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The Persian Wars This is about the Persian Wars. There is a huge amount of available material surveying the period and the immediate attention of HSC students is often the chronology and the details of battles. Well, I could fill those aspects in for you but if I were you, I would be disappointed paying to see specialist material that I could get in my textbook. Instead, I want to point out certain details and to emphasise key concepts and understandings that cause a re assessment of your basic textbook knowledge and assumptions you may have made as a result. Let’s examine the following items in particular as a method of re considering our basic knowledge. Key Concepts Slide Strategy Tactics Logistics Warfare differences Troop Types These fit within the context of the overall Persian War starting with Darius in 490 at Marathon and ending somewhere around 479 arguably with the battle of Mykale. I will assume prior knowledge for all of you of the basic causes stemming from the Persian Throne’s desire to expand into “Europe”, the catalyst of the Ionian Revolt, and the first attack at Marathon. Past HSC questions have asked what did Darius and the Greeks learn from Marathon. Other HSC questions have revolved around the success, in individual battles and across the entire war, of the Greeks and alternately, the failure of the Persians to conquer the Greeks. To get the maximum mark reward in the exam, you will need to demonstrate an understanding of the nature of ancient warfare and the strategy of war. So what’s strategy then? Strategy Slide Strategy Strategy: theme and/or planning which results in the OVERALL victory in the LONG TERM (of a war usually) Tactics: goals and tricks or methods to gain victory in the SHORT TERM (of a battle usually) These terms need understanding of their differences - You can win a war and lose a battle. You can win a battle and fail in your strategy thereby losing a war. Consider that the Persian War was a struggle between two competing strategies, not simply warriors. Each side made a keen examination of the other, of its own resources and fashioned plans that maximized their own strengths and minimized their weaknesses. It is in this context that every event of the war be re-examined to see the pattern of logic that each side used to make decisions and to why the Greeks won and the Persians lost. It is in this context that a student can make deductions about the course of the war at different stages. Greek and Persian Warfare The Persian Method of War Let’s examine, like the Persians must have, their military resources: Persian warfare was fundamentally different to the Greek experience. The Persian Empire was controlled militarily based on cultural, geographical and technological considerations. The Persians and Medes were fierce horsemen and, as such, struck fear into all infantry forces which were the mainstay of nearly all other nations in the empire. Most cultures within the empire were technologically inferior to the ruling Persian and Median forces. But horse are valuable resources requiring pasture lands and expensive maintenance and training as well as for the riders. Furthermore, these horsemen were relatively few in number. They needed a large quantity of infantry to support them and to ‘soften up’ an enemy to maximize the strike power of the cavalry when launched. The potential enemy for Persian forces were the ordinary people of a rebellious satrapy. Therefore, the Persians usually faced an infantry force. That enemy force was usually poorly equipped – little or no armour and few sophisticated weapons. The bow was the most common weapon as it was easy to use, cheap to make and required little training – especially for a force of people recently having made the decision to revolt. Armed conflict between the Persians and a revolting infantry force was likely to happen long before that revolting force could organize sufficiently to train and equip itself to face the Persians with a good chance of success. Persian Bowmen Slide The Persian military forces were based around a core of professionals – both infantry and cavalry but their typical weapon, which was supplemented by spears and other weapons dependent of circumstances and training, was the bow. Battles in the Persian Empire were generally ‘fire fights’ or shooting matches between an organised, trained and concentrated Persian force against a lesser trained, lesser equipped and battle knowledgeable force made up of the poorer classes such as farmers and labourers. Hdt Account Of Marathon Where The Hoplites Ran At The Persians To Avoid Their Arrows / Arrows And Wicker Shield The Persian cavalry were the shock troops that