase the importance of dominant conceptions without reflecting or constraining anything like the totality of behaviour they purportedly characterize.24 Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 415 On either of the alternative views, however, the result is that at any given time, the social political and economic order is understood to be composed of highly contingent constellations of institutional and ideological compromises and provisional solutions to common problems. They are newly created admixtures of possibility and constraint forged out of problems and struggles that antecedent admixtures fostered. Specific forms of institutional organization and conceptions of authority and control as well as whole complexes of them at the level of large societies will, on this alternative view, never achieve the kind of tight interconnected coherence and power that they are given within unitary theories. Non-unitary theory holds as unrealistic, overly simplistic or even implausible notions of organization and control such as a formally rational bureaucracy or a social order dominated through and through by instrumental rationality. The normative hierarchy that encourages such a way of conceiving social order and its component institutions is absent in non-unitary theory. In the unitary conception, social orders follow lines of development; in the alternative non-unitary conception, social orders transform themselves from what they were through the creative local strategies of reflexive agents. Relation Between the Present and the Past Conceiving of the social, political and economic order as a highly contingent congery of possibility and constraint, characterized by the continuous, unpredictable local lifting of constraint, realization of possibility and (inevitably) creation of new constraint has consequences for the way that the relationship between the past and the present are thought of in the alternative theories of industrial transformation. In the unitary tradition, where history moves along a path, the past is in all positive practical senses useless. The present has moved beyond the organizational forms, technologies, and mechanisms of the past to more "developed" forms. The past is useful only in an analytical sense, as a way of identifying the specificity of the present along the development path. The only practical role that the past plays in the present is an obstructive and polluting one in the form of "tradition." Advocates of outmoded and backward modes of practice and organization can use structural power to disrupt the forward march of unitary progress. But over time, such traditions tend to give way to the acid of unitary capitalist progress. The present literally destroys the past in unitary theories. In the alternative tradition, where there is no path toward a beyond, merely contingent constellations of possibilities and constraints on human Herrigel 416 potential, the past can be extremely useful in a practical sense. It can serve as a reservoir of information involving past institutional experiments, viable but abandoned organizational forms, technologies, production arrangements, forgotten possibilities for human improvement, and so forth, from which those in the present can learn. Thus, the alternative present is understood as a congery of problems and possibilities for liberation, while alternative history is viewed as a reservoir of ideas, beliefs, practices, understandings, organizational forms, and so forth that can be drawn on in the effort to solve problems, lift constraints and make liberation possible.25 In the alternative theoretical frame, tradition is understood in an utterly different way than it is in the unitary tradition: Not as a barrier to change, but as contingently ordered congeries of thought and/or practice from the past that continues to have value in the present and that can be applied, abandoned, ignored or deconstructed as a whole or piecemeal by problem solving actors in the present. The alternative tradition rejects the unitary view of tradition as a barrier to change and social, economic or political transformation. Alternative Critical Theory Understanding the social political and economic order as a heterodox constellation of contingently related social arrangements (possibilities and constraints), and the past as a reservoir of information that can have practical value for problem solving in the present, makes for a very different conception of the role of social theory and of "critical" analysis. In the unitary tradition, "critical theory" set itself the task of using reason (properly understood) to identify ways in which the structure of the social order— capitalism—systematically stifled or repressed the realization of a very particular transhistorical conception of human potential. In the alternative view, critical analysis tries to point to ways in which active and present possibilities for the development of human capacity might be realized, either through the elimination of constraint or through the identification of possibility. The social theorist can also be publicly useful by marshalling knowledge of the organization of other contexts, both in the present and in the past, that not only identify possibility, but that can contribute to real problem-solving and transformation in the social order. Naturally there will be normative and analytical disagreements among analysts as to the character of problems and on the possibility and desirability of their solution. There is no transhistorical norm that makes it possible to order the importance of social problems or prioritize them. Such ordering must be done through local and historically specific debate, collective argument, Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 417 struggle and experimentation. The alternative tradition expects the evolution and transformation of the social world to be driven by politics and struggle and for all outcomes to be provisional and subject to revision. A NON-UNITARY ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY In light of these theoretical differences between the unitary tradition and the alternative tradition, it is easy to see how the latter tradition might present a different narrative of the