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The Persian Wars
This is about the Persian Wars. There is a huge amount of available material
surveying the period and the immediate attention of HSC students is often the
chronology and the details of battles. Well, I could fill those aspects in for you but if I
were you, I would be disappointed paying to see specialist material that I could get in
my textbook.
Instead, I want to point out certain details and to emphasise key concepts and
understandings that cause a re assessment of your basic textbook knowledge and
assumptions you may have made as a result.
Let’s examine the following items in particular as a method of re considering our
basic knowledge.
Key Concepts Slide
 Strategy
 Tactics
 Logistics
 Warfare differences
 Troop Types
These fit within the context of the overall Persian War starting with Darius in 490 at
Marathon and ending somewhere around 479 arguably with the battle of Mykale.
I will assume prior knowledge for all of you of the basic causes stemming from the
Persian Throne’s desire to expand into “Europe”, the catalyst of the Ionian Revolt, and
the first attack at Marathon.
Past HSC questions have asked what did Darius and the Greeks learn from Marathon.
Other HSC questions have revolved around the success, in individual battles and
across the entire war, of the Greeks and alternately, the failure of the Persians to
conquer the Greeks. To get the maximum mark reward in the exam, you will need to
demonstrate an understanding of the nature of ancient warfare and the strategy of war.
So what’s strategy then?
Strategy Slide
Strategy
Strategy: theme and/or planning which results in the OVERALL victory in the LONG
TERM (of a war usually)
Tactics: goals and tricks or methods to gain victory in the SHORT TERM (of a battle
usually)
These terms need understanding of their differences - You can win a war and lose a
battle. You can win a battle and fail in your strategy thereby losing a war.
Consider that the Persian War was a struggle between two competing strategies, not
simply warriors.
Each side made a keen examination of the other, of its own resources and fashioned
plans that maximized their own strengths and minimized their weaknesses.
It is in this context that every event of the war be re-examined to see the pattern of
logic that each side used to make decisions and to why the Greeks won and the
Persians lost. It is in this context that a student can make deductions about the course
of the war at different stages.
Greek and Persian Warfare
The Persian Method of War
Let’s examine, like the Persians must have, their military resources:
Persian warfare was fundamentally different to the Greek experience. The Persian
Empire was controlled militarily based on cultural, geographical and technological
considerations. The Persians and Medes were fierce horsemen and, as such, struck
fear into all infantry forces which were the mainstay of nearly all other nations in the
empire. Most cultures within the empire were technologically inferior to the ruling
Persian and Median forces.
But horse are valuable resources requiring pasture lands and expensive maintenance
and training as well as for the riders. Furthermore, these horsemen were relatively few
in number. They needed a large quantity of infantry to support them and to ‘soften up’
an enemy to maximize the strike power of the cavalry when launched.
The potential enemy for Persian forces were the ordinary people of a rebellious
satrapy.
Therefore, the Persians usually faced an infantry force. That enemy force was usually
poorly equipped – little or no armour and few sophisticated weapons. The bow was
the most common weapon as it was easy to use, cheap to make and required little
training – especially for a force of people recently having made the decision to revolt.
Armed conflict between the Persians and a revolting infantry force was likely to
happen long before that revolting force could organize sufficiently to train and equip
itself to face the Persians with a good chance of success.
Persian Bowmen Slide
The Persian military forces were based around a core of professionals – both infantry
and cavalry but their typical weapon, which was supplemented by spears and other
weapons dependent of circumstances and training, was the bow. Battles in the Persian
Empire were generally ‘fire fights’ or shooting matches between an organised, trained
and concentrated Persian force against a lesser trained, lesser equipped and battle
knowledgeable force made up of the poorer classes such as farmers and labourers.
Hdt Account Of Marathon Where The
Hoplites Ran At The Persians To Avoid Their
Arrows / Arrows And Wicker Shield
The Persian cavalry were the shock troops that waited for suitable opportunities such
as an enemy weakened by the Persian missiles (arrows and javelins too) or an enemy
too immobilized by the shower of arrows to react to unexpected flanking movements
of the horse.