waited for suitable opportunities such as an enemy weakened by the Persian missiles (arrows and javelins too) or an enemy too immobilized by the shower of arrows to react to unexpected flanking movements of the horse. Persian Horse Slide Once the horse had charged, battles were effectively over, and the speed of the cavalry also meant few of the enemy could run away. A scattered enemy was hunted down piecemeal by the fast horsemen who were well trained by mounted hunting skills. (These hunting skills are well attested in reliefs and coins and even stated in inscriptions by Darius and Xerxes themselves for instance “as a horseman, I am a good horseman, as a bow man, I am a good bow man” etc). When the Persian went to invaded Greece, they used this winning warfare method – they were not worried by the technological superiority of the Greek armour and weaponry – they had two advantages they felt sure would succeed in defeating the Greeks: The large numbers of the Persians and … The Persian cavalry. But the large numbers meant a logistics/supply line to keep them fed, equipped etc. By Xerxes’ invasion, this was MASSIVE, REALLY MASSIVE!! The Greek Method of War The Greeks were a motley collection of poleis (city states) that were at each others’ throats on and off throughout the decades prior to the Persian War. (Even during the Persian War, the Greeks are regularly fighting amongst themselves at least in arguments about what to do next.). If they could unify, cooperate, then they could deploy a force which could be called a national army rather than the small forces each city used. What the Greek soldiers could do well, however, was to concentrate small contingents from a poleis into a phalanx of hoplites which were effectively impossible to defeat from the front in hand to hand combat. These were supplemented by the poorer population who formed a cloud of skirmishers and supporting troops that screened the hoplites from missiles until they were ready to fight. Greek Hoplites in Phalanx Slide The hoplite, and the fighting formation called the phalanx, was based on three crucial aspects: training, armour and a Xenophon constitution of the Athenians comments on equipment and training of Hoplites as does his Anabasis (March Up Country) about the Ten Thousand lost in Persia very specific weapon/fighting skill that maximized the capabilities of what would otherwise be a rather small army. The hoplite force was made up of wealthier middle and upper class Greeks – merchants, aristocrats, large landowners etc. These were the only men able to afford the armour panoply and to take the time to attend drill in marching and turning in tight formation at least once a month. Hoplites wore bronze helmets, breastplates front and back, heavy leather spolas hanging down over the groin, bronze greaves (shin pads), and their distinctive large heavy bronze covered shields – the hoplon. Hoplites, however, were effective most of all because they formed a phalanx. The phalanx was a multiple of one thousand men who stood eight ranks deep, and stood shoulder to shoulder with the men beside themselves. The large hoplons then overlapped each other and formed a shield wall. From the front, the phalanx presented only bronze (either helmets and greaves or hoplon) which left little flesh for an enemy to aim at but most of all, was unstoppable once moving forward. Here then was the strength of the Greek army – the phalanx was pushed forward by each successive rank of men who used their own shields to shove the ranks ahead forward. The net effect was to form a huge rugby scrum of heavily armoured men that could not be stopped but could be attacked from the sides and rear. A phalanx had little or no turning ability to face enemy from another direction. In this regard, the Greeks were always fearful of an enemy who could out manouvres, out position the phalanx to attack it from another side. Read about the hesitation, the vacillation of the Greeks at Marathon, at Plataea when contemplating Persian cavalry. Greek and Persian Navies Both sides of the war had embarked on a set of strategies that meant the navies of each side were destined to eventually meet in a battle that resolved the outcome of the war more thoroughly than the results of land battles. How did they fight? There was no gunpowder in ancient times so Triremes, (ancient ships), did not fire anything at each other. There were, in fact, only 2 methods of inflicting damage boarding and capturing an enemy triremes – which required moving your ship beside the enemy’s and sending armed and armoured men onto the other vessel like pirates. Ramming the enemy triremes so that it settled into the water drowning the rowers and crew (most did not know how to