Download Building Peace by Unlearning the Habit of “Us and Them”: Would it

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

History of philosophy in Poland wikipedia , lookup

Women in philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Philosophical progress wikipedia , lookup

Natural philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Stoicism wikipedia , lookup

Public sector ethics wikipedia , lookup

Philosophy in Canada wikipedia , lookup

Perennial philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Morality wikipedia , lookup

List of unsolved problems in philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Moral relativism wikipedia , lookup

American philosophy wikipedia , lookup

Ethical intuitionism wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
Rethinking Reason and Ethical Action in
Western Philosophy of Education
Daniel Vokey
University of British Columbia
Canadian Society for the Study of Education
Annual Conference, Ottawa, May 23-26, 2009
Point of Departure #1
• “All views are partial” --- hence the call for
“epistemic humility” and dialogue on the one
hand and, on the other, the concern over the
epistemological as well as moral harm caused
by “pedagogical violence” (Sihra and Anderson,
in press.)
• Unqualified, this view risks lapsing into a “soft
liberalism” (Portelli, 1996), in which all
perspectives must be accepted at face value.
Point of Departure #2
• The currently popular view that “everything
is connected.”
• This notion is aligned with a relational view
of persons (e.g., ubuntu, Desmond Tutu:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu_(philosophy)
• I take this notion to be equivalent to the
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination
(pratitya-samutpada)
Dependent Origination
• On this view, nothing has “self-nature”
(svabhāva). Rather, everything arises in
mutual dependence upon multiple causes
and conditions (e.g., the 12 nidanas).
• The flip side of dependent origination is
shunyata (“emptiness”): The things to
which qualities are ascribed exist only as
convenient linguistic conventions.
Shunyata and Logic
• Indian philosopher Nagarjuna (c. 150-250
CE) composed arguments and
contemplations showing that experience
confounds the three laws of thought:
identity, non-contradiction, and exclusion
of the middle (e.g., analysis of causation;
Batchelor, 2000). “Both/and” is closer to
the truth than “either/or” (e.g., the relation
between the whole and its parts).
Absolute and Relative Truth
• “Non-duality” asserts that, whether logical,
moral, or otherwise, binary oppositions do
not inhere in things as they are, but are
our projections (Loy, 1988). This is not to
say that we should give them up entirely,
but that we should never forget they are
our constructions. This rescues “all views
are partial” from sliding into “anything
goes” relativism.
“Both/And” (continued . . .)
• “The universe is organized through
opposites that create balance, not
absolutes” (McCabe and Mason, 2008).
• This statement resonates with Taoist
teachings on the dynamic interplay of yin
and yang.
My “Working Hypothesis”
• Moral judgment-and-action is properly
governed by a variety of polarities-intension rather than singular overriding
principles. For one example, Chantal
Mouffe (2000, 2005) argues there is no
final resolution to the tension between
freedom and equality in liberal political
philosophy.
“Both/And” (continued . . .)
• Rushworth Kidder (1996)’s categories
of recurring moral dilemmas:
– truth versus loyalty,
– justice versus mercy,
– best interests of the individual versus
the collective good, and
– short term versus long term benefits.
“Both/And” (continued . . .)
• Also, if I have understood correctly what I have
heard about the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas, he affirms the necessity of both ethics
(in which equality is not a consideration) and
politics (in which equal treatment is a primary
concern). Similarly, while in some respects we
are called upon to treat people as the same, and
ignore differences as morally irrelevant; in other
respects differences are understood to be
morally salient. “Note motif.”
Practical Judgment and Ethical Action
• On this view, the tension between such core
moral commitments cannot and should not be
eliminated. I submit, however, that which
commitment should be given precedence and to
what degree in particular situations is not
arbitrary. Rather, each situation requires a
context-sensitive response in which discursive
reasoning must be complemented—and, in
some cases, replaced by—an intuitive-aesthetic
sense of what response is most “fitting” (Nash,
2002, p. 168; Vokey, 2005).
A Dialectical Point
• I find support for this view in the failure of
reasoning from general moral principles
(cf. Nash, 2002) to yield satisfactory moral
judgments in many “real life” situations,
including the complex contexts of
professional practice (Vokey, 2005).
Proposing “moral bricolage” underlines the
need for context-sensitive, intuitive
judgment.
Not all Dualities are Created Equal
• Given the difficulty of seeing all sides of an issue and of
balancing multiple moral commitments, I expect that the
best judgments may often result from compromises
among people representing incommensurable moral
perspectives. However, knowing when compromise is
and is not appropriate is also a matter of contextsensitive, intuitive discernment. This is similar to the view
that, while sometimes it is legitimate and productive to
reason logically in pursuit of truth, other times it is not;
and to know when requires a “higher” standpoint from
which one can appreciate both the strengths and the
limitations of dualistic, discursive mind.
“Higher Standpoint”?!
• In asserting that intuition properly trumps
logic I am drawing upon (a) the western
and eastern “wisdom traditions” that hold
some form of direct insight to be the
“highest” most accurate form of
knowledge, which cannot be expressed in
language (not least because it transcends
binary oppositions); and (b) Star Trek.
“To boldly go . . .”
• Professional preparation programs would
benefit from a conceptual framework that
developed the educational implications of
understanding the respective contributions
to practical judgment of discursive
reasoning and of different forms of nondiscursive “intuition”; in particular, those
that reflect accumulated practical
experience and those that do not.
Directions for a first step
• Discernment (payu, the ability to know
what to accept and what to reject, what to
cultivate and what to abandon) is the
fruition of the synchronization of “body,
speech, and mind” (Mukpo, 2002).
• “Not-knowing, bearing witness, loving
action” (Glassman, 1999)
• The Path of Two Accumulations
References
•
•
•
•
•
•
Batchelor, Stephen. (2000). Verses from the center: A Buddhist vision of the
sublime. New York: Riverhead Books.
Glassman, Bernie. (1999). Bearing witness: A Zen Master’s lessons in making
peace. New York: Bell Tower. See also his Harvard Lecture “Bearing Witness”
http://www.zenpeacemakers.org/zps/dharma/Bernie/harvard_07_lecture3.htm
Kidder, Rushworth. (1996). How good people make tough choices. Simon and
Schuster.
Loy, David. (1988). Nonduality: A study in comparative philosophy. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
McCabe, Glen. and Mason, Ralph. (2008). Balance, harmony, and cosmology:
Toward a curricular unity of indigenous knowledge, science, spirituality, and
wellness. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for
the Study of Education, Vancouver, BC, May 31-June 3, 2007.
Nash, Robert J. (2002). “Real world” ethics: Frameworks for educators and
human service professionals (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.
References (continued . . .)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Mouffe, Chantal. (2000). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Vienna:
IHS.
Mouffe, Chantal. (2005). The return of the political (2nd. ed.). London: Verso.
Mukpo, Mipham J. (2002). Taming the mind and walking the bodhisattva path.
Halifax: Vajradhatu Publications.
Portelli, John P. (1996). The challenge of teaching for critical thinking. In W.
Hare and J. P. Portelli (Eds.), Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings
(2nd. Ed., pp. 55-71). Calgary: Detselig (Temeron).
Sihra, Karen and Anderson, Helen. (in press). Exploring pedagogical
possibilities for a non-violent consciousness. In D. Kerdeman (Ed.), Philosophy
of Education 2009. Urbana-Champaign: Philosophy of Education Society.
Vokey, Daniel. (2005). Teaching professional ethics for educators: Assessing
the “multiple ethical languages” approach. In K. Howe (Ed.), Philosophy of
Education 2005 (pp. 125-133). Urbana-Champaign: Philosophy of Education
Society.