Persian Horse Slide
Once the horse had charged, battles were effectively over, and the speed of the cavalry
also meant few of the enemy could run away. A scattered enemy was hunted down
piecemeal by the fast horsemen who were well trained by mounted hunting skills.
(These hunting skills are well attested in reliefs and coins and even stated in
inscriptions by Darius and Xerxes themselves for instance “as a horseman, I am a
good horseman, as a bow man, I am a good bow man” etc).
When the Persian went to invaded Greece, they used this winning warfare method –
they were not worried by the technological superiority of the Greek armour and
weaponry – they had two advantages they felt sure would succeed in defeating the
Greeks:
 The large numbers of the Persians and …
 The Persian cavalry.
But the large numbers meant a logistics/supply line to keep them fed, equipped
etc.
By Xerxes’ invasion, this was MASSIVE, REALLY MASSIVE!!
The Greek Method of War
The Greeks were a motley collection of poleis (city states) that were at each others’
throats on and off throughout the decades prior to the Persian War. (Even during the
Persian War, the Greeks are regularly fighting amongst themselves at least in
arguments about what to do next.). If they could unify, cooperate, then they could
deploy a force which could be called a national army rather than the small forces each
city used.
What the Greek soldiers could do well, however, was to concentrate small contingents
from a poleis into a phalanx of hoplites which were effectively impossible to defeat
from the front in hand to hand combat. These were supplemented by the poorer
population who formed a cloud of skirmishers and supporting troops that screened the
hoplites from missiles until they were ready to fight.
Greek Hoplites in Phalanx Slide
The hoplite, and the fighting formation called the phalanx, was based on three crucial
aspects:
 training,
 armour and a
Xenophon constitution of the Athenians comments on equipment and
training of Hoplites as does his Anabasis (March Up Country) about the Ten
Thousand lost in Persia
 very specific weapon/fighting skill that maximized the capabilities of what
would otherwise be a rather small army.
The hoplite force was made up of wealthier middle and upper class Greeks –
merchants, aristocrats, large landowners etc. These were the only men able to afford
the armour panoply and to take the time to attend drill in marching and turning in tight
formation at least once a month.
Hoplites wore bronze helmets, breastplates front and back, heavy leather spolas
hanging down over the groin, bronze greaves (shin pads), and their distinctive large
heavy bronze covered shields – the hoplon. Hoplites, however, were effective most of
all because they formed a phalanx.
The phalanx was a multiple of one thousand men who stood eight ranks deep, and
stood shoulder to shoulder with the men beside themselves. The large hoplons then
overlapped each other and formed a shield wall. From the front, the phalanx presented
only bronze (either helmets and greaves or hoplon) which left little flesh for an enemy
to aim at but most of all, was unstoppable once moving forward.
Here then was the strength of the Greek army – the phalanx was pushed forward by
each successive rank of men who used their own shields to shove the ranks ahead
forward. The net effect was to form a huge rugby scrum of heavily armoured men that
could not be stopped but could be attacked from the sides and rear.
A phalanx had little or no turning ability to face enemy from another direction. In this
regard, the Greeks were always fearful of an enemy who could out manouvres, out
position the phalanx to attack it from another side. Read about the hesitation, the
vacillation of the Greeks at Marathon, at Plataea when contemplating Persian cavalry.
Greek and Persian Navies
Both sides of the war had embarked on a set of strategies that meant the navies of each
side were destined to eventually meet in a battle that resolved the outcome of the war
more thoroughly than the results of land battles.
How did they fight?
There was no gunpowder in ancient times so Triremes, (ancient ships), did not fire
anything at each other. There were, in fact, only 2 methods of inflicting damage

boarding and capturing an enemy triremes – which required moving your ship
beside the enemy’s and sending armed and armoured men onto the other vessel
like pirates.

Ramming the enemy triremes so that it settled into the water drowning the
rowers and crew (most did not know how to swim). Note that ancient warships
did not actually sink lower than their gunwales – the top edges of the deck sides
as they were made completely of wood! (After battles, the victorious side
actually towed these floating wrecks back to harbour, repaired them and used
them in the next battle.)