swim). Note that ancient warships did not actually sink lower than their gunwales – the top edges of the deck sides as they were made completely of wood! (After battles, the victorious side actually towed these floating wrecks back to harbour, repaired them and used them in the next battle.) The significant aspects to remember are that the Persian triremes are larger and faster – but they are also lighter built (not so strongly built to resist damage) and higher (more susceptible to wind blowing them) Trireme slides x 2 Persian naval fighting was also different to the Greek style and this would affect the outcomes of the naval battles of the war. Persian fighting was more the boarding of vessels to capture them. This meant drawing alongside and transferring troops across – hence the advantage of using higher, faster ships. Greek ships were slightly slower but much heavier and sturdy. They were also more maneuverable – able to turn quicker. The difference between the navies was therefore subtle but telling - the Greeks preferred to ram and ‘sink’ the enemy triremes vs Persian ships who preferred to draw closer and board the enemy. The Athenians especially were well trained in very specific tactics that surprised the Persians at Artemisium. They were able to ‘back up’ their triremes into a star pattern bows facing outwards which ‘exploded’ on a trumpet call in all directions and caught the circling Persian ships on their broadsides. Greek triremes therefore aimed at maneuvering to get at the broadsides of enemy vessels. The best of the Persian fleet were the Phoenicians and Egyptians while the Athenians were probably the best of the Greeks – especially so when it was realised they formed the bulk of the Greek navy. Now the influence of the Lessons Learnt at Marathon In 499 BC, the Ionians revolted from Darius’ Persian Empire. The Ionians were Greeks in the Persian Empire who were on the western most edge of modern day Turkey. They were lead by Aristagoras, a Tyrant of Miletus in Ionia, to revolt because of many factors – the tax/tribute they were paying to Darius, the ambitions of Aristagoras, and the general disaffection against Persian rule in Ionia. Aristagoras had pleaded with the major Greek powers, in particular Sparta and Athens, for help in their revolt. Only Athens and Eretria on Euboea sent a small quantity of ships and men. These participated in a short lived success for the Ionians when a temple and much of the city of Sardis was burned down. Athens’ and Eretria’s ships returned to their homes at this point. Digress - Persia eventually crushed the rebellion but Darius never forgot the help from the two Greek city states and Hdt says he had a slave wake him every day with the words “Sire, remember the Athenians”. Needless to say, Darius became fixed on a program of revenge and punishment and despite an abortive naval attempt in 492 BC which sunk off Mt Athos before even reaching Greece, he eventually sent a small army to attack Athens. This small force landed at Marathon and fought with the desperate Athenian hoplites. Despite outnumbering them 2 or 3 to 1, the Persians lost disastrously. Both sides learnt key lessons for their future conflict. Lessons slide o Persia learnt an understanding of Greek technology in war (armour and tactics) and that the Greeks were great warriors in close combat. Darius, and later Xerxes, decided that larger numbers Persian forces would be needed. o The Greeks became more aware of the Persian forces and it was Themistokles who predicted the Persians would return with a larger army. Themistokles also realised that a larger Persian army needed to be supplied and that could only happen with ships. Hence his dedication to have an Athenian fleet to leading a Greek fleet to break the Persian logistics. Note he did NOT build up the Athenian army. The fleet could better utilise the manpower of its citizenry. 40,000 citizens could all row ships but only 9-10,000 could be hyoplites (using Marathon figures as a contrast). o For the Persians, they also understood that a war with Greece would take considerable time not a single quick battle. It is in the shadow of the lessons of Marathon that Xerxes’ invasion was planned and executed. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * So there we have it – an examination of the strengths of each side. We have just done what the commanders of the Persian and Greek armies did. Now how to do defeat the enemy? Ahh – you’d need a strategy!!!!!!!! The Persian Strategy Note role of Medising states further emphasises the Persian numerical superiority Persian Strategy Slide 1 To have short sharp battles as quickly as possible. Why? It reduced the ‘downtime’ of Persian subjects missing from agriculture and therefore disrupting Persian agriculture, trade and economy It reduced pressure on Persian supply routes and shipping – supplies couldn’t be kept going via fleets indefinitely as men and ships cannot sail forever It reduced time king spends away from Persian society/throne - therefore reduces destabilisation caused by an absent king. Persian Strategy Slide 2 To utilise the Persian numerical advantage. Why? So they can …– Counter the strength of the phalanx formation and hoplite armour/tactics with envelopment by numbers Use the superior Persian cavalry which would decimate/annihilate Greeks if given chance (cavalry is fast and therefore Greek survivors (on foot naturally) of a battle could be chased down on horse and destroyed. Plataea battlefield slides But it also means they would need to build and utilize a massive navy – not simply for fighting purposes but to carry supplies round the clock and criss crossing the Aegean Ocean in an operation involving hundreds or even thousands of ships. Think about the logistics to supply hundreds of thousands of men for 18 months as they move from location to location across Greece. (These ships could carry soldiers too, when needed, to drop off at new locations behind the Greek lines/army or to raid targets not defended while the Greeks marched elsewhere.) Understanding the Persian Strategy: Persia needed quick victories to avoid a long war which would destabilise empire (so many workers/farmers on campaign impeded the economy, with most of the Empire’s army away from Persia, it was not at hand to guard against revolts and lastly, there was the constant difficulty in supplying army for so long which meant the navy was fighting not trading etc) Xerxes had learnt from Darius/Marathon that the Greek phalanx was virtually invincible/impregnable from the front so he intended to swamp Greeks with numbers and the cavalry to envelop flanks and rear. Xerxes’ need for a navy slide To supply and support these huge numbers, he had to build and use a huge NAVY which would escort the army marching along coast. The navy would be able to carry supplies communicate orders maraud/raid Greek coasts, towns and cities left unprotected by troops fighting main Persian forces land extra troops to break a deadlock such as happened at Thermopylae prevent Greek forces from attacking the Persian rear Army and navy would of course need to move together along the coast so the navy could drop off supplies when needed and even drop off troops behind Greek positions as was intended at Thermopylae (thereby causing the battle of Artemisium). But this also meant that the combined forces moved at the army speed. As a result, the Persian navy was not able to chase the Greeks after Artemisium being ‘tied’ to the army. The Greek Strategy Digress - role of Unity here – without unity, the Greeks would become fragmented and destroyed piecemeal (bit by bit). Greek unity was only just maintained by Themistokles.. Greek Strategy Slide 1 To draw out the war. Why? To cause serious stress to Persian supply routes and shipping as they continued to use ships for war To reduce the fighting spirit of the Persian soldiers who were fighting a long distance from their homes and families To cause the Persian king to want to return to Persia to avoid disruptions to Persian empire and society Greek Strategy Slide 2 To fight in narrow spaces. Why? To avoid the Persian numerical superiority by reducing space for them to envelop and flow around the phalanx’ sides and rear To avoid the Persian cavalry by utilizing natural obstacles and protecting mountains/coasts preventing outflanking movements of the Persian cavalry. To maximise the phalanx fighting power which is highly concentrated to fight on a narrow frontage (width) rather than spread out. (Largely, these aims could be realized as the Greeks had excellent knowledge of their geography – eg at Salamis they knew of winds and currents etc to their advantage.) Geography Battlefield Slides Understanding the Greek Strategy: To draw out the war as long as possible was a key in the initial plans of the Greeks. As already mentioned above, a long war was to Persia’s extreme disadvantage. It could mean that the Persians would leave Greece because it was taking too long! Delaying the Persians therefore was potentially the best plan the Greeks could contemplate. To this end, fighting the Persians at geographical bottle necks would hold them up – mountain passes were perfect positions and had the added benefit of making the hoplite phalanx near invulnerable. To fight in “narrow spaces” (Herodotus) would nullify the Persian numerical superiority by preventing use of all their men at once. Effectively speaking, each battle shows the advantage