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Rethinking Reason and Ethical Action in Western Philosophy of Education Daniel Vokey University of British Columbia Canadian Society for the Study of Education Annual Conference, Ottawa, May 23-26, 2009 Point of Departure #1 • “All views are partial” --- hence the call for “epistemic humility” and dialogue on the one hand and, on the other, the concern over the epistemological as well as moral harm caused by “pedagogical violence” (Sihra and Anderson, in press.) • Unqualified, this view risks lapsing into a “soft liberalism” (Portelli, 1996), in which all perspectives must be accepted at face value. Point of Departure #2 • The currently popular view that “everything is connected.” • This notion is aligned with a relational view of persons (e.g., ubuntu, Desmond Tutu: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu_(philosophy) • I take this notion to be equivalent to the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) Dependent Origination • On this view, nothing has “self-nature” (svabhāva). Rather, everything arises in mutual dependence upon multiple causes and conditions (e.g., the 12 nidanas). • The flip side of dependent origination is shunyata (“emptiness”): The things to which qualities are ascribed exist only as convenient linguistic conventions. Shunyata and Logic • Indian philosopher Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 CE) composed arguments and contemplations showing that experience confounds the three laws of thought: identity, non-contradiction, and exclusion of the middle (e.g., analysis of causation; Batchelor, 2000). “Both/and” is closer to the truth than “either/or” (e.g., the relation between the whole and its parts). Absolute and Relative Truth • “Non-duality” asserts that, whether logical, moral, or otherwise, binary oppositions do not inhere in things as they are, but are our projections (Loy, 1988). This is not to say that we should give them up entirely, but that we should never forget they are our constructions. This rescues “all views are partial” from sliding into “anything goes” relativism. “Both/And” (continued . . .) • “The universe is organized through opposites that create balance, not absolutes” (McCabe and Mason, 2008). • This statement resonates with Taoist teachings on the dynamic interplay of yin and yang. My “Working Hypothesis” • Moral judgment-and-action is properly governed by a variety of polarities-intension rather than singular overriding principles. For one example, Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005) argues there is no final resolution to the tension between freedom and equality in liberal political philosophy. “Both/And” (continued . . .) • Rushworth Kidder (1996)’s categories of recurring moral dilemmas: – truth versus loyalty, – justice versus mercy, – best interests of the individual versus the collective good, and – short term versus long term benefits. “Both/And” (continued . . .) • Also, if I have understood correctly what I have heard about the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, he affirms the necessity of both ethics (in which equality is not a consideration) and politics (in which equal treatment is a primary concern). Similarly, while in some respects we are called upon to treat people as the same, and ignore differences as morally irrelevant; in other respects differences are understood to be morally salient. “Note motif.” Practical Judgment and Ethical Action • On this view, the tension between such core moral commitments cannot and should not be eliminated. I submit, however, that which commitment should be given precedence and to what degree in particular situations is not arbitrary. Rather, each situation requires a context-sensitive response in which discursive reasoning must be complemented—and, in some cases, replaced by—an intuitive-aesthetic sense of what response is most “fitting” (Nash, 2002, p. 168; Vokey, 2005). A Dialectical Point • I find support for this view in the failure of reasoning from general moral principles (cf. Nash, 2002) to yield satisfactory moral judgments in many “real life” situations, including the complex contexts of professional practice (Vokey, 2005). Proposing “moral bricolage” underlines the need for context-sensitive, intuitive judgment. Not all Dualities are Created Equal • Given the difficulty of seeing all sides of an issue and of balancing multiple moral commitments, I expect that the best judgments may often result from compromises among people representing incommensurable moral perspectives. However, knowing when compromise is and is not appropriate is also a matter of contextsensitive, intuitive discernment. This is similar to the view that, while sometimes it is legitimate and productive to reason logically in pursuit of truth, other times it is not; and to know when requires a “higher” standpoint from which one can appreciate both the strengths and the limitations of dualistic, discursive mind. “Higher Standpoint”?! • In asserting that intuition properly trumps logic I am drawing upon (a) the western and eastern “wisdom traditions” that hold some form of direct insight to be the “highest” most accurate form of knowledge, which cannot be expressed in language (not least because it transcends binary oppositions); and (b) Star Trek. “To boldly go . . .” • Professional preparation programs would benefit from a conceptual framework that developed the educational implications of understanding the respective contributions to practical judgment of discursive reasoning and of different forms of nondiscursive “intuition”; in particular, those that reflect accumulated practical experience and those that do not. Directions for a first step • Discernment (payu, the ability to know what to accept and what to reject, what to cultivate and what to abandon) is the fruition of the synchronization of “body, speech, and mind” (Mukpo, 2002). • “Not-knowing, bearing witness, loving action” (Glassman, 1999) • The Path of Two Accumulations References • • • • • • Batchelor, Stephen. (2000). Verses from the center: A Buddhist vision of the sublime. New York: Riverhead Books. Glassman, Bernie. (1999). Bearing witness: A Zen Master’s lessons in making peace. New York: Bell Tower. See also his Harvard Lecture “Bearing Witness” http://www.zenpeacemakers.org/zps/dharma/Bernie/harvard_07_lecture3.htm Kidder, Rushworth. (1996). How good people make tough choices. Simon and Schuster. Loy, David. (1988). Nonduality: A study in comparative philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press. McCabe, Glen. and Mason, Ralph. (2008). Balance, harmony, and cosmology: Toward a curricular unity of indigenous knowledge, science, spirituality, and wellness. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education, Vancouver, BC, May 31-June 3, 2007. Nash, Robert J. (2002). “Real world” ethics: Frameworks for educators and human service professionals (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press. References (continued . . .) • • • • • • Mouffe, Chantal. (2000). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Vienna: IHS. Mouffe, Chantal. (2005). The return of the political (2nd. ed.). London: Verso. Mukpo, Mipham J. (2002). Taming the mind and walking the bodhisattva path. Halifax: Vajradhatu Publications. Portelli, John P. (1996). The challenge of teaching for critical thinking. In W. Hare and J. P. Portelli (Eds.), Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings (2nd. Ed., pp. 55-71). Calgary: Detselig (Temeron). Sihra, Karen and Anderson, Helen. (in press). Exploring pedagogical possibilities for a non-violent consciousness. In D. Kerdeman (Ed.), Philosophy of Education 2009. Urbana-Champaign: Philosophy of Education Society. Vokey, Daniel. (2005). Teaching professional ethics for educators: Assessing the “multiple ethical languages” approach. In K. Howe (Ed.), Philosophy of Education 2005 (pp. 125-133). Urbana-Champaign: Philosophy of Education Society.