The significant aspects to remember are that the Persian triremes are larger and
faster – but they are also lighter built (not so strongly built to resist damage) and
higher (more susceptible to wind blowing them)
Trireme slides x 2
Persian naval fighting was also different to the Greek style and this would affect the
outcomes of the naval battles of the war. Persian fighting was more the boarding of
vessels to capture them. This meant drawing alongside and transferring troops across
– hence the advantage of using higher, faster ships.
Greek ships were slightly slower but much heavier and sturdy. They were also more
maneuverable – able to turn quicker. The difference between the navies was
therefore subtle but telling - the Greeks preferred to ram and ‘sink’ the enemy
triremes vs Persian ships who preferred to draw closer and board the enemy.
The Athenians especially were well trained in very specific tactics that surprised the
Persians at Artemisium. They were able to ‘back up’ their triremes into a star pattern
bows facing outwards which ‘exploded’ on a trumpet call in all directions and caught
the circling Persian ships on their broadsides. Greek triremes therefore aimed at
maneuvering to get at the broadsides of enemy vessels.
The best of the Persian fleet were the Phoenicians and Egyptians while the Athenians
were probably the best of the Greeks – especially so when it was realised they formed
the bulk of the Greek navy.
Now the influence of the Lessons Learnt at Marathon
In 499 BC, the Ionians revolted from Darius’ Persian Empire. The Ionians were
Greeks in the Persian Empire who were on the western most edge of modern day
Turkey. They were lead by Aristagoras, a Tyrant of Miletus in Ionia, to revolt because
of many factors – the tax/tribute they were paying to Darius, the ambitions of
Aristagoras, and the general disaffection against Persian rule in Ionia.
Aristagoras had pleaded with the major Greek powers, in particular Sparta and
Athens, for help in their revolt. Only Athens and Eretria on Euboea sent a small
quantity of ships and men. These participated in a short lived success for the Ionians
when a temple and much of the city of Sardis was burned down. Athens’ and Eretria’s
ships returned to their homes at this point.
Digress - Persia eventually crushed the rebellion but Darius never forgot the
help from the two Greek city states and Hdt says he had a slave wake him every
day with the words “Sire, remember the Athenians”.
Needless to say, Darius became fixed on a program of revenge and punishment and
despite an abortive naval attempt in 492 BC which sunk off Mt Athos before even
reaching Greece, he eventually sent a small army to attack Athens. This small force
landed at Marathon and fought with the desperate Athenian hoplites. Despite
outnumbering them 2 or 3 to 1, the Persians lost disastrously.
Both sides learnt key lessons for their future conflict.
Lessons slide
o Persia learnt an understanding of Greek technology in war (armour and tactics)
and that the Greeks were great warriors in close combat. Darius, and later
Xerxes, decided that larger numbers Persian forces would be needed.
o The Greeks became more aware of the Persian forces and it was Themistokles
who predicted the Persians would return with a larger army. Themistokles also
realised that a larger Persian army needed to be supplied and that could only
happen with ships. Hence his dedication to have an Athenian fleet to leading a
Greek fleet to break the Persian logistics. Note he did NOT build up the
Athenian army. The fleet could better utilise the manpower of its citizenry.
40,000 citizens could all row ships but only 9-10,000 could be hyoplites (using
Marathon figures as a contrast).
o For the Persians, they also understood that a war with Greece would take
considerable time not a single quick battle.
It is in the shadow of the lessons of Marathon that Xerxes’ invasion was
planned and executed.
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So there we have it – an examination of the strengths of each side. We have just done
what the commanders of the Persian and Greek armies did. Now how to do defeat the
enemy?
Ahh – you’d need a strategy!!!!!!!!
The Persian Strategy
Note role of Medising states further emphasises the
Persian numerical superiority
Persian Strategy Slide 1
To have short sharp battles as quickly as possible. Why?
 It reduced the ‘downtime’ of Persian subjects missing from agriculture and therefore disrupting Persian agriculture, trade and economy
 It reduced pressure on Persian supply routes and shipping – supplies couldn’t be
kept going via fleets indefinitely as men and ships cannot sail forever
 It reduced time king spends away from Persian society/throne - therefore
reduces destabilisation caused by an absent king.