the Greeks gained by choosing the geographical location both land and Sea. To build a navy to counter the Persian strategy (predicted by Themistocles before the war – note his persuasion of the Athenians to use the newly found silver mines at Mt Laurium to build a fleet 483 BC). Successes on land would still be unlikely to defeat the vast Persian numbers - they could lose more troops and still win against the Greeks. To break their ability to wage war was essential – to defeat their supply lines was an easier task than to defeat a Persian army. A starving army would retreat from Greece without needing to be fought to a defeat. Thus the Greek strategy was to BREAK the Persian strategy – to fight a long war and to disable the Persian supply lines. The rest of what would appear to be the details of the Persian War are basically the TACTICS of the war that was the implementation of the strategy. The Synhedron of Corinth / Congress at the Isthmus 481 BC Strategy needs resources, personnel and leadership to make it work and therefore win a war. The biggest difficulty the Greeks faced in accomplishing their strategy was, arguably, maintaining UNITY. Without the close cooperation and common effort of every Greek state, the Greeks would not win. Here we need to focus on the role of Themistokles in the holding together of Greek Unity. Themistokles Slide Themistokles was perhaps the architect of the Greek strategy. He predicted the need for a strong Greek navy, and for Greeks to unify. Keep in mind Themistokles’ efforts to plan for the Persian War was long in advance of Xerxes’ invasion. His persuasion of the Athenians to build triremes was 3 years BEFORE Xerxes came. His foresight also resulted in the beginnings of the fortifying the Piraeus harbour rather than using Phaleron. Athens was being put on a war footing before the war began. But it is his efforts to keep the Greek alliance together even under the stresses of war while following the strategy to beat the Persians that deserves your attention most. The key moment for Greek unity occurred in 481 BC – just before Xerxes invaded – the Synhedron at Corinth (or the Congress at the Isthmus). It is easy to gloss over this small section of Herodotus but they mean a great deal (we must realise Herodotus was no general and often made a mess of trying to recognise the crucial events and battle details. In this regard, he didn’t make enough of what was one of the most important moments of the coming war.). The Synhedron was a coming together of those Greek states that had not yet yielded to the Persian intimidatory demands and the remorseless march of the huge army and discussed what to do. At this time, there were over 300 Greek poleis (city states) but only 31 came to discuss ways to fight the Persians. Tellingly, it was the southern Greek states which came together – the northern poleis were directly in the path of the Persian advance and nothing could save them in time. The southern Greek states could not have gathered their armies, train them, equip them and march them to the north. This Synhedron resolved on the following details which were crucial to the war: Synhedron Slide I. They elected, unanimously, Sparta to lead the Greeks. II. Themistokles handed over control of the Athenian fleet to Spartan control. III. To send a strong force of Hoplites north to block entrance through the mountains into Thessaly – they were trying to prevent access to the southern and main Greek states. Let’s take these carefully: 1. Sparta was chosen leader – the great warrior state of Sparta had been the military leader of all Greece for decades. Generations of Greeks had grown up with the notion that Sparta knew everything about war and fighting. They were essentially correct but this war was not to be fought just on the land. However, Spartan understanding of the tactics of battle meant they were the only real choice as leasder. Athens was briefly contemplated but the vast majority of the Greek states would never follow an untried state with no experience in leadership. If other Greek states were to follow any city state, (and therefore be unified), it had to be Sparta. 