industrial experience in the twentieth century. In fact, writers in the non-unitary tradition present a host of different narratives of the experience of industrial development in the twentieth century.26 I do not intend to outline all the narrative variants. Instead, I will highlight how they collectively reject the main empirical claims of the unitary narrative, in particular the two most central claims in the unitary account as represented by Dahms: that twentieth century industrial society has been dominated by hierarchy and bureaucratic organization and that the experience of the United States corresponds to the most pure capitalist type. Bureaucracy: Whatever it is, it's not the Whole Picture, Only Part of it A major critique of the unitary idea of bureaucratic domination as a system of control based on hierarchy and instrumental or means/ends rationality comes from organization theory and empirical studies of bureaucracy itself. Most studies show organizations of the sort that the unitary thinkers theorize rarely exist in such a unitary form in reality.27 Moreover, Hans Joas, after summarizing a vast array of empirical objections to the view that bureaucracy dominates modern organizations, notes that there are equally numerous objections to the notion that the most rational form of organization is one with a hierarchical command structure. Arguments which have been brought forward to refute the reality and viability of the commandhierarchy model include reference to the specialized expert knowledge of subordinates, to their independent interaction with the outside world, to the stimulation of their ability to learn, to horizontal cooperation and to the need to encourage autonomous action.28 Each of those capacities in subordinate locations within a hierarchy, Joas emphasizes, significantly diffuses and refracts the capacity of those at the top of a hierarchy to achieve or implement their ends. The degree of control in bureaucracy is thus, as an empirical matter, considerably less powerful than is represented in unitary views of the corporation or of state agencies. The alternative tradition is therefore highly skeptical of arguments, especially from the unitary left, that attribute tremendous coher- 418 Herrigel ence and power to bureaucratic or corporate capital as an actor.29 There is little evidence that such coherent actors exist. So, before the question of the degree to which bureaucracy was or was not a "dominant" form of control and organization in the twentieth century is even posed, the nonunitary tradition casts doubt upon the idea that bureaucratic organization and hierarchical control ever existed in any actual form reminiscent of the way they are described in the abstract unitary conception. Non-unitary theorists have provided other forms of counter evidence to the claim that the twentieth century was a bureaucratically dominated century as well. Business historians and historical political economists, for example, have done a lot of historical work showing that forms of industrial production that did not take place within large vertically integrated corporations existed all over the industrial world throughout the twentieth century.30 To take only the work on the United States, Philip Scranton has shown that small and medium sized producers in machinery, textiles, furniture and jewelry making and other sectors, in a broad array of industrial regions, prospered in the US economy in the period between the end of the nineteenth century when the Chandlerian industrial corporation first emerged and World War II, when Scranton's narrative stops.31 The historical economic sociologists, Schwartz and Fish, have done extensive research on early twentieth century Detroit showing that during the period of the invention of "Fordism" and the creation of the multidivisional enterprise by the Ford Motor Company and General Motors, the region was densely populated by small and medium sized supplier firms upon whom the larger assemblers were symbiotically related and dependent.32 Gerald Berk, an historical political economist, has extensively documented how even in national anti-trust law and industrial regulation the power of large corporations was by no means completely determining of state policy in the first part of the twentieth century in the U.S. Indeed, much of the regulatory discussion was preoccupied with the proper way to govern highly specialized small- and medium-sized firm-dominated industries.33 Claims of bureaucratic dominance in the post-War period have also been radically relativized. Critics of the unitary view emerged already in the 1950s, sixties, and seventies among labor market economists and sociologists who pointed out that the growth of large scale production did not lead to a unitary process of concentration and centralization. Rather, they pointed out that mass production growth seemed to be accompanied by the development of a "dual labor market" for less skilled labor and a "secondary sector" of smaller firms acting both as suppliers and competitors of large firms during boom times.34 Not only that, others pointed out that the growth of the large mass production firm tended also to cultivate the development of sectors of craft production based specialists in capital goods who supplied Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 419 mass producers with production technology. These sectors were, on the whole, dominated by small- and medium-sized—often family-owned firms.35 Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, as producers of all sizes began to seek greater flexibility in production, numerous scholars in political economy, economic geography and economic sociology (as discussed earlier in this essay) pointed to both a growing vibrancy of small and medium sized firm production in many sectors and breathtaking efforts on the part of formerly large vertically integrated producers to dis-integrate their production and extend their sub-contracting ties. This literature, moreover, placed great emphasis on the significant regional variation of institutions, strategies and governance structures within the U.S. that these trends revealed.36 Given all of this historical evidence, it seems prudent to claim that even where