Persian Strategy Slide 2
To utilise the Persian numerical advantage. Why? So they can …–
 Counter the strength of the phalanx formation and hoplite armour/tactics with
envelopment by numbers
 Use the superior Persian cavalry which would decimate/annihilate Greeks if
given chance (cavalry is fast and therefore Greek survivors (on foot naturally) of
a battle could be chased down on horse and destroyed.
Plataea battlefield slides
 But it also means they would need to build and utilize a massive navy – not
simply for fighting purposes but to carry supplies round the clock and criss
crossing the Aegean Ocean in an operation involving hundreds or even
thousands of ships. Think about the logistics to supply hundreds of thousands of
men for 18 months as they move from location to location across Greece. (These
ships could carry soldiers too, when needed, to drop off at new locations behind
the Greek lines/army or to raid targets not defended while the Greeks marched
elsewhere.)
Understanding the Persian Strategy:

Persia needed quick victories to avoid a long war which would destabilise empire
(so many workers/farmers on campaign impeded the economy, with most of the
Empire’s army away from Persia, it was not at hand to guard against revolts and
lastly, there was the constant difficulty in supplying army for so long which meant
the navy was fighting not trading etc)

Xerxes had learnt from Darius/Marathon that the Greek phalanx was virtually
invincible/impregnable from the front so he intended to swamp Greeks with
numbers and the cavalry to envelop flanks and rear.
Xerxes’ need for a navy slide

To supply and support these huge numbers, he had to build and use a huge NAVY
which would escort the army marching along coast. The navy would be able to

carry supplies

communicate orders

maraud/raid Greek coasts, towns and cities left unprotected by troops fighting
main Persian forces

land extra troops to break a deadlock such as happened at Thermopylae

prevent Greek forces from attacking the Persian rear
Army and navy would of course need to move together along the coast so the navy
could drop off supplies when needed and even drop off troops behind Greek positions
as was intended at Thermopylae (thereby causing the battle of Artemisium). But this
also meant that the combined forces moved at the army speed. As a result, the Persian
navy was not able to chase the Greeks after Artemisium being ‘tied’ to the army.
The Greek Strategy
Digress - role of Unity here – without unity,
the Greeks would become fragmented and
destroyed piecemeal (bit by bit). Greek unity
was only just maintained by Themistokles..
Greek Strategy Slide 1
To draw out the war. Why?
 To cause serious stress to Persian supply routes and shipping
as they continued to use ships for war
 To reduce the fighting spirit of the Persian soldiers who were
fighting a long distance from their homes and families
 To cause the Persian king to want to return to Persia to avoid
disruptions to Persian empire and society
Greek Strategy Slide 2
To fight in narrow spaces. Why?
 To avoid the Persian numerical superiority by reducing space for them to
envelop and flow around the phalanx’ sides and rear
 To avoid the Persian cavalry by utilizing natural obstacles and protecting
mountains/coasts preventing outflanking movements of the Persian cavalry.
 To maximise the phalanx fighting power which is highly concentrated to fight
on a narrow frontage (width) rather than spread out.
(Largely, these aims could be realized as the Greeks had excellent knowledge of their
geography – eg at Salamis they knew of winds and currents etc to their advantage.)
Geography Battlefield Slides
Understanding the Greek Strategy:

To draw out the war as long as possible was a key in the initial plans of the Greeks.
As already mentioned above, a long war was to Persia’s extreme disadvantage. It
could mean that the Persians would leave Greece because it was taking too long!
Delaying the Persians therefore was potentially the best plan the Greeks could
contemplate. To this end, fighting the Persians at geographical bottle necks would
hold them up – mountain passes were perfect positions and had the added benefit of
making the hoplite phalanx near invulnerable.

To fight in “narrow spaces” (Herodotus) would nullify the Persian
numerical superiority by preventing use of all their men at once.
Effectively speaking, each battle shows the advantage the Greeks gained
by choosing the geographical location both land and Sea.