2. Themistokles was very aware that Athens would not be followed as a leader but he was also aware that the poleis of Greece were nervous about resisting Persia. He was also aware that Spartan planners needed his direct input if the strategy to win the war, rather than just battles, was to be implemented – especially on the seas, A significant gesture was needed to focus all the states on unifying and also for him to be close to the command level of the war. Handing over the Athenian fleet into Spartan control was that gesture: Handing over a military force (in this case a fleet of warships and their crews) was unprecedented in Greek warfare – it meant a surrender of sovereignty – so Themistokles was making a VERY significant gesture that he was behind Sparta all the way in its leadership of the Greeks. Please remember that ships mean men – 200 triremes are rowed by the Athenian citizenry – 200 crew per ship. That is 40,000 men – contrast this with the middle and upper class hoplite force of 9,000 - 10,000 that were the ‘call to arms’ that fought at Marathon. Handing over the fleet meant handing over nearly all men in Athens of fighting age into the hands of another country. But his symbolic act also allowed Themistokles to be the ‘advisor’ to the Spartan admiral Eurybiades. Themistokles was in the thick of battle tactics and also in a position to control the Athenian fleet. Sparta had had no experience in naval warfare and so Themistokles’ advice’ was essential. 3. Lastly, the Congress did attempt to begin the fighting in 481 BC by sending as many as 10,000 hoplites to block the mountain passes at Tempe in Thessaly but the Persians chose another pass and these Greeks were recalled when they realised their error. It did show, however, their serious commitment to the war to come and also showed their strategy at work early on – to block and therefore draw out the war. This force would also have given time for the rest of the Greeks to gather and train more men for the main event! Now We turn to the Textbook Type Details you might be comfortable with but still the fine nuances are often lacking that help make sense of a battle. Troop Types of the War Heavy Cavalry - Mounted soldiers almost always fighting with short spears used for stabbing but occasionally for throwing (javelins). They typically wore some kind of armour (protective clothing) and were the equivalent of ‘heavy infantry’ but on a horse. They fought in a close formation designed to use the momentum of the group top break up enemy formations. Slides of HC Light Cavalry - A version of cavalry which included Skythians and others who carried missiles and were not ‘shock troops’. They did not wear armour at all so did not try to come to close combat like heavy cavalry. They would shoot with javelins or bows and run away from the enemy. When an enemy was sufficiently weakened by the shooting, then the light cavalry MIGHT attempt to finish off their victims. Slides of LC Heavy Infantry - Armoured foot soldiers whose main purpose was to fight hand to hand combat using a close combat weapon such as a spear or sword. Hoplites were heavy infantry and their long spear gave them reach and weight of thrust vs their opponents. Heavy infantry almost always carried a shield for further protection. Immortals had a shorter spear, less protective armour (not so much metal), bow and arrow and a wicker shield designed to catch arrows shot at them to shoot back. Generally well trained although hoplites were by far better trained than Immortals. Slides of Hoplites and Persian INF Skirmishers - Also known as Psiloi in the Greek army. Psiloi were usually javelin throwers or bow men who shot and ran. Did not fight in any precise formation and were not equipped to fight hand to hand. They acted like the light cavalry - weaken an enemy by shooting. In the Persian army, there were probably a large number as it required almost no serious training. LI Slide What battles were there and what was significant about tem? The battles of the Persian War a) Marathon 490 BC b) Thermopylae 480 BC c) Artemisium 480 BC d) Salamis 480 BC e) Plataea 479 BC f) Mykale 479 BC Marathon Slide Marathon = Datis and Artaphernes were the commanders (Datis was commander of the infantry and Artaphernes was commander of the Cavalry). Darius was NOT there. Greeks were especially afraid of Persian cavalry. When Miltiades (polemarchos that day?) noticed there was no cavalry present, he charged the remaining Persian troops (Artaphernes probably began to load them on ships so Persians could leave and attack Athens). The battle was exceptional for the phalanx being thin in centre and heavy on wings so that it matched the Persian army line in length thus preventing being enveloped by Persian numbers. A crushing Greek victory. Thermopylae and Artemisium Slide Thermopylae and Artemisium = please observe that these two battles are linked together. Because the Greeks settled on the mountain pass at Thermopylae, they also had to cover the ‘flank’ of the battle to prevent Persian ships landing troops past the Greek position and thereby surrounding them. Artemisium, therefore, was the flank battle to ensure no envelopment of the land army. The fleet combat, then, was critical. An early loss at sea would have disastrously ended the battle of Thermopylae (– mind you, Ephialtes the traitor who led the Persians over the mountains accomplished the same anyway but that was not anticipated in the planning stage). Thermopylae was a defence of a narrow pass in the mountains preventing the Persians from gaining access to Attica and therefore Athens. The 7,000 Greeks there (remember that there were Thespians and others as well as Spartans) could hold up the Persians indefinitely. The Persians knew this and had already sent their fleet to intervene but this in turn was stopped at Artemisium by the Greeks who had also thought of the same!! Although Artemisium was a loss to the Greeks TACTICALLY (they lost slightly more ships in the fighting) their STRATEGY was partially successful – they stopped the ships from intervening and allowed the battle to become a deadlock. It was pure luck (good for the Persians, bad for the Greeks) the Ephialtes betrayed the Greek forces with the mountain path. This allowed the best Persian troops, the Immortals, to attack from the rear and force the end of the battle. Salamis Slide Salamis = is a favourite for examiners in this kind of question and has even been the centre for questions on its own such as “Why was Salamis the turning point of the war?” and similar questions. Salamis represented the Greek Strategy defeating the Persian Strategy. In this battle, in fact, the strategy also became the method of winning, the TACTICS. The Greeks fought in narrow spaces defeating the Persian navy. The defeat of the Persian navy meant Xerxes and the army now had major problems: – Xerxes realised the potential unrest/threat of revolt this would cause in Persia itself (particularly Ionia). He traveled back to Persia to stabilize and be on hand in the event of revolt and took troops with him from the army in Greece. He did NOT flee – Herodotus suggests his cowardice but an examination of the length of time it took for his return shows there was no panic but rather a careful protection of the retreat route for his army home. – The army was no longer able to be supplied as, functionally, there was no more navy. As a result, this naval defeat caused the army to retreat because there were nearly no supplies for them anymore. Their retreat went all the way back to Thessaly and later to Thebes – the last/nearest medising city to the north. Later, this is why the battle of Plataea occurred – because this is where the Persian army had stayed during the winter as the medisers supplied the army with food and lodging. – Ultimately the army was also left in the control of Mardonius – the ambitious general who wanted an all out battle at Plataea and nearly won it! Salamis therefore spelt the beginning of the end of the Persian invasion, broke the Persian supply line, forced the army to retreat from Attica back to Thebes, necessitated the leaving of Xerxes taking with him many troops and left them in control of the ambitious/aggressive Mardonius. Plataea Slide Plataea = Different to previous battles (land and sea) Slides of Plataea battlefield Geographically it was a plain - the opposite of what the Greeks wanted and perfect for their most feared enemy - cavalry. No narrow spaces, no terrain inhibiting cavalry movement. Mardonius had requested all cavalry from Xerxes before he left after Salamis. He knew he best weapon he had. Persians and Medes were primarily cavalry - the troops which were the nobility which had carved out the empire in the first place. Greeks had a baggage train of supplies - food, water, tents, ammunition, weapons, cooking utensils etc in stark contrast to the Persian army on that day. It was the Greek supplies which got the Greek army into severe trouble in the battle.. The Greeks moved to avoid battle against the cavalry, to gain water, to retreat in the face of missile (arrows and javelins) harassment. Persian movement is to provoke the Greeks into the plain, to harass to cause disorder and to catch the Greeks in bad positions (the reverse of past battles where they were caught in disadvantageous positions) It is arguable that as the Greeks were caught out right from the start out of position facing cavalry, outthought at every turn by Mardonius. But for the luck of killing Mardonius (although to a large extent also aided by the negativity of Artabazus) the Greeks would probably have lost and lost in a huge way that spelled the end of the Persian Wars. Mykale Slide Mykale = According to Herodotus, the Persians suffered another defeat on the same day as Plataea, (but actually within a few days – not the same day). This took place at Mycale, a small bay on the Ionian coast and was supposedly spurred on by news of an impending Ionian revolt against Persian dominance of the Greeks. Shortly after Salamis, the