corporate bureaucracy did exist in the twentieth century U.S. economy, it was never a general phenomenon, but rather always a particular facet of the U.S. experience, coexisting (and colliding) with alternative forms of organization, control and regional peculiarity. Another way in which non-unitary theory has attempted to relativize the significance of bureaucracy within the modern economy has been to indicate that hierarchy is only one of a wide array of empirically identifiable and theoretically coherent forms of governance in contemporary industrial economies. To chose only one argument from an array of competing ones among non-unitary schools of thought, this point is developed well in the recent book by Michael Storper and Robert Salais, Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy.37 Storper and Salais thoroughly deconstruct the core categories of unitary economic analysis—individual self-interested action, markets, hierarchies, preferences, growth—as well as its core dualisms and constitutive distinctions—structure and action, state and market, economic and non-economic behavior—such that rather than acting as points of theoretical departure, those categories are understood as conditioned outcomes of prior cognitive and behavioral processes. Ultimately they suggest that there are four quite distinct possible worlds of production in the contemporary world economy, governed by different frameworks of action, different kinds of rationality, different institutions, different standards of profitability, different ways of dealing with labor and different propensities to innovation. The four worlds, the Interpersonal World, Market World, Intellectual World and Industrial World are ideal types, but the authors show that they are found in various interpenetrated combinations in actual practice ("real worlds") in all contemporary advanced economies.38 The point to be emphasized here is that in the Storper/ Salais typology the bureaucratic organization and hierarchical control that the Dahms volume regards as dominant in twentieth century capitalism is confined by Storper and Salais to the Industrial World. In their view then, 420 Herrigel in a conceptual sense, bureaucratic governance is only one of four possible contemporary forms of organization and control in the economy. And, further, this ideal form, they show, is actually nowhere realized in its pure form in historical and actual practice. All of these examples have been presented simply to point out that there are very many sound empirical, conceptual and theoretical arguments against the view, represented by the thinkers in the Dahms volume, that hierarchical bureaucracy was/is the dominant form of organization and control in industrial societies during the twentieth century. Surely the elements of bureaucratic capitalist order noted by Dahms and his authors— hierarchy, the separation of ownership and control, financial pressure on management, etc.—were/are dimensions of the twentieth century experience. But, to call them dominant or to argue that they shaped (or continue to shape) the development of whole national industrial orders, even in the United States, is to be blind to the wide variety of alternative forms of order and strategies for transformation that characterize the experience of development in advanced industrial countries in the twentieth century. THE UNITED STATES AMONG A VARIETY OF CAPITALISMS The examples of alternative, non-bureaucratic forms of development within the United States during the twentieth century may also serve as pieces of evidence for why the alternative tradition does not regard the United States as the practical embodiment of a pure model of capitalism. There are simply too many contending, competing, regionally dispersed and contradictory forms of governance and development within the U.S. economy to be able to represent the whole economy in a unitary way—much less as somehow dominated by the corporate bureaucratic form or finance capitalism. The U.S. is a congery of many forms of capitalism. For the non-unitary tradition, this is no surprise, for it is highly skeptical of the very idea of a single or pure type of capitalism. Indeed, conceiving of social, economic and political order as a historically specific congery of practices and institutions, leads the alternative tradition to be very fascinated with and preoccupied by the whole problem of variety among industrial societies. In the non-unitary tradition, the other industrialized countries are not viewed as lesser variants of the U.S. case. Rather, they are viewed in the same way the U.S. is: as distinctive, nationally bounded, congeries of organization and control, compose by reflexive actors confronted by similar but not identical world market pressures, and capable of drawing on different historical resources. When the comparative process of industrialization is viewed in this way, interesting questions then become: How Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 421 well do these systems compete against one another at any one point in time? What are the relative transformational possibilities and constraints that each face in the context of a new global dynamic of exchange and competition? European and Japanese (and all other) industrialisms are different and, from a U.S. perspective, are competitors, but also possible exemplars for alternative practice, and sources of inspiration for those grappling with local problems and/or seeking change. Such reflective and competitive engagements among varieties of industrial society are what in the end drive global change, not any underlying unitary logic of capitalism. Dahms and the unitary tradition hang a lot of their argument for viewing the U.S. as a pure type on the importance of traditional beliefs and institutions in economies outside the U.S. acting as a barrier to industrial development. But a considerable body of alternative empirical work exists showing that so-called traditional elements in industrializing countries have either been irrelevant to the adoption of new forms of industrial technology, organization and mechanisms of control, or they have actually contributed to highly innovative new forms that result in highly competitive new arrangements. An example of the irrelevance of tradition to the industrialization process is the Japanese encounter with Taylorism in the twentieth century.39 In his recent book on the subject, William Tsutsui writes: "Scientific Management was smoothly aligned with Japanese conceptions of tradition".40 More specifically: "Taylorite doctrines . . . were rooted in 'tradition' and almost effortlessly recast as 'Japanese-style management' when they were imported and applied in Japan. In the end, extensive crossfertilization by American ideas and a broad parallelism with Western practice, rather than culturally specific and autonomous course of development, characterized the Japanese experience with Scientific Management." 