To build a navy to counter the Persian strategy (predicted by Themistocles before
the war – note his persuasion of the Athenians to use the newly found silver mines
at Mt Laurium to build a fleet 483 BC). Successes on land would still be unlikely to
defeat the vast Persian numbers - they could lose more troops and still win against
the Greeks. To break their ability to wage war was essential – to defeat their
supply lines was an easier task than to defeat a Persian army. A starving army
would retreat from Greece without needing to be fought to a defeat.
Thus the Greek strategy was to BREAK the Persian strategy – to fight a long war
and to disable the Persian supply lines.
The rest of what would appear to be the details of the Persian War are basically the
TACTICS of the war that was the implementation of the strategy.
The Synhedron of Corinth / Congress at the Isthmus 481 BC
Strategy needs resources, personnel and leadership to make it work and
therefore win a war.
The biggest difficulty the Greeks faced in accomplishing their strategy was, arguably,
maintaining UNITY.
Without the close cooperation and common effort of every Greek state, the Greeks
would not win.
Here we need to focus on the role of Themistokles in the holding together of Greek
Unity.
Themistokles Slide
Themistokles was perhaps the architect of the Greek strategy.
 He predicted the need for a strong Greek navy, and for Greeks to unify.
Keep in mind Themistokles’ efforts to plan for the Persian War was long in advance
of Xerxes’ invasion. His persuasion of the Athenians to build triremes was 3 years
BEFORE Xerxes came.
His foresight also resulted in the beginnings of the fortifying the Piraeus harbour
rather than using Phaleron. Athens was being put on a war footing before the war
began.
But it is his efforts to keep the Greek alliance together even under the stresses of war
while following the strategy to beat the Persians that deserves your attention most.
The key moment for Greek unity occurred in 481 BC – just before Xerxes invaded –
the Synhedron at Corinth (or the Congress at the Isthmus).
It is easy to gloss over this small section of Herodotus but they mean a great deal (we
must realise Herodotus was no general and often made a mess of trying to recognise
the crucial events and battle details. In this regard, he didn’t make enough of what was
one of the most important moments of the coming war.).
The Synhedron was a coming together of those Greek states that had not yet yielded
to the Persian intimidatory demands and the remorseless march of the huge army and
discussed what to do.
At this time, there were over 300 Greek poleis (city states) but only 31 came to
discuss ways to fight the Persians. Tellingly, it was the southern Greek states which
came together – the northern poleis were directly in the path of the Persian advance
and nothing could save them in time. The southern Greek states could not have
gathered their armies, train them, equip them and march them to the north.
This Synhedron resolved on the following details which were crucial to the war:
Synhedron Slide
I. They elected, unanimously, Sparta to lead the Greeks.
II. Themistokles handed over control of the Athenian fleet to Spartan control.
III. To send a strong force of Hoplites north to block entrance through the mountains
into Thessaly – they were trying to prevent access to the southern and main Greek
states.
Let’s take these carefully:
1. Sparta was chosen leader – the great warrior state of Sparta had been the military
leader of all Greece for decades. Generations of Greeks had grown up with the
notion that Sparta knew everything about war and fighting. They were
essentially correct but this war was not to be fought just on the land. However,
Spartan understanding of the tactics of battle meant they were the only real
choice as leasder. Athens was briefly contemplated but the vast majority of the
Greek states would never follow an untried state with no experience in
leadership. If other Greek states were to follow any city state, (and therefore be
unified), it had to be Sparta.
2. Themistokles was very aware that Athens would not be followed as a leader but
he was also aware that the poleis of Greece were nervous about resisting Persia.
He was also aware that Spartan planners needed his direct input if the strategy to
win the war, rather than just battles, was to be implemented – especially on the
seas, A significant gesture was needed to focus all the states on unifying and
also for him to be close to the command level of the war. Handing over the
Athenian fleet into Spartan control was that gesture:
 Handing over a military force (in this case a fleet of warships and their crews)
was unprecedented in Greek warfare – it meant a surrender of sovereignty –
so Themistokles was making a VERY significant gesture that he was behind
Sparta all the way in its leadership of the Greeks. Please remember that ships
mean men – 200 triremes are rowed by the Athenian citizenry – 200 crew per
ship. That is 40,000 men – contrast this with the middle and upper class
hoplite force of 9,000 - 10,000 that were the ‘call to arms’ that fought at
Marathon. Handing over the fleet meant handing over nearly all men in
Athens of fighting age into the hands of another country.