Greek fleet assembled at Aegina. The Spartan king Leotychidas was approached by refugees from Chios (an island off Ionia) who asked that the Greek fleet sail to Ionia as it was ready to revolt. The Persian navy was now much smaller. It had made its headquarters at Samos (another island off Ionia), according to Herodotus so as to "guard against a possible Ionian revolt". To the Greeks at Delos, came news from Samos. The arrival of a Greek fleet, it was said, would encourage Ionians to revolt. The Persian army was also camped at Mykale and contained Ionian contingents which were of dubious loyalty. The Greeks decided to take the offensive and sailed to Samos. The Persians at Samos decided not to fight the Greeks at sea and joined the army at Mycale on foot. The Greeks (mostly Athenians) landed and then attacked, defeated and burned the enemy camp. The victory was decided by the desertion of the Ionians. Sestos Slide Sestos = The Greek fleet next sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the famous bridges there yet another storm had already beaten them to it !!! Instead, they just collected the cables as proof of their being there. Leotychidas (the Spartan admiral) then sailed home to Greece but the Athenians stayed to capture Sestos. With this capture, Herodotus calls the Persian Wars to an end. All lands which were inhabited by Greeks were now back in Greek hands. More importantly, this region was largely freed by the work of the Athenians. But critically, the fall of Sestos represented the beginning of the Athenian empire. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Epilogue Even today, we can still see the offering made at Delphi of a golden tripod made of 3 bronze snakes intertwined (pictures of the tripod can be seen in Turkey). On it is inscribed "Leader of the Greeks when he destroyed the hosts of the Medes, Pausanias set up this memorial to Phoebus Apollo". Shortly after this, the inscription was disowned and erased because Pausanias had dared to give himself, an individual, credit ahead of Sparta. When erased, the names of the participating Greek states were placed on the tripod instead. The Athenians set up their own memorial at Athens which immortalised Salamis, Plataea and probably Mycale. States who are on the inscription as having joined the successful Greek Alliance: Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Tegea, Sicyon, Aegina, Megara, Epidaurus, Orchomenos, Phileious, Troezen, Hermione, Tiryns, Plataea, Thespiae, Mycenae, Ceos, Melos, Tenos, Naxos, Eretria, Chalcis, Styra, Elis, Potidaea, Leucas, Anactorium, Kynthnos, Siphnos, Ambracia, Lepreon. The order of the listed names is important. Sparta was always the commander of the Greeks but Athens was second because of the importance of her fleet. Athens the Saviour???? “And here I feel constrained to deliver an opinion, which most men, I know, will mislike, but which, as it seems to me to be true, I am determined not to withhold. Had the Athenians, from fear of the approaching danger, quitted their country, or had they without quitting it submitted to the power of Xerxes, there would certainly have been no attempt to resist the Persians by sea; in which case the course of events by land would have been the following. Though the Peloponnesians might have carried ever so many breastworks across the Isthmus, yet their allies would have fallen off from the Lacedaemonians, not by voluntary desertion, but because town after town must have been taken by the fleet of the barbarians; and so the Lacedaemonians would at last have stood alone, and, standing alone, would have displayed prodigies of valour and died nobly. Either they would have done thus, or else, before it came to that extremity, seeing one Greek state after another embrace the cause of the Medes, they would have come to terms with King Xerxes- and thus, either way Greece would have been brought under Persia. For I cannot understand of what possible use the walls across the Isthmus could have been, if the king had had the mastery of the sea. If then a man should now say that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece, he would not exceed the truth. For they truly held the scales; and whichever side they espoused must have carried the day. They too it was who, when they had determined to maintain the freedom of Greece, roused up that portion of the Greek nation which had not gone over to the Medes; and so, next to the gods, they repulsed the invader. Even the terrible oracles which reached them from Delphi, and struck fear into their hearts, failed to persuade them to fly from Greece. They had the courage to remain faithful to their land, and await the coming of the foe.” Herodotus Bk 9 Herodotus Slide