41 Tradition in this case, was an accommodating interlocutor for the new form of organization; not a force of opposition. An example of how tradition can contribute actively to the construction of new and highly competitive arrangements is the German system of workplace codetermination. This system, which enforces dialogue between labor and capital inside of plants, was forged during the American occupation of Germany out of a set of compromises between social catholic, socialist, bourgeois conservative, and liberal American ideas about property and the proper limitation of its social power.42 The system has been widely praised for its flexibility and positive contribution to German manufacturing success.43 CONCLUSION It would be possible to go marshalling empirical example after empirical example to show how overdrawn or incorrect the claims of the unitary 422 Herrigel tradition of social theory are. But I think the point has been made. In committing itself to a single, abstract, tightly interconnected and linear conception of capitalism and its development, the unitary traditions in social theory and political economy have blinded themselves to the great variety of social, political and economic organization that have consistently reproduced themselves in advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. Their preoccupation with corporate and bureaucratic power, in particular, causes them to vastly overestimate its coherence and ultimately its significance in social life. It is, moreover, worth it to point out that this preoccupation with a particular form of power in social organization has, in its critical and left variants, produced a form of social theory primarily concerned with constraints on the capacity of human beings to extend and develop their potential. The critical and reflective capacity to identify transformative possibilities in social organization, in other words, has been undermined by the false necessity invested in the constraints of bureaucratic power. The alternative non-unitary tradition, on the other hand, is concerned with identifying practical possibilities for human improvement in social life. For this tradition, the extent of bureaucratic and corporate power in social life is an empirical question, unconnected to a set of commitments to the nature and trajectory of capitalism. In an effort to unearth as many possibilities for transformation as possible, the tradition has preoccupied itself with identifying the broad variety of organizational forms and mechanisms of control that contemporary industrial societies are producing. For the alternative tradition, the critical project is to try to learn from this variety and to communicate this learning in the interests of the practical lifting of constraint and the enhancement of human possibility. ENDNOTES 1. Harry F. Dahms TRANSFORMATIONS OF CAPITALISM: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Main Trends in the World Series) (New York: NYU Press, 1999). 2. On false necessity in social theory, see Roberto Unger, False Necessity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 3. Birke, A. (1971). Bischof Ketteler und der deutsche Liberalismus. Mainz, Griinewald. 4. Uday Mehta, (1999) Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 5. Friedrich List, (1904), The National System of Political Economy, English edition, (London: Longman). 6. K. Steven Vincent, (1984) Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 7. John Dewey, 1927, The Public and its Problems, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1954); id. (1931), Individualism. Old and New, (London: George Allen & Unwin); id. 1939, Freedom and Culture, (New York: GP Putnam's Sons). Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 423 8. Paul Hirst, (1989) The Pluralist Theory of the State: selected writings of GDH Cole, JN Figgis and HJ Laski, (London: Routledge); Mary Parker Follett, 1926, The New State. Group Organization and the Solution of Popular Government, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co.) and David P. Mandell, "The Promise of Pluralism: Pragmatism, Pluralism and Civil Society," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago (March 1999). 9. For a systematic critical discussion of additional unitary economic explanatory mechanisms that I do not mention in my list that follows, see G. Dosi, C. Freeman, and S. Fabiani, "The process of economic development: Introducing some stylized facts and theories on technologies, firms and institutions" in Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 3, Number 1, 1994, pages 1-46. 10. For a general description of these new systems, see Charles Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring" in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) pages 137-165; for a wide range of case studies of such systems in the automobile industry, see Robert Boyer. Elsie Charron, Ulrich Jurgens and Steven Tolliday, eds. Between Imitation and Innovation: The transfer and hybridization of productive models in the international automobile industry, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Thomas A. Kochan, Russell D. Lansbury, and John Paul MacDuffie (eds.), After Lean Production: Evolving Employment Practices in the World Auto Industry (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1997); John Paul MacDuffle and Susan Helper, "Creating Lean Suppliers: Diffusing Lean Production through the Supply Chain" in California Management Review. Vol. 39, No. 4, Summer 1997, pages 118-151. 