 But his symbolic act also allowed Themistokles to be the ‘advisor’ to the
Spartan admiral Eurybiades. Themistokles was in the thick of battle tactics
and also in a position to control the Athenian fleet. Sparta had had no
experience in naval warfare and so Themistokles’ advice’ was essential.
3. Lastly, the Congress did attempt to begin the fighting in 481 BC by sending as
many as 10,000 hoplites to block the mountain passes at Tempe in Thessaly but the Persians chose another pass and these Greeks were recalled when they
realised their error. It did show, however, their serious commitment to the war to
come and also showed their strategy at work early on – to block and therefore
draw out the war. This force would also have given time for the rest of the
Greeks to gather and train more men for the main event!
Now We turn to the Textbook Type Details you might be comfortable
with but still the fine nuances are often lacking that help make sense of a battle.
Troop Types of the War
Heavy Cavalry - Mounted soldiers almost always fighting with short spears used for
stabbing but occasionally for throwing (javelins). They typically wore some kind of
armour (protective clothing) and were the equivalent of ‘heavy infantry’ but on a
horse. They fought in a close formation designed to use the momentum of the group
top break up enemy formations.
Slides of HC
Light Cavalry - A version of cavalry which included Skythians and others who
carried missiles and were not ‘shock troops’. They did not wear armour at all so did
not try to come to close combat like heavy cavalry. They would shoot with javelins or
bows and run away from the enemy. When an enemy was sufficiently weakened by
the shooting, then the light cavalry MIGHT attempt to finish off their victims.
Slides of LC
Heavy Infantry - Armoured foot soldiers whose main purpose was to fight hand to
hand combat using a close combat weapon such as a spear or sword. Hoplites were
heavy infantry and their long spear gave them reach and weight of thrust vs their
opponents. Heavy infantry almost always carried a shield for further protection.
Immortals had a shorter spear, less protective armour (not so much metal), bow and
arrow and a wicker shield designed to catch arrows shot at them to shoot back.
Generally well trained although hoplites were by far better trained than Immortals.
Slides of Hoplites and Persian INF
Skirmishers - Also known as Psiloi in the Greek army. Psiloi were usually javelin
throwers or bow men who shot and ran. Did not fight in any precise formation and
were not equipped to fight hand to hand. They acted like the light cavalry - weaken an
enemy by shooting. In the Persian army, there were probably a large number as it
required almost no serious training.
LI Slide
What battles were there and what was significant about tem?
The battles of the Persian War
a) Marathon 490 BC
b) Thermopylae 480 BC
c) Artemisium 480 BC
d) Salamis 480 BC
e) Plataea 479 BC
f) Mykale 479 BC
Marathon Slide
Marathon = Datis and Artaphernes were the commanders (Datis was commander of
the infantry and Artaphernes was commander of the Cavalry). Darius was NOT there.
Greeks were especially afraid of Persian cavalry.
When Miltiades (polemarchos that day?) noticed there was no cavalry present, he
charged the remaining Persian troops (Artaphernes probably began to load them on
ships so Persians could leave and attack Athens).
The battle was exceptional for the phalanx being thin in centre and heavy on wings
so that it matched the Persian army line in length thus preventing being enveloped by
Persian numbers.
A crushing Greek victory.
Thermopylae and Artemisium Slide
Thermopylae and Artemisium = please observe that these two battles are linked
together. Because the Greeks settled on the mountain pass at Thermopylae, they also
had to cover the ‘flank’ of the battle to prevent Persian ships landing troops past the
Greek position and thereby surrounding them. Artemisium, therefore, was the flank
battle to ensure no envelopment of the land army. The fleet combat, then, was critical.
An early loss at sea would have disastrously ended the battle of Thermopylae (– mind
you, Ephialtes the traitor who led the Persians over the mountains accomplished the
same anyway but that was not anticipated in the planning stage).
Thermopylae was a defence of a narrow pass in the mountains preventing the
Persians from gaining access to Attica and therefore Athens. The 7,000 Greeks there
(remember that there were Thespians and others as well as Spartans) could hold up the
Persians indefinitely. The Persians knew this and had already sent their fleet to
intervene but this in turn was stopped at Artemisium by the Greeks who had also
thought of the same!!
Although Artemisium was a loss to the Greeks TACTICALLY (they lost slightly
more ships in the fighting) their STRATEGY was partially successful – they stopped
the ships from intervening and allowed the battle to become a deadlock. It was pure
luck (good for the Persians, bad for the Greeks) the Ephialtes betrayed the Greek
forces with the mountain path. This allowed the best Persian troops, the Immortals, to
attack from the rear and force the end of the battle.
Salamis Slide
Salamis = is a favourite for examiners in this kind of question and has even been the
centre for questions on its own such as “Why was Salamis the turning point of the
war?” and similar questions.
Salamis represented the Greek Strategy defeating the Persian Strategy.
In this battle, in fact, the strategy also became the method of winning, the TACTICS.
The Greeks fought in narrow spaces defeating the Persian navy.
The defeat of the Persian navy meant Xerxes and the army now had major problems:
– Xerxes realised the potential unrest/threat of revolt this would cause in Persia itself
(particularly Ionia). He traveled back to Persia to stabilize and be on hand in the
event of revolt and took troops with him from the army in Greece. He did NOT flee
– Herodotus suggests his cowardice but an examination of the length of time it took
for his return shows there was no panic but rather a careful protection of the retreat
route for his army home.
– The army was no longer able to be supplied as, functionally, there was no more
navy. As a result, this naval defeat caused the army to retreat because there were
nearly no supplies for them anymore. Their retreat went all the way back to
Thessaly and later to Thebes – the last/nearest medising city to the north. Later, this
is why the battle of Plataea occurred – because this is where the Persian army had
stayed during the winter as the medisers supplied the army with food and lodging.
– Ultimately the army was also left in the control of Mardonius – the ambitious
general who wanted an all out battle at Plataea and nearly won it!
Salamis therefore spelt the beginning of the end of the Persian invasion, broke the
Persian supply line, forced the army to retreat from Attica back to Thebes,
necessitated the leaving of Xerxes taking with him many troops and left them in
control of the ambitious/aggressive Mardonius.
Plataea Slide
Plataea = Different to previous battles (land and sea)
Slides of Plataea battlefield
Geographically it was a plain - the opposite of what the Greeks wanted and perfect for
their most feared enemy - cavalry. No narrow spaces, no terrain inhibiting cavalry
movement.
Mardonius had requested all cavalry from Xerxes before he left after Salamis. He
knew he best weapon he had. Persians and Medes were primarily cavalry - the troops
which were the nobility which had carved out the empire in the first place.
Greeks had a baggage train of supplies - food, water, tents, ammunition, weapons,
cooking utensils etc in stark contrast to the Persian army on that day. It was the Greek
supplies which got the Greek army into severe trouble in the battle..
The Greeks moved to avoid battle against the cavalry, to gain water, to retreat in the
face of missile (arrows and javelins) harassment. Persian movement is to provoke the
Greeks into the plain, to harass to cause disorder and to catch the Greeks in bad
positions (the reverse of past battles where they were caught in disadvantageous
positions)
It is arguable that as the Greeks were caught out right from the start out of position facing cavalry, outthought at every turn by Mardonius. But for the luck of killing
Mardonius (although to a large extent also aided by the negativity of Artabazus) the
Greeks would probably have lost and lost in a huge way that spelled the end of the
Persian Wars.
Mykale Slide
Mykale = According to Herodotus, the Persians suffered another defeat on the same
day as Plataea, (but actually within a few days – not the same day). This took place at
Mycale, a small bay on the Ionian coast and was supposedly spurred on by news of an
impending Ionian revolt against Persian dominance of the Greeks.