11. For German examples, see Michael Schumann, "New Concepts of Production and Productivity" in Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1998, vol. 19: 17-32; Michael Schumann, "The German Automobile industry in Transition" in The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 1998: 221-247; Michael Schumann, "The Development of Industrial LabourNew Inconsistencies" lecture to Arbetslivsinstitutet in Stockholm, May 1998; Michael Schumann and Detlef Gerst, "Innovative Arbeitspolitik—Ein Fallbeispiel. Gruppenarbeit in der Mercedes Benz AG" in Zeitschrift fttr Arbeits- u. Organisationspsychologie (1997) 41 (N.F. 15) 3: pages 143-156; for US examples, John Paul MacDuffie, "The Road to 'Root Cause': Shop Floor Problem-Solving at Three Auto Assembly Plants" in Management Science, Vol. 43, No. 4, April 1997 pages 479-502. 12. See Philip Cooke and Kevin Morgan, The Associational Economy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) Michael Storper, The Regional World, (New York: Guilford Press, 1998). 13. see Archon Fung, "Street Level Democracy; A Theory of Popular Pragmatic Deliberation and Its Practice in Chicago School Reform and Community Policing, 1988-1997," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 1999; Ulrich Mueckenberger, "Zivilgesellschaft und Politische Theorie. Bezug zum Ansatz Eurexcter/Zeiten und Qualitat der Stadt" ms, Hamburg; Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism', Columbia Law Review 98, 2 (1998). 14. Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, World of Possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in western industrialization, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Philip Scran ton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 3865-1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), esp. ch. 13, Rudolf Boch,, "Zunfttradition und friihe Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Ein Beitrag zu einer beginnenden Diskussion mil besonderer Berucksichtigung des Handwerks im Verlagssystem," Prekitre Selbstiindigkeit, Zur Standortbestimmung vom Handwerk, Hausindustrie und Kleingewerbe im Industrialisierungsprozess, ed. Ulrich Wegenroth. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1989) Rudolf Boch, Die Entgrenzung der Industrie. Zur Industrialisierungsdebatte im rheinischen Wirtschaftsbilrgertum, 1814-1857, (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991); Boch, Rudolph, Handwerker Sozialisten gegen die Fabrikgesellschaft, (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985). 15. Grannovetter, Mark, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 91.3 (1985): 481-510; Walter W. Powell and 424 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Herrigel Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Michael Storper and Allen Scott, eds. Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development, (London: Routledge, 1992), Michael Storper and Robert Salais, Worlds of Production. Collective Action and the Economic Identities of Nations and Regions, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), Allen Scott, New Industrial Spaces: Flexible Production and Regional Economic Development in the USA and Western Europe. (London: Pion, 1988); Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Cooke & Morgan, The Associational Economy. G. Dosi, R Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete, eds., Technical Change and Economic Theory, (London: Pinter, 1988); Geoffrey Hodgson, Economics and Evolution. Bringing Life back into Economics, (Cambridge: Polity, 1993). Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Victoria Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Richard Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Unversity Press, 1995). Dorf & Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism;" Unger, False Necessity, Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996). The tradition is divided in what it thinks: those closer to classical economics believe the former while those closer to Marxism believe the latter. For a very thorough elaboration of this critique, see Unger's, False Necessity. A good example of the position elaborated at this level of theory is John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) and The Public and its Problems (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1954). Contemporary elaborations, from slightly different perspectives within the alternative tradition, are Geoffrey Hodgson, Economics and Evolution, and Unger, False Necessity. Also on the very broad understanding of "local" and "historically specific" within pragmatism, see Eric MacGilvray, "The Task Before Us: Pragmatism and The Narratives of Liberal Democracy," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, December 1999. Geoffrey Hodgson, "Varieties of capitalism and varieties of economic theory" in Review of international political economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1996, pages 380-433, quote page 403; This principle is also extensively discussed in Hodgson, The Democratic Economy: A New Look at Planning, Markets and Power, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), esp. pp. 85-109. Jonathan Zeitlin, "Productive Alternatives: Flexibility, Governance, and Strategic Choice in Industrial History" To appear in Franco Amatori and Geoffrey Jones (eds.), Business History Around the World at the End of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Further elaboration of this perspective may be found in the introductions to Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities, pages: 4-5, 2933 and Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Postwar Europe and Japan (Oxford University Press, 2000). This poses the problem of how to narrate the relationship between events and organizations in the past to those in the present, an area that is receiving increasing attention in alternative social theory. This will not be addressed in the text, but see the discussion in the introduction to Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities, as well as the literary theoretical work of advocates of more "open" and non deterministic narrative forms: Gary Saul Morson, Narrative and Freedom, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) and