Shortly after Salamis, the Greek fleet assembled at Aegina. The Spartan king
Leotychidas was approached by refugees from Chios (an island off Ionia) who asked
that the Greek fleet sail to Ionia as it was ready to revolt.
The Persian navy was now much smaller. It had made its headquarters at Samos
(another island off Ionia), according to Herodotus so as to "guard against a possible
Ionian revolt". To the Greeks at Delos, came news from Samos. The arrival of a Greek
fleet, it was said, would encourage Ionians to revolt. The Persian army was also
camped at Mykale and contained Ionian contingents which were of dubious loyalty.
The Greeks decided to take the offensive and sailed to Samos.
The Persians at Samos decided not to fight the Greeks at sea and joined the army at
Mycale on foot. The Greeks (mostly Athenians) landed and then attacked, defeated
and burned the enemy camp. The victory was decided by the desertion of the Ionians.
Sestos Slide
Sestos = The Greek fleet next sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the famous bridges
there yet another storm had already beaten them to it !!! Instead, they just collected
the cables as proof of their being there. Leotychidas (the Spartan admiral) then sailed
home to Greece but the Athenians stayed to capture Sestos.
With this capture, Herodotus calls the Persian Wars to an end.
All lands which were inhabited by Greeks were now back in Greek hands. More
importantly, this region was largely freed by the work of the Athenians.
But critically, the fall of Sestos represented the beginning of the Athenian
empire.
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Epilogue
Even today, we can still see the offering made at Delphi of a golden tripod made of 3
bronze snakes intertwined (pictures of the tripod can be seen in Turkey).
On it is inscribed "Leader of the Greeks when he destroyed the hosts of the Medes,
Pausanias set up this memorial to Phoebus Apollo". Shortly after this, the inscription
was disowned and erased because Pausanias had dared to give himself, an
individual, credit ahead of Sparta. When erased, the names of the participating
Greek states were placed on the tripod instead.
The Athenians set up their own memorial at Athens which immortalised Salamis,
Plataea and probably Mycale.
States who are on the inscription as having joined the successful Greek Alliance:
Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Tegea, Sicyon, Aegina, Megara, Epidaurus, Orchomenos,
Phileious, Troezen, Hermione, Tiryns, Plataea, Thespiae, Mycenae, Ceos, Melos,
Tenos, Naxos, Eretria, Chalcis, Styra, Elis, Potidaea, Leucas, Anactorium, Kynthnos,
Siphnos, Ambracia, Lepreon.
The order of the listed names is important. Sparta was always the commander of
the Greeks but Athens was second because of the importance of her fleet.
Athens the Saviour????
“And here I feel constrained to deliver an opinion, which most men, I know, will
mislike, but which, as it seems to me to be true, I am determined not to withhold. Had
the Athenians, from fear of the approaching danger, quitted their country, or had they
without quitting it submitted to the power of Xerxes, there would certainly have been
no attempt to resist the Persians by sea; in which case the course of events by land
would have been the following. Though the Peloponnesians might have carried ever
so many breastworks across the Isthmus, yet their allies would have fallen off from
the Lacedaemonians, not by voluntary desertion, but because town after town must
have been taken by the fleet of the barbarians; and so the Lacedaemonians would at
last have stood alone, and, standing alone, would have displayed prodigies of valour
and died nobly. Either they would have done thus, or else, before it came to that
extremity, seeing one Greek state after another embrace the cause of the Medes, they
would have come to terms with King Xerxes- and thus, either way Greece would have
been brought under Persia. For I cannot understand of what possible use the walls
across the Isthmus could have been, if the king had had the mastery of the sea. If then
a man should now say that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece, he would not
exceed the truth. For they truly held the scales; and whichever side they espoused
must have carried the day. They too it was who, when they had determined to
maintain the freedom of Greece, roused up that portion of the Greek nation which had
not gone over to the Medes; and so, next to the gods, they repulsed the invader. Even
the terrible oracles which reached them from Delphi, and struck fear into their hearts,
failed to persuade them to fly from Greece. They had the courage to remain faithful to
their land, and await the coming of the foe.”
Herodotus Bk 9
Herodotus Slide