Michael Andre Bernstein, Foregone Conclusions. Against Apocalyptic History, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Examples of various non-unitary takes on the industrial experience of the last century: Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity, (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism'; Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), Between Fordism and Flexibility: The Automobile Industry and Its Workers (2nd ed., Oxford: Berg, 1992; orig. 1986); Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Social Theory and Capitalism in the Twentieth Century 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 425 1994); Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions. The sources of German industrial power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds.). The Power to Manage? Employers and Industrial Relations in Comparative-Historical Perspective (London: Routledge, 1991); Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty; Michael Schwartz, 'Markets, Networks, and the Rise of Chrysler in Old Detroit', forthcoming in Enterprise and Society 1 (2000); idem and Andrew Fish, 'Just In Time Inventories in Old Detroit', Business History 40 (1998); Michael A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Koichi Shimokawa, 'From the Ford System to the Just-in-Time Production System: A Historical Study of International Shifts in Automobile Production Systems, their Connection, and their Transformation', Japanese Yearbook on Business History 10 (1993), 84-105; Steven Tolliday 'The Diffusion and Transformation of Fordism: Britain and Japan Compared', in Robert Boyer et al Between Imitation and Innovation pages 57-95; Michael Storper and Robert Salais, Worlds of Production. Collective Action and the Economic Identities of Nations and Regions, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). in addition to the studies in Powell and DiMaggio, The new institutionalism in Organizational analysis; such basic doubts about the unitary rationality of bureaucracy are expressed in classic works of post war sociology: Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Bureaucracy, (New York: Free Press, 1954); and James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958). Joas, The Creativity of Action, pages 150-151. Dahms invokes a lot of this work to defend his view, set out in his epilog, that bureaucratic multinationals are extending their tentacles of control deeper into society. Examples he gives are Bennett Harrison, Lean and Mean. The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Guilford Press, 1997; much of this unitary literature on Globalization can be found summarized in Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, Vol. I of The Information Age: Economy Society and Culture, (Maiden Mass: Blackwell, 1996). For a survey of historical work on other advanced economies, see the article by Zeitlin "Productive Alternatives. . . ." Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty esp. chapter 13. Michael Schwartz, 'Markets, Networks, and the Rise of Chrysler in Old Detroit', forthcoming in Enterprise and Society 1 (2000); idem and Andrew Fish, 'Just In Time Inventories in Old Detroit', Business History 40 (1998), 48-71. Gerald Berk, "Neither Competition Nor Administration: Brandeis and the Anti-trust Reforms of 1914" in Studies in American Political Development, 9,1994, pages 24-59 and idem, "Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American State, 1911-1929" in Social Science History, 20, 3, 1996, pages 375-400. For an overview of US anti trust debate in the 20th century, see Rudolph Peritz, Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). see the essays by Michael Piore in Susanne Berger and Michael Piore, Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Society, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). see Gary Herrigel, "Industry as a form of order: A historical comparison of the development of the machine tool industry in the United States and Germany" in JR Hollingsworth, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Governing Capitalist Economies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). see Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Allen Scott, New Industrial Spaces; Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage; Michael Storper and Allen Scott, eds. Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). The authors survey the entire advanced industrial world, but present detailed case studies of interpenetrated "real worlds" in Italy, France and the US. While recognizing that the ideal types are not found in ideal form in reality, the various worlds can be illustrated here with the following examples: The intellectual world emphasizes the kind of dynamic 426 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. Hcrrigel personal interaction and compulsive networking one observes in dynamic regions such as Silicon Valley; the market world is a world based on largely on exchange and competition between relatively fixed entities, such as are represented in neo-classical textbooks; the Industrial world is intended to describe the unitary Chandlerian world of hierarchical mass producers and the interpersonal world is intended to describe the constant circulation and exchanges of skill and market knowledge that one observes in traditional industrial districts. William Tsutsui, Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth Century Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). ibid. p. 239. ibid. p. 240. see the discussion of the formation of this law from this perspective in my own "American Occupation, Market Order and Democracy: Reconfiguring the Japanese and German Steel industries after World War II" in Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds. Americanization and its Limits, pages 340-400, esp. 375-380. for praise, see Kathy Thelen, Union of Parts, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), David Soskice, "Divergent production regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s" in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks & John Stephens, eds.